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Abstract 
In recent years K-12 school systems from New York to Mexico City to Toronto, serving 
vastly divergent students and communities, have been subject to strikingly similar waves of 
neoliberal policies by governments. A key manifestation has been the de-professionalization or 
deskilling of teachers. Organized labour’s response has been highly uneven geographically.  
 Professional autonomy means a capacity and freedom of teachers to exercise their 
judgement in interpreting broad curriculum guidelines, into their day to day classroom activities. 
It is the primary obstacle to the further neoliberalization of education. The expansion of 
standardized instructional and evaluative techniques and technologies are necessary for opening 
new markets within schools and for weakening the collective power of teachers and their unions. 
Their proponents are limited by the existence of the classroom as a space of labour autonomy, 
run by experienced and highly educated teachers. Recognizing the significant crossover of policy 
at the North American scale alongside significant economic and political linkages, this 
dissertation centres on case studies in three cities, New York, Mexico City and Toronto. 
 This dissertation assesses challenges to teachers’ professional autonomy from 2001 to 
2016 across five dimensions of comparison. First are changes in governance, namely the 
centralization of authority, often legitimized by mobilizing policies from elsewhere. Second are 
policies which have shifted workplace power relations between principals and teachers, as with 
‘School Based Management’ programs that download budgetary, discipline and dismissal 
practices to school administrators. Third are the effect of standardized testing of students and 
teachers on the latter’s capacity to exercise professional judgement in the classroom through 
designing unique lesson plans, pedagogy and evaluation. Fourth is the creation of ‘school choice’ 
for schools competing for enrolment and thereby funding, which has tended to perpetuate class 
and racial segregation. Finally, the ability of teachers’ unions to construct a multi scalar strategy 
is considered, including alliances with parents, communities and other sectors of labour. This 
dissertation concludes with recommendations for how teachers’ unions could respond to the 
challenge to professional autonomy with a stronger engagement on teacher practice and 
professional self-regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1: Key Ideas, Focuses & Limitations 
 What it means to be a teacher or a student within public education is undergoing a 
transformation. In recent years K-12 school systems from New York to Mexico City and 
increasingly in Toronto, each serving vastly divergent students and communities, have been 
subject to strikingly similar waves of policy proposals. Many of these initiatives can be 
characterized within an overarching neoliberal rationality (Klees 2008; Hernandez 2013; Aboites 
2012; Weiner 2012). A key manifestation has been the de-professionalization or deskilling of 
teachers.  
 Although highly uneven in terms of the resources dedicated by the state both within and 
between Mexico and its northern neighbours, mass public elementary and secondary education 
emerged through much of the twentieth century to a large extent defined by humanist ideals of 
relative equality and the intrinsic worth of education, at least in theory (Manzer 2003; Levinson 
2001; Pinto 2015). Alongside it evolved a labour relations structure through which teachers won 
a substantial degree of security, stability and professional autonomy through waves of strikes and 
organizing in Canada and the US (Weiner 2008). In Mexico, corporatist integration of the 
teachers’ union resulted in greater instability for teachers depending on political circumstances. 
Grassroots mobilization was overwhelmingly suppressed until the emergence of the democratic 
teachers’ movement in 1979, subsequently consolidated in Mexico’s central and southern states 
(Cook 1996; Foweraker 1993).   
 The contemporary neoliberal shift in education confronts the universal public service 
model by striving to both privatize this system by realigning its form and content from 
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‘education as its own end’ to for-profit rationalities, and reducing expenditures on educators -by 
far the largest component of public education budgets. Examples well-established across North 
America include a shift of classroom time and emphasis to standardized testing to assess both 
students and their teachers, their usage to define ‘school choice’ and the related rise of privately 
managed, publicly funded charter schools opened in tandem with the closure of traditional public 
schools. Powerful coalitions have emerged in Canada, the US and Mexico to push forward this 
agenda. Across each country, their membership consistently includes businesses with a large 
stake in education markets, pro-privatization think tanks, their outspoken ideological allies in 
government, and transnational organizations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) (Lipman 2011; Weiner 2012; Hernandez 2013). 
 To pursue their objectives these groups have consistently sought to weaken the power of 
resistant teachers’ unions. Organized labour’s response has been highly uneven geographically. 
For the past thirty years, militant responses by Mexican teachers to similar policies has been 
largely limited to state locals in the south led by the democratic teachers’ movement, though the 
fall of 2013 and summer of 2016 yielded dramatic waves of nationwide strikes and protests. 
Meanwhile in the US despite notable exceptions like the seven day strike by the Chicago 
Teachers Union in September 2012, the response of union leadership has largely been to 
reluctantly acquiesce (Brogan 2014). In Canada the record is more mixed. Provincial/state, and/
or national unions may play significant roles in articulating union policy and negotiations. 
However it is at the local level where teacher unions primarily interact with the school districts 
where policy is actually implemented, and where their members, their students and their parents 
work, study and live. Recognizing the significant crossover of policy at the North American scale 
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alongside significant economic and political linkages, my research will centre on case studies of 
these issues in three North American cities, New York, Mexico City and Toronto. 
 My research seeks to address two major sets of questions. First, how do governmental 
policymakers and key privatization advocates (eg. think tanks, business associations and 
academics) develop neoliberal K-12 education policy and how does it move across jurisdictions 
in North America? A second set of questions addresses the agency of teachers’ unions within this 
context, a focus I will be approaching guided by theorists in labour geography and considering 
the role in a broader social context, geographies of education. What are the characteristics that 
define the uneven responses of local teachers’ unions in Canada, the US and Mexico to the roll-
out of neoliberal education policies, including but not limited to, the union’s history and political 
cultures within the city and at the school level? As will be made evident in each of my case 
studies, teachers’ unions are also far from politically homogeneous spaces. They are the site of 
sometimes bitter conflicts over internal priorities, and associated debates on how to relate to the 
state, the communities which their members serve, and the role of the teacher itself. 
 This dissertation explores how mobile contemporary education policies intersect with the 
agency of teachers’ unions in negotiating the professional autonomy of teachers. Professional 
autonomy means the capacity and freedom of teachers to exercise their judgement in interpreting 
broad curriculum guidelines established by the state into their day to day classroom activities. 
Teachers exercise their autonomy by making pedagogical decisions (methodologies of 
instruction and evaluation), determining the relative emphasis to place on these general 
objectives, choosing many of the resources used, and in their efforts to build rapport with 
students and effectively run the class. The capacity for judgement teachers exercise in these areas 
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derives principally from professional training and years of experience and peer support. The 
objective of exercising professional autonomy or judgement, is to best meet the specific needs of 
each unique class of students. Teachers’ professional knowledge could perhaps be organized into 
three areas: subject area knowledge, pedagogy and arguably, a less tangible emotional 
intelligence for supporting child and adolescent development. While important in all schools, the 
latter is especially critical in contexts where students experience severe deprivation of social 
supports, often for reasons associated with high levels of poverty. These parameters place the 
professional autonomy of teachers within broad boundaries, more limited than the traditional 
academic freedom of tenured university faculty. Professional autonomy is essential for teachers 
to be able to interpret policies and curriculum originating from distant authorities in a way that is 
meaningful for their students. There are also justifiable limits to this autonomy, an issue that will 
be further discussed in Chapter 2. 
 I argue in this dissertation, that teachers’ professional autonomy is under threat across 
North America, due to a range of contemporary neoliberal policies which have the outcome of 
disempowering and deprofessionalizing educators. It is a, if not the, primary site of contestation 
in education systems. The forms of these policies which attack professional autonomy, and the 
degree to which they have been implemented vary considerably across and within Canada, the 
US and Mexico. I attempt to explain the extent to which this is the case by examining the 
mobility of these policies and their intersection with the agency of teachers’ unions and 
movements. Moreover, I argue that professional autonomy, the power this conveys to teachers 
over their work, is the primary obstacle to the further neoliberalization of education. The further 
expansion of standardized instructional and evaluative techniques and technologies, and semi-
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skilled instructors or technicians to operate them, are two of the key objectives of both opening 
new markets within schools and politically, for weakening the collective power of teachers and 
their unions. Both are important for increasing the viability of schools as a source of profitability. 
They are limited by the continued existence of the classroom as a space of labour autonomy, run 
by experienced and highly educated teachers.  
 I assess challenges to teachers’ professional autonomy in my case studies across five 
dimensions of comparison on governmental policy and teacher responses. First I will be looking 
at changes in governance, namely the centralization of authority to higher levels, often 
legitimized by mobilizing policies from elsewhere. A weakening of local democratic control 
often ensues. Second, I will consider how contemporary policies have shifted workplace power 
relations between principals and teachers, as with ‘School Based Management’ programs that 
download budgetary, hiring, discipline and dismissal practices to school administrators. Thirdly, I 
look at the effect of standardized testing of students and teachers on the latter’s capacity to 
exercise professional judgement in the classroom through designing appropriate and unique 
lesson plans, pedagogy and forms of evaluation. Fourth, and particularly relevant in New York 
and Toronto, I assess ‘school choice’ or the creation of competitive markets for schools seeking 
to increase enrolment and thereby secure more funding. Finally, in each case study site I consider 
the strategies employed by teacher unions towards accommodation and resistance, the 
importance of a strong school-site presence, the ability to ‘scale-up’ strategy to challenge higher 
levels of government, and the capacity or failure to construct sufficiently broad alliances with 
parents, community allies and other sectors of labour. 
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 My three case studies, New York, Mexico City and Toronto, share the characteristics of 
‘global cities’. They comprise the dominant metropolitan area of their nation and a high profile 
site for policy development and implementation, due to a critical degree of international 
interconnectedness through the presence of major universities, think tanks, media and policy 
makers (Sassen 2012). Each is also the home of established teachers’ unions with complex 
histories of dissent, collaboration and acquiescence by educators to waves of education reforms. 
A tremendous diversity and unevenness of political culture, economics and history exists 
between and within the countries in which these cities are situated (especially between Mexico 
and its northern neighbours). However, I believe that a North American study is a useful lens for 
understanding contemporary education policy and teachers’ work for what it can tell us generally 
about policy mobility generally within such a diverse region, and because actors are increasingly 
conscious and influenced by, developments occurring elsewhere on this continent. Of course, 
these reforms also exist and derive their logic (as do sometimes resistant teachers) from 
definitions of ‘common sense’ in education that are increasingly global in scale (Verger et al 
2013; Weiner 2008). 
 This dissertation focuses then on analyzing a specific set of policies affecting teachers’ 
professional autonomy, which are necessary for us to understand how their work is being 
transformed. It does not pretend to encompass the breadth of what the neoliberalization of K-12 
education signifies, in the form of Ravitch (2013) or Weiner (2008). For example, there is less 
discussion here of charter schools, which are very important in shaping the contemporary context 
of education in the US, or the effect that a prevalence of charter schools where teachers are 
significantly deprofessionalized (especially in New York) has on public schools. The study does 
 6
not significantly explore issues and debates around the role of classroom technology on teachers’ 
work or the existence of commercial contracts in schools. 
 Here, I focus on the changes in classroom governance which have an effect on the roll out 
of education reforms, especially if professional autonomy is diminished. These developments are 
usually part of a scalar strategy by governments to optimize their capacity to implement policies, 
frequently in these cases, with the objective of overcoming a critical weight of organized 
teachers at a particular scale. Teachers respond with their own strategies which with varying 
effectiveness, try to make scale work for them too. Across all three cases in this dissertation, the 
tendency is towards a scaling up of governance, usually from the municipal scale -the basic 
institutional level of union organization, to the state/provincial or even national level. In all 
cases, the primary state actors leading these initiatives are a relatively small group around the 
executive, with the elected legislature playing a less significant role. The centralization of labour 
relations for teachers in North America provides an interesting contrast with contemporary trends 
in decentralization for significant sectors of unionized workers in the private sector (Sweeney, 
McWilliams & Hickey 2012: 247). Nevertheless, while assessing these scalar shifts, as this 
dissertation argues that the agency of teachers is vital for understanding the success or failure of 
how these policies impact their work, the case studies are primarily at the local scale. This is the 
level at which ordinary teachers live and work, and where I employ field observation at schools 
and interviews with classroom teachers. 
 The shared spatial characteristics of these three urban case studies naturally imposes 
limitations on the applicability of this study in other contexts. The experiences of teachers 
working in rural schools or within mid-size ‘ordinary cities’ (Robinson 2006) are not represented 
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here. It is also important to recognize the diversity of teachers’ experience at the subnational 
level through regional variations. In Canada, this is evident through the provincial administration 
of K-12 education. Although the characteristics of the systems share strong similarities in terms 
of policies and governance, the dynamics of distinct provincial governments leads to a 
divergence between the experiences of the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation, which 
engaged in major strikes in the mid-2000s, and the Ontario teachers who practiced a relative 
labour peace during this period. Similarly, the experience of teachers’ work varies dramatically 
across the US. Despite the many challenges described in Chapter 5, New York City remains a 
relative bastion of professional stability in comparison with the context of education in Florida, 
Arizona, North Carolina and elsewhere in the mostly poorer and socially conservative ‘Right to 
Work’ South. In Mexico, the principal divisions are between the predominantly rural and 
Indigenous south, and the urban, more affluent Mestizo centre and north, and within these 
regions, between cities and the countryside. The former is the bastion of the democratic teachers’ 
movement; teachers’ union locals in the latter are mostly presided over by the official national 
union. Many studies of Mexican teachers have focused on high profile struggles in Chiapas, 
Guerrero or Oaxaca. Part of the purpose of this study is to understand the conditions that have 
led to a less militant response in Mexico City, as well as in New York and Toronto, while 
colleagues elsewhere have more assertively contested similar policies. 
 It is also important to establish the historical parameters of this dissertation. Chapter 4 
will provide a brief historical overview of the rise of North American teacher unionism in the 
20th Century with a focus on Toronto, New York and Mexico City. I believe strongly in the value 
of historic context for social research and I am conscious of the danger of portraying the current 
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window of education politics as somehow unique or without precedent. For instance, a brief read 
of Mary Kay Vaughan’s The State, Education, and Social Class in Mexico, 1880-1928 reveals 
that the privileging of the nation’s capital and the north over the south in the distribution of 
education resources is an old pattern. So are conflicts between humanist versus utilitarian ‘labour 
ready’ visions of the purpose of education. Or the usage of scalar strategies by actors whose 
bases of political power is concentrated at the state, regional or national level, or fears by the 
authorities that teachers will organize communities against the ruling party (Vaughan 1982: 
143-148). I have limited historical depth in favour of more space for empirically understanding 
contemporary education policy, and in order to draw deeper cross-case conclusions. In the core 
case study chapters, I have focused on a period roughly corresponding with the start of the 21st 
Century, which aligns with the emergence of a particular wave of neoliberal proposals for 
education, which I will argue in Chapter 2, has particular significance for teachers’ work.  
 Within K-12 education, I focus principally on secondary schools and their teachers, due 
especially to my personal experience in this area as a high school teacher and a corresponding 
higher degree of access. All of my ethnographic school observations occurred at secondary 
schools, though I did interview some elementary teachers, particularly on questions like union 
strategy, which in NYC was appropriate as the UFT includes both primary and secondary 
teachers. In Mexico City, separate locals (sections) of the same union represent primary and 
secondary teachers, whereas in Toronto they are represented by separate unions. Some important 
differences exist between the distribution of grade levels and institutions in these sites. Most 
students in the Toronto District School Board attend an elementary school from junior 
kindergarten to grade eight, and secondary school from grades nine through twelve. The New 
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York Department of Education is organized into elementary schools (junior kindergarten to grade 
four), middle schools (grades five through eight) and high schools (grades nine through twelve). 
The system in Mexico City is the most distinct. The city-state’s administration of the national 
Secretary of Public Education operates three year kindergartens, primary schools which are six 
years in duration and secondary schools which last for three years (corresponding to grades 
seven through nine). Upper level high school, which became compulsory nationwide in the early 
2000s and is not fully enforced, is divided in Mexico City between preparatory feeder schools 
operated by the city’s public universities and technical colleges, and the Instituto de Educación 
Media Superior (Institute of Mid-Superior Education) operated by the municipal government . 1
Due to this complex system of governance, I have chosen to make the grade seven to nine 
secondary schools my primary basis of comparison in Mexico City, as these are administered 
directly by the secretary of public education, and its teachers are affiliated with the SNTE 
(Sindicato Nacional de los Trabajadores de la Educación), the national union of education 
workers, allowing for an easier basis of comparison with Toronto and New York. 
  
1.2: Dissertation Overview 
 Chapter 2 explores the theoretical significance of six concepts integral to this study. I 
begin from the abstract: neoliberalism, policy mobilities, labour geography, and move to the 
more concrete and empirical: neoliberal education policy, teachers’ professional autonomy and 
teachers’ unions and social movements. I then attempt to synthesize these explanations, and 
 Private institutions in Mexico accounted for 20.5 percent of enrolment in upper level high schools (medio-1
superior), and a high of 38 percent of vocational schools in 2003. However only 8 percent of primary students and 7 
percent of secondary students attended private schools (Brambila 2008: 221).
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introduce my concept of a labour geography of teacher autonomy, which undergirds what I hope 
is the broader theoretical contribution of this dissertation. 
 I explain the methodology behind this dissertation in Chapter 3, beginning with 
describing the significance to my research of my personal identity as a teacher and a union 
activist from a family of teachers. I then explain how my observations of the limited voice of 
teachers in education policy debates helped shape my field research, encouraging me to prioritize 
semi-structured, in-depth interviews with teachers and participatory observation in schools and at 
union events. This approach was considerably aided by my insider status. I then provide 
additional explanation of my choice of case study cities. In addition to drawing heavily on 
interviews with teachers, as well as policy makers, administrators, academics and union officials, 
my research is considerably informed by studying the content of the policies themselves, as well 
as how they are portrayed, presented or marketed by their advocates and critics. Finally, I offer 
an epistemology for studying teachers’ autonomy. I link the persisting influence of positivist 
conceptions of social research to popular and academic legitimation of technocratic, ‘data driven’ 
policies like ‘Value Added Measures’, which attempt to deploy complex mathematical 
algorithms to define good or bad teachers and schools based on standardized test scores. In its 
place, I identify my affinity with the pragmatic, mixed methods approach advocated by C. 
Wright Mills, and at a more theoretical level, the work of critical realists. 
 Having established the theoretical and methodological underpinnings, I begin to approach 
the core of this study in Chapter 4, where I describe the geographies of neoliberal education 
policy. First, I give an overview of the history of teacher unionism in Toronto, New York and 
Mexico City, emphasizing features related to the status and definition of professional autonomy. I 
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then introduce several key texts and actors active in the neoliberalization of education in North 
America; a textual analysis which I use to also show key moments in its evolution. They are then 
integrated into a short history of the significance of New York, Mexico City and Toronto as 
important centres of education policy making. I then explore some international organizations 
which have produced a teachers’ policy mobility. These range from the institutional: Education 
International and collaboration between the leaders of the National Education Workers Union 
(SNTE) of Mexico and the American Federation of Teachers and National Education 
Association; to the grassroots, including the United Caucus of Rank and File Educators 
(UCORE) and the Trinational Coalition in Defence of Public Education. 
 I present my first case study, New York City in Chapter 5. I begin by explaining the 
context of structural reforms to the governance and operations of the city’s schools at the outset 
of the 21st Century, which created the context for policies that have greatly undermined the 
professional autonomy of teachers. The implementation under former Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
of mayoral control was crucial for concentrating power in the hands of him and his appointed 
executives, and subsequently facilitating the implementation of his neoliberal ‘fast policy’ (Peck 
& Theodore 2015). A key example was an extreme acceleration of earlier initiatives to break up 
large high schools into several smaller institutions within the same building, with over a hundred 
schools created in one year at its peak. The small sizes of these schools of a few hundred students 
and a few dozen teachers intersected with increased emphasis on preparation for high stakes 
Regents exams to result in a narrowing of the curriculum and pressure on faculty to teach to the 
test. The concept of a default neighbourhood school was also eliminated to increase competition 
for enrolment through ‘school choice’ among these many schools, assessed on the basis of test 
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score results. The most prestigious established exclusive entrance requirements that tend to 
perpetuate class and racial segregation. Changes in school finance intersected with increased 
powers for principals under mayoral control, to create an incentive to save money in the budgets 
of individual schools by hiring low seniority teachers. The sum of these and other policies like 
changes to tenure rules and higher turnover, dramatically shifted the balance of power in schools 
from teachers to administrators. Bloomberg’s avalanche of neoliberal reforms were challenged 
by his left leaning successor. Mayor Bill De Blasio’s administration attempted to alleviate the 
effects of high stakes testing, curb the expansion of charter schools and make some 
improvements in working conditions for teachers, such as by easing Bloomberg policies that 
made obtaining tenure increasingly difficult. Governor Andrew Cuomo’s success in stymying De 
Blasio’s efforts, amid state efforts to increase the punitiveness of teacher evaluations and high 
stakes standardized tests, provides an important case of scalar struggle. This example also 
demonstrates the weakness of the municipally bound United Federation of Teachers in 
effectively confronting the governor. I conclude with a look at the successful mobilization of the 
parent led Opt Out movement in 2015, that succeeded in reducing the weight of these tests, and 
the 2016 campaign for UFT union office of the dissident Movement of Rank and File Educators 
(MORE) for what can be learned for teacher-community solidarity that effective jumps scales. 
 Chapter 6 brings my study to Mexico City. I begin where the historical context described 
in Chapter 4 leaves off, by explaining the attempts at neoliberal education reform under the 
National Action Party (PAN) presidents Vicente Fox (2001-2006) and Felipe Calderon 
(2007-2012). In this era in which the influence of most other official unions declined, SNTE 
leader Elba Esther Gordillo consolidated her power base both within the union and in national 
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politics. She collaborated with Fox and Calderon in the creation of the National Institute for 
Education Evaluation (INEE), and the roll out of the nationwide standardized ENLACE exam in 
2006. This exam ranked schools and when combined with the ‘Alliance for Quality Education’ 
initiative in 2008, purported to provide a basis for evaluating teachers on the basis of their 
student’s test scores. The CNTE and other dissident movements provided steady opposition, 
exempting the application of these national programs in states where their presence was 
strongest. An important turning point was the election of Enrique Peña Nieto and the return of 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to the presidency in 2012. In another textbook case of 
‘fast policy’, he worked closely with his compatriot José Angel Gurria, general secretary of the 
OECD, Mexicanos Primero, the leadership of the PAN and the centre-left Party of the 
Democratic Revolution (PRD), to make major changes to constitutional statutes governing 
education within months of his inauguration. These amendments facilitated the subsequent 
passage of the Professional Teaching Service Law (Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente) with 
far reaching effects on teachers’ professional autonomy. One key element was eliminating a 
university degree in education as a prerequisite for K-12 teaching. This undermined both the 
distinct pedagogical knowledge base obtained by attending a faculty of education, and the shared 
professional identity of teachers, which had begun with the closure of public teachers’ colleges 
(normal schools) and their substitution by programs offered through private universities. Most 
crucial was a standardized national exam taken by teachers every three years as a condition for 
maintaining their employment. Peña Nieto’s reforms were built upon a scalar strategy in which 
policies entrenched in the national constitution would be more difficult for state governments to 
exempt themselves from, under pressure from the CNTE. Administrative functions that had been 
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decentralized in the 1980s and 1990s, and which had given the CNTE influence in states where it 
was powerful, were also reversed. Meanwhile funding for school facilities was downloaded to 
the municipal level, and in many cases to parents. I explain the factors that impeded the mass 
participation of Mexico City teachers in the CNTE’s militant protests and strikes, despite the 
sentiment expressed by many educators that their profession was being undermined. I conclude 
with evaluating the changes in local and national politics that facilitated the participation of 
thousands of teachers from the nation’s capital in the wave of strikes in the summer of 2016 that 
helped forced a compromise from Peña Nieto’s government. 
 I discuss my home city of Toronto in Chapter 7. The contemporary scaling up of 
education governance in the province of Ontario began during the tenure of Mike Harris’ 
Conservative Party from 1995-2002 (briefly discussed in Chapter 4) and was continued by their 
successors in the Liberal Party under premiers Dalton McGuinty and Kathleen Wynne. The 
shifting of taxing powers from the school district to the provincial government under Harris 
significantly undermined the autonomy of the Toronto District School Board (TDSB). Budget 
shortfalls have led to regular threats by the provincial government to suspend its elected board of 
trustees. The most important event shaping teacher and principal power relations was the 
removal of the latter from the teachers’ federations and their reclassification as management in 
the late 1990s. Along with discussing the workplace dynamics that ensued, I explain how the 
Ontario Public School Board Association strongly advocated at the provincial level for increased 
management rights over the work of teachers. Standardized testing of students is present in 
Ontario, though with less punitive power against teachers and schools than in the US or Mexico. 
Nevertheless, Toronto teachers explain how they are the subject of pressure passed from the 
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Ontario Ministry of Education to the TDSB, to produce steadily rising scores, which has an 
effect on classroom instruction, felt differently in schools with high or low results. In a 
demographic context of declining student enrolment and fiscal austerity, Toronto also has 
dynamics of school choice, if not as pervasive as in New York. These are structured around 
specialty magnet programs, which while competing for students, have increased racial and class 
segregation between and within schools. Finally, I look at how collective bargaining followed the 
scaling up of finance, with province-wide negotiations taking precedent over local agreements. 
This process lead to an imposed province-wide contract in 2013, and confusing, protracted 
struggles over 2015-2016 at the provincial level, where much of the conflict centred on 
professional autonomy, and then the local level. Despite, unlike the UFT, having institutional 
mechanisms to engage in scaled up negotiations, OSSTF has not yet successfully navigated these 
multi scalar structures of bargaining, especially in the case of Toronto. 
 I end this dissertation by making some comparisons across my case studies, drawing 
some larger conclusions of what the experience of teachers in New York, Mexico City and 
Toronto mean for understanding the contemporary trajectory of neoliberal education policy. To 
take back the initiative from pro-privatization reformers that seek to degrade the basis of 
professionalism in order to take control of teachers’ work, I contend that teachers’ unions should 
be more proactive and assertive in defining the basis of professional autonomy. This means 
developing a clearer vision among its members of what constitutes good pedagogy and 
classroom practice. By elevating professional autonomy to the prominence of traditionally 
negotiated issues of salary and class sizes, teachers may collectively be able to shape the public 
schools and classrooms of the future.  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2. Theoretical Areas and Conceptual Framework 
2.1: Introduction 
 This chapter seeks to provide an overview of six concepts and their accompanying 
theoretical understandings. Each concept is integral to the approach of this dissertation and its 
focus on the significance of teachers’ professional autonomy. These concepts are organized 
below in a progression from the broadest, more abstract categories in Part A: Neoliberalism, 
Policy and Labour, which are then applied to the more specific and concrete in Part B: Education 
Policy, Teachers’ Professional Autonomy and Resistance. I conclude this chapter by bringing 
these layers of ideas together to explain how the capacity of North American educators to 
exercise agency in their work in the classroom is the crucial obstacle to the neoliberalization of 
education. These are multi scalar struggles involving various levels of governments, labour 
organizations and policy advocates, which are profoundly rooted in the particular historical 
contexts of the local communities in which teachers work. 
Part A: Neoliberalism, Policy Mobilities and Labour 
2.2: Neoliberalism 
 For the purposes of a simple definition, I define neoliberalism as a project to extend and 
intensify markets into new spheres of society, as through privatization, and while doing so, 
reinforce the political power of the economic elite. I make this definition within the 
contradictions between neoliberalism as an articulated ideology, versus its historically and 
geographically specific practice. I describe some of these tensions below. Geographer Simon 
Springer (2012) argues that the central distinction among various conceptualizations of 
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neoliberalism is between it as a form of ‘governmentality’, an ideology which generates its own 
‘common sense’ from the bottom up, or as a top down strategy for renewing ruling class political 
power. The former view is most associated with Michel Foucault and post structuralism 
(Foucault 2008; Gane 2014), while the latter is espoused by Marxists exemplified by David 
Harvey. Many others like Peck (2010, see also Tickell & Peck 2002), adopt analyses combining 
aspects of both. I provide an overview here of these perspectives, seeing both as relevant for 
understanding the contemporary transformation of education and teachers’ work. 
 Foucault presents as a foundational concept the notion of the ‘individual as the 
entrepreneur of the self’, subsequently popularized as human capital theory, a profound 
explanation of the ideological shifting of neoliberalism from both neoclassical and Marxist 
notions of labour. Rather than a worker selling their labour, individuals are investing their 
‘human capital’ with the expectation of a return. Foucault explains, “...the stake in all neoliberal 
analyses is the replacement every time of homo economicus as partner of exchange with a homo 
economicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his 
own producer, being for himself the source of his own earnings.” (Foucault 2008: 226). This may 
sound merely like a way of stripping an understanding of the asymmetrical power relations 
between classes recognized by both Marxists and many classical economists, however its 
implications are actually far reaching. The notion of human capital explains neoliberalism’s 
rationale for why markets should penetrate into social areas previously not considered as 
potentially ‘for profit’, including education. 
 These ideas resemble Susan Robertson’s (2000: 209-210) notion of neoliberalism 
replacing service-oriented career educators with an ideal of the ‘teacher as entrepreneur’, who 
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exchange job security, a secure salary, pension, and union membership, for performance-based 
contracts in which they endeavour to foment ‘innovation’. Foucault further notes how 
neoliberalism’s extension of an economic analysis into ‘social’ fields like education, leads to a 
“permanent political criticism” (2008: 246) of the financial cost and benefit of government and 
political action, foreshadowing contemporary ‘fiscal austerity’. It demands schools to be 
economically viable, answerable to their contribution to the economy and the ‘intrusion’ of the 
state into otherwise market activities. 
 Neoliberalism in practice has been less than a thoroughly consistent expression of an 
ideology of expanding and deepening markets. David Harvey argues that neoliberal ideas were 
taken up by national elites beginning in the mid-1970s as part of an overarching political 
imperative towards restoring ruling class power and high profits, threatened in many regions of 
the world by rising left, labour and social movements.  With average economic growth rates in 2
most developed countries and the world as a whole below the postwar Keynesian era, capitalists 
accrue wealth under neoliberalism through creative destruction via accumulation through 
dispossession. Forms include the privatization of public resources and the expansion of the 
financial sector and its use of debt to exploit fiscal crises. He emphasizes the political 
unevenness of the neoliberalizing world, as with the survival of strong unions and welfare states 
in some countries beyond the heydays of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, as crucial to 
understanding the geography of neoliberalism (Harvey 2007). Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck and Nik 
Theodore (2010) critically assess a range of models offered by geographers and comparative 
policy studies that seek to explain why ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism has been so variegated 
 See also: Glyn (2007); Panitch & Gindin (2012).2
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across space. Distinct political contexts cause neoliberalization to occur differently across cities 
and regions within as well as between nation states. Harvey and Peck, and especially Naomi 
Klein (2007), widely concur that neoliberalism makes many of its greatest advances by 
exploiting crises, in order to rapidly implement comprehensively new governance structures. The 
latter two cite as an (in)famous example; the replacement of over 80 percent of New Orlean’s 
public schools with privately run, non-union charter schools in the wake of the devastation of 
Hurricane Katrina in 2006, the highest proportion of any local school system in the United 
States. In Ontario, under the hard-right Conservative government of Mike Harris, education 
minister John Snoblen in 1995 proposed “creating a useful crisis” to facilitate vast changes to the 
province’s school system (MacLellan 2009: 52). 
 Springer provides a useful critique of the paralyzing tendency of some left critics to 
describe neoliberalism as monolithic, “an unstoppable force” (2012: 135), by recognizing the 
resilience of grassroots movements and pre-figurative politics generally, in the vein of Gibson-
Graham’s post-capitalism (Springer 2010, 2014). He also accuses Harvey and other Marxist 
geographers of categorically condemning political projects as neoliberal that seek to decentralize 
power, while advocating a focus on resistance at the national level, which Springer contends 
leads to endorsing top-down, hierarchical modes of organization. Springer echoes the ‘flat 
ontology’ of Marston et al’s (2005) call for “a human geography without scale” (Springer 2014: 
408), which would facilitate a focus on more anarchist forms of organization. The call for 
recognizing the agency of groups (in this case, especially of workers), rather than see them 
primarily as the victims of economic processes, is a key principle of labour geography, and a 
guide for this dissertation. However I find the dismissal of the geographic concept of scale 
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frankly bewildering. Despite Springer’s (2014) assertion that he does not pretend to make the 
scalar organization of power go away by not acknowledging it, the call to ‘forget about scale’ is 
unhelpful if one wishes to understand how state authorities at various levels of government have 
developed education policy, and how organized teachers have responded locally, regionally or 
nationally, depending on the circumstances. Springer’s caricature of Harvey’s focus on the state 
as a key site for contesting neoliberalism is as politically unproductive as arguing that creating a 
small radical alternative school precludes working to transform the rest of the school district. 
 Emphasizing the continually unfolding, historically and geographically contingent nature 
of this political process, Peck prefers the term neoliberalization to neoliberalism, ”...since the 
latter tend to rely too heavily on regime-like conceptions, bracketed in time and space.” (2010: 
20-21) Amid the trials and errors of the neoliberalization process, Peck and Tickell (2002) 
identify an historical pattern of ‘roll back’ and ‘roll out’ phases. The former signifies the initial 
neoliberal attack on existing structures of the welfare state (privatization, cuts to universal 
programs, attacks on unions, implementation of monetarist polices, etc), generally predominant 
in the 1980s (beginning in New York City with the fiscal crisis of the mid 1970s). The latter 
consists of measures from the mid-1990s onwards to deal with market failures, acute poverty, 
concerted resistance and other crises associated with roll back, including regulating privatized 
agencies, funding anti-poverty NGOs and expanding the penal system. If Thatcher and Reagan 
were the protagonists of the roll back era, Tony Blair and Bill Clinton were the harbingers of roll 
out neoliberalism. While roll back represents a reaction to the Keynesian welfare state and state 
socialism, roll out is a ‘positive’ expression of neoliberal governance, replete with contradictions 
and politically necessary compromises (Peck 2010: 23). 
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 This conceptualization of neoliberalization into somewhat distinct historical, 
geographically uneven phases, provides a helpful means for understanding the particular form of 
the contemporary struggle over education policy at the heart of this dissertation. Public 
education, at least in the three case study cities at the centre of this dissertation, has been a 
relatively strong point of resistance to neoliberal ‘roll-back’, at least up to the early 21st Century. 
Though within the three countries in which these cities are located, this experience has been 
uneven. The contested neoliberal education reforms from the early 2000s onwards described in 
the case studies below, could be understood as a context in which state actors (backed by various 
non-governmental and corporate agents) attempt to ‘roll-back’ existing forms of public education 
through chronic budget cuts and attempts to weaken unions. More or less simultaneously, the 
‘roll out’ of neoliberalization can be seen in the impact on teachers’ work of standardized testing 
in evaluation, changing workplace power relations, and many other factors discussed below. The 
convergence of these reactive and creative forms of neoliberalism can help explain the 
difficulties faced by their advocates in getting these policies to stick in public education, 
especially as they move across space. 
2.3: Policy Mobilities 
 I start from the argument that within the contexts of contemporary Canada, US and 
Mexico, domestic state actors at various scales exercise considerable agency in mobilizing 
education policy. They are not coerced to do so by multilateral agencies like the OECD, the 
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World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Instead the primary factor is the balance 3
of power between domestic political groups.  When asked about the role of the World Bank, a 4
senior official in Mexico’s Secretary of Public Education (SEP) provided this example, 
illustrating both a desire for autonomy from the Bank, and how privatization has filled in the 
absence of new public resources, “Previously, the Mexican government would get a loan from 
the World Bank to build a highway. Now the Mexican government contracts directly with foreign 
investors to finance and operate a new toll highway. Hopefully we’re getting to the point where 
we don’t have to borrow anymore.” (SEP official: Interviewed Jun. 2015). I argue that the 
recommendations provided particularly by the OECD and the World Bank, based upon some of 
the most extensive comparative international research on education systems available, are drawn 
upon to publicly legitimize decisions driven by governments. Also significant for the research 
base on which they draw, as well as their political influence, are domestic think tanks and 
research centres including the Brookings Institution, Teachers’ College, Fraser Institute, People 
for Education, the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education and Mexicanos Primero. The most 
significant direct vertical exercise of power to implement policy in this context is conducted by 
centralized upper levels of government (state/provincial or federal) downloading responsibility 
onto municipal and school-level authorities. These are seen in the No Child Left Behind from 
2002 to 2015 in the US, the Alliance for Quality Education (ACE) in 2008 and the Professional 
 In the 1982 debt crisis, Mexico was compelled to privatize dozens of state industries along with other neoliberal 3
‘conditionalities’ for the loans it received from the IMF; a precedent marking the end of Import Substitution 
Industrialization and economic nationalism (Torres 1991: 117). 
 Verger (2009) makes this case while studying the motivations for national trade representatives in the Doha round 4
of the World Trade Organization determining whether to offer to liberalize their country’s education systems in 
exchange for concessions from other participants. He found that the Chilean government’s capacity to ignore 
teachers’ unions contributed to its decision to offer substantial private investment opportunities in education. These 
options were kept off the table by Argentine representatives whose government negotiated with labour. 
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Teaching Service Law since 2013 in Mexico, and the standardized tests of Ontario’s Education 
Quality and Accountability Office since 1996. 
 Accordingly, this dissertation asks how policy is used by local, regional and national 
states to support political objectives, and the extent to which this involves a ‘mobility’ of policy 
across borders. To what extent can the movement of these policies explain the similarities of the 
neoliberalization of education governance across the diverse jurisdictions of North America? 
Alternately, how do teachers’ unions and movements mobilize policy from below as they resist 
or collaborate with these proposals? The significant roles of New York, Mexico City and Toronto 
as sites of education policy formation, the genealogy and movement of key texts and actors in 
the evolution of North America’s neoliberal turn and the agency of teachers’ organizations will 
be explored below in Chapter 4. Here, I will briefly review the development of key concepts that 
are the most relevant to the context of the neoliberalization of public education in policy 
mobility, an emerging field in which geographers have been especially influential. 
 Since 2008, geographers Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore have led the formation of the 
critical study of policy mobilities as an interdisciplinary research area. Extending from Peck’s 
study (1996) of workfare programs and local labour markets, they researched (2010) the ‘fast’ 
social policy of workfare conditional cash transfers. Originally implemented nationally by the 
Mexican government in the mid 1990s to mitigate extreme poverty in the midst of social unrest, 
it was brought to New York City by Mayor Bloomberg in the 2000s. This case emphasizes how 
in the contemporary context, policy can move across scales, but also from the South to the global 
North. Peck and Theodore use this example to introduce their concept of ‘fast policy’: the 
movement of ideas developed by technocratic circles of experts that liaise relatively easily across 
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borders, and operate within closed policy networks to quickly implement new programs. The 
makers of ‘fast policy’ typically claim to be politically pragmatic, their only ideology is a fealty 
to ‘best practices’ supported by quantitative data.   
 Peck (2011) subsequently lays out his critique of the policy transfer studies that became 
orthodox in political science in the 1990s (typically focused on the rapid ascendancy of 
globalization with the end of the Cold War), in which rational governmental actors utilized their 
perfect knowledge to borrow ‘best practices’ for their jurisdiction. According to Peck, these 
scholars gloss over the ideological contexts in which policy decisions were made, while 
attempting to exorcise geography by neglecting to consider how policies will inevitably ‘mutate’ 
as their proponents attempt to implement them in places very different from where they 
originated. These ideas are further developed by Peck and Theodore in Fast Policy: 
Experimental Statecraft at the Thresholds of Neoliberalism (2015). Their case studies on the 
global movement of conditional cash transfer and participatory budgeting use the concept of 
head winds and tail winds to explain how the selection of policies from elsewhere and their 
adaptation by their importers to fit local realities is shaped by prestigious multilateral institutions 
like the World Bank and the OECD, and a more abstract neoliberal ‘common sense’. Policies 
going against these dominant forces still attract emulators abroad but will not receive warm 
accolades from the Bank. They also discuss the methodological value of participatory 
observation, attending the conferences where peripatetic advocates ply their craft among policy 
makers, as a form of ethnographic research. They caution academics not to allow these 
immersions to block out the pursuit of dissident voices, especially of communities directed 
affected by these policies.  
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 Recognizing the limitations on publicly available documents describing the (often 
politically sensitive) work of policy consultants, Russell Prince (2012) also emphasizes the 
importance of ethnographic methods to study the individuals and firms directly involved to 
understand how they function. He pursues how policy consultants have contributed to 
neoliberalization, outlining the emergence of major consulting firms and think tanks since the 
1980s, contracted by governments to evaluate the public sector and advocate for its privatization. 
Prince shares conclusions reached by Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2010) that in part through 
these expert networks, neoliberalism has affected processes of governance to an extent that not 
only are policies themselves neoliberalized, so is the means by which policies are developed. 
Echoing Peck’s (2011) critique of conventional policy transfer studies: 
The assembling of sociomaterialities and technical systems across space is a fraught, 
multidirectional process. The resulting assemblages in which policies circulate are not 
necessarily what anyone intended, and their durability can range from short-lived to 
relatively enduring. They do allow us, however, insight into the day-to-day work of 
constructing geographies of governance, and a perspective on the often uneven and 
chaotic geographies that result. This last point speaks to the value of work on policy  
transfer conducted in the geographical literature. It moves beyond political science 
conceptions by making history and context more central, rather than treating them as 
background. (Prince 2012: 193) 
Eugene McCann and Kevin Ward concur, favouring geography’s emphasis on understanding the 
role of “place, space and scale coupled with an anthropological/sociological attention to ‘small p’  
politics both within and beyond institutions of governance” (2013: 2) in critical policy mobility 
studies.  5
 Working within comparative education policy, Stephen J. Ball and Carolina Junemann 
(2012) use the concept of network governance to describe the mobility and proliferation of 
 See also: Larnar & Laurie (2010).5
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neoliberal education policy in the UK. They explain how beginning in the 1980s under Thatcher 
and accelerating under subsequent governments, the state provisioning of education has been 
undermined through privatization, de-professionalizing of teachers and weakening of their 
unions. The result of the outsourcing of public service delivery has been a shift from government 
to governance, in which private actors take increasing roles coordinated and regulated by the 
centralized state. In this context of governance by ‘best practices’ and audits, networks of private 
businesses, philanthropies, think tanks and wealthy individuals have gained considerable 
influence in policy making in tandem with their contracting of education services. Both appear to 
have advanced more extensively than in the North American case studies here. Policy mobility in 
this context is both the means for spreading proposals for the neoliberalization of education, and 
the structure of governance for a neoliberalized school system. Ball and Junemann describe their 
methodological approach to network ethnographies through extensive interviews with 
practitioners, to construct web diagrams depicting connections between individuals, 
organizations and firms that comprise specific policy networks. Their policies have frequently 
elicited considerable resistance from organized teachers in the case studies presented here, 
particularly as they have seen their professional autonomy in the classroom challenged. 
2.4: Labour Geography 
 Labour is a key group that has contested efforts to neoliberalize the landscapes in which 
workers live and are employed. Whether defensively by opposing the relocation of production 
and investment, or proactively by pursuing new strategies for organizing in urban service sectors 
or by building transnational unions, labour has struggled to maintain and expand its agency 
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within the adverse circumstances of neoliberal globalization. Peck (1996) establishes a source of 
the fundamental imbalance of spatial power between workers and capital that has only increased 
in the neoliberal era of free trade agreements: labour is overwhelmingly (if not exclusively) 
local.  Labour markets are also segmented by social regulation, resulting in widely ranging 6
employment patterns, incomes and job security, affected by new forms of flexibility under 
neoliberalism (Peck 1996). These new forms include workplace relocation, outsourcing and 
recurring struggles over socially constructed definitions of skilled labour or the speed-up of work 
processes. The public K-12 education sector is among the most regulated labour markets in 
Canada, the US and Mexico, due in large part to a very high rate of unionization. As the case 
studies show, a major way that teachers’ work has been changed by neoliberal policies has been 
the growth of the proportion of the workforce employed in a precarious, ‘untenured’ capacity. 
 Andrew Herod was a principal founder of labour geography (Bergene, Endresen & 
Knutsen 2010). Like Peck, he critiques (1997) the dominant tendency of economic geography to 
treat workers as merely another factor of production determining the location of firms. Herod 
challenged not only neoclassical geographers, but also Marxists who he argued all too often 
portrayed workers as passive victims of capitalist spatial strategies. Herod argued that organized 
workers exercise agency by drawing on spatial strategies to contest capitalist power and remake 
the landscapes in which they work and live to better meet their needs. He finds that workers are 
pragmatic, organizing on local, regional, national and transnational scales, sometimes entering 
into alliances with elements of capital, and sometimes against the interests of other groups of 
workers (Herod 2001, 2010). He argues that, ”industrial relations specialists and labor and social 
 Herod argues (2010) that we should avoid a dichotomy. Some groups of workers are much more mobile than 6
others, an unevenness also found among sectors of capital, strongly influencing the strategies of both groups.
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historians... have generally tended to view geography in terms of how place functions as a 
“context” for social action rather than in terms of how space and spatial relations may serve as 
sources of power and objects of struggle...” (Herod 2001: 2). I certainly view the political 
contexts of Toronto, New York and Mexico City, and the state/province and nations in which 
they are located as crucial for determining the struggles of teachers against the neoliberalization 
of education. It is my intention to do so in a way that recognizes the agency of teachers, insofar 
as they also have a capacity to shape this context, while they are most certainly shaped by it. 
 Applying this frame of the contingent nature of workers’ agency to use scalar strategies to 
the education sector, Sweeney (2013) studied the rescaling of contemporary collective bargaining 
in Ontario, with key decision-making increasingly shifting from school board and teachers’ union 
local negotiations to province-wide discussions in which the provincial government and central 
union leaders play a much more direct role. This study is also important because labour 
geography has not yet looked significantly at the public sector and how its workers employ 
spatial strategies despite not being employed in tradable goods industries and so not part of 
global supply chains or subject to plant relocations. He demonstrates, particularly in the current 
context of the rescaling of public service provision as explained by Brenner et al (2010), public 
sector workers must grapple with multiple scales of state authority, an issue present in each of 
the case studies in this dissertation, within an overall context of the centralization of power and 
downloading of responsibility. 
 Steven Tufts (2007) and others describe how in the context of deindustrialized post-
Fordist neoliberalism, world cities have become strategic sites for capital accumulation and 
private services, often performed by racialized immigrant workforces in precarious employment. 
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The three case studies of this dissertation share the characteristic of being the most important 
‘world city’ in their respective countries, as defined by a concentration of political and economic 
power and a high degree of influence facilitated by strong connections to other centres around 
the world. Tufts agrees with Herod (2001, 2010) and Wills (2002) that determining the most 
strategic scale on which workers are best able to organize and act in a given context is the key 
question of labour geography. While broadly interested in and supportive of organizing efforts 
that explicitly draw on a spatial analysis as situated within the neoliberalized environment of the 
world city, Tufts also issues some cautions on the limits to concentrating on the global scale 
present within the city. Brogan (2014) adds to the study of labour in the world city, within the 
context of the privatization of Chicago’s public education system and its relation to the 
gentrification of its racially and class stratified landscapes. He positions the Chicago Teachers 
Union, led since 2012 by the Caucus of Rank and File Educators which intensively organizes its 
membership and constructs extensive community alliances, as an important actor within larger 
struggles for social justice in this neoliberalized world city. Brogan argues that the power and 
media attention of teachers’ struggles are best located at the metropolitan scale. 
 Herod (2001) uses a case study of a successful global campaign by locked out aluminum 
smelter workers in the US to reiterate his contention drawing on Gibson-Graham, that globalized 
capital is beatable. He also presents a distinction between ‘accommodative’ acts of international 
solidarity, in which Northern unionists ask labour in the South to help prevent the relocation of 
their jobs, with little consideration to confronting the systemic inequity between the two regions, 
and ‘transformative solidarity’ in which a genuine relationship of equals is constructed, 
concerned with the interests of both groups of workers. Kay (2011) pursues these themes 
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studying how leading up to NAFTA and afterwards, cross border relationships were built 
between unions in Canada and the US and in Mexico. Her impressive fieldwork covered a range 
of private sector unions that did or did not build alliances. This enables one to address critiques 
by Das (2012), that labour geography has given disproportional attention to ‘good news stories’, 
while overlooking the many more instances in which workers lacked sufficient agency to 
effectively oppose neoliberal global capitalism.  
 Marxist inspired critiques such as Das (2012) take aim at what they see as the reformist 
agenda of labour geography, arguing that workers cannot exercise genuine agency unless they 
explicitly define themselves in class terms in opposition to capitalism. I argue that dismissing the 
possibilities for workers achieving significant local victories under the globalized power of 
capital, substantially narrows the possible scope for labour’s action in our context, making the 
potential future composition of a revolutionary global working class difficult to imagine. Asking 
why labour internationalism has been so limited, Kay’s (2011) findings follow Wills (2002, 
2005) and Herod (2001), that cross border solidarity has been consistently led by ideologically 
driven progressive-socialist activists. Cold War or contemporary nationalist and racist world 
views have acted as blockages, as Chapter 4 will discuss in the historical context of teacher 
union internationalism in the Americas. 
 Castree (2007), Tufts and Savage (2009) consider future directions for labour geography 
in the context of neoliberalism. They recommend that labour geography needs to expand its 
scope to include new groups of workers, particularly in the South.  This shortcoming creates the 7
risk of labour geography extrapolating theoretical conclusions from studies of workers in the 
 See also Bergene, Endresen & Knutsen (2010).7
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North onto contexts in the South. This dissertation speaks to this concern with a truly continental 
focus, including Mexico alongside Canada and the US, the latter two of which are more 
frequently studied together. Like these authors, this dissertation also discusses alternative forms 
of worker organization to conventional trade unions. 
 While employers cannot (yet) relocate schools to geographies where teachers can be paid 
the lowest salaries, this dissertation demonstrates that the challenges faced by the 
neoliberalization of their work is strikingly similar across North America, leading to 
opportunities for strategic alliances beyond the regional or national scales of their public sector 
employers as identified by Coe & Jordhus-Lier (2010: 37). Prospects for international teachers’ 
solidarity are explored in chapter 4 and the conclusion. I look at how the national SNTE under 
Juan Diaz de la Torre since 2013 has strived to compensate for the legitimacy it lacks among its 
members by gaining endorsements from the leadership of Education International -the global 
federation of teachers’ unions, and closer relations with the American Federation of Teachers and 
the National Education Association. Meanwhile through the Trinational Coalition in Defense of 
Public Education, the CNTE draws on international solidarity from OSSTF, the British Columbia 
Teachers’ Federation, and left leaning teacher locals in the US, the United Teachers of Los 
Angeles and the Chicago Teachers’ Union. 
Part B: Education Policy, Teachers’ Professional Autonomy & Resistance 
2.5: Neoliberal Education Policy 
 The heart of this dissertation studies the contemporary experience of neoliberal education 
policy as it impacts teachers’ professional autonomy in three local case studies, New York, 
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Mexico City and Toronto, and how ideas and policies, both from elite state and non-
governmental actors, and teacher activists, move across borders. A scalar analysis of political, 
economic and cultural contexts at the local, state/provincial, national and global level are 
essential in attempting to explain the success or failure of these policies (Ginsburg 1991a). This 
must be done without over-emphasizing structural explanations and neglecting the roles and 
actions of individuals and groups. Without being overly deterministic, I believe my research 
supports Ginsburg’s contention, “political and economic factors are more important in shaping 
educational reforms than are factors internal to the educational system itself.” (1991a: 7) 
 A critical approach will recognize that education policy, like all areas of politics, is 
subject to tensions and conflicts on the basis of class, race and gender, and other axes through 
which power is unevenly distributed in society. Reforms developed by predominantly male 
senior administrators and politicians impact teachers and other education workers who are 
mostly women. Likewise, policies around parental engagement and user fees disproportionally 
affect mothers and other care givers (Ginsburg 1991b: 378). Funding cutbacks and school 
closings hit students from poor families the hardest, who are also more likely to be racialized. 
 An analysis of the role of the state  in capitalist society is also crucial. More than simply 8
an ‘executive committee for the capitalist class’, its relative autonomy is defined by internal 
tensions as well as external pressures from its dual roles of both acting to perpetuate capitalist 
accumulation and profitability (and thereby its own revenue base), while maintaining social 
legitimacy and cohesion (Ginsburg 1991a: 20-24). Cut public education too much, and either 
through popular opposition or reduced infrastructure capacity, the state risks losing this crucial 
 Considered in this sense to include its agencies and publicly funded NGOs.8
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institution for social reproduction and ideological hegemony (Ginsburg 1991b: 379-380). I 
concur with the Globally Structured Agenda for Education (GSAE) paradigm articulated by 
Roger Dale (2000), Verger (2009) and others within comparative education studies:  
Its main ontological assumption is that the world capitalist economy is the driving force 
of globalization and the first causal source of multiple transformations manifested in 
different policy areas, including education. Consequently, capitalism’s expansion and 
transformations directly and indirectly affect contemporary education systems, although 
its effects are also locally mediated. … Although globalization presents common features 
around the world, its effects in education and in other fields are mediated by domestic 
factors and contingencies. (Verger 2009: 380-381) 
From the GSAE perspective, political and economic dynamics, though their manifestations are 
spatially uneven, are essential for understanding education policies. 
 Peck and Tickell’s concept described above, of a ‘roll back’ wave of neoliberal policies 
from the late 1970s through the early 1990s is relevant to understand changes made in education. 
In various circumstances, they were a reversal of a progressive expansion of public education, 
triggered in the early 1980s by recession in developed countries like the US and Canada and 
drastic debt crisis in the developing world, including Mexico. Political elites now pushed a new 
imperative of state austerity and increasing their nation’s competitiveness in the context of 
globalization (Ginsburg 1991b: 370-371; Robertson 2008: 15; Klees 2008).  
 ‘Roll back’ education policies centred around the privatization and deprofessionalizing or 
disempowering teachers’ work, as they do now, though the specific forms varied. A key 
mechanism for accomplishing this was a scalar shifting of decision-making power from local to 
national governments, and a corresponding downloading of responsibility without authority to 
the school level (Ginsburg 1991b: 383-384). This remains the dominant trajectory of education 
governance, as will be seen in this dissertation’s case studies. The first wave occurred in 
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England, Australia and New Zealand, marking an abrupt end to a period at least since the 1940s, 
in which teachers’ unions enjoyed a degree of corporatist relations or close collaboration with 
education authorities. Within a centralizing national government, these authorities shifted their 
political stance to overtly favouring collaboration with business groups (Ginsburg 1991b: 
373-374). The latter had an antagonistic vision of education that was pro-employer, both in its 
content and goals (shifting from humanistic growth to workplace preparation and 
entrepreneurialism) and its form (the process of teaching subordinated to increasingly scripted 
curriculum in preparation for standardized testing). Its advocates made heavy usage of 
supportive policies from the US and the UK, “even the titles and texts of reports point the way to 
educational reform explicitly borrowed from similar documents in the United States.” (Ginsburg 
1991b: 378) The centralization of control over education policy in these countries in each case 
was related to a goal of limiting the occupational authority of teachers, who were popularly 
portrayed as having too much self-interested power over the institutions where they worked. A 
major element of rollback education policies in these three countries in the 1980s consisted of 
weakening teachers’ unions by legally restricting the scope of collective bargaining, enabling 
governments to substantially alter their employment, “…a process of proletarianization or 
deskilling and depowering of teachers, whereby they become the implementors of policy and 
practice conceived and controlled by others.” (Ginsburg 1991b: 384). 
 In regions of the developing world where teachers’ unions were already weak and 
governments were more desperate for international loans to pay rising interest rates, the social 
consequences in this era were more dire. Under the aegis of the ‘Washington Consensus’, a term 
which describes the heyday of neoliberal orthodoxy among top multilateral institutions and 
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national governments parallel to Peck and Tickell’s ‘roll back’ phase, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank pushed for tuition fees for public primary and secondary schools. 
Student enrolment plummeted in the Sub Saharan and Latin American countries that acquiesced 
to these demands in exchange for loans. Their governments reversed policy by the late 1990s, 
and UNESCO’s Education For All campaign within the UN’s Millennium Development Goals 
called for free universal K-12 schooling. The World Bank was slower and more reluctant to 
adjust (Klees 2008: 314-315).  While some of the more extreme experiments in privatization in 9
the roll back phase were mitigated, underlying political demands for austerity in the public sector 
and efforts to weaken teachers’ unions proved to have considerable longevity (Carnoy 1999; 
Robertson 2008: 17-20). 
 In the early 21st Century, neoliberal reformers increasingly turned their scrutiny to the 
practices and processes of teachers’ work (Cuban 2009, 2013). They castigated teachers as a 
profession for the failings of education, and provided recommendations to government officials 
for how to increase surveillance and control over their work and employment. Armed with 
studies anchored by questionable mathematical models, some claim to be able to measure how 
much a good or bad teacher adds or subtracts from their student’s future earnings as workers, and 
extrapolated from there, their cumulative impact on the economy as a whole (Ravitch 2013a: 
 Education was rapidly privatized in 1980s post-coup Chile with the implementation of vouchers for enrolling 9
students in public and private schools, at the urging of economists from Milton Friedman’s Chicago School, citing 
small scale municipal experiments in the US. The military government prohibited the teachers’ union from 
negotiating salaries, class sizes and other aspects of their working conditions. With the segregation of poor students 
in hollowed out public schools, corrupt private operators, and a massive reallocation of school resources towards 
marketing and standardized tests, the democratically elected government in 1988 limited vouchers. However with its 
continued emphasis on test scores, the proliferation of private schools and weak teacher unions, Chile remains the 
most neoliberalized education system in the Americas (Klees 2008: 323).
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107-108). Great Teachers: How to Raise Student Learning in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(2014), a report commissioned by the World Bank, is typical of this genre. It concludes: 
 [T]he quality of teachers in Latin America and the Caribbean is the binding constraint on 
the region’s progress toward world-class education systems. Low standards for entry into 
teaching; low-quality candidates; salaries, promotions, and job tenure delinked from 
performance; and weak school leadership have produced low professionalism in the 
classroom and poor education results. Moving to a new equilibrium will be difficult, and 
will require recruiting, grooming and motivating a new breed of teacher. (Bruns & Luque 
2014: 40) 
For the authors of this report, teachers are indolent employees who in the absence of effective 
discipline, will do the least amount and lowest quality work possible, a worldview reminiscent of 
neoliberal theorists who postulated on the inherent selfishness of humans. For Chester Finn Jr 
and Michael Petrilli, president and vice president of the right wing Thomas B. Fordham Institute 
and researchers at the free market Hoover Institution, if only self-described ‘outsiders’ like 
themselves were given a free hand to apply their ideas for how public education should function 
(eliminate teacher job security, increase the managerial power of principals over their staff, more 
charter schools, etc), its problems would be resolved. That many local school boards and state 
administrations reject these proposals as “adults versus change,” means that they are controlled 
by teachers’ unions (Finn & Petrilli 2013: 29) . Fortunately for government officials and 10
politicians, the amount of funding and resources which they provide to schools are seldom 
questioned. Teachers’ unions are the adversary, as the authors remind governments that, “[T]he 
 Their contempt for school boards is captured in this passage, “In far too many places, well-educated, civic-10
minded, and reasonably prosperous people find district-level politics daunting and painful. ... Serving on such 
boards can also bring unpleasantness: long, boring evenings listening to public testimony; onerous (and costly) 
election campaigns; the risk of name-calling, picketing, and racial acrimony; painful responsibilities such as 
deciding whether to close and ‘reconstitute’ neighborhood schools; and agendas that are laden with micromanagerial 
issues and short on decisions about fundamental policy and direction. ... Under these circumstance who would want 
to serve on a school board?...aspiring politicans, union puppets, individuals with some cause or scheme they yearn to 
inflict on everyone’s children, and former employees of the system with a score to settle.” (Finn & Petrilli 2013: 31)
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goals of teachers’ organizations are not congruent with the goals of education policy makers or 
the interests of education beneficiaries -including students, parents, and employers who need 
skilled workers.” (Bruns & Luque 2014: 38) 
 In their 2013 report for the global teachers’ union federation Education International, 
Antoni Verger, Hülya Altinyelken and Mireille de Koning present case studies from seven 
developing countries of what they describe as Global Managerial Education Reforms (GMERs). 
The policies share characteristics including privatization and the de-professionalization of 
teachers’ work, as through increased standardized testing and more prescribed pedagogy.  Their 
study surveys the contemporary ‘roll-out’ form of neoliberal education policy, or the ‘Post-
Washington Consensus’ (Robertson 2008). They define GMERs as: 
...tend[ing] to modify the working conditions of teachers and their responsibilities, as 
well as how teachers’ performance is assessed and judged by the state and society. 
Managerial reforms also challenge the professional status of teachers, and reshape 
teaching as a profession. To some extent, this is the consequence of the fact that the 
managerial focus of GMERs converts teachers into objects of intervention and assets to 
be managed rather than to subjects of educational change. ...these types of reforms, due to 
their disciplinary character, do not only change what teachers do, but also who teachers 
are or are supposed to be. (Verger et al 2013: 2) 
In contrast to roll back era reforms in which teachers were often presented as relatively 
insignificant compared to the introduction of new technology in the classroom, for instance, the 
report argues that in roll out reforms, teachers are the centre of attention. Their performance or 
‘quality’ is judged as the most critical input into education, making vitally important the shaping 
of their work and its evaluation.  
 Again, I argue in this dissertation that the transformation of teachers’ work, generally in a 
direction towards de-professionalization and disempowerment, is the most important element of 
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contemporary neoliberal education policy (Rezai-Rashti 2009; Pinto 2015). Despite vastly 
different local and national contexts, this broad trajectory, albeit to varying extents and 
manifesting itself in distinct forms, can be seen in the three case studies here: New York, Mexico 
City and Toronto. These studies focus on a historical period beginning in roughly the early 
2000s, a time of significant changes in education governance in each of these three cities that 
relate with characteristics of the ‘roll out’ phase of neoliberal policy. In Toronto, this corresponds 
with the election of the Ontario Liberal Dalton McGuinty/Kathleen Wynne governments in 2003. 
In New York City this period is defined by the election of mayors Michael Bloomberg in 2002 
and Bill de Blasio in 2013 and State Governor Andrew Cuomo in 2010. In Mexico it is defined 
by the Quality Schools Program of Vicente Fox (2001-2006), the standardized ENLACE student 
exam (2006-2013) and the ‘Alliance for Quality Education’ (ACE in Spanish) under National 
Action Party (PAN) President Felipe Calderon and SNTE union leader Elba Esther Gordillo. The 
latter program was adopted into the Mexican Constitution and accompanying legislation under 
President Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 2012-2013. 
 I explore in detail how teachers’ work in these cities is being neoliberalized in the early 
21st Century on the basis of five common dynamics. First, changes in governance, entailing the 
centralization of education policy-making to higher levels and a corresponding weakening of 
local democratic voice have facilitated the rollout of subsequent wide ranging reforms, through 
mayoral control in New York, the shifting from state to federal authorities in Mexico, and 
municipal school boards to the provincial government in Ontario. Second, workplace power 
relations between principals and teachers has changed particularly in New York and Ontario, 
from collegiality to a hierarchy of managers and employees, giving administrators more control 
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over the way teachers use their time attacking teacher autonomy. Resistance to a similar shift in 
Mexico has been a major frustration for neoliberal reformers, though ‘School Based 
Management’ would give Mexican principals substantial control over school budgets, as it has in 
the US. Third, the rise of standardized testing has had substantial impact on shaping the means 
and ends of teaching in all three countries, particularly in Mexico through ENLACE and the US, 
through No Child Left Behind and then even more insidiously through Race To the Top, where it 
is tied directly to the job security of teachers. Fourth, in large urban districts with economies of 
scale, ‘school choice’ schemes aim to create a market in which public schools compete for 
student enrolment, in large part on the basis of standardized test scores, particularly in New York 
where this is most advanced, but also in Toronto on the basis of boutique specialty programs. I 
argue that these forms of enrolment competition distort teaching by exacerbating the tendency to 
‘teach to the test’, while perpetuating student segregation and unbalancing the ‘classroom 
ecosystem’. Finally, a key variable to the degree that these common policies have been 
implemented has been the response of the teachers’ unions locally and at higher levels of 
organization. I will especially explore how political culture shapes the response of local unions, 
how these organizations have responded to the scaling up of governance and their successes and 
failures in building broader alliances to challenge the adverse consequences of these policies. 
 Privatization coupled with public sector austerity, remain key objectives of neoliberal 
education policy. Pecuniary interest in education have increased for capitalists looking for a good 
return on investment, facing an early 21st Century forecast of low rates of growth interspersed 
with recessions for the foreseeable future. With limited new markets expected to emerge on the 
horizon and record high stockpiles of uninvested capital sitting in banks, privatizing K-12 public 
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education, worth an estimated $600 billion in the US in 2013, presents a vast and potentially 
relatively secure way to turn a profit (McGuinn & Manna 2013: 12; Mason 2016). In most 
regions of the US, a primary vehicle for its achievement are charters, privately run, publicly 
funded schools that may be for or not for profit (though the management firms contracted to 
administer the schools are nearly always for profit). They save large sums of money by 
employing non-union teachers, with high turnover rates and minimal benefits or pension 
obligations (Levine & Levine 2014: 377-378). Many American school boards retain high priced 
‘efficiency’ consultants, who recommend the contracting of their colleagues in the for-profit 
education services sector. Firms specialized in writing report cards and developing software to 
replace math teachers are considered good investments, as are companies contracted to run 
Special Education programs or provide outsourced substitute teachers. In many states of Mexico, 
a key form of privatization is represented by the fees parents must pay to ensure their children’s 
schools have plumbing or photocopier paper. In every province of Canada, schools supplement 
their publicly provided funding with fundraising, sometimes including commercial sponsorships, 
yielding vastly divergent outcomes in wealthy and poor communities. These developments pose 
a significant threat to the integrity of public education.  
 However I will demonstrate, the efforts of policy makers to increasingly control teachers’ 
work and thereby curtail their autonomy over the interpretation of curriculum, pedagogy and 
teaching strategies, represents the single biggest push to neoliberalize public education.  If 11
teachers can be replaced with instructors requiring minimal training and salary, then the 
 Education geographers also argue that charter schools and other direct forms of privatization in the US have the 11
most significant social impact by facilitating racialized gentrification. Students and their families are pushed out of 
their neighbourhood when their local public school is closed and the new charter school will not accept them, as in 
New York, Chicago and New Orleans, among other cities (Brogan 2013; Lipman 2011; Huff 2013; Buras 2013).
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institution of schooling will be far more malleable for political elites to expand privatization.  If 12
in doing so, teachers’ unions are significantly weakened or broken, then perhaps the single 
largest sector of the North American labour movement would be defeated, with both politically 
and economically profound consequences (Brogan 2013). For these reasons, this dissertation 
seeks to understand the neoliberalization of public education in North America by analyzing the 
struggle over spaces of labour autonomy and power from the classroom to the policy arena. 
2.6: Teachers’ Professional Autonomy 
 At the core of this dissertation as it relates to the work of teachers, I argue that the 
education of students is best served by professionally prepared teachers with substantial 
autonomy to meet their unique needs. In the face of the aforementioned neoliberal reforms 
whose motivation often comes from considerations outside the classroom or the field of 
education (Ginsburg 1991a), professional autonomy is vital to preventing the disempowerment 
and deskilling of teachers. A concise, though not exhaustive definition of teachers’ professional 
judgement, a key element of the concept of professional autonomy, is provided by the Ontario 
Ministry of Education’s Growing Success, an official document intended to guide how teachers 
assess and evaluate student’s work: 
Judgement that is informed by professional knowledge of curriculum expectations, 
context, evidence of learning, methods of instruction and assessment, and the criteria and 
standards that indicate success in student learning. In professional practice, judgement 
involves a purposeful and systematic thinking process that evolves in terms of accuracy 
and insight with ongoing reflection and self-correction. (Ontario Ministry of Education 
2010: 152) 
 The experiences of the for-profit Rocket charter school chain in California and the online K12, Inc., suggests that 12
high turnover, low wage educators are essential for publicly funded, tuition-free schools to generate significant 
profits (Conniff 2014).
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Concerned by member reports of school administrators unilaterally ordering changes to student 
grades or dictating preparation methods for standardized exams, the Ontario Secondary School 
Teachers Federation (OSSTF) distributed a brochure to its members in 2016 defining 
professional judgement. In addition to the above quote, there is a “not exhaustive” list of 
examples of exercising professional judgement, that includes (among other points): 
 • choosing the order and emphasis of specific expectations when delivering the curriculum  
 • identifying the instructional strategies to deliver the curriculum  
 • determining the format and content of your lesson plans  
 • selecting methods for differentiating instruction and assessments for students  
 • deciding what resources are used to support the curriculum and outcomes and whether or  
 not to use ministry approved textbooks  
 • choosing the frequency, timing, methods and types of assessment and evaluation used to  
 measure student learning (OSSTF 2015) 
The brochure was introduced in the monthly union newspaper in an article titled 
“Professionalism = Autonomy” (OSSTF 2016). 
 A wave of one day province wide walkouts and longer local strikes by teachers across 
Ontario from late 1973 to early 1974 (discussed in detail below), “admitted the secondary school 
teachers very substantially into areas of school policy and management hitherto considered the 
exclusive preserve of the board, its officials, and the school principals.” (Hennessy 1975: 5) The 
1974 contract signed by the Windsor district of OSSTF won a key precedent of workplace 
control by mandating school board and school level staffing committees evenly comprised of 
OSSTF and administrative representatives that would jointly determine class assignments and 
ensure seniority provisions were followed in case of layoffs (Hennessy 1975: 23).  
 Workplace power relations are a critical factor determining the professional autonomy of 
teachers. As such, a focus is placed on how contemporary neoliberal reforms in all three cities 
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have changed the way that teachers and school administrators work with each other. In reviewing 
the literature of many policy advocates and academics , I use the cynical phrase, ‘the principal 13
as protagonist’ to describe the tendency to view administrators as the primary resource for 
educational expertise, and as those on the frontline implementing reforms who need to be 
liberated from contractual restrictions in order to effectively manage teachers. Crucially different 
in Mexico from the United States and Ontario after 1998, school directors remain part of the 
National Union of Education Workers (SNTE), blunting a division between employees and 
management.  As a result, historically school directors in Mexico have intervened less to 14
regulate teachers’ work, though as will be discussed in the Mexico City case study this is 
changing with the onset of new forms of standardized evaluation for students and teachers.  
 In Mexico, poverty and state repression, traditions of collective action including peasant 
and Indigenous organizing, and strong socialist currents among teachers, have frequently led 
educators to socially and politically identify closely with the communities in which they live and 
work, especially in rural regions. As employees of the national government, they remain 
beholden to its curricular policy, which can clash with the priorities of local communities, as 
with instruction in regional Indigenous languages. Similar tensions pitting obligations to the state 
against the demands of local communities have existed for Canadian and US teachers. These 
forces shape the extent of teachers’ professional autonomy. The James Keegstra case of an 
Albertan teacher who fought his dismissal to the Supreme Court of Canada for expounding anti-
 See many of the contributors in Ravitch & Viteritti (2000) and Manna & McGuinn (2013).13
 However, numerous other issues exist, particularly the tradition of awarding school directorships as a form of 14
patronage to teachers loyal to the official SNTE leadership and local bosses of the ruling political party.
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Semitism in his classroom in the 1980s serves as an infamous reminder of why some limits are 
justified to professional autonomy. 
 Teacher claims to professional autonomy have sometimes exacerbated divisions between 
them and the communities they serve. Ginsburg argues that pursuing professional status and 
placing their practice above popular critique can isolate teachers from parents and other workers, 
making them vulnerable in times of struggle. Reflecting on England in the mid-1980s when the 
Thatcher government succeeded in weakening the power of the National Union of Teachers 
(NUT) to negotiate the salaries and working conditions of its members, he says: 
More often historically teachers had pursued a strategy of professionalization, an  
occupational group project involving negotiations with the state for renumeration, status, 
and power as well as distancing of “professional” educators from the “nonprofessional” 
or lay community, including parents. As teachers’ past strategy of professionalization was 
undermined by recent efforts by state elites to proletarianize the work of teachers and 
teachers responded with militant “trade union” action, parents often became further 
alienated from teachers. Thus the possibility of an alliance between teachers and parents 
became more remote. (Ginsburg 1991b: 385) 
Conflict between the NUT and Thatcher coincided with the more famous miner’s strike of 
1984-85, yet Ginsburg observes that few connections were made between the two, due at least in 
part to differences in ideology and strategy, derived from a conceptualization of the former as 
professionals aloof from the blue collar labour movement epitomized by the miners. He 
concludes, “Educators seeking to forge an occupational group strategy in isolation of other social 
groups may succeed for a while in their struggle with economic and state elites but perhaps only 
as long as the educators are perceived to be serving the elites’ interests.” (Ginsburg 1991b: 385). 
 In 1968, less than a decade after its founding, New York City’s United Federation of 
Teachers embroiled itself in a series of ugly, racially divisive citywide strikes against an 
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experimental ‘community-controlled’ school district in the predominantly African American 
Ocean Hill/Brownsville neighbourhoods of Brooklyn. Led by Black power activists, the district 
demanded the right to circumvent disciplinary due process rights and seniority to forcibly 
transfer (and later fire) teachers deemed to be poorly serving African American students, and hire 
preferable replacements. The strikes dragged on, cumulatively, for months. They acquired a 
strong racial dimension of black parents and students versus overwhelmingly white (mostly 
Jewish) teachers, rupturing any previous relationship the union had with black community 
organizations in the city, and alienating many of its small minority of African American 
members.  Murphy (1992), Robertson (2000) and Weiner (2012) argue that the UFT under the 15
leadership of Al Shanker bore considerable responsibility for the conflict. While flexing its 
power to solidify the professional rights of its members, the union had neglected the needs and 
concerns of the most marginalized, racialized communities that they served. The conflict had 
profound political ramifications. Murphy (1992) and New York labour historian Joshua Freeman 
(2000) argue it contributed to the breakup of the broader US civil rights movement and killed the 
idealism of the 1960s public sector union movement. Freeman concludes:  
Keeping the city in chaos for half a year, the walkout rent the civic body, creating wounds 
that remained raw decades later. Nationally, the conflict marked a turning point in the 
history of the civil rights movement, liberalism, and black-Jewish relations. Locally, it 
cast a pall of ill-humour and distrust over social and political relations. Working-class 
New York was never the same thereafter. (Freeman 2000: 215) 
 The 1971 strike by the Newark Teachers Union to eliminate ‘unprofessional duties’ including hall and lunchroom 15
supervision, while driven by a desire to ensure its members had guaranteed breaks, developed a similarly racially 
divisive dynamic. Without the groundwork to build community alliances and incorporate the demands of 
predominantly African American parents who already struggled with the inadequacies and inequities of the school 
system, the narrowly conceived contract fight was perceived and portrayed as a strike by relatively privileged, 
majority white teachers against struggling black families (Golin 2002; Weiner 2012).
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In comparison Chicago had a much higher proportion of black teachers and administrators. The 
union more easily and directly interacted with black community activists, resulting in less 
adversarial relations. The Chicago union supported demands for community control in exchange 
for support for their own collective bargaining campaigns. A convergence of interests was made 
in fighting school closings and mass teacher layoffs from proposed budget cuts (Murphy 1992: 
247-248).  While professional autonomy is crucial to teachers’ work, with the socially vital role 16
of educators particularly in marginalized communities, the narrow pursuit of occupational 
interests has significant limits. 
 Particularly in the US, struggles over teachers’ professional autonomy continue to be 
racialized. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, NYC charter schools, particularly the Success 
Academy chain led by the high profile Eva Moskowitz, have widely touted a highly scripted 
model of teaching. She argues that a relentless focus on drills, rote learning and strict discipline 
is necessary for their black and Latino pupils from predominantly low income families to excel, 
as measured on the basis of their standardized test results. Conversely, allowing teachers to 
interpret the specific needs of their students and using more open-ended forms of instruction, is 
associated with perpetuating the existing dismal results for poor, racialized children. The 
significance of socio-economic context in educational inequity is dismissed by Moskowitz and 
others as tantamount to harbouring low academic expectations. One of the greatest challenges of 
New York State’s parent-led standardized testing Opt Out movement, whose success is described 
in Chapter 5, is to build alliances with working class racialized parents. Then Secretary of 
 The New York Teachers Union, while lacking the formal collective bargaining rights of its successor, succeeded in 16
many of its campaigns in blending the desire of its members for better working conditions with the needs of students 
and their families for better learning conditions. The Teachers Union operated from 1916 until its destruction during 
Cold War purges of public employees associated with the Communist Party (Taylor 2011).
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Education Arne Duncan dismissed the movement in 2014 as “white suburban moms who—all of 
a sudden—their child isn’t as brilliant as they thought they were, and their school isn’t quite as 
good as they thought.” (Rethinking Schools 2014). In Chicago, activists in the predominantly 
African American South Side have linked the usage of standardized test scores that label their 
schools as failures, to a drive to racially gentrify their neighbourhoods by replacing these schools 
with charters that can exclude local students from enrolment (Rethinking Schools 2014). This 
work is ongoing in NYC, where members of the Movement of Rank and File Educators caucus 
within the UFT have led public campaigns to increase the number of funded sports and 
extracurricular activities offered in the small high schools which replaced large institutions in 
Latino and black communities in Harlem, the South Bronx and central-eastern Brooklyn. In 
doing so, they confront the argument of many neoliberal advocates that the well-being of 
students is primarily measured by test scores, and reassert the role of teachers as activists for the 
interests of their students. 
 Robertson cites Marxist political economist Harry Braverman who studied tendencies in 
capitalism towards the deskilling of labour, in describing a grim vision of emerging 
neoliberalized categories of teachers. They are differentiated from a once universal ‘service 
teacher’, the conventional full time, permanent career teacher and union member, in terms of job 
security and work autonomy. The ‘teacher bricoleur’: teacher managers and entrepreneurs are 
free floating consultants paid on temporary contracts according to performance, rather than 
collective agreements. They earn bonuses and retain some professional autonomy through 
churning up new forms of education ‘innovation’ and while supervising other teachers. At the 
bottom are temporary teachers. Epitomizing the new precariat, they are unable to market 
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themselves like the bricoleur, and so float between short-term jobs without security or 
professional autonomy (Robertson 2000: 209-210). Robertson poetically describes their 
precariousness: 
The temporary teacher is dependent largely on personal networks, becoming friendly 
with and getting along with key personnel in the school’s administration. A change of 
personnel can result in the need to renegotiate the social relationships and social 
arrangements again. Managing this network requires a different set of skills: deference, a 
sense of being able to  manage even the toughest class, of being on top of it, and always 
available. ‘Filling in’ is both a way of operating in the world and of understanding the 
world; it is like marking time and being marked by time. (2000: 211)  
These conditions are the reality in all three cities for many, particularly new teachers without 
permanent status. To a greater extent this is deliberate in New York and Mexico, whereas in 
Ontario it is the result of a combination of declining student enrolment and budget cuts. 
 Education professor and former school administrator Larry Cuban takes a stance distinct 
from the more direct critics of neoliberal education policy cited here. He alternately critiques or 
supports various aspects of what he describes as the ‘dominant reform agenda’ since the early 
1980s in the US. Cuban eschews the term ‘corporate reform movement’, arguing that it implies 
more unity of motivation and strategy among its participants than really exists. He does not 
utilize the concept of neoliberalization to describe the shift in education politics either, though he 
notes the increasing shift towards market-style models and discourses in education alongside 
other public institutions. However he demonstrates (2013) that despite various waves of top 
down reforms in recent decades such as mandating new curriculum guidelines, pedagogical 
practices or technology, what teachers do in their classrooms has not changed radically. In this 
sense, Cuban is arguing that a greater degree of resilience exists among teachers in determining 
how they work in the face of externally imposed policies than is typically acknowledged by the 
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advocates of these policies or their opponents. He explains in an earlier book based on similar 
studies of teachers’ work: 
[T]eachers use (and have used) their limited discretion in classrooms to construct 
practical blends of teaching traditions to manage efficiently 25 or more students while 
addressing the abiding expectations of a community with long-standing beliefs about 
what schools ought to do. In addition, they teach content and skills tailored to both 
shifting currents in the larger society and their sense of what will work best with the 
students they see daily -regardless of what policy makers and administrators cajole or 
demand from teachers. Most top-down policies ignore this slender autonomy that 
teachers possess and use. (Cuban 2009: 63) 
Cuban does argue that some recent policies like student standardized testing and its linkage to 
teacher evaluations through Value Added Metrics (discussed in Chapter 5 for their use in New 
York), have demonstrably changed teaching. For the worse, and in ways contrary to the goals 
claimed by their proponents, with rote learning and drills on test questions pushing aside student-
centred inquiry. Cuban is significant as a high profile mainstream voice within North American 
education policy who argues that teaching would most likely change for the better if would-be 
reformers attempted to overcome their inability to see schools and the classroom from a teachers’ 
perspective, and focused on meaningful engagement through professional development 
programs. I am inclined to agree with outspoken Texan school superintendent and anti-
standardized testing activist John Kuhn (2014), that many advocates of neoliberal education 
reforms may indeed have good intentions, but that the end for most others is profit-making 
through privatization and weakening teachers’ unions. Cuban’s efforts to understand the practical 
effects of contemporary education policy on teachers’ work are very valuable. 
 Particularly in Mexico and the US, in the face of a much more severe political attack than 
was generally the case in Canada, the national AFT, NEA and SNTE and many local leaders in 
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the 1990s adopted varying forms of accommodations with the neoliberal drive for ‘teacher 
accountability’ (Riegel 2003; Peterson 1999). These leaders and academics like Charles 
Kerchner and Julia Koppich argued (1997) for a turn away from militancy and the defence of 
contractual rights, to embrace new forms of teacher evaluation as a mark of ‘professionalism’, 
alongside teacher voice in school budgeting, teacher evaluation, hiring and firing decisions, 
implicating union members in managerial decision-making. Forms of this have been pursued by 
the United Federation of Teachers in New York City, as I will show in Chapter 5. I argue, 
following Riegel, that Canadian teachers’ unions largely avoided falling into this false dichotomy 
of feeling a need to choose between professional responsibility versus upholding their members’ 
salaries and working conditions.  Within the time period of the case studies, some Canadian and 17
US union locals, notably the Chicago Teachers’ Union since 2012, alongside the Mexican 
democratic teachers’ movement (the CNTE) demonstrate the possibilities of placing the concerns 
and needs of parents and students alongside teachers, and struggling for them aggressively 
(Brogan 2013; Weiner 2012). In the case of the CNTE, this is a tradition in which the movement 
is rooted, though with the necessity of continual renewal. Nevertheless, this dissertation argues 
that North American teachers’ unions should place more of an emphasis on defending the 
professional autonomy of their members from incursions by neoliberal policy. Some thoughts on 
overcoming the existing institutional barriers will be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
 Kerr argues that the Alberta Teachers Association embraced a similar stance to the NEA and the AFT, of so-called 17
‘new teacher unionism’, de-emphasizing collective bargaining for ‘professional responsibility’ (2006: 153).
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2.7: Teachers’ Unions & Labour 
 Many of the similarities and differences between US, Mexican and Canadian teachers’ 
unions originate in the divergent histories of the labour movements of these countries, in turn 
shaped by distinct political and economic contexts. Among the most significant differences, the 
dominant teachers’ organizations in Canada and US evolved over the 20th Century from 
associations  primarily concerned with professional practice and with limited capacity for 18
collective action, to full-fledged labour unions that struck over salaries and working conditions. 
An overview of this development and its significance for struggles over professional autonomy is 
provided in section 4.1. In Mexico, from the earliest local unions to the National Union of 
Education Workers (Sindicato Nacional de los Trabajadores de la Educación -SNTE) founded in 
1943, teachers have affiliated within self-identified labour organizations. However in all three 
countries, labour law maintained a status for public school teachers apart from most private 
sector workers, either by their status as teachers or as public sector workers, which while 
favouring organization by making membership a statutory condition of employment, also 
typically came with considerable limitations on the right to strike.   19
 The greatest difference among teachers’ unions in North America is the relative 
independence of US and Canadian teachers’ unions from their respective governments, and the 
historic domination of the main Mexican teachers’ organization, the SNTE, by the state (Cook 
1996; Bensusan & Middlebrook 2013). These relationships reflect the divergence between the 
 The American Federation of Teachers was founded in 1916 as a labour union, but was dwarfed until the 1960s by 18
the National Education Association.
 Teacher are under the Education Act in Ontario rather than the provincial Labour Relations Act. They are under 19
separate labour codes in the US and Mexico. In the latter they are legally prohibited from joining union federations 
with private sector workers.
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freedom and subordination of unions generally in these countries. Teachers’ unions in Canada 
and the US have been subject to legal intervention in various forms on numerous occasions, 
however they can still be said to represent the interests of their members. In Mexico, as will be 
discussed below in Chapter 4.1, the state has intervened within the SNTE, as it has in most major 
unions, to remove and impose leaders according to its political and economic agendas. Part of 
this intervention is conducted through legislation, for example the ‘taking of note’ (toma de nota) 
process which gives the state ultimate approval over the appointment of union officials, or the 
determination of the legality of proposed strikes by a tripartite board comprised of government, 
business and state endorsed labour representatives. In many other instances, state intervention 
within Mexican unions has been wholly illegal and without judicial consequences, as when 
police have violently attacked union conventions in the process of electing representatives 
considered undesirable by employers or the government (Bensusan & Middlebrook 2013). In 
other cases, the Mexican government has simply not intervened and refused to investigate when 
factions within unions commit electoral fraud or physically attack their opponents, as has 
occurred on innumerable occasions within the SNTE as described in Chapters 4 and 6. Finally, 
while teachers’ unions in Canada and the US have long and complex relations with political 
parties and governing politicians, which on various occasions has arguably limited their 
autonomy (Weiner 2012), most Mexican unions including the teachers, were historically 
formally aligned with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). With its predecessor parties, 
the PRI ruled Mexico as a de facto one-party state from the late 1920s until the late 1990s, losing 
the presidency only in 2000. The corporatist structures that bound most Mexican unions to the 
state began to break down in the late 1980s as the ruling party shifted from an authoritarian 
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populism based in part on the support of mass unions, to neoliberal technocracy in the context of 
a deep recession and preparations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (Bensusan & 
Middlebrook 2013). 
 The privatization of state enterprises in the 1980s and loss of much of the PRI’s 
institutional power amid formal democratization in the late 1990s, contributed to the rapid 
decline of most PRI-aligned unions, though as will be explained in Chapter 6, not the teachers’ 
union. Unionization in Mexico fell from around 30 percent in 1984 to less than 10 percent by 
2010, though most of these numbers are comprised by company unions (Fairris & Levine 2004; 
de la Garza Toledo 2012). As a result of declining employment in unionized industries, 
offshoring facilitated by trade agreements, new non-union plants, a lack of success in organizing 
new service industries, vicious employer anti-unionism frequently aided by the state, and a 
cultural turn to conservatism, US union membership has declined steadily in the private sector 
since the early 1980s (Fletcher & Gapasin 2008) to 6.7 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2016). It has remained relatively steady among public employees at 35.2 percent (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2016). Not subject to most of the conditions described above, public school 
teachers are distinguished as among the job classifications with the highest rates of unionization 
(Brogan 2013). Private sector union membership has also declined in Canada, but to 15.2 percent 
(Statistics Canada 2016). While subject to similar pressures related to globalization, Canada 
retains a much more favourable labour law regime amid a generally more social democratic 
political culture (Lipset & Meltz 2004). Meanwhile, Canada’s public sector union membership 
has also remained stable but at 71.3 percent (Statistics Canada 2016), making universally 
unionized teachers stand out less.   
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 Unionization rates vary dramatically within all three countries due to distinct regional 
economic structures and differences in labour law and political culture. Rates in Canada ranged 
from 20 percent in Alberta to 37 percent in Quebec and Newfoundland (Statistics Canada 2016). 
In Mexico it ranges from 26 percent in Tamaulipas to 10.6 percent in Baja California, though it is 
difficult to know what this really means, since many ‘union members’ are unaware of their 
affiliation, as the organization holds a secret ‘protection contract’ with an employer (de la Garza 
Toledo 2012: 454, 468). These regional variations do not directly affect teachers in either 
country, who are statutory members of their respective unions. A far wider range exists in the 
United States, between New York State at 24.7 percent and South Carolina at 2.1 percent 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016). A significant factor behind this range, the existence of ‘Right 
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to Work’ legislation which makes union membership for employees of unionized workplaces 
optional, does apply to teachers. As a result, the proportional membership and therefore the 
strength of teachers’ unions in the US varies dramatically between those in the socially 
conservative and anti-union ‘right to work’ south, and the rest of the country.  
2.8: Towards a Labour Geography of Teacher Autonomy 
 This dissertation seeks to build on theoretical understandings in several areas at both the 
general sub-discipline level such as comparative education policy and labour geography, as well 
as far more specific studies on the composition of urban teachers’ unions and movements. I hope 
to demonstrate the centrality of the conflict over the professional autonomy of teachers to the 
contemporary neoliberalization of education. The literature of critical policy mobility studies and 
labour geography is useful for understanding how both state authorities and unions use scalar 
strategies. The former seeks to enhance their authority and out-scale geographically defined 
pockets of resistance, while sometimes drawing on the resource of policies from elsewhere. The 
latter attempts to mitigate the spatial unevenness of its power in order to negotiate at a higher 
scale when appropriate to do so. 
 To clearly reiterate a sentiment which has guided the direction of this chapter, this study 
on the impact of contemporary neoliberal education policy on teachers’ work is based on the 
argument that teachers exercise considerable agency. I say this in challenge to scholars who in 
their description and analyses view the neoliberalization of education as a totalizing force . I 20
argue that this buries the real or potential agency of teachers and other actors to contest this 
 I would place some works by Henry Giroux in this category.20
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process. Even when they conclude with a call to arms, what comes across is that the neoliberal 
transformation is overwhelming; if this is truly the case, what prospects exist for resistance?  
 While it is seldom conceived by their practitioners as of a political nature, let alone as 
acts of resistance, teachers’ agency is exercised day to day by individual teachers determining 
how best to meet the needs of their unique group of students. This resilience has been identified 
by Cuban (2009, 2013) and other researchers on classroom practice and its persistent non-
alignment with top-down education policy, in which teachers are seldom consulted substantively. 
The intervention of teachers’ unions and organizations in the determination of the state’s 
education policy has a higher profile. Across North America, teachers through collective action 
have affirmed Springer’s (2012) contention that neoliberalism is not an invincible juggernaut. 
However the strategies of their organizations vary considerably. Despite high profile struggles in 
Chicago, Oaxaca or British Columbia, the case studies of this dissertation reinforce that for the 
most part these interventions are more typically within the set parameters of state-labour 
relations. Sometimes teachers’ organizations intervene in ways which accommodate neoliberal 
reforms or advocate for them (Riegel 2003). It is also far from the case that teachers’ 
organizations exert overwhelming power over state authorities, as anti-union critics like the US 
Hoover Institute’s Terry Moe (2011), former Ontario Conservative leader Tim Hudak, or 
Mexicanos Primero have claimed. This is overwhelmingly clear from the consistent erosion of 
the working and employment conditions of teachers by these governments. 
 This dissertation begins from the premise that professional autonomy is desirable not 
only for the quality of teachers’ working conditions, but is also essential for an education system 
that meets the unique needs of its students. A critique is woven throughout the high profile 
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studies and reports such as those cited here issued by the Brookings Institution, the World Bank 
and the OECD, which all too often dismiss the voices of teachers as being self-interested, despite 
their integral role in education. Meanwhile, senior policy advocates and business leaders are 
lauded as authoritative voices that are ideologically neutral or driven by altruistic concern for the 
needs of students. What is consistent in these neoliberal prescriptions for education are policies 
that reduce overall funding levels for public schools and fill the void with privatization -either 
through the creation of new markets or the downloading of financing onto parents. The power of 
teachers in their schools and in their communities is an obstacle for these policies. 
 I argue above that preserving the professional autonomy of teachers, which can only be 
done by their individual and collective agency, is so critical in the contemporary context of 
public education, because neoliberalization cannot substantially advance without the 
transformation of the labour process of educators. This is what makes the existing spaces of 
labour autonomy in the classroom important and worthy of study. It also suggests a certain 
methodology in which drawing directly on the experiences of classroom teachers is particularly 
key, as will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 This study demonstrates that scale has real, tangible meaning for social movements and 
workers contesting state strategies. For those concerned with the strategies and dynamics of 
social movements and their fates, I argue that it is more productive to study how these 
movements successfully or unsuccessfully interact with scale as defined by state structures and 
other institutions, than to argue that scale should not be used as a way to conceptualize political 
geography because it is a hierarchical form of thinking. Here, I argue that Marston et al (2005) 
and Springer’s (2014) calls to forget about scale as a way of thinking prefiguratively for a more  
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horizontal politics, are unhelpful for understanding movements and organizations that must 
confront and negotiate with the state. Likewise, understanding the politically contingent nature of 
the state and its strategies are important for comprehending the prospects for social movements 
and labour. The state is not ideologically neutral as the advocates of neoliberal policies infer 
(unless these governments act against their wishes). However as Nicos Poulantzas (1978), Bob 
Jessop (2002) and other critical social theorists have argued, capitalist states are also far from 
politically monolithic. Considerable space exists within the North American context for 
sufficiently powerful movements of teachers and their allies to challenge the dominant neoliberal 
governmentality and even implement alternatives. 
 In Figure 2, I seek to visually represent how teachers’ organizations, state authorities and 
various policy advocates utilize scalar strategies in their efforts to shape public education in 
North America. It must be emphasized that this is an extremely general schema for 
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understanding scalar structures and flows of influence within public education across North 
America. For example in the extremely hierarchical official union structures of the SNTE, there 
are few spaces for grassroots influence on the direction of the national executive as there are 
through the delegate assemblies of the dissident CNTE movement or other unions like OSSTF. 
Likewise, in many specific local contexts in the case studies of this dissertation, teachers have 
made meaningful connections with parent leaders, as with standardized testing Opt Out activists 
associated with the MORE caucus of New York’s UFT, discussed below in Chapter 5. However 
Figure 2 indicates that a disconnect exists in typical conditions. 
 Figure 2 shows the scales of institutional structures within which teachers’ professional 
autonomy and education policy in general exists and are developed in North America. Four 
scales of power relations are shown here, from the classroom to the national level. While these 
scales depict an overall hierarchy of authority, more horizontal relations also exist, as between 
different levels of unions and governments, as well as spaces for bottom-up contestation as 
exercised by some community and parent groups. Despite the global reach of their activities, I 
placed powerful multilateral nongovernmental agencies like the OECD in a tier alongside 
national governments to illustrate how the authority of the former is contingent on the 
recognition and uptake by state authorities. I argue that at least within the context of Canada, the 
US and Mexico, these global policy developers and advocates derive their primary importance 
from their usage by domestic elites to validate their own policy agendas.  21
 One of the most important case study distinctions within Figure 2 is the virtual absence of 
a national level tier for education policy in Canada. What is more difficult to clearly depict here 
 An analysis gained from Panitch & Gindin (2012) and in the context of education policy, from Verger (2009).21
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are differences in the degree of centralization between the US and Mexico. Whereas US federal 
intervention in education policy alongside an increase in funding, has grown substantially since 
the passage of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 2001 and Race to the Top in 2009, much of this 
national authority was relinquished to the state level with the Every Student Succeeds Act of 
2015. However the latter law only codified widespread state exemptions and modifications from 
NCLB policies that had existed in practice almost since its enactment. The federal level remains 
important in the US for its role as a high profile bully pulpit to set a national agenda and define 
the ‘common sense’ of education policy, which is subsequently articulated and rolled out to a 
large extent by state governments. The institution of mayoral control in New York and other big 
US cities represents a different scalar approach to place power in the hands of a local executive. 
By contrast, education policy in Mexico was steadily centralized over the 2000s, particularly 
with the constitutional amendments of 2012-2013 that prohibit state-level exemptions from 
national evaluation programs, and the uploading from states of responsibility for SEP employee 
salaries.  In Ontario, the key scalar shift since the turn of the 21st Century has been the 22
uploading of collective bargaining from school districts to the provincial level, following British 
Columbia and other provinces (Sweetman & Slinn 2012). In both Mexico and Canada, I argue 
that the primary objective appears to be to exert greater executive control over labour 
negotiations, though mayoral control appears to have accomplished this as well. 
 Teachers’ unions and movements have responded in highly divergent ways. While the 
CNTE coordinated nationwide waves of strikes and mobilizations against education reforms in 
 However it was accompanied by the further downloading of school operations and maintenance costs to the states, 22
which can further pass them on to municipalities, which can decide again to shift this burden directly onto the 
parents of students themselves through annual fees. The government of Mexico City has taken on many of these 
costs (though in the case of school maintenance, arguably not yet sufficiently), ensuring that no fees are charged to 
parents, whereas in Guerrero and elsewhere, parents must contribute to the upkeep of the school.
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2013, obtaining some limited negotiations with the Secretary of the Interior, it ultimately fell 
back on fighting these policies to the greatest extent within their southern regional base. The 
UFT struggled to exert influence over the uploading of policymaking to the governor’s mansion 
in Albany, while community organizations led by parents, with some dissident teacher 
participation, effectively challenged statewide testing policies in 2015 and 2016. In Ontario, the 
provincial level of OSSTF has successfully fended off further incursions on professional 
autonomy, but many teacher unionists especially in Toronto, were frustrated by the sapping of 
meaningful local negotiations, as most issues were now determined at Queen’s Park. Despite this 
overall scaling up of struggle, I argue that examining teachers’ contestation of challenges to their 
professional autonomy at the local level is still crucial, as this is the place where educators live 
and work, and are most likely to construct meaningful and more broad alliances. In democratic 
unions (ruling out the national SNTE), a significant degree of its internal political culture is 
formed at this level. With the exception of the massive state-level and occasionally national 
mobilizations fielded by the CNTE or OSSTF and other Ontario unions at the provincial level, it 
is at the local level where rank and file teachers predominantly exercise their agency, above all in 
the schools and classrooms where they work, and where the extent of their professional 
autonomy is ultimately determined. So while studying the scaling up of neoliberal policy 
formation and its contestation, I simultaneously strive to maintain a focus on the differentiation 
among sites where abstraction meets lived experience.  
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3. Methodology 
The central argument of this dissertation is that contemporary neoliberal policies in North 
America are undermining the professional autonomy of teachers, and that this process is highly 
but unevenly contested. I use three case studies to assess the impact of neoliberal policies on 
local school systems and the response of teachers’ unions in Toronto, New York City and Mexico 
City. In this chapter I critically reflect on my relationship to my research, my reasons for 
focusing on teachers as key interview subjects and participants in my ethnographic observations, 
and the details of how I conducted these aspects of the study. I then address the challenges of 
ethics and rigour derived from my own partiality which has frequently aided me in granting me 
‘insider’ access. I explain my use of these case studies and what I believe my choice of these 
three urban sites contributes, before providing an overview of my use of policy analysis and 
journalistic sources.  
 Finally, I situate this study within larger epistemological approaches. I explain how my 
interest in teachers as qualitative sources partially stems from a critique of how contemporary 
neoliberal policy advocates frequently employ a positivist rationale to exclude the voices of 
educators from their narrow perspective of legitimate sources. I broadly identify my approach 
with critical realism, especially for its acknowledgment of both the significance of both social 
structure and individual or collective agency, and in my efforts to draw out threads of 
commonality among widely divergent social contexts.
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3.1: Situating the Researcher 
 In researching and writing this dissertation, I draw heavily on personal, professional and 
political experience formally external to being a graduate student of geography. Jensen and 
Glasmeier (2010) contend that it is important for geographers to situate themselves socially in 
order for their work to have a policy impact outside academia. Previous to them, Haraway (1991) 
developed the concept of ‘situated knowledge’, that in contrast to positivist claims to objectivity, 
ideas are shaped by the social context of the researcher and the relationship of the researcher 
with their subject of study. Here, I attempt to ‘situate’ myself in relation to my research on 
teachers’ work and education policy. 
 My mother is a career high school teacher, the head of her Modern Languages 
department, and a proud union member. To a great degree inspired by her, I taught full time for 
four years in several high schools in the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) prior to entering 
doctoral studies. In a context of declining student enrolment and reduced provincial government 
funding, I was unable to obtain a permanent position, working back to back year-long contracts 
covering for absent teachers. I taught a broad range of courses in the social science and 
humanities, usually with ‘difficult’ classes in predominantly working class and racialized 
schools. A placement in an ‘academic’ school, located in an affluent west Toronto neighbourhood 
was an eye opening experience for me. Seeing firsthand how the nature of teaching is 
fundamentally shaped by the context in which we work, influencing the sources of stress, usage 
of time and pedagogy we employ, where possible in my field work (especially in Toronto) my 
interview recruitment strategy reflected this reality.  
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 During this time I was elected to the local union executive representing short and long 
term substitute secondary teachers, the Occasional Teachers Bargaining Unit (OTBU), and have 
participated in a number of local and provincial-level union committees, serving on the 
negotiations table team in 2015. Through these experiences I am well positioned to understand 
some of the contemporary realities of teaching within a Canadian context, and the institutional 
responses of teachers’ unions to the challenges addressed by this dissertation. Along with 
advantages in terms of institutional access and an intuitive understanding of the processes of 
teachers’ work, my personal, professional and political involvement with public school teaching 
and unions yields significant ethical questions for academic research. I have attempted to address 
this with an extended explanation of my background, which I continue below under subsection 
3.3, the “Challenges of rigorous but not disinterested research.” 
 I also benefit from strong connections with teachers and education activists in Mexico 
originating well before I formally began my field work for this dissertation. Beginning with a 
yearlong undergraduate study abroad program in 2005-2006 at the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM) in the capital, I have travelled extensively in Mexico, visiting 
friends and making contacts for the past decade, becoming fluent in Spanish. Many of these 
connections were facilitated by my involvement since 2010 with the Trinational Coalition in 
Defence of Public Education, led by Maria de la Luz Arriaga Lemus, professor of economics and 
education finance at the UNAM and participation in its frequent conferences in Mexico City, 
usually co-organized with the dissident Mexican teachers’ movement, and networks of post-
secondary academics. In 2012, I produced and directed a micro budget feature-length 
documentary film, 2 Revolución: Free Trade, Mexico and North America, focusing on the 
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privatization of public education and other impacts of neoliberal policies in Mexico. I screened it 
for audiences of teachers and labour activists from the cities of Matamoros on the US border, to 
Cuernavaca, south of Mexico City. I have written for OSSTF publications on conflicts over 
public education in Mexico and the United States, and represented my union at various 
conferences organized by the CNTE. My prior experience with US teacher activists was much 
more limited, mainly meetings at biennial Labour Notes conferences in Chicago. My York 
University geography colleague Peter Brogan, whose dissertation focused on teachers in New 
York and Chicago, was instrumental in making initial introductions here, as was New Jersey City 
University professor of education Lois Weiner. 
 In support of my scholarly work I am drawing then on experiences and identities that are 
beyond the strictly academic. I identify this approach with phronesis, which as applied by Basu 
(2009) who citing Flyvbjerg, emphasizes “practical wisdom, practical judgment, common sense 
and prudence” (quoted in Basu 2009: 481). This concept was useful in Basu’s research on 
neoliberal education policy as a theoretical framework addressing practical challenges of data 
collection in which contemporary state authorities are frequently reluctant to provide access to 
key information. She argues then that documenting and analyzing the challenges created by these 
gatekeepers in order to understand the power relations that are embedded in these practices is in 
fact part of the research process, as is describing the utilization of unconventional strategies to 
circumvent them, as a means of assisting future scholars in the field (Basu 2009: 481-482). I 
have attempted to do so below in discussion of my access to three case study sites.   
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3.2: Participatory Ethnography: A Focus on Listening to and Talking with Teachers 
 The key questions of this dissertation on how teachers’ work and professional autonomy 
have been transformed by contemporary neoliberal policy, necessitates prioritizing research 
among those directly affected, the educators. In doing so I am seeking to remedy the absence of 
classroom teacher voices in much of qualitative education policy research. I argue that this short 
coming can often be associated with an ideological orientation that sees teachers categorically as 
a key part of problems facing education, as with Brun’s report on Latin American and Caribbean 
teachers for the World Bank (2014), Viteritti’s edited collections on US schools (2000, 2009) and 
most publications from the Brookings Institution. Teachers are seen as interested parties who 
must be acted upon, as the objects rather than the subjects of education policy (Rezai-Rashti 
2009: 307). Sometimes as with People for Education’s annual survey of Ontario schools or in 
Pinto’s (2015) research on the province’s education policy, principals are taken up instead where 
a ‘ground level’ perspective is needed. Alternately, the format of the research itself precludes the 
inclusion of teacher voices, as with the annual Education at a Glance (568 pages long in 2015) 
comparative study of national education statistics compiled by the OECD. Influenced by my 
background as a teacher, and as a graduate of a labour studies program that emphasized social 
research in which workers are given a voice, I have strived to remedy this deficit of teachers 
talking about their own work. I used a combination of formal semi-structured recorded 
interviews from 40 to 90 minutes in length which following Cresswell (2013), utilized 
phenomenological questioning on how policies impacted their experiences and the contexts in 
which this occurred, and ethnographic study by participating in teachers’ organizations and 
working alongside other educators. During the course of my field work, I was able to identify 
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and solidify my understanding of what became the five common dynamics  of the 23
neoliberalization of teachers’ work through their de-professionalization, that I consider across my 
three case studies. I benefited in this way from what McDowell (2010) describes as the 
importance of flexibility and allowing the focus of one’s research to evolve through interviews. 
Concurring with her argument for the importance of analyzing the context and dynamics of 
interviews and of field research more broadly, I describe the basis of my work at the three case 
study sites below. 
 For my Toronto case study, I decided to focus my qualitative research around interviews 
with English teachers in two high schools, whose widely divergent student demographics 
attempts to capture my first hand observation as a teacher that working in a school whose 
students are predominantly from poor and working class families makes the job fundamentally 
different than the experience of teaching children from affluent families. These interviews were 
conducted between August 2014 and July 2015. One school is located in an affluent, 
predominantly white Anglo west end neighbourhood. The other is in Scarborough, one of 
Toronto’s ‘inner suburbs’ populated by young first generation families from south Asia and east 
Africa, as well as seniors of south European descent. I have taught from six months to a year in 
the English departments at both of these schools. I was able to recruit former colleagues to 
participate in interviews representing a fairly representative cross section of years of teaching 
experience, participation in school activities (including department leaders ), age, gender, 24
political views and union involvement. All eight of the teachers interviewed at these two schools 
 Identified in the preceding chapter in the ‘Neoliberal Education Policy’ subsection.23
 Referred to in Ontario as Curriculum Leaders and Assistant Curriculum Leaders.24
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were white, which unfortunately is fairly close to being representative of their departments which 
were 80-90% white. The teaching staff of their schools were perhaps 70-80% white in 
2014-2015, in line with demographics across the Toronto District School Board (which is 
attended by a majority of students of colour). It was a priority for me to recruit a cross section of 
participants who would represent the ‘average’ sentiment of teachers in regards to how their 
work has changed over the course of their careers, and how they conceive of teacher-principal 
power relations, the role of the union, and the impact of standardized testing and curriculum 
changes on their work, among other issues. In addition to these representative participants, I 
interviewed self-identified union activists and elected OSSTF leaders at the local and the 
provincial level. I also spoke with academics and leading policy activists in the Ontario 
education sector. Unfortunately I did not have success arranging meetings with officials from the 
provincial Ministry of Education or the Toronto District School Board. 
 My interviews in Mexico were more extensive, in part to compensate for less initial 
familiarity. In November 2013, I participated in an international conference in Mexico City of 
teachers and union leaders from Canada, the US and Mexico. With the help of several secondary 
school teachers in the audience from Mexico City, I later made a presentation on my proposed 
research to around 20 local secondary teachers, from which I obtained contact information and 
offers of introductions to school principals. These initial contacts were thus made based on my 
legitimacy established by speaking at the conference, and being introduced by others as a known 
union activist and teacher and therefore as somebody likely to be sympathetic to their struggles. 
My position as a graduate student of geography was of secondary importance. From here, I 
ultimately worked with two teachers who facilitated my visits to their two schools on multiple 
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occasions in May to June 2015 and February 2016, to interview in Spanish a sample of their 
colleagues who were diverse in terms of experience, subject area, age, gender, school 
involvement and political views. I also interviewed administrators and principals at both schools, 
and at one, the official SNTE school representative.  
 Crucial in selecting these two schools was the relative comfort of my hosts for bringing 
me into the building to meet their colleagues and principals. In Toronto, I was able to arrange 
most of my interviews outside of schools because of prior contacts and the relative ease of 
commuting around the city. In Mexico City, most of these interviews occurred on the school site; 
in the staff room during a break, or in a classroom at the end of the day. As a result, by necessity 
these were schools with friendly principals willing to cooperate with a visiting foreign 
researcher, and with whom the teachers of their schools generally enjoyed relatively good 
relations. This is an important limitation of my study in Mexico City. I chose not to pursue 
official endorsement, support or assistance from a higher level of education authorities, due to 
the suspicion in which I knew they were held by many teachers.   25
 In these visits I was also able to observe the ambience of both their overall conditions of 
teaching, and specifically the ways in which they interacted with each other, and what was said 
between colleagues in the staff room or the corridor. I was frequently invited into classrooms to 
speak to students and participate in lessons. Following Kearns (2004), I saw these informal 
observations as an important, often nonverbal supplement of information to my interviews. I 
would write my observations into my notebook in the evening on the bus and Metro rides back to 
 In February 2016, while chatting informally with a newer teacher in the staff room of her school regarding her 25
opinions on the national teacher exam, a colleague of hers walked in and sat at a nearby table with his lunch, making 
a face in my direction. “Don’t worry, he’s not with the INEE [the state evaluation agency].” she laughed, pointing at 
me. “You’re not though, right?” she quickly added. My answer sufficiently reassured her and her colleague, that he 
joined our table and shared his packet of cookies.
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my apartment. Though not coming close to my years in Toronto high school classrooms, I 
wanted to gain a first-hand idea of what it was like to teach in a Mexico City secondary school. 
In my initial visits, I relied heavily on my hosts to introduce me to people. My hosts were well 
known by their colleagues as prominent activists with the CNTE. While it’s possible this 
association could have coloured the responses of my interviewees, I do not believe it was a 
significant factor because these formal interviews were conducted privately one on one and 
because I emphasized my credentials as a politically independent researcher. Compared to the 
power imbalance of the employer/employee relationship particularly in Mexico’s highly 
conflictual context, being associated with a labour activist created far less of an obstacle, and 
was helpful insofar as teachers knew I was not associated with the authorities.  
 Both of these schools were located in the massive borough of Iztapalapa in southeastern 
Mexico City, with over 2 million residents, the largest of the city’s 16 delegations. Predominantly 
working class, the neighbourhoods in which these two schools are located are representative of 
this urban region, much of it built informally by rural migrants during the city’s population 
explosion from the 1950s through the 1970s. Unlike in Toronto, I decided to base my interviews 
in two schools serving demographically similar communities. While it would not be as useful in 
distinguishing the differences of teaching in an affluent versus a working class school, it 
recognized that the latter represented the characteristics of the vast majority of the city’s schools, 
in comparison to Toronto’s far larger middle and upper classes as a proportion of the population. 
By controlling for socio-economic status, it would also help me to identify other causes for 
divergent experiences of teachers in these schools.  
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 Like in Toronto, I also interviewed a selection of activists, in the case of Mexico City, 
active CNTE members and elected officers, who were invaluable for providing explanations of 
the development of the movement over the past twenty years since the publication of Maria 
Lorena Cook’s key study (Cook 1996). I especially wanted to understand the context of the 
movement in the city, as so much journalistic and activist coverage focuses on more visible 
CNTE contingents in Oaxaca, Michoacan and Guerrero. I always asked them to explain why the 
movement in the capital had seldom reached the strength of these predominantly rural states. In 
addition, I benefited from substantial interviews from several of Mexico’s most engaged 
academics on labour and education policy. Mexican education policy makers were far more 
receptive to meeting with me than their equivalents in Toronto or New York. I was able to meet 
and interview senior officials of both the Mexico City SEP and the national administration, from 
whom I gained some valuable insights into how their government interacted with multilateral 
agencies like the OECD and UNESCO. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain a response from 
the official leaders of sections 9 and 10 of the Mexico City SNTE, its national office or its 
research centre, the Institute for Education and Union Studies of the Americas.    26
 Lacking long standing prior connections, my field research was the weakest in New York 
City. The initial assistance of my PhD colleague Peter Brogan was invaluable for introducing me 
to several politically active teachers he had interviewed as part of his research. I then employed a 
snow ball approach, interviewing these teachers and obtaining further contacts for subsequent 
interviews. I also separately contacted several teachers I became aware of through their online 
 Instituto de Estudios Educativos y Sindicales de América -IEESA, which while a branch of the SNTE, regularly 26
issues far more critical reports and commentaries on the government’s education policy. See for example, IEESA 
(2013). Algunas Consideraciones del Pasado Reciente del Sindicalismo Docente Latinoamericano. [‘Some 
considerations on the recent past of Latin American teacher unionism’. Downloadable at www.ieesa.org.mx 
 72
blogs and essays on their experiences in New York’s school system. My teacher interview base in 
New York was therefore skewed towards the politically active, specifically those involved in the 
Movement of Rank and File Educators (MORE), a dissident left caucus within the UFT. Despite 
this limitation, I benefited from articulate, highly critical perspectives on the experience of 
education under mayors Bloomberg and De Blasio, and Governor Cuomo. These teachers 
worked in a diverse range of subject areas, responsibilities (a couple were department leaders), 
representative of age and gender, years of experience, employment status and union involvement 
(a few led their school’s union chapters). Like in Toronto, they were predominantly white. They 
tended to teach in struggling inner city schools, but with a fairly even dispersal across the city, 
though a disproportionate number taught in alternative schools with some exemptions from the 
state’s standardized student evaluations. The interviews were conducted during visits in 
December 2014, January and April 2015, with follow up conversations later that year in October. 
Most were conducted in coffee shops, two were done in the schools where they worked. Many 
participants did not have positive relationships with their principals.  
 With my relatively short stays in the city, it was not possible to conduct extensive 
observations in the schools themselves. I did receive formal recognition from the NYC 
Department of Education’s Institutional Review Board, but this did not assist me in obtaining 
responses to interview requests from any central office administrators. Noting my colleague 
Brogan’s difficulties in receiving any response from the offices of the UFT, I sent multiple letters 
and emails, including a letter of introduction from the president of OSSTF, to no avail. Social 
networks ultimately connected me to two former union officials. Where I lacked access to 
institutional settings, I was able to engage in a limited ethnographic study of the organizing of 
 73
the MORE caucus, by attending a number of their meetings, conferences, socials, and a rally at 
the state capitol in Albany in January 2015. Attending a major international conference of union 
activists in Chicago organized by Labor Notes in April 2016 was particularly valuable. The event 
included hundreds of teachers from Canada, Mexico and the US, many of the latter with the 
United Caucus of Rank and File Educators, which has emerged as a significant network for 
dissidents in AFT and NEA affiliated unions. Sessions provided an international analysis of 
common policies like standardized testing. I will discuss my observations from this significant 
event of grassroots policy mobility in Chapter 4. 
 While doing my field work, I gained insights both from intensive hour long interviews 
and while carrying a note pad, observing meetings and in casual ‘off the record’ conversations. I 
frequently found that respondents were more willing to make a controversial point in this 
manner, usually when I had returned months after conducting a formal recorded interview. I 
followed up with the more intensive interview participants concerning the status of my research, 
out of a belief that these individuals should share in some of the results of the work to which they 
contributed (Kearns 2004). Maintaining these connections over time was a challenge, for which 
the easy ‘check-ins’ facilitated by social media was indispensable. Occasionally reading through 
the news feeds of several informants active on Facebook has been helpful for rapidly informing 
myself of key events in education politics in their cities and finding relevant reposted articles and 
essays. I identify with the experience of Harng Luh Sin (2015) who considered how his extensive 
use of Facebook to communicate with his informants blurred the lines of when he was and was 
not in the field, as well as raising new issues around confidentiality, such as the appropriateness 
of publicly sharing content on media profiles which implicates your social relationship, and of 
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‘partiality’. I grappled with these questions, but the reward was the development of stronger 
connections and linkages of trust than would otherwise be possible, and on which so much of the 
research behind this dissertation depended. 
3.3: Challenges of ‘Rigorous but not Disinterested’ Scholarship 
 Following Berg and Mansvelt (2004) and taking a post positivist stance, I am stepping 
forward from the impersonal third person perspective here to be clear about how my research has 
been shaped by my world view. It should be evident by this point, that I make no claims to 
political neutrality. I have tremendous faith in and loyalty to teachers and the teaching 
profession, and I am ardently opposed to what I have described above as the neoliberalization of 
education. I believe that students are best served by teachers free to exercise their full 
professional experience and training, alongside democratic community engagement and the 
equitable allocation of resources to mitigate the effects of a socio-economically unequal society. 
I am an active and proud trade unionist. For me this precipitates a sincere critical approach to 
analyzing the shortcomings of labour’s leadership and organizations, from the perspective of 
someone who wants them to do far better in serving the interests of and emancipating working 
people and the oppressed. A critical, honest approach to my research is for me the essential core 
of academic integrity, which I hope I have maintained throughout this dissertation.  
 I draw inspiration from Rosemary Hennessy’s phrase, ‘rigorous but not disinterested 
scholarship’, which she used to describe her study of the sexual politics of queer organizers in 
the Maquiladora factory districts (2013). Hennessy’s ethnographic research made her a witness 
to crowded meetings of women workers in small living rooms, and spirited protest camps of 
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fired activists outside the gates of windswept, sterile industrial parks. Some of whom confided 
their personal stories to her, on the basis of trust in a woman who was in solidarity with their 
struggles and their lives. A key challenge emerges in balancing one’s sense of loyalty of and 
solidarity for a movement or group, with the necessity of maintaining one’s academic integrity 
—especially when it is necessary to make a critique. I grappled with this while analyzing the 
union of which I am an active part, OSSTF. Perhaps it was more challenging in relation to the 
Mexican teachers’ movement, given the far greater stakes in which their struggle unfolds. I do 
believe that all academic work which attempts to influence policy and intervene in politics is 
highly subjective and thus with inherent biases, following McDowell (2010), Jensen and 
Glasmeier (2010) and the feminist adage, ‘the personal is political’. I have made mine clear. 
 It is likely impossible to verify, but taking a clear political stance on the issues at the core 
of this dissertation may have cost me opportunities to meet and interview those who oppose my 
views. These are the consequences of doing critical social research. My political views are easy 
to triangulate from an internet search.  On the other hand, by conveying a stance of being pro-27
teacher and pro-union, I built trust with individuals I would not have likely reached to a great 
degree if I portrayed myself as an impartial academic. Along with establishing a basis of trust in 
the context of the hierarchical worker-boss power relations of the workplace, I may not have 
been considered worth the time of my informants to accompany to a colleague’s school on their 
day off, or to shuttle around to talk with teachers on their breaks between classes amidst the 
chaos and cacophony of hundreds of adolescents. Or to confide their critique of their principal or 
 I had a unique opportunity to confirm this after writing my Masters thesis. A freedom of information request by a 27
human rights NGO released an email transcript where Canadian embassy staff in Mexico recommended that the 
CEO of a mining company not contact me due to my published critical stance on the activities of his company.
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their school’s union representative, if it wasn’t in the service of a project that strives to assist in 
creating a better public education system and better working conditions for teachers. I believe I 
have gained more than I have lost. 
3.4: Using and Choosing Case Studies 
I focused on the city scale of union organization to conduct my intensive case study 
research as I believe that despite uneven degrees of regional-federal centralization across the 
three national contexts , this scale is still the most critical for determining the results of 28
collective bargaining. This is so through the intersection of the union local’s capacities and 
political culture, with the resources and political direction of both the municipal school board 
and varying levels of senior government in each country. Further, I believe that the city-level 
local is optimal for studying the political culture of each union, as this is the scale at which rank 
and file education workers are most likely to engage meaningfully with their union. As Herbert 
(2010) contends, for qualitative geographers, using locally situated case studies enables us to add 
depth to our research by understanding the context of a specific place. From here, we can assess 
whether our case study confirms broader trends and dynamics on the bases of comparability 
(with the five dynamics of de-professionalization I introduced in Chapter 2.5), or is in fact an 
aberration, opening up further discussion. I gained an understanding of these cultures and 
institutional histories through field work within a political entity defined around these cities.  
 Ranging from a very strong influence by the Mexican Secretary of Public Education, the employer of all public 28
primary and secondary teachers in Mexico and determining the education policies of Mexico City, to the New York 
City Department of Education which sets its terms for negotiating with the UFT, though influenced by state and 
federal policies. The Toronto District School Board lies in-between, as the signatory to the collective agreements of 
Toronto teachers, though its role has diminished with the assumption of negotiations over monetary issues since 
2009 by the Ontario Ministry of Education and the provincial unions.
 77
 Where field work allowed, within these cities I focused on specific schools, as I believe 
that the greatest contributor to the political culture of a larger union local are the interpersonal 
relationships at the worksites between members, and between members and their immediate 
supervisors. I found that teacher sentiment and responses towards the policies which confronted 
them were significantly determined through discussions with their colleagues. While the 
classroom is ultimately where teachers’ professional autonomy is practiced or suppressed, I 
orient my case studies at the city level because while the individual practices of teachers matter, 
ultimately what I am studying here are collective phenomena of protest and acquiescence. 
 As the populations of the three cities varies widely, so do their teachers’ union 
membership . In 2016, approximately 22 000 teachers (including substitutes) were employed by 29
the Toronto District School Board, affiliated to two unions, the Elementary Teachers Federation 
of Ontario and the Ontario Secondary School Teachers Federation.  New York City’s United 30
Federation of Teachers identifies 150 000 members including retirees and workers at non-
education employers. The New York City Department of Education reports 77 000 active 
teachers. In Mexico, the key sub national unit of organization in the education system is at the 
state level, which is paralleled by the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE)’s structure 
of local union sections. As the nation’s capital, Mexico City has a special administrative status 
and its own education authority. It was titled the Federal District until 2016, when it achieved the 
full status of a state and is known since as simply Mexico City. The SNTE has three Mexico City 
 Publicly employed K-12 teachers are automatically members of their unions in all three case studies because of 29
contractual labour rights, and in Ontario, statutory membership in a teachers’ federation.
 An additional 6 000 unionized teachers are employed by the publicly funded Toronto Catholic school board. They 30
are largely excluded from this study as they work under a separate local employer. 
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sections, representing elementary and secondary teachers (Sections 9 and 10), and support staff 
(Section 11), totalling nearly 200 000 members. I focus on the teacher locals. 
 These three cities, the most important urban centre of each country, have been chosen as 
they are the highest profile sites for the implementation of education policy, and as a result, 
provide a litmus test for the subsequent rollout of policy elsewhere within each country, as well 
as transnationally.  Each location also features the closest proximity to elite policy makers of 31
any local school authority in these countries (along with Washington, DC). These are also sites 
with histories of union and dissident teacher organizing (Cook 1996; Taylor 2011; Sweeney 
2013), in cities with rich popular left traditions. Since the 2008 recession, teachers’ unions in 
each country have fought high profile battles. The character of these struggles grew beyond 
contesting specific government policies associated with austerity, curtailing union rights or de-
professionalization, to take on a larger public ideological significance of defending education as 
a social good, upholding workers’ rights and opposing privatization. A brief survey includes the 
battles of the British Columbia teachers almost continuously since the first election of the 
provincial Liberal government in 2001 (Sweetman & Slinn 2012), the Chicago teachers’ strikes 
of 2012 and 2016, and the protests and strikes of the teachers of southern Mexico in 2008-09, 
2013 and 2016. The three cities at the centre of this study have also been focal points of struggle. 
Toronto as the most militant site of a two week illegal province wide teachers’ strike in 1997 
 This dynamic is especially evident in Mexico’s highly centralized education system, as well as within the still 31
nominally state-based US system in which a very significant degree of ‘policy borrowing’ is evident among local 
and state authorities vying to meet federal guidelines. It may be less evident in Canada with the dominance of 
provincial governments in education policy, passed to school boards for implementation. However here too, charter 
school advocates in Ontario laud their implementation in Alberta, and precedents set by the Ontario government in 
the mid 1990s with standardized testing (exposed to media and policy scrutiny in major centres like Toronto) were 
then enacted in other provinces (Sweetman & Slinn 2012).
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(Head 2005), Mexico City as the centre of the 1989 national strike for salary increases and union 
democracy (Cook 1996) and New York in the 1960s (Murphy 1992).  
 However the teachers of these cities have not massively participated in such an upsurge 
in recent years. My choice of these three sites is guided by an interest in why greater levels of 
protest have yet to emerge so close to the policy-making centre. In contrast with each country’s 
‘hot spots’ in which militant unions resist aggressive governments, the situations and experiences 
of the teachers and unions in my case studies may be more typical of the status quo in their 
countries, and therefore perhaps more useful for understanding it. I utilize an ‘extended case 
method’ (Peck & Theodore 2015), in order to understand the movement of neoliberal education 
policy and its impact on teachers’ work in North America.
3.5: Policy Analysis 
 My interviews with teachers about their work is complemented by a thorough reading of 
relevant state/provincial government legislation and reports, school board documents, think tank 
recommendations and political party policies to understand how the professional autonomy of 
North American educators is impacted by neoliberal policy. Following the education blog 
Chalkbeat NYC was essential for keeping up with education policy changes in New York, 
collected on this website either as original articles or links to the New York Times, Capital New 
York, NY Daily News and other sources. Profelandia was similarly useful for its original 
coverage and as an online aggregator on Mexican education, from the statements and activities 
of Mexicanos Primero on the right, to the CNTE on the left. The La Jornada newspaper was 
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essential for Mexico City and national education news. For Ontario, the Toronto Star most 
frequently covered the city and province’s education news, followed by the Globe and Mail. 
 I argued above in Chapter 2.5 that the key impetus for neoliberal policy in Canada, the 
US and Mexico originates from domestic sources. However, the recommendations of multilateral 
organizations like the OECD’s comprehensive annual Education at a Glance reports and the 
World Bank’s Making Schools Work (2011) and Great Teachers: How to Raise Student Learning 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (2014) are important because of their prestige and influence 
on state policy makers. Frequently these documents offer a more candid expression of elite 
rationales for policy, unvarnished by savvy public relations framing. With this non-academic 
‘grey literature’, I develop my principal original insights on policy mobility by applying a 
content analysis (Forbes 2004). 
 Following Ball and Junemann (2012: 12-17), I developed a network ethnography analysis 
of the relations between key policy actors through internet research to complement information 
gleaned from interviews and participation in conferences and other instances of direct 
observation, attempting to “follow the policy” (Peck & Theodore 2015: 42). Simple methods 
include studying the programs for conferences like ‘Building blocks for education: whole system 
reform; an international summit of education experts’ hosted by the Ontario government in 2010. 
The event was co-chaired by Michael Fullan and Michael Barber, former special advisors on 
education to the premier of Ontario and the prime minister of the UK, respectively. Studying 
conference participation at events like Labour Notes can be applied to understanding national 
and international relationships between teacher unionists, and their articulation of shared 
analyses (see Chapter 4). Other examples include comparing lists of key funders and directors in 
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the ‘Who We Are’ sections of think tank websites, and tracking citations of experts through 
policy documents and media reports. This approach was particularly useful for me in presenting 
my analysis in Chapter 6 of the specific conjuncture of individuals and organizations that 
facilitated the rapid passage of amendments stipulating standardized teacher examination in the 
Mexican constitution, immediately following the inauguration of President Enrique Peña Nieto 
in December 2012. In the absence of access to the confidences of the participants themselves, the 
intention is to see if it is possible to find linkages between events like the visit of former Florida 
governor and future unsuccessful presidential candidate Jeb Bush to Toronto’s elite Economic 
Club in October 2013 to promote charter schools, for the development of policy by Ontario’s 
business associations and political parties. Or the extent to which pro-privatization lobby group 
Students First directly inspires its southern cousin Mexicanos Primero, which subsequently 
exercises significant influence over the education priorities of the government of Mexico. 
3.6: An Epistemology for Studying Teachers’ Autonomy 
 To argue that ideological commonalities exist among these various policies and that they 
consistently generate forms of resistance aligns with the concept of Global Managerial Education 
Reforms (GMER) utilized by Verger et al (2013), and the concept in comparative education 
studies of a Globally Structured Agenda for Education (GSAE), described in sections 2.3 and 
2.5. GSAE and GMER as paradigms within education policy challenge the concept of a 
Common World Education Culture (CWEC), developed by John Meyer to explain 
commonalities in education policy and governance around the world through concepts of cultural 
convergence. Whereas Meyer assumes a context of social consensus, the former two paradigms 
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begin from an analysis of divergent political-economic interests and struggles. A parallel in 
geographical studies of policy can be found in Peck’s approach to policy mobility, which he 
conceives as situated within and filtered through heterogeneous political contexts at various 
scales, against more conventional political science policy transfer approaches in which rational 
actors simply choose the best ideas from elsewhere, unclouded by ideological subjectivities 
(Peck 2011). Through all of these alignments, I place my research within a conflict paradigm 
approach to social research (Babbie & Benaquisto 2002: 34).  
 A significant part of contemporary education policy studies illustrates the political 
dangers of a positivist ideology applied to social research. While the original 19th Century 
philosophy of French sociologist Auguste Comte that observation is the only valid source of 
scientific knowledge has seen many revisions and qualifications, it continues to have a 
significant influence over geography and other social sciences (Berg & Mansvelt 2004: 
162-163). American sociologist C. Wright Mills levels this critique of a misapplication of 
techniques attributed in a simplified form to the natural sciences: 
This model of research is largely an epistemological construction; within the social 
sciences, its most decisive result has been a sort of methodological inhibition. By this I 
mean that the kinds of problems that will be taken up and the way in which they are 
formulated are quite severely limited by The Scientific Method (Mills 1959: 57).  
As standardized test scores are used as a primary means of evaluating the effectiveness of 
schools, and once inputed through the complex algorithms of ‘Value-Added Measures’, the 
capabilities of individual teachers (Kuhn 2014; Ravitch 2013), we see how this limited 
conceptualization of knowledge is mobilized politically with the consequence of degrading the 
teaching profession. If neoliberal policy advocates are able to frame the success or failures of 
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schools to policy makers and the general public on the basis of these metrics, I contend that the 
insufficient challenge they receive is due to the hold of positivist ideology over both elite and 
popular ideology. Social researchers using positivist methods employ the ‘God Trick’ (Haraway 
1991) of framing their investigation as disembodied, objective, impartial and scientific. Their 
choices which led them to define and limit this study, the criteria for determining the ‘cut score’ 
on a test, or what is worth measuring on a test in the first place, are externalized from 
consideration. Their personal identity and their relationship with the subjects (objects?) they are 
studying is also considered irrelevant. Their numbers represent facts. They are not the biased 
opinions of self-interested individuals (usually teachers in this context). Drawing on continued 
widespread support for positivism, the fixation on test score results intersects with the political 
agenda of blaming teachers and schools for low results, while ruling the extremely divergent 
socio-economic contexts in which students live as irrelevant. Attention to these issues is 
considered tantamount to “making excuses” in the words of American policy advocate Michelle 
Rhee and former NYC schools chancellor Joel Klein. In the context of education research, 
positivism is exploited to marginalize the legitimacy of qualitative research that focuses on 
understanding the experiences or ‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway 1991) of key participants in 
the education system, teachers, students and their parents.  
 This analysis informs my decision to draw on qualitative research methods centred on 
interviews with teachers and participatory observation of their workplaces, alongside policy 
analysis drawing on texts and interviews with policy experts. However dismissing the 
importance of quantitative research in education policy would be self-limiting. What I argue is 
that positivist ideology facilitates political agendas served by reports based on test scores, when 
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the mystique of quantitative data serves to mask these studies from challenges to their 
legitimacy. Critical quantitative research challenges positivism by identifying power dynamics 
and questioning previously assumed governmental rationalities, while using tools like GIS to 
provide a more fulsome contextual analysis of social phenomena (Basu 2004b, 2009). This 
dissertation draws on quantitative data on numerous occasions, merged with insights gained from 
qualitative research with teachers and other participants, to create a ‘thick description’ (Berg & 
Mansvelt 2004: 177) of the present context of the struggle over teachers’ professional autonomy. 
 In orienting my approach to research, I take inspiration from Mill’s formulation of 
striving to understand how the agency of individual actors and groups such as teachers and their 
organizations, or neoliberal policy advocates and their think tanks, fit into the larger social 
structures and political contexts of contemporary Canada, US and Mexico. Much of his ideas are 
articulated in The Sociological Imagination (1959), where he critiques both empirically 
unmoored ‘Grand Theory’ and data driven ‘Abstracted Empiricism’ disconnected from social 
context. He exhorts a ‘pragmatic’ mixed methods approach, “Let every man [sic] be his own 
methodologist.” (Mills 1959: 224) Even more importantly, he urges a concrete engagement by 
the researcher with the structural problems and conflicts of the day. He poses this with a formula 
familiar to any community or labour organizer, of connecting personal troubles to larger political 
issues, linking individual biography to human history. Given my personal approach to this 
research that I described in sections 3.1 and 3.3, these ideas certainly resonated with me. 
 While writing this dissertation, I struggled to avoid ‘getting lost in the weeds of empirical 
details’, at the risk of burying broader applicable conclusions, crowding out the space and time to 
theorize on my findings. In Mill’s words, “Social research of any kind is advanced by ideas; it is 
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only disciplined by fact.” (1959: 71) My insider status as a teacher-researcher within many of the 
communities I observed perhaps made this inevitable. A challenge was to know when I had 
followed my case studies far enough to be able to substantiate my key arguments. At what point 
would going any further reduce my dissertation to a descriptive narrative, only of interest to 
those concerned by what happened during the first two decades of the 21st Century in the 
education systems of three specific North American cities? Citing Mills again, “The problem of 
empirical verification is ‘how to get down to facts’ yet not get overwhelmed by them; how to 
anchor ideas to facts but not to sink the ideas. The problem is first what to verify and second how 
to verify it.” (1959: 125) 
 In developing a conscious epistemological and ontological analysis, I was drawn towards 
the philosophy of critical realism as a useful paradigm. Most resonant to my case study approach 
is critical realism’s recognition that social structures are defined and shaped by local contexts. 
Further critiquing positivist ideology as well as the relativism of postmodernism (Vandenberghe 
2014: 3-4), a key insight of critical realism is that facts have moral and political implications and 
that “social science can study both ideas, and what those ideas are about.” (Bhaskar & Collier 
1998: 387). Social scientist Roy Bhaskar and others critique philosopher David Hume’s law that 
one cannot logically argue that a value is derived from a fact. In doing so, they develop their 
concept of the explanatory critique. Social research commonly involves interpreting and 
understanding aspects of the dominant society. Critical realists argue that value judgements are 
often necessarily inherent in these descriptions, as of class structure or social inequality. Citing 
Marx, Freud and Nietzsche: 
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They explain ideas that we have and live by, in ways that throw doubt on their truth. They 
do not replace the question of truth of an idea by the question its causal origins… Rather, 
they pose the questions of the causation and function of an idea together with that of its  
truth or falsehood, in such a way that the causal accounts show why we tend to have  
certain kinds of false belief. (Bhaskar & Collier 1998: 386) 
Another example for understanding critical realism’s concept of explanatory critique: 
[T]he study of a particular society and a particular time will include information about the 
class structure of that society at that time, and also about the ideas prevalent in that 
society, which will include ideas about its class structure. It may be that many people in  
that society believe that it is a classless society, when in fact it is not…. Such beliefs may 
not be accidental. They may, for example, be caused directly or indirectly, in all or in part 
by just that class structure whose existence they are denying. (Bhaskar & Collier 1998: 
387) 
Bhaskar and Collier observe that close ties exist between many critical realists and social critics 
more generally, as with advocates for socialism. One explanation for this is their contention that 
explanatory critique must be made within the context of a specific society for it to have any 
effect or consequence (Collier 1998: 467). This argument has a particular resonance for my 
writing. Vandenberghe (2014) contends that a strength of critical realism is that it blends a 
recognition and analysis of both the significance of social structure and individual/collective 
agency. This enables critical realism for example, to supersede false dichotomies between 
humanist and structuralist conceptions of Marxism and left social theory. It recognizes both 
forms of analysis as important for developing practical understandings of social contexts, 
towards the objective of progressive political change (Vandenberghe 2014: 5-6, 30-32). This 
dissertation’s critique of neoliberalism’s impact on public education and on teachers’ work 
provides for a logical affinity with critical realism. 
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4. North American Geographies of Neoliberal Education 
Policy 
Introduction 
 This chapter provides an overview of some key historic developments in the geographies 
of neoliberal education policy in North America up to the early 21st Century, providing the 
necessary background to the city specific case studies in the following chapters. It has four 
purposes. The first is to provide some historical context with an overview of the development of 
teacher unionism in North America as it relates to the defining of professional autonomy (section 
4.1). Second, I will demonstrate the importance of the particular histories and characteristics of 
the case studies New York, Mexico City and Toronto as major urban centres for the development 
of education policy and its diffusion (section 4.2). The third is to demonstrate the existence of a 
specific community of neoliberal education policy mobility and resistance at the North American 
continental scale, within the larger global flows of ideas and governance networks (section 4.3). 
Here I will provide some illustrative examples of education policy movement and convergence 
across borders within North America since the 1980s. The final section (section 4.4) will survey 
the experiences of North American teacher organizations and unions of cross border 
collaboration on strategy and responses to state policy. These demonstrate diverse tendencies 
from conservative to radical unionism, and forms from top-level meetings of leaders to 
horizontal networks with more bottom-up participation. This chapter will introduce the 
importance of both structural factors informing distinctive local, regional and national contexts, 
and the agency of significant organizations and individuals in creating the North American 
geographies of neoliberal education policy, out of which important common developments can 
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be identified. As may already be observed, this chapter will move up and down geographical 
scales, analyzing developments in teacher unions and education systems from the case study 
cities to the state/provincial and national levels. 
4.1: Professional Autonomy and the History of Teacher Unionism: Three Contexts 
 This section is an overview of the emergence and key developments of teachers’ unions 
and movements and their relationship to professional autonomy in Canada, the US and Mexico 
up to the time period covered in the case studies of this dissertation. While distinctive historic 
trajectories followed in each country, broad parallels in periods of development are made below. 
We begin with the initial development of public education and formation of teacher organizations 
in the early 20th Century, follow to their consolidation as important institutions shaping the 
profession in a context of teacher militancy and the postwar demographic boom, and conclude 
with the emergence of neoliberal governance, fiscal austerity and an overall shift to the defensive 
for teacher unions. This sets the context for the current challenges to professional autonomy.  32
 Despite many publications on how neoliberal policies have adversely impacted teachers and public education, 32
relatively few address teachers’ resistance or analyze teacher unions. The literature has tended to focus on 
individuals and at the school level, usually due to ethnographic methods, neglecting the role of teachers’ unions at 
larger scales (Riegel 2003: 109). Studies on teachers’ unions tend to be official histories like OSSTF’s two books 
which focus on Ontario government policies and responses of the federation leadership (1971; 2005). The best 
history of the NEA and the AFT up to 1980 remains Murphy’s Blackboard Unions (1992). The Global Assault on 
Teaching, Teachers, and Their Unions (2008) edited by Weiner and Compton, is an important resource for the 
breadth of its cases. Worth Striking For: Why Education Policy is Every Teachers’ Concern (2015) link a critique of 
contemporary neoliberal policy to teachers’ union struggles, also done by Weiner (2012). Labour geographers 
Brogan (2013) and Sweeney (2013) are important contributors, focusing on the US and Canada, respectively. 
Organizing Dissent by Cook (1996) for the depth she provides on the internal functioning of the CNTE, remains one 
of the best books in English not only on the Mexican teachers’ movement, but on the nation’s labour movement. 
Foweraker (1993) is an important source for the emergence of the CNTE, also covered by journalist and author 
Monsiváis (1987). Hernandez Navarro, one of Mexico’s foremost journalists on eduction politics is a definitive 
source on the movement (2012, 2013). No Habrá Recreo: Contra-Reforma Constitucional y Desobediencia 
Magisterial (2013) (No Recess: Constitutional Counter-Reform & Teachers’ Disobedience) accounts the policies of 
President Peña Nieto’s first two years, the response of the CNTE, and downfall of SNTE boss Elba Esther Gordillo.
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The Foundation of Public Education & Emergence of Teachers’ Unions 
 At its origins in the late 19th Century, mass public education in Canada and the United 
States typically gave little recognition of the capacity of teachers, many of whom had limited or 
no professional training, to interpret the needs of their students. As documented by Ravitch 
(2000) in New York City’s early schools, methods frequently consisted of rote learning using 
standard texts in large, crowded classrooms. Few students were expected to achieve more than 
basic literacy and numeracy. Public education in Mexico expanded rapidly in the 1920s, 
following the end of the Revolution. Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution, ratified in 1917 in the 
midst of the violent upheaval, specified that the public education system would be “free, secular 
and scientific,”  emphasizing a drive at the time to inculcate a humanistic vision of education as 33
an important pillar of national development. It also served to demarcate the autonomy of teachers 
from the influence of still powerful clerical authorities and local caciques (traditional clientelistic 
political bosses). Teachers were important actors for the post revolutionary state. In terms of 
furthering social development, they were among the few federal employees located in every 
community. They perpetuated official ideology by cultivating a national identity (Torres 1991).  
 The professional prestige of teachers was heightened by their status particularly in rural 
communities, as local intellectuals and leaders. As a function of the vast ambitions of the post-
revolutionary SEP under Jose Vasconcelos that public education would be the medium for social 
transformation, combined with the limited resources of the state, teachers were given a broad 
 The adjective ‘socialist’ was added by the left nationalist president Lazaro Cardenas in 1934, removed by his 33
conservative successor Manuel Avila Camacho in 1946 (Brambila 2008: 213).
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mandate within which they had considerable autonomy.  Not only were they to establish schools 34
in rural communities, but to serve as local leaders and organizers. Their formal training followed 
after the fact. These were the origins of the foundational myths of the Mexican education system 
of dedicated teachers rooted in communities. They are alternately described as the ‘martyrs’, 
willing to acquiesce to abysmal salaries and working conditions (Martin 1994). Reflecting the 
predominantly rural population of Mexico through the first half of the twentieth century and the 
government’s priority of establishing federal authority across its vast geography, the first 
teachers’ colleges in the 1920s opened in Michoacan, Hidalgo, Guerrero, Guanajuato and Puebla, 
with an emphasis on agricultural training. Rural teachers led many peasant and Indigenous 
movements, and in the case of Lucio Cabañas, a graduate of the Ayotzinapa teachers’ college in 
Guerrero in the 1970s, leftist guerrilla movements  (Padilla 2013; Cook 1996: 243). With 35
education authorities lacking capacity to regularly surveil schools, a significant degree of de 
facto professional autonomy existed for decades in many regions of Mexico, until the 
introduction of the first national standardized testing system in 1992 (Aboites 2012: 16).  
 While New York and Ontario’s secondary schools were growing in the 1920s, Mexico’s 
system of middle schools (equivalent to grades 7-9) was only officially established in 1923. As 
late as 1958, while NYC high schools enjoyed a reputation as among the best in the US (prior to 
 Jose Vasconcelos advocated paying rural teachers twice the rate of urban teachers to encourage graduates to leave 34
cities, “there is no better training for a young teacher than to discover in the countryside the needs of the school, and 
to have to improvise their solution.” (quoted in Curiel Méndez 1982: 442) His vision never came to pass. Urban 
teachers and their schools have historically enjoyed considerably better working conditions and more resources.
 Rural normal schools became the spiritual home of the dissident teachers’ movement that coalesced into the 35
CNTE. In the 1980s, a third of all teachers in Oaxaca and Chiapas were Indigenous bilingual instructors when the 
movement emerged and established its stronghold in these states (Solano 2016). They were considered centres of 
leftist organizing by the Mexican government, according to recently declassified Mexican intelligence agency 
reports, leading to efforts since the 1960s to restructure or close the schools. They were also viewed with hostility by 
the official SNTE leadership. Elba Esther Gordillo, SNTE president from 1989 to 2013, described them in 2010 as 
“guerrilla seedbeds.” (Padilla 2013: 24).
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mass expansion in the 1960s), the reappointed Secretary of Education, Jaime Torres Bordet, 
reported that of every 1000 entrants to primary schools, only 114 graduated (an 88.6 percent drop 
out rate). Of these 114, 59 enrolled in secondary school, of which only 27 graduated. One in a 
thousand obtained a university degree (Méndez 1982: 452). Under Torres, the Secretary of Public 
Education (SEP) focused on retaining students and increasing overall enrolment by rapidly 
increasing funding for more schools and teachers (though with miserly salaries) in the 1960s and 
1970s. Like the US and Canada in these decades, Mexico experienced a baby boom, but the 
profoundly centralized nature of infrastructure and the postwar ‘economic miracle’ in Mexico 
City, driven by growing manufacturing industries protected by Import-Substitution policies, led 
to the zona metropolitana (the contiguous urban area of the Federal District and adjacent 
municipalities in Mexico State), growing disproportionately from the migration of poor rural 
families. Mexico City became the preeminent megapolis of the developing world in this period, 
with its education system expanding apace. 
 Mexico’s secondary schools doubled between 1964 and 1970 to 4 379, staffed with over 
78 000 teachers and attended by 1.2 million students (Cosio 1982: 410). Through the 
demographic boom, increased retention and higher graduation rates, secondary enrolment 
increased 1000% from 1950 to 1970 (Levinson 2001: 27). Secondary school only became 
compulsory with the General Education Law of 1993 (Brambila 2009: 219). Enforcement was 
delayed for nearly a decade due to the 1995 peso crisis and an ensuing deep recession (Levinson 
2001: 27). Enrolment reached 93.4 percent by 2000, but only 57.3 percent of students graduated 
(Brambila 2009: 221). Citing government statistics (INEGI) for 2008, Marquez places the 
secondary attendance rate at 72 percent (2008: 156).  
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 The mass expansion of public education in Canada, the United States and Mexico, was 
followed by varying approaches to group together teachers. The remainder of this section 
explores the growth of teacher unionism in this context. In Canada and the US, the dominant 
trajectory was the establishment of professional associations to regulate its membership, 
represented by the National Education Association (NEA) in the US (founded in 1857), which 
included principals and superintendents. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) established 
in 1916, defined itself as a union and affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. It 
remained a minor presence outside of its stronghold in Chicago and non-majority unions in New 
York City, Philadelphia and a handful of other cities. From the outset, responsibility for K-12 
public education in the US was the responsibility of local school boards, directed by state 
governments. Financing was divided roughly evenly between local and state taxes. The Great 
Society program of Lyndon Johnson in 1964 established a precedent for additional funding from 
the federal government. However Washington’s intervention in education policy would not be 
significant until decades later (Murphy 1992: 225; Vergari 2013).  
 In Canada, K-12 education is constitutionally established as a provincial responsibility 
without federal intervention, while the balance of finance and governance powers between local 
and provincial governments was similar until centralization towards the latter in the 1990s 
(Wallner 2014; Vergari 2013: 232). Teachers’ federations had emerged in every province but 
Ontario by 1917, where the Federation of Women Teachers’ Association was formed in 1918  36
 The Women Teachers’ Association of Toronto formed in 1888. They were the first group in Ontario to pursue the 36
distinct occupational interests of teachers as opposed to earlier associations controlled by school board trustees and 
administrators. Confronted by the opposition as late as the 1950s of male elementary teachers to their struggle for 
pay equity and to base pay scales on seniority rather than the grade level taught, women teachers opted for a separate 
gender-based organization until attacks by the Harris government pushed the organizations to merge as the 
Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario in 1998 (Spagnuolo & Glassford 2008: 56-58).
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representing elementary teachers, followed by OSSTF in 1919 and the Ontario Public School 
Men Teachers’ Federation in 1920. Unlike other provinces where teachers formed one unified 
federation  Ontario teachers were divided between five organizations, also including the 37
Catholic Teachers’ Association for those employed in the publicly funded Catholic school 
boards, and an association for the French language public system. None affiliated to provincial or 
national labour federations.  The Ontario Teachers’ Federation coordinated provincial lobbying 38
and represented its five affiliates in pension discussions, but held no formal role in collective 
bargaining. The Canadian Teachers’ Federation had less power, it was an umbrella organization 
tasked with international liaisons and limited forms of inter-provincial cooperation. Ontario’s 
five federations, relatively weak in relation to the provincial government, were strengthened 
institutionally with the Teaching Profession Act in 1944. This made membership in the 
corresponding affiliate and the payment of dues mandatory for all publicly employed teachers. 
With no provisions for certification, decertification or contestation by another union, it 
represented among the strongest institutional language in Canada (Spagnuolo & Glassford 2008: 
58-59; Shilton 2012: 224). However, decades more would pass before the federations would take 
collective action as unions and strengthen the autonomy of the profession.  
 In Mexico, at the urging of President Manuel Avila Camacho and with the assistance of 
the government aligned Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), an array of regional 
teachers’ unions merged into the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) in 1943. Like the 
CTM and the rest of organized labour in Mexico, the SNTE was rapidly absorbed into the 
 Except for Quebec and New Brunswick with separate federations for teachers in the English and French boards.37
 OSSTF and the Ontario English Catholic Teachers Association (OECTA) affiliated to the Ontario Federation of 38
Labour and the Canadian Labour Congress in the mid 1990s, in the context of significant attacks by the governing 
Progressive Conservatives on public sector unions.
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corporatist political structure of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which through 
its predecessor parties had governed Mexico since the 1920s. The takeover of the SNTE in 1948 
by PRI-aligned groups led by Jesus Robles Martin, extinguished democracy within the union. 
Robles and other bosses imposed by the state on unions were known as the ‘charros’ (cowboys), 
for the fashion preferences of the newly installed leader of the railroad workers’ union (Rincones 
2008: 217-218; Foweraker 1993: 45-50; Torres 1991: 118-119; Monsiváis 1987). 
The Consolidation of Unionism & Emergence of Teachers as a Militant Social Force 
 An upsurge of teachers’ activism in 1958 centred in Mexico City and led by the Mexican 
Communist Party, demanded wage increases and control over their own union, in the context of a 
major national strike by railroad workers over similar issues. Both movements were crushed by 
police and military units in cooperation with the charro union leadership. Robles controlled the 
union until 1972, when he in turn was ousted at gun point by Jongitud Barrios and his 
Vanguardia Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Vanguard) group. Barrios had the tacit support of PRI 
officials who were concerned that Robles was unable to control his restive members. Nearly 
from the outset, rather than serving as a legitimate union of educators, the SNTE acted as a mass 
membership appendage of the state-party, like most labour organizations in the PRI’s Mexico 
(Cook 2007; Rincones 2008: 218). The SNTE seldom advocated on behalf of its membership, 
and so teacher salaries and working conditions generally followed the will of the governing party 
in this period. Alongside its subordination to government policy, its corporatist status as a 
political arm of the state mobilized during election periods to support the ruling party, gave it a 
high degree of influence within the Secretary of Public Education (SEP). The union exercised 
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significant control over administration, often controlling the appointment of school and state 
level officials, as well as the ‘sale’ of teacher jobs. While ruling the union, Barrios amassed 
considerable power. Through the 1980s he was simultaneously a federal senator, president of the 
Congress of Labour (the umbrella organization for PRI-aligned unions) and state governor of San 
Luis Potosi (Foweraker 1993: 50-60; Torres 1991: 123; Monsiváis 1987: 170-172). The rapid 
expansion of the SEP in the 1950s-1970s created an increasingly unwieldy bureaucracy highly 
centralized in Mexico City. Combined with a desire to check the pervasive influence of Jongitud 
Barrios, federalization progressed from 1976 to 1982 under President Jose Lopez Portillo. 
Fuelled by a short term burst of oil wealth, the system reached it maximum extent for decades, as 
did teachers’ salaries (alongside workers’ wages overall) (Brambila 2009: 217). 
 The defeat of the initial large scale attempt by Mexico City teachers to organize 
independently of their corporatist leadership and improve their conditions was superseded by 
educators in New York City. With the decline of the Cold War era McCarthyism that had broken 
up the New York Teachers Union, the union benefited from considerably greater freedom of 
association at a time when municipal workers were beginning to organize and private sector 
unionism was near its 20th Century peak of influence (Freeman 2000). The rapid victory 
between 1961 to 1963 of the AFT aligned United Federation of Teachers (UFT) in signing up a 
majority of NYC’s teachers, obtaining legal status as their official bargaining agent and winning 
significant gains after short citywide strikes, had explanations related to far more than a desire to 
match the salaries of skilled unionized private sector workers (Robertson 2000: 101-103; 
Murphy 1992: 222). Murphy refutes claims that it was driven primarily by status conscious, 
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militant male high school teachers in spite of docile female elementary teachers, citing the many 
examples of important female teacher union leaders to this point in New York. She argues: 
If one were to dismiss the gender argument as an explanation of militancy yet agree that 
economic factors alone did not explain the rising militancy of teachers, there was one 
other issue, explored in all the studies, that can serve as a less gender-biased explanation 
of what was happening in the schools... teachers were fed up with the centralized 
bureaucracy of the schools. Teachers complained about oversupervision, increasing 
bureaucratization, inappropriate assignments, and a lack of control over licensing, 
training, and assignments. These grievances go back to the beginnings of unionization; 
after tenure laws had been effectively introduced, teachers were willing to strike for those 
same demands (as well as higher pay) after World War II. (Murphy 1992: 222) 
Alongside the expansion of high school education after the Second World War, teachers in New 
York State in the 1960s and Ontario in the mid-late 1970s made substantial gains in defining and 
protecting their professional autonomy in a wave of union militancy.  In his book on the Newark 39
Teachers Union of New Jersey, historian Steve Golin finds that its strikes in the early 1970s, 
directly inspired by the UFT’s victories, were not solely over salaries or learning conditions, as 
the school board or the union alternately claimed:  
Talking to teachers, I found the dichotomy was false, not only because most striking 
teachers wanted to make more money and improve the schools, but also, and especially, 
because they wanted a third thing: teacher power. ...more than anything, striking teachers 
hoped to end the tyranny of principals and of the Board of Education. (Golin 2002: 3-4)  
Golin quotes a teacher who co-founded the union in the late 1930s, “The personal indignity that 
you had to undergo as a teacher when I first started teaching -you wouldn’t believe it. Being 
treated like children. Whatever the superiors told you, that was law. Unquestioned.” (Golin 2002: 
10-11) 
 British teachers won substantial professional autonomy through the National Union of Teachers in the early 39
1920s. According to Robertson (2000), the Liberal and Conservative parties feared teachers’ links to socialist 
movements and labour, and recognized their significant electoral power. The settlement granted substantial 
professional autonomy and relatively generous salaries and benefits to curry their favour. A national curriculum was 
not pursued for fear a Labour government could implement a socialist curriculum (Robertson 2000: 90-94).
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 Success for the UFT in NYC inspired victories in Detroit and Philadelphia, among 26 
union elections to represent over 74 000 urban teachers across the US between 1961 and 1965. 
Spurred by the upstart AFT that had quickly grown to 110 000 members, the NEA embraced 
collective bargaining and began to formally organize as a union, winning 14 elections during this 
period, representing 21 000 teachers, mostly in suburban and rural districts. The NEA’s 
membership at the time stood at 943 000 (Murphy 1992: 224, 227-228). Increasing competition 
between the two education unions led to calls for unity. While unattained at the national level, 
state-level federations in New York (New York State United Teachers -NYSUT) and California 
affiliated by 1970. These mergers created electorally focused organizations that partially 
addressed the obvious limitations of the urban-focused AFT and the suburban/rural NEA which 
was structured to negotiate with state governments, but had little presence in large cities (Murphy 
1992: 253). Murphy describes how the union victories of the 1960s and early 1970s transformed 
and empowered the profession: 
For elementary teachers, collective bargaining meant breaks from the constant pressure of 
being in front of the classroom for six hours; for high school teachers it meant time to 
prepare for classes; for junior high school teachers it mean relief from extra lunch guard 
duties. Teachers were no longer told arbitrarily when they had to appear at school and 
when they could leave; surprise faculty meetings after school disappeared; and 
administrators could no longer appear suddenly in a teacher’s classroom. Teachers still 
had to report to school at a prescribed time, they still had to attend meetings, they still 
had to welcome in outsiders to their classes, but what changed was the arbitrariness, the 
complete absence of control on the job that teachers had incessantly complained of. If the 
fundamental object of unionism is to give workers dignity on the job, unionization 
achieved that much for teachers and more. (Murphy 1992: 209) 
 Frustrations of a loss of professional autonomy within growing, increasingly 
bureaucratized school boards, resonated with teachers in Ontario a decade later according to 
Peter Hennessy, contracted by the Canadian Teachers Federation in 1975 to survey educators 
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there and in Quebec and New York State, on their motivations for participating in unions. A 
study in 1970 found that Ontario secondary teachers were highly status conscious, subscribing to 
a hierarchy in which academic subjects were ranked as the most prestigious to teach, followed by 
commercial and then technical courses at the bottom (Humphreys 1970). Many teachers in 
Ontario were estranged from their employers by the consolidation of 1400 local boards into 77 
public and 49 Catholic boards in the early 1970s (Hennessy 1975: 9), “foster[ing] suspicion and 
hostility.” (Hennessy 1975: 10) In an alternate interpretation, the decreased proximity to their 
supervisors created the space in many communities for teachers to organize. Hennessy describes 
both the union-building effect of the breakdown of paternalist relationships from the 
amalgamation of small school boards, and foreshadows the political limits discussed in Chapter 
2.6 of collective teacher identity formation that eschewed the community they worked in:  
Schools were becoming larger, more highly structured, and more impersonal as 
management of education increasingly was divorced from teaching. Often, too teachers 
did not identify with the community in which they taught -and often enough did not even 
live there. The result was a progressive sense of alienation from both the school and the 
community; it was to the group, either the union or association -that teachers turned 
increasingly for security and support. (Hennessy 1975: 14-15) 
 An immediate cause of militancy in 1973-1975 was the imposition by the provincial 
government of spending ceilings on school boards in the context of rising inflation, setting a 
maximum funding level per student, and thereby a cap on the salary increases which boards 
could offer to its employees. Boards with the capacity to raise their taxes could not create a 
greater gulf with poorer, usually rural boards , creating a fiscal squeeze on the largest urban 40
boards in Toronto and Ottawa which offered the widest range of programs (Gidney 1999: 114). 
 A foreshadowing of the Ontario government’s later shifting of education funding under the Conservative Harris 40
government in the late 1990s from local taxes to centrally dispersed revenues.
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This policy caused many boards to lay off staff from 1971 onwards (Head 2005: 6-13; Hennessy 
1975: 11). The teachers’ federations pushed back to ensure their members’ salaries would not be 
eroded by inflation. Not having the right to strike, about 7800 public and Catholic teachers 
across 16 mainly urban boards tendered their resignations in protest in November to December 
1973. When the provincial government ruled the resignations out of order, OSSTF and the other 
federations conducted a one day strike on December 18, featuring a rally of over 20 000 teachers 
in Toronto (Head 2005: 12-16; Hennessy 1975: 5-8). Along with restoring school board control 
of funding and initiating a wave of local strikes that won improvements in working conditions 
and wage gains of over 20 percent for thousands of teachers , the action lead to legislation in 41
1975 awarding full collective bargaining rights to the federations including grievance and 
arbitration procedures and the right to strike  (Hennessy 1975: 53). With the legal rights of 42
unions and a demonstrated capacity for militancy that had won significant material and 
professional gains in the mid 1970s, Ontario teachers arrived at unionism. 
 Secondary school became a nearly universal institution in Canada and the US in the 
1960s. In Ontario as elsewhere, this coincided with policy struggles over meeting the needs of 
students who in previous decades would not have attended high school, and sustaining academic 
rigour. The debate impacted teachers’ professional autonomy, as the outcome by the 1980s was a 
more defined curriculum and greater centralization of its development and oversight in the 
provincial ministry of education. OSSTF was particularly vocal where its members’ employment 
 Rapid gains above the rising rate of inflation contributed to the Federal government under Prime Minister Pierre 41
Trudeau instigating wage and price controls. The November 1974 to January 1975 strike by OSSTF Toronto ended 
with an imposed contract well below these gains (Head 2005: 20-24, 31).
 Subject to intervention based on perceived harm to students from extended strikes or lockouts (Hennessy 1975: 42
53). The body established to adjudicate on this basis, the Education Relations Commission, 40 years later prohibited 
a series of local strikes conducted in 2015 by OSSTF in the context of provincial negotiations. 
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and professional integrity was at stake, as when it warned that raising the number of mandatory 
courses would reduce enrolment in electives and potentially increase student drop out rates. Its 
advocacy affected public opinion and was taken seriously by the governing Conservatives 
(Gidney 1999: 96-103). During this period, OSSTF led the other federations in developing 
significant campaign capacity to support or punish politicians and parties at election time. The 
strategy balanced on a tension between pragmatically engaging with the ruling party, and 
assisting the more ideologically aligned labour-endorsed New Democratic Party in the handful of 
areas where a breakthrough appeared possible. 
 When the teachers’ movement resurged in Mexico in 1979 as the Coordinadora Nacional 
de los Trabajadores de la Educación (National Coordination of Education Workers -CNTE), it 
was preoccupied by a layer of bread and butter issues: better medical facilities for public 
employees, the regular payment of salaries and increases to meet rising costs of living. However 
beneath them all was the more intractable, far reaching and ultimately most challenging demand, 
control over their own union, the SNTE. With the SNTE’s far reaching power in the education 
system, union democracy meant professional autonomy (Cook 1996; Foweraker 1993). The 
eruption of the Mexican teachers’ movement in 1979 also marked the end of a decade long surge 
in workers’ organizing and strikes unprecedented since the consolidation of PRI control over 
unions in the 1940s. Both the US and Canada (along with Western Europe) also experienced 
unprecedented strike waves in the early 1970s, pointing to political and economic developments 
(a resurgent left politics and high working class expectations combined with increasing economic 
uncertainty caused by rising inflation and unemployment) that were global in reach, though also 
shaped by distinctly national and regional contexts (Glyn 2007; Brecher 1997). Its specific 
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origins in Mexico evolved from social ferment and popular dissatisfaction with the government 
party in the aftermath of the bloody repression of the 1968 pro-democracy student movement. 
Many Mexican leftists were inspired by revolutionary Cuba and the recently killed Che 
Guevara’s internationalist efforts to foment insurrections among Latin America’s oligarchical 
dictatorships. Cook (1996) emphasizes the significance for the formation of the CNTE, that a 
significant number of its future leaders were graduates of the 1968 student movement. Many 
spent the early to mid 1970s working in central Mexico’s rapidly expanding and modernizing 
industrial sectors , participating in the Insurgencia Obrera (Workers’ Insurgency)  attempting to 43 44
establish militant independent unions in place of the corrupt CTM (Robles & Gómez 1997). 
Others joined predominantly Indigenous peasant and rural labour movements in the southern 
states of Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero, where they fought for land rights (Cook 1996; 
Monsiváis 1987). By the time they became teachers in the late 1970s, these activists in their late 
20s and early 30s possessed considerable experience as organizers in terms of mobilization 
strategies and in facing state repression. As they subsumed themselves in the particular problems 
of their new profession, they retained an outward orientation to building broader coalitions. 
 Triggered by a rapidly rising cost of living due to the large scale development of 
hydroelectric and oil extraction projects and the tepid response of official union leadership 
aligned with Jongitud Barrio, teachers in Chiapas walked out in 1979, soon joined by colleagues 
 The tactic of university graduates taking blue collar jobs to organize in strategic industrial sectors was practiced 43
by Trotskyist and Maoist groups across North America in this period. See Martin Glaberman (2002). Punching Out. 
Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.; and David Owen (2005). My Confession: The Making of a Militant. Toronto: On the 
Edge Press; Robles & Gomez 1997.
 The movement coincided with the 1970-76 regime of Luis Echeverria, who in response to the political context, 44
adopted a stridently leftist ‘Third Worldist’ public discourse and foreign policy. His government created some space 
from repression for labour organizers at multinational corporations. Simultaneously, Echeverria prosecuted a ‘dirty 
war’ against guerrillas radicalized by the repression of 1968, in which he was complicit as the Secretary of the 
Interior (Robles & Gómez 1997).
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in neighbouring Oaxaca. Both were states where his Vanguardia Revoluciónaria had a relatively 
weak hold over the union. Cook (1996) applies to this context an analysis developed by 
sociological theorists Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007) of how successful social 
movements leverage strategic political conjunctures such as intra-elite conflicts. Cook (1996) 
and Torres (1991) emphasize the significance of conflict between Secretary of Education (SEP) 
officials who resented the official SNTE’s control over education and so were endeavouring to 
decentralize some administrative provisions from Mexico City to the state level, where the 
SNTE’s power would be diluted. Recognizing and negotiating with the CNTE in Oaxaca and 
Chiapas provided a means to fulfill this agenda and curb the influence of the national SNTE, 
which was subsequently compelled by the federal government to convene transparent elections 
for the union executives in these states, which the CNTE won overwhelmingly. In applying 
pressure on the SEP to make these agreements, thousands of teachers from Oaxaca and Chiapas 
traveled to Mexico City and erected a protest camp outside the SEP headquarters on Avenida 
Republica de Brasil. They were joined by thousands more teachers from central states 
surrounding Mexico City including Guerrero, Hidalgo, Mexico State and Morelos, though 
notably not many teachers from the capital itself at this time. Cook (1996) explains the failure of 
the movement in these latter states to consolidate themselves due to the far stronger political base 
held there by Vanguardia Revoluciónaria in the form of patronage networks among the union 
membership and alliances with local PRI officials, who were more willing to provide police to 
attack marches and protest camps. Just as crucial, the teachers of Oaxaca and Chiapas launched 
their movement on a much stronger base of prior organization, and pre-existing alliances with 
local peasant and Indigenous organizations, factors which combined with less repression, 
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enabled them to more quickly build up a critical mass of support. When the force of the 
movement ebbed in 1983, the CNTE weakened in these central states, unable to force their 
demands for democratic state union executive elections. However while most state sections of 
the SNTE, including its largest in Mexico City, remained under the control of the charros, the 
emergence of the CNTE in 1979 set a critical precedent for an enduring independent movement. 
While not yet ‘national’ in scope, it established a significant regional base from which it would 
later expand. In the interim, despite these school systems in two of Mexico’s poorest states 
remaining grossly underfunded, the CNTE transformed faculty relations, giving classroom 
teachers a significant voice in their work. (Monsiváis 1987: 193-201; Cook 1996: 105-173, 
195-196; Foweraker 1993: 50-60). Given the importance of the SNTE in politics at all levels, the 
CNTE made an impact beyond the schools where their members worked: 
At the local level, dissident teachers broke with clientelistic ties to national union and  
government officials and created largely autonomous union organizations that forced  
administrators to abide by teachers’ collective decisions concerning their jobs and 
workplaces. Ambitious local union officials, displaced in those areas where the dissident 
teachers’ movement emerged most strongly, lost their support base and often their 
political careers, and local PRI politicians could no longer rely on teachers’ networks for 
local electoral campaigns. The success of the dissident teachers’ movement in some 
regions of the country upset the regional balance of power and threatened, where it did 
not sever, previous ties with state and federal government, party, and union officials. 
(Cook 1996: 24) 
The Neoliberalization of Education: Teacher Unionism on the Defensive 
 After common, though distinctly timed, periods of growth and consolidation, teachers’ 
organizations in all three countries confronted firm barriers to further advancement and gains. 
The timing and strength of these blockages varied, but all related to contexts of state fiscal 
austerity and the emergence of neoliberal education policy. With some notable exceptions, a 
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shared outcome was the decline of teacher militancy, reducing opposition to the implementation 
of neoliberal reforms. New York teachers were the first, facing the city’s fiscal crisis of 1975, 
triggered when commercial lenders refused to extend and roll over the city’s debt. The White 
House and bankers saw an opportunity to press a common ideological cause to force New York 
City to dismantle its welfare state, beginning by diminishing the ranks of its municipal 
employees, and lowering the expectations of those who remained. It had a profound impact on 
the UFT. The role of New York City as a US test case for urban neoliberal policy will be 
explored further below in section 4.2.  
 In Mexico, the 1982 debt crisis was even more drastic. The value of a worker’s wage 
plummeted. Government spending on public education as a share of the Gross National Product 
declined from 5.2 percent in 1982 to 2.45 percent by 1989, at the end of the deep recession 
(Torres 1991: 121). Teachers’ salaries fell by 62 percent between 1982 and 1989, reaching the 
national minimum wage  by the end of the decade (Cook 1996: 184). Student drop out rates 45
soared. Nationwide, the sharp rise in poverty and unemployment elicited little protest after the 
defeat of a 1983 cross-industry strike in which even some CTM locals participated. During this 
time of lessened teacher demand and low enrolment in normal schools, authorities upgraded the 
prerequisite required to become a teacher to the equivalent of a bachelors degree in education 
(Brambila 2009: 217). The CNTE was unable to expand significantly during these years. Though 
it consolidated its base in Oaxaca, manipulations by the national SNTE, who had made peace 
with the SEP led by a new, more conservative PRI government, resulted in the movement losing 
 Initially due to the prevalence of much higher tripartite negotiated sectoral minimum wages covering most urban 45
workers, and later due to the complicity of these state-controlled unions, Mexico’s minimum wage has historically 
been proportionally far lower than the legal minimum in Canada or the US. Statisticians calculate salaries on the 
basis of how many multiples of the minimum wage a worker earns, with the bare minimum earned in the most 
exploited sectors (Bensusan & Middlebrook 2013: 49-51).
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control of the Chiapas local in 1987. This state had a new, more repressive governor. An army 
general, his administration participated in the killings of hundreds of teachers, peasants and other 
leftist activists in the mid-late 1980s (Monsiváis 1987: 193-201; Cook 1996: 183-215).  
 In Ontario, austerity and neoliberal policy hit education in the early 1990s in a recession 
during the administration of a left leaning New Democrat (NDP) government. While the imposed 
salary freezes and unpaid days off were relatively mild compared to the austerity measures of 
future governments, it set an important precedent for undermining free collective bargaining. Not 
least because it was implemented by an avowedly pro-labour government, creating a deep well 
of cynicism towards electoral participation for many teachers and union activists, contributing to 
support for future alliances of a much more transactional nature. Though coupled with 
progressive policies, the NDP government also proposed far reaching reforms that would later be 
implemented by the subsequent hard right Conservative government after 1995. Gidney, Basu, 
Robertson and Kerr identify the NDP’s 1994 ‘Royal Commission on Learning’ as an important 
precedent. Arguing that public confidence in teacher effectiveness needed to be restored, the 
report proposed a more prescribed provincial curriculum, provincial standardized tests in literacy 
and math, administered through a new ‘Education Quality and Accountability Office’ (EQAO) 
and the creation of the Ontario College of Teachers (OCT). The OCT would be a disciplinary 
body for teachers, reducing the autonomous power of the teachers’ federations to self-regulate, 
while the EQAO used test scores to produce tables of quantified data ranking ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
schools. Despite the ideological gap with his social democratic predecessor, these proposals were 
adopted by the hard right Conservative premier Michael Harris (Gidney 1999: 232-233; 
Robertson 2000: 134; Kerr 2006; Basu 2004: 625).  
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 Under the Conservatives, professional autonomy and working conditions were 
undermined with drastic reductions in daily preparation time and increases in class sizes, as well 
as the reclassification of vice principals and principals as management, and their removal from 
the federations. Ontario’s teachers mounted a vigorous defence, including an illegal two week 
strike of all public and Catholic schools in 1997. It garnered popular support as the unions 
presented it in opposition to nearly a billion dollars in proposed cuts to education, rather than 
only the specific contractual issues of teachers. Despite militancy and broad support, their 
struggles remained defensive, defeating some (Eg. a proposal to replace some categories of 
teachers with uncertified instructors) but not all of Premier Harris’ policies. Community-led 
efforts also forced the Conservatives to prevent the closure of a hundred schools in Toronto  46
(Gidney 1999: 256-264; Head 2005: 54-65; Kerr 2006; Rose 2002; Basu 2004).  
 Though the circumstances varied of New York in the late 1970s, Mexico in the mid-late 
1980s and Ontario in the early 1990s, in each instance an economic downturn facilitated 
significant cuts to public spending on education, not reversed for years or decades. Just as 
significantly, the existence of these ‘crises’ in education facilitated politically the subsequent 
implementation of neoliberal policies related to privatization and incursions on teachers’ 
professionalism (Ginsburg 1991b). Moreover, the ability of states to apparently overturn 
previous years of union gains, had an impact on member morale, diminishing militancy. All of 
this occurred alongside drastic declines in overall strike rates in all three countries, and drops in 
unionization rates in the US and Mexico (discussed above in section 2.7), which left the heavily 
unionized K-12 public education sector isolated. 
 Dozens have since been closed due to a combination of declining student enrolment and provincial budget cuts 46
pushing the cash strapped Toronto District School Board to raise revenue from land sales.
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 An important exception to this general trajectory was the national strike of half a million 
Mexican teachers in April 1989 (Torres 1991: 130). Marking a dramatic resurgence of the CNTE, 
the strike wave has since only been rivalled by the fall of 2013 strikes described in Chapter 6, 
where the outcomes were far more ambiguous. Cook (1996) identifies the 1989 strikes as timed 
to take advantage of a window of political opportunity, an important strategy in the repertoire of 
successful social movements. Sensing the political vulnerability of the newly elected president 
Carlos Salinas, widely viewed to have prevailed through electoral fraud over left candidate 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and perceiving that his government was not as closely aligned with 
Jongitud Barrios, the movement rapidly expanded across the country demanding the restoration 
of a living wage for its members. Mexico City’s teachers joined the movement in mass numbers, 
led by the predominantly female elementary teachers of Section 9, the SNTE’s largest local. 
Since the poor response of authorities to the devastating 1985 earthquake, the emergence of 
independent urban social movements for housing rights, and Cárdenas’ 1988 campaign for 
president, the city had become the nation’s new centre of political dissidence to the ruling PRI. 
Never before had teachers struck so effectively nationwide, again occupying downtown Mexico 
City streets surrounding the SEP offices. To head off a political crisis, Salinas deposed Barrios 
and promoted one of his rising lieutenants from Mexico State, Elba Esther Gordillo. Teachers 
won a 25 percent salary increase (the SEP had initially offered 10 percent), and Gordillo 
responded to pressure from the CNTE by scheduling free elections for the state executives of 
Oaxaca, Chiapas and Section 9. All were won overwhelmingly by the movement. Teachers in 
Guerrero and Michoacan were unsuccessful in applying sufficient pressure for open elections, 
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but did succeed in being acknowledged as representatives of the union by their state governments 
(Cook 1996: 266-289; Torres 1991: 131-132; Mariluz Arriaga: Interviewed Jun. 2015).  
 Cook attributes the success of the CNTE to its commitment to participatory, democratic 
processes that helped maintain the momentum of a mass movement and mitigated the corrosive 
effects of internal factional conflicts. The development of functioning school and district-level 
committees which elect delegates to state assemblies, helped ensure the movement could 
continue to function were it to lose control of the formal machinery of the union. This is how the 
CNTE functions in states where it has the support of a critical mass of teachers but lacks 
institutional control of the local. Also vital to the longevity of the CNTE and its ability to 
consolidate its bases, has been its capacity to effectively address members’ day to day issues, 
from transfer requests to resolving payment problems, as well as the marked difference of a 
greater climate of freedom from interference from charro union and SEP officials at the school 
level  (Cook 1996: 193-196, 216-265). 47
 The geographic growth of the teachers’ movement from the 1989 strike was quickly 
challenged by the new leader of the SNTE. Elba Esther Gordillo’s path to become one of the 
most important neoliberal policy advocates during the PAN governments of Fox and Calderon 
(from 2001 to 2012) and mastermind of Mexican politics, began in the early 1990s in the twilight 
of the PRI’s era of uninterrupted national hegemony. Once under her control, the SNTE, Latin 
America’s most powerful union, was her springboard into national politics where she became a 
president-maker. First she had to roll back the considerable advances won by the CNTE, 
 The CNTE benefited in the early years of Salinas’ government from Education Secretary Manuel Bartlett’s  47
decentralization of administration to state governments, curbing the power of the national SNTE controlled by 
Gordillo. Salinas replaced him in 1993 with future president Ernesto Zedillo, who made a rapprochement with 
Gordillo (Brambila 2009: 218-219). At a conference he organized in Mexico City in 2016 for opponents of the Trans 
Pacific Partnership trade agreement, he described the SNTE to me as “very, very corrupt.” 
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particularly within the large Mexico City locals. In the precarious years following her 
appointment by Salinas, the CNTE had obtained a large minority of seats on the national 
executive, a majority of the executive of Section 9 representing the DF’s primary teachers, and 
roughly half the executive of Section 10 (the city’s secondary teachers). According to a 
secondary teacher and CNTE activist elected to Section 10’s executive in the 1990s, Gordillo co-
opted much of the movement’s leadership among secondary teachers, and to a lesser extent in 
Section 9, preventing them from otherwise gaining majority control over the former. Gordillo 
welcomed many Mexico City dissident leaders into full time union positions for Section 10 and 
at the national office. Others were vaulted above the standard career steps into school 
directorships. Individuals in both were enrolled in the Carrera Magisterial (Teaching Career) 
program negotiated by Gordillo and the SEP in 1993, which grants salary increases upon 
completion of courses, examinations and classroom observations, without having to meet these 
prerequisites. While Section 9 remained under the leadership of the movement , these measures 48
shifted the balance of power within Section 10 to her favour, winning control of the entire 
institutional structure by the early 2000s (CNTE Section 10 Activist, Interviewed Feb. 2015; 
Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 544). However new waves of dissent came quickly in the early 21st 
Century in opposition to the neoliberalization of education. 
4.2: New York, Mexico City and Toronto as Centres of Education Policy Formation 
 New York City, Mexico City and Toronto are important sites for education policy making 
and diffusion. In this section I will overview their evolution over the twentieth century, 
 An important reason for the differences in durability of the dissident movements in Sections 9 and 10 may be 48
attributed to the former’s deeper roots in school-level and zone committees in the years prior to the 1989 upsurge 
(Enrique Enriquez Ibarra, CNTE Section 9 General Secretary, Interviewed Jun. 2015).
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introducing how influential academics and powerful business-funded think tanks centred in these 
cities have wielded significant influence with policy makers. While all three cities are arguably 
the most significant sites for education policy development and roll out in their respective 
countries, the specific nature of their prominence varies. An important factor are the distinctive 
federal structures of government in each country, shaping how policy moves from the centre to 
other regions, and its ease in doing so. 
New York 
 New York holds influence with by far the largest school district in the US, whose students 
represent a socioeconomic polarization that is racially and spatially organized; dynamics that are 
present in large urban centres across the country. It is the site of the nation’s largest cluster of 
media, some of the most important faculties of education in terms of the number of its teacher 
graduates and prominent academics, and home to major think tanks on education policy. The city 
has an important history as a site for emulation, though not without reversals. After a late start 
establishing a public system in the nineteenth century compared to nearby east coast cities, from 
the 1930s through 1950s it was a national policy-setter with a reputation for the ‘best 
schools’ (Ravitch 2000: 142). It became home to arguably the most prestigious teachers’ faculty, 
Teachers’ College at Columbia University, primarily for its research, while City University of 
New York’s Queens College became the largest conventional producer of teachers in the US.   49
 New York’s public schools were demonized as among the worst ‘inner city’ schools in the 
1970s through 1980s in the midst of the city’s fiscal crisis and the long aftermath for its public 
education system. Its resolution in the late 1970s was a harbinger of neoliberal policy in the rest 
 As of 2013-14. Excluding two Arizona universities that rely heavily on online courses (Brysch 2014: 15).49
 111
of the US, and of structural adjustment programs carried out in Mexico and elsewhere in the 
global South by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s. 
When commercial banks refused to lend more money to the city in 1975, the federal government 
under president Gerald Ford saw an opportunity to use New York as a highly visible disciplinary 
test case against other municipal governments defaulting, while drastically scaling down the 
city’s more expansive social democratic welfare state (Freeman 2000: 259-263): 
Making an object lesson out of New York could serve as a national curative for overly  
generous social programs and attendant fiscal irresponsibility. Any federal aid to New 
York, [US treasury secretary] Simon testified in October 1975, should be on terms “so 
punitive, the overall experience so painful, that no city, no political subdivision would 
ever be tempted to go down the same road.” (Quoted in Freeman 2000: 259). 
According to the bankers unhappy with the city’s tuition-free public university, social housing, 
public hospitals and extensive and affordable transit, “New York exceptionalism had to be ended, 
quickly and dramatically.” (Freeman 2000: 263). Among the massive cuts made to New York’s 
public services from 1975-78, over 8 000 teachers and para-professionals were laid off in the 
summer of 1975 (Freeman 2000: 265), resulting in a 25 percent decline in the total number of 
teachers. They were disproportionately African American and Latino, being among the most 
recently hired (Freeman 2000: 271). Class sizes rose dramatically. Rank and file anger led to a 
five day strike, settled by UFT president Albert Shanker  in exchange for freezing existing 50
benefits and salaries, however per pupil funding adjusted for inflation did not recover until 1989 
(Ravitch & Viteritti 2000).  
 Shanker denounced calls for a general strike, describing it as “[A] political weapon associated with the communist 50
unions of Europe. For us to use it would be irresponsible.” (Freeman 2000: 267). Instead he and the union leader 
representing municipal employees including school custodians, teachers aides and secretaries, acceded to a 
corporatist plan to use the municipal workers’ pension to buy $2.5 billion in city bonds to get out of the crisis, 
shifting the risk of default from the banks onto their own members (Freeman 2000).
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 The resolution of New York’s fiscal crisis through public austerity and the curbing of 
union militancy was a turning point for organized teachers and the broader labour movement, as 
well as the idea of a ‘social’ or welfare state. It set the stage for subsequent neoliberal 
showdowns at the municipal scale due to both its profile and the unusually high level of 
organization of New York labour and the UFT as the most prominent teachers’ union. From here 
onwards, despite later funding increases, NYC schools struggled to be properly funded to meet 
community needs. As service correspondingly declined, like with municipal hospitals and transit, 
it came to be seen as second rate to private alternatives increasingly adopted by those who could 
afford them. Freeman concludes:  
The fiscal crisis constituted a critical moment in the history of privatization, spreading the 
belief that the market could better serve the public than government... Because New York 
served as the standard-bearer for urban liberalism and the idea of the welfare state, the 
attacks on its municipal services and their decline helped pave the way for the national 
conservative hegemony of the 1980s and 1990s. Working-class New York led they way in 
both the rise and the fall of social democracy in America. (2000: 272) 
Increasing popular economic and social conservatism by the late 1970s in NYC, to which racial 
tension greatly contributed, manifested itself in anti-union sentiment and a cynicism towards 
public services. A further sign of retreat from a working class social democratic vision in the 
aftermath of the fiscal crisis was a change in the basic approach of NYC unions like the UFT, 
from advocating militantly for their members, as through strikes, to joining corporatist lobby 
boards pushing for business and income tax cuts, and backing publicly funded private 
developments like convention centres to create jobs and expand the tax base (Freeman 2000). 
 NYC’s ideological shift to the right was facilitated by foundation of conservative think 
tanks in this period which sought to respond directly to issues facing the city. One of the most 
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significant was the Manhattan Institute, formed in 1975, “in the heart of the beast” in the words 
of its founders (Peck 2010), to bring the ideological battle to the bastion of the US left. The 
Manhattan Institute initially saw its role as the provider of more academic neoliberal theory 
geared towards intellectuals and elites. Future mayor Rudy Giuliani was a firm supporter, 
attending many events, which he attributed to help shape his ‘tough on crime’ and workfare 
policies. His mayoralty was lauded by the Institute (Peck 2010). The think tank contributed to 
NYC, along with other key sites like Chicago and Washington, DC, becoming key sources of 
neoliberal policy innovation. By 2016 the Manhattan Institute had become involved in applied 
forms of policy intervention with a significant focus on education. Its website, 
www.schoolgrades.org purported to rate US schools on the basis of their literacy and math exam 
scores, normed to National Assessment of Education Progress and PISA test scores and the 
proportion of students receiving subsidized lunches, to offer local and international comparisons. 
The National Education Policy Centre at the University of Colorado, described the website’s 
methodology as highly flawed, stating it was unclear how to meaningfully compare the results of 
various different local, state and national tests, and that the Institute’s method for doing so was 
not transparent (NEPC 2016). 
 The aforementioned Teachers’ College at Columbia University is much more 
ideologically heterogenous. Both its importance and its political variability are embodied in the 
career of its PhD graduate and sometime lecturer Diane Ravitch. The foremost historian on 
NYC’s education system, she was the author of several books in the 1980s through early 2000s 
which aimed to provide ‘lessons’ from the NYC system (particularly under Mayor Giuliani) for 
the rest of the US. She promoted the roll out of charter schools and standardized testing with a 
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belief that competitive ‘school choice’ market mechanisms would subject teacher 
professionalism to greater rigour. Ravitch served as the Assistant Secretary of Education in the 
administration of George HW Bush from 1991 to 1993. From here, she became a regular 
contributor on education policy studies jointly published by Teachers’ College and DC based 
Brookings Institution, the latter considered the most influential think tank in the world (McGann 
2016). She also affiliated with the conservative Thomas B. Fordham Institute, the Hoover 
Institution and the Manhattan Institute. In the mid 2000s she radically reassessed her beliefs. 
With the publication of The Death and Life of the Great American School System in 2010, she 
confronted many of the policies she previously advocated, disassociated herself from earlier 
collaborators at Brookings and the other right wing think tanks, and became arguably the most 
prominent champion of public education in the US in the early 21st Century (Bailey 2015: 
327-328; Ravitch 2010: 1-14).  
 NYC is far from alone among key American urban centres for policy in the early 21st 
Century, and states can also be the primary scale of policy roll out. Chicago under Arne Duncan 
and Rahm Emmanuel, DC under Michelle Rhee and Florida under Governor Jeb Bush come to 
mind. The criteria for being a key policy influencing centre seems to be a combination of the 
national prominence of the city and or state plus a highly charismatic neoliberal leader with 
considerable power via legislation and outward influence through media and intellectuals. These 
are not necessarily the most extreme neoliberal education test cases, which would include New 
Orleans since Hurricane Katrina, Arizona’s de-facto voucher system and private charters and 
Michigan’s patchwork of completely privatized small school districts. However they have not 
had as much influence in setting the debate nationally (or beyond) as the larger centres and their 
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key advocate leaders. As policy advocates Michael Fullan and Alan Boyle enthused about the 
prominence of NYC’s Bloomberg era:  
New York City has attracted enormous attention over the past decade for its educational 
reform  efforts for several reasons: It is a large prominent system; it represents an 
aggressive, relentless attempt by a mayor and his appointed chancellor to pull out all the 
stops to get successful reform; and it was carried out in a transparent, high-profile 
manner. Everyone in the school reform community was watching! (2014: 21) 
One activist NYC teacher argues his city is an important centre for neoliberal innovation because 
of its significance for capitalist accumulation. As a result, it is also an important site for racial 
and class conflict: 
Here in the city you have Goldman Sachs overseeing a charter school in Harlem. They 
will drop down in the middle of Harlem a gleaming cube with new everything!… And 
throw millions of dollars to prove that resources don’t matter. And bring in a few kids by 
lottery, Willy Wonka style. In order to prove that the public schools suck. And then the 
kids who act up and won’t follow their super strict rules, get kicked back to the public 
schools in order to further prove that the public schools can’t do it. …there’s this 
tremendous publicity machine that promotes to the whole world that they are miracle 
workers in this miracle factory sponsored by Goldman Sachs. That is what we have in 
New York City. Goldman Sachs doesn’t care in the same way about what’s happening in 
Albany or Syracuse. New York City’s like a laboratory for this remaking of the cities. As 
is Chicago… they really want to reconquer the city centre. It used to be, the geography of 
American cities was a despised inner city. The phrase ‘inner city’ is practically 
synonymous with black! Now the inner city is where the rich people want to be! …Get 
these black people out of here! But to do that, you have to dislodge them from the 
schools, you’ve got to dislodge them from the unions… you’ve got to break up the 
connection between the school and the community. (NYC Teacher 1, Interviewed Dec. 
2014) 
Mexico City 
 Mexico City is home to the nation’s second largest school authority (following Mexico 
State which encompasses its suburbs). Given Mexico’s heavy institutional centralization in the 
nation’s capital over the twentieth century, it holds an even greater concentration of important 
faculties of education, media, think tanks and offices for multinational policy centres, including 
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UNESCO, the OECD and the World Bank. It is the unparalleled national centre for governance, 
a role which has only grown more important with the recentralization of education policy over 
the early 21st Century described in Chapter 6. The history of Mexico’s post-revolutionary 
education history up to the neoliberal era is dominated by a handful of elite, cosmopolitan 
intellectuals based in Mexico City who transformed the nation’s education. SEP founder Jose 
Vasconcelos’s influential secretary Moises Saenz, studied under the famous progressive educator 
John Dewey at Columbia University in New York. He brought back ideas for dynamic pedagogy 
and the use of schools to meet popular needs and demands in a mostly rural system, “…
schoolteachers were much more than instructors of literacy and mathematics. Rather, teachers 
were conceived of as moral, social, and technical ‘apostles’ of modernity… guiding their 
communities to practical and spiritual liberation -and integration into national life.” (Levinson 
2001: 21). For its first few decades after its founding in 1921, the SEP’s first objective was the 
expansion of public schools into rural Mexico for national development and as a political 
strategy of overcoming regional interests and identity to create a unified nation-state. It only 
began prioritizing specifically urban needs in the 1950s, coinciding with the beginning of 
Mexico City’s explosive growth (Levinson 2001: 21-26).  
 The career of Secretary of Public Education, Jaime Torres Bodet from 1943 to 1946 and 
1958 to 1964 provides an example of the Mexico City-based system’s early international vision. 
After overseeing the continued expansion of the SEP after Lazaro Cardenas with its budget 
increasing from 76 million pesos in 1940 to over 200 million by 1946, and presiding over the 
founding convention of the SNTE, he served as the second director of UNESCO from 1948-52. 
When he returned to Mexico, he oversaw the continued expansion of the system, standardized 
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teacher training through normales and worked with UNESCO to organize conferences on 
comparative Latin American education policy with a focus on progressive pedagogy and 
benchmarks for eliminating illiteracy. UNESCO’s Mexican offices were housed in SEP 
headquarters from the 1970s through 1980s, a symbol of the multilateral agency’s prominence.  51
Torres Bordet unsuccessfully urged the members of the Organization of American States to 
increase the percentage of GDP dedicated to education to 15 percent through the US’s Alliance 
for Progress funding (Caballero & Medrano 1982: 395-402; SEP Officials 1 & 2, Interviewed 
Jun. 2015). 
 In the early 1950s, the central Escuela Nacional de Maestros (National Teachers’ School) 
for primary teachers was founded in the Santa Maria de la Ribera neighbourhood west of Mexico 
City’s centre, and the Escuela Normal Superior de Mexico for secondary teachers in the 
northwest borough of Azcapotzalco (Curiel Méndez 1982: 456-458). Both were four year tuition-
free programs in which students boarded on campus, contributing to the sense of collective 
identity. The location of these large facilities in the capital was consistent with the state’s 
centralizing tendencies, and coincided with the beginning of Mexico City’s population explosion 
and the nation’s rapid urbanization. They immediately became centres of activism, with 
secondary teachers in training protesting against initial assignments of only six hours a week, 
demanding at least 12 hours. Their activism flowed into the first national teachers’ movement of 
1956-58, centred in Mexico City (Enrique Enriquez Ibarra, Interviewed Jun. 2015). They also 
contributed to the rising movement of university students in the city with their colleagues at the 
 SEP officials emphasize the Mexican government’s close relation with UNESCO by explaining how most other 51
governments appoint their foreign ministry as the principal contact point, rather than the actual education authorities 
(SEP Officials 1, 2, 3, Interviewed Jun. 2015).
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National Autonomous University of Mexico that culminated in 1968 (Curiel Méndez 1982: 442). 
The National Pedagogic University (UPN), founded in 1982 at the height of Mexico’s oil boom, 
was also situated in the capital. It was to be the nation’s primary centre for research in education 
policy, responsible with the SEP for defining the teacher education curriculum used in normales 
across the country, and an important faculty of education in its own right.  In these respects it 52
held a role similar to the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE) in Toronto. The UPN 
was also conceived as an institution autonomous from Jongitud Barrio’s SNTE union leadership, 
provoking considerable resistance from him and his successor Elba Esther Gordillo (Brambila 
2008; Arnaut 2008: 148). 
 From the 1990s, UNESCO’s role became more symbolic (and it moved from its national 
office in the SEP headquarters) as a source of pride for the nation’s prominent engagement in 
international relations. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the World Bank came to occupy a more influential position as their discourses on economic 
growth and quantitative evaluation resonated more within the neoliberalized policy circles of the 
day than the well meaning but “vague” principles of UNESCO’s ‘Education for All’ (SEP 
Officials 1, 2, 3, Interviewed Jun. 2015). The political synergy between the OECD led by 
Mexican politician Jose Angel Gurría and the government of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) 
over education policy will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
Toronto 
 The national curriculum devised in Mexico City reflected the dominant ideology of the state well before its 52
neoliberalization. The official criteria for plans of study in primary schools during the tenure of ‘Third Worldist' 
president Luis Echeverria (1970-76), included the usual terms like ‘adaptability’, ’interdisciplinary’ and the 
‘preservation of national values’, alongside ‘international solidarity’ and ‘consciousness of the historical 
situation’ (Cosio 1982: 417).
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 Toronto is home to the largest public school board in Canada.  As the capital of the 53
largest of Canada’s provinces, which under the federal system hold sole jurisdiction over the 
governance of primary and secondary education, the city is arguably the most important centre 
for education policymaking in the country. Its reach is augmented as for New York and Mexico 
City by being the most important national site for media, such that conflicts over education in 
Toronto are more likely to have further reverberations than those elsewhere, a factor for teachers’ 
struggles and education policy province wide.  
 The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE) was opened in Toronto by 
provincial legislation in 1965 to conduct education research on behalf of the Ministry of 
Education. It was created in the context of elementary and secondary teachers’ colleges merging 
with university faculty of educations and the requirement of bachelor’s degrees for elementary 
teachers. In the mid-1990s it was merged with the University of Toronto’s faculty of education 
(Gidney 1999: 54-55). Its’ academics have been the most prominent scholars in shaping the 
province’s education trajectory, despite a period of marginalization during the Conservative 
governments of 1995 to 2003 (Gidney 1999). Chapter 7 will discuss how its most prominent 
professors on education policy, Michael Fullan, Charles Pascal, Benjamin Levin and Andy 
Hargreaves became central figures within the ambitious agendas of the Liberal governments of 
Dalton McGuinty and Kathleen Wynne (2003 to 2018), serving as special advisors to the premier 
and deputy ministers of education (Sue Winton, Interviewed Dec. 2015). According to Fullan and 
Boyle (2014: 67), their engagement by the provincial Liberals was inspired when McGuinty 
 As well as the largest publicly funded separate Catholic school board, and two much smaller but growing French 53
public and Catholic boards.
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observed their work in England as advisors to Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government on 
‘literacy and numeracy’ strategies. 
 Ontario’s governing Liberals in the early 21st Century found OISE to be an important 
source of intellectual support for a socially progressive education agenda.  It became a 54
convenient target for the Progressive Conservatives, singled out for criticism in a 2013 policy 
document that articulated their education vision for the following year’s provincial election: 
The government’s role is to set expectations, measure progress and help principals and 
teachers do the best possible job for our children. To accomplish that, we have to work 
with principals and teachers and give more weight to what they say. The future of 
education in Ontario should be shaped by the people who work directly with your 
children every day, not by professors at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education in 
Toronto [emphasis added] or bureaucrats in the education ministry (Progressive 
Conservative Party of Ontario 2013: 11). 
The contradiction between the Conservative’s stated interest in empowering teachers and their 
policy prescriptions that would actually undermine their professional autonomy are discussed in 
Chapter 7. One can note the words in Toronto and speculate on the extent that they were added to 
channel frustrations and resentment from rural and northern Ontario with a state perceived as 
removed from their reality and Toronto-centric. 
Annie Kidder, the founder and executive director of the Toronto-based People for 
Education, has a nuanced, critical perspective on the powerful influence exerted on education 
politics by a small circle of traveling policy superstars. People for Education is a pro-public 
education research and advocacy group, founded in the mid-1990s as a parent activist network 
opposing the Conservative Harris government’s budget cuts. Among Kidder’s concerns is a 
tendency by OISE’s high profile policy advocates to contribute to a narrowing of education 
 However partially and contingently it was actually funded, and layered on top of existing policies creating 54
considerable challenges for implementation (Sue Winton, Interviewed Dec. 2015).
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policy goals. According to Kidder, one of the most recognizable ‘brands’ of Ontario’s policy 
advocates, and of the ‘Ontario model’ which they promote, is the ‘pressure and support’ formula 
coined by Michael Fullan. Pressure and Support refers to holding school boards, principals and 
teachers to account through quantitative metrics like standardized test scores administered by the 
Education Quality Accountability Office (EQAO) and overall graduation rates, while also 
providing additional resources to struggling schools. She contrasts this approach with the 
punitive agenda of No Child Left Behind in the US where schools with low scores are threatened 
with closure, “Their brand is not to attack teachers.” (Annie Kidder, Interviewed Nov. 2015).  
 People for Education has evolved within the context of Ontario’s education politics. 
From its protest roots, over the tenure of the McGuinty and Wynne Liberal governments it 
increasingly focused on research and has become one of the most influential education advocacy 
groups in Canada, drawing considerable media coverage to its reports. Its high profile annual 
conferences feature prominent officials from the Ministry of Education, school boards, 
academics and many consultants. Though comprising around half of the hundreds of attendees, 
no teachers were among nearly 40 expert speakers or panelists in 2015, two were included in 
2016, plus a representative from a Norwegian teachers’ union. This is most notable when the 
session topic is assessment and evaluation practices, an important issue for teachers’ 
professionalism. The teachers’ federations are virtually invisible in its work, but People for 
Education has conducted several research studies with the Ontario Principals Council.  55
 While the policies put forward by Fullan and others are friendlier to the teaching 
profession than many of the dominant discourses in the US, retired Toronto secondary teacher 
 Author’s notes from People for Education conference, University of Toronto, November 7, 2015.55
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Lindsay Kerr’s critique is that these are still top-down reforms. She contends that under Harris 
and McGuinty, they were implemented with little meaningful consultation with teachers and 
their federations. She charges that Fullan and Andy Hargreaves’ prescriptions while claiming to 
‘empower’ teachers in fact facilitate neoliberalism. They intensify teachers’ work by not 
providing additional resources, and leave systemic external factors like poverty, which would 
require significant increases in funding, unaddressed (Kerr 2006: 153-157). Nevertheless, the 
powerful discourses emanating from OISE are part of the explanation why Toronto remains a 
centre for policy that’s divergent from the dominant ideas south of Ontario’s borders. 
 The dominance of these three cities as policy centres persisted through changes in 
ideology. The distinctive federal structures of government in each country is also an important 
means for understanding differences in how New York, Mexico City and Toronto act as 
policymaking centres. While policymaking power is highly centralized in the capital Mexico 
City, it is comparatively far more decentralized through provincial/state administrations in 
Canada and the US, in which Toronto and New York’s influence is more defined by example 
than executive fiat, since while Ontario and New York State are among the most important 
subnational entities within their respective countries, their education administrators can only give 
suggestions to authorities in Los Angeles or Vancouver. What is common among the case studies 
is the importance of the metropolis as policy centre, with both a critical concentration of state 
power and influential intellectuals, and as a proximate, large scale site for implementation. 
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4.3: Rolling Out Neoliberal Education Policy: Key Authors and their Texts 
 This section provides a brief overview of how the ideas that became known as neoliberal 
education policy as described in section 2.5 evolved in the context of North America and became 
the dominant frame of reference for governance. It will show how these particular ideas 
facilitated both a tendency towards a scaling up of education policy and increasing cross-border 
mobility. This discussion will also suggest some reasons for the greater mobility of neoliberal 
education policy from the US to Mexico, than from either country to Canada. 
 Many accounts of the emergence of neoliberal education policy begin with the 
publication of A Nation at Risk by the US Department of Education in 1983 (Kuhn 2014; Ravitch 
2010). While some of its concerns were historically specific and its prescriptions scarcely 
mention standardized testing or school choice (Ravitch 2010) , its legacy stems from being a 56
high profile declaration of ‘the crisis’ in public education. Issued by a national authority, this 
profile served as a precursor for the future scaling up of education policy to this level in the 
2000s. In the meantime as the neoliberal era emerged, it facilitated a national ‘discussion’ that 
precipitated rapid policy exchanges at the state and local levels. It soon became international in 
the scale of its analysis, with academic Philip Coombs’ influential The World Crisis in Education 
(1985), a timely sequel to his The World Educational Crisis: A Systems Analysis (1968). Both 
complain of the ‘disparity’ between education systems and economies, rising cost of education 
and propose to replace teachers with technology (Ginsburg 1991a: 13-14; Hernandez Navarro 
2013: 71).  
 Ravitch observes “[W]hen we contrast the rhetoric of A Nation at Risk with the reality of the No Child Left 56
Behind legislation of 2002, A Nation at Risk looks positively idealistic, liberal, and prescient.” (2010: 29).
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 Mexican President Carlos Salinas was perhaps the first key importer of neoliberal 
education policy from the US to his country.  He initially proposed standardized tests for 57
primary and secondary students and their use to evaluate teachers, as well as entrance exams for 
high school and university during his presidential campaign in 1988. Mexico’s CENEVAL high 
school and university application exam was designed as a “detailed replica” according to 
Aboites, of the US’s semi-non profit corporation Educational Testing Service, which administers 
NAEP, SAT, GRE and TOEFL tests on behalf of universities, school districts, states and the 
Department of Education in the US and the UK. The CENEVAL exam was initiated at the end of 
his term in 1994 to coincide with the launch of NAFTA (Aboites 2012: 333-336). Aboites 
contends that Salinas and his peers willfully ignored substantive evidence available by the early 
1990s of the failings of similar tests in the US: 
The school aptitude test was implemented in the US through the initiative of a group of  
businesspeople in the context of the reassessing of education policy by the government of 
that country. In Mexico it was imposed even more easily and quickly thanks to a powerful 
and authoritarian government-business alliance (Aboites 2012: 329). 
 Politics, Markets and America’s Schools  published in 1990 by Terry Moe and John 58
Chubb, academics at the Brookings Institution, was important as an early intellectual argument 
frequently cited by other academics and policymakers for introducing market mechanisms into 
public education. It advocates for ‘choice’ through school vouchers and de-professionalizing 
teaching by removing certification requirements and eliminating teachers’ unions. It represents 
the fully envisioned, ‘hard’ version of the neoliberal agenda. Moe and Chubb’s work gained 
 The pivotal role of the Salinas regime, following the profound austerity administered by his predecessor (and the 57
IMF), for neoliberalizing the Mexican state, can be summed up in the halving of the public sector’s share of GDP 
over the course of his tenure from 41.8% to 23.2%. Salinas privatized hundreds of state-owned enterprises, which 
combined with corporate and income tax cuts, perpetuated chronic budget austerity (Marquez 2008: 154).
 Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.58
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international influence and bolstered its credibility at home through its uptake by the World Bank 
as part of its curated ‘policy menu’: 
The rationale and evidence used by the [World] Bank and other agencies in the 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s to promote the privatisation of primary and secondary schooling in 
developing countries  has often come from the United States. The two studies by 
Coleman and Chubb and Moe were and still are used to show the benefits of privatising 
schools, and the small voucher experiments in the United States are used similarly. (Klees 
2008: 322) 
 Joseph P. Viteritti, a former longtime collaborator with Diane Ravitch, especially on 
books discussing New York, is considered by neoliberal education advocates to have made 
important contributions to developing their narrative beyond Moe and Chubb’s market 
efficiency. Viteritti’s career is another example of New York as an important centre for neoliberal 
education policy and the mobility of top level policy advocates. A professor at the City 
University of New York, he has previously taught at New York University, Harvard and 
Princeton, and served as special assistant to the chancellor of schools of New York City, Boston 
and San Francisco (American Centre for School Choice 2015). According to the American 
Centre for School Choice, which lobbies on behalf of charter schools and voucher programs, his 
book published by the Brookings Institution, Choosing Equality: School Choice, the 
Constitution, and Civil Society (1999) , “helped shift the debate about school choice from a 59
discussion about the efficacy of free markets to a moral argument about how schools might better 
accommodate the educational needs of poor and under-represented communities.” (American 
Centre for School Choice 2015). This change in discourse represents one of the most important 
shifts in political strategy that characterizes how neoliberal education policy transitioned from an 
initial ‘roll back’ phase that attacked the legitimacy of the public sector to a more sophisticated 
 Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.59
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‘roll out’ phase in the early 21st Century (Peck & Tickell 2002). The latter discourse which 
frames poor and racialized children against self-interested unionized teachers was presented in 
the high profile anti-public school documentary Waiting for Superman, released in January 2010 
at the Sundance film festival in the US. Its Mexican clone De Panzazo! was released in October 
2010 at the Morelia International Film Festival in Mexico (Hernandez Navarro 2012: 429-430). 
 The Washington DC based Brookings Institution’s status as the most influential think 
tank in the world (McGann 2016) is facilitated by its formidable resources including a large staff 
of researchers at this ‘university without students’. While it portrays itself as politically ‘centrist’, 
many of its flagship publications on education policy, as can be seen in the citations throughout 
this chapter, are themselves associated with conservative free market think tanks, academic 
research centres and business lobby groups. Its major edited volume Education Governance for 
the Twenty-First Century (2013) includes contributors affiliated with the American Enterprise 
Institute (Frederick Hess, Olivia Meeks), the Center for American Progress (Cynthia Brown), the 
Thomas B. Fordham Institute and the Hoover Institution (Chester Finn Jr and Michael Petrilli), 
and a New York City charter school management organization. There are also a smattering of 
political science, economics and education policy professors such as Jeffrey Henig of Teachers 
College. Among the contributors there is scant K-12 classroom teaching experience. None are 
associated with teachers’ unions. Most of the contributors share similar assumptions that the 
problems of public education have little or nothing to do with funding or social equity, and 
everything to do with unions and school boards that disagree with their prescriptions. Hess and 
Meeks cite a survey of US school board officials in which 40 percent oppose hiring non-
traditionally trained teachers (Eg. through Teach for America), half oppose forms of school 
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choice (charter schools vouchers, eliminating neighbourhood schools) and 80 percent oppose 
new charter schools. He admonishes them for favouring “genteel measures” such as more 
professional development for teachers and principals, “while steering clear of more disruptive 
proposals” which they claim are the best ways to improve student learning (Hess & Meeks 2013: 
109). For Hess and his compatriots, it’s the thousands of school board officials who are wrong. 
As with teachers, working within education makes them interested, rather than informed parties. 
 Significant elements of education policy mobility in Latin America occur between 
southern nations but are mediated by (northern led) multilateral agencies like the World Bank. 
Messina (2008) contends that for issues of education governance, of which the dominant policy 
proposal in Latin America from the 1990s onwards were forms of decentralization (Eg. ‘school 
based management’ and federalization), the most significant sources of inspiration for Mexico 
were experiments by other Latin American nations. Particularly Chile, which was the first to 
implement radical decentralization as part of its neoliberal reforms to education under 
dictatorship in the mid-1970s. Also significant were the Escuela Nueva experiments in 
Colombia, and projects from the early 1990s in Argentina, Brazil and Spain (the latter due to 
ease of linguistic exchange). All of which were analyzed and promoted by the World Bank. This 
policy affinity is due to shared socioeconomic conditions within the region (more so than with 
developed countries like the US or Finland) and preexisting channels for policy exchange, such 
as the regional branch of UNESCO (SEP Official 2, Interviewed Jun. 2015). Messina notes a 
distinction of discourse between the World Bank’s ‘human capital theory’ and the more humanist 
vision of UNESCO emphasizing rights and equity and professional development for teachers. 
She acknowledges some authors see an emerging convergence in ideology between the two, with 
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UNESCO becoming more neoliberalized. It is difficult to measure the extent to which the World 
Bank drove policy mobility versus national governments, but it appears the Bank was significant 
as a key broker, shaper and funder of ideas taken up by sympathetic governments.  
 According to Messina, the literature on education decentralization was most developed 
within the Latin American context, serving as a model for African and Asian countries (Messina 
2008: 15-20). Decentralization became a “global discourse” through its uptake by UNESCO, the 
OECD and the World Bank, though with distinctions among them of what it entails. For the 
Bank it is primarily about greater efficiency in education disbursements and reducing them 
where possible through substitution with private sources, whereas for UNESCO it is more about 
effectively meeting local needs (Messina 2008: 22-24). Brambila concludes: 
This expected common education agenda, in Latin America’s case, consists of a limited 
number of general ideas that are elaborated daily in the multilateral organizations and in 
many other agencies, such as governmental offices, universities, foundations, academic 
associations, and specialized journals. They are part of an education discourse from which it 
is practically impossible to escape. … Decentralization, educational quality and coverage, 
privatization and  social participation, acquire tones, and various and even opposed 
meanings according to the particular features of each nation. (Brambila 2008: 222) 
However it will be demonstrated that while decentralization discourse (Eg. school based 
management and autonomy) has been retained in Mexico, over the early 21st Century the most 
significant trend in education governance has been centralization of policy in the executive of the 
national government, as in the US and at the provincial level in Canada. This was the means to 
attempt to implement an array of neoliberal policies that provoked resistance from teachers’ 
unions, which was most effective at lower levels of scale (ie. municipal or regional levels).  
 One means to measure the World Bank’s influence on Mexico’s education policy is by 
the size of its loans and grants, which peaked in 2010 at $6.4 billion, dropped to $2.8 billion the 
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following year and has since declined to a projected $500 million in 2016 (World Bank 2016). 
Meanwhile, the OECD has increased its influence over education policy, arguably eclipsing 
UNESCO (Sellar & Lingard 2013: 716), particularly in Mexico (SEP Officials 1, 2, 3 
Interviewed Jun. 2015). A senior official in Mexico’s Secretary of Public Education (SEP), 
credits the OECD with creating awareness of its own qualitative deficiencies:  
It was the OECD that came and said, ‘Yes you have many schools but they [students] are 
not understanding what they’re learning, they don’t understand what they’re reading and 
in some cases can’t even complete basic mathematical equations.’ But this was the OECD 
that opened our eyes, not UNESCO. (SEP Official 1, Interviewed Jun. 2015) [Author’s 
translation]. 
Their colleague continues: 
It’s not as if the government says ‘from this moment on, I’m going to work more with the 
OECD than with the United Nations.’ No, we were working on a series of programs that 
we wanted to strengthen. The OECD has more interest in evaluation, and so we’ve asked 
for their studies (SEP Official 3, Interviewed Jun. 2015) [Author’s translation]. 
A tangible means of measuring this influence can be found in the publications issued by the 
OECD directed towards Mexico’s education system, that are endorsed or republished by the SEP, 
such as the 250 page OECD Review of Evaluation and Assessment in Education: Mexico 2012.  60
It is also found in the biographies of key policymakers like Mexican academic Sylvia Schmelkes, 
a researcher with the OECD before becoming president of the National Institute for the 
Evaluation of Education (INEE), the governmental authority responsible for overseeing 
Mexico’s testing systems of students and teachers. Beyond Mexico’s particular political 
dynamics, like the World Bank, the OECD gained importance among its member as the purveyor 
of internationally comparable education statistics, particularly its Program for International 
 Santiago, Paulo et al (2014). Revisiones de la OCDE sobre la Evaluación en Educación: México 2012. Mexico 60
City: Instituto Nacional para la Evaluación de la Educación.
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Student Assessment (PISA) of the performance of 15 year old students in reading and math since 
2000 (Sellar & Lingard 2013: 716-717). For Winton, the PISA is: 
[O]rganizing behaviour all over the world and definitely in Ontario. And it’s very 
effective. A lot of policy isn’t effective. But this policy linked to economics, it’s really 
taken hold as a  dominant discourse. Last year our math test scores were lower. A lot of 
people said they actually weren’t lower, there was more people in the game so our overall 
ranking fell, but that set off a lot of dialogue and movement around where our math 
education should be and what we should be doing. (Professor Sue Winton, Interviewed 
Dec. 2015) 
According to the World Bank’s report, Great Teachers: How to Raise Student Learning in Latin 
America and the Caribbean:  
Hard data on education system results are a crucial political tool. Especially powerful are 
data on student learning outcomes, results that are internationally benchmarked. …. Political 
leaders’ use of these to build the case for reform has been a factor in all successful strategies 
to date. Of  all international tests, the OECD’s PISA seems to resonate most strongly with the 
business community and civil society groups (Bruns & Luque 2014: 39).  
Robertson adds from a critical perspective: 
Given that the OECD represents the interests of powerful member states and the multi-
national corporate sector, and, it can be argued convincingly, is ideologically committed 
to the new global competitive agenda, it is a matter of considerable significance how it 
articulates the issues and trends concerning teachers. In other words, given that the 
OECD sets important  dimensions of the reform agenda for member nations on economic 
and public sector activity, the assumptions upon which this agenda are framed is very 
important, even if member nations choose to ignore the agenda. (Robertson 2000: 206)
Sellar and Lingard (2013) observe that the PISA has also led to the global prominence and 
celebration of the top scoring education system of Finland, whose features include a high degree 
of professional autonomy for teachers and an absence of measures celebrated by neoliberal 
reform advocates in North America including high stakes testing and ‘school choice’. However 
policy lessons from Finland are absent from the principal recommendations which the OECD 
provides to its member nations, as will be seen in its Getting it Right: Strategic Agenda for 
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Reforms in Mexico (2013) discussed in Chapter 6. This selectiveness suggests the OECD’s 
neoliberal ideological frame described above by Robertson. 
 A key question is why the most aggressive neoliberal education policies pursued by 
political leaders in the US and Mexico, which threaten to seriously undermine the professional 
autonomy of teachers and privatize public education, have had much more difficulty taking root 
in Canada. After participating in the 2015 conference of the American Education Research 
Association  in Chicago, Annie Kidder left with the impression that “Americans had just given 61
up on the idea of public education itself.” (Interviewed Nov. 2015). Like Sue Winton 
(Interviewed Dec. 2015), Kidder believes differences in popular ideology and the strength of key 
political actors are important: 
It's also our core value in Canada about social democracy...what we also don't have in 
Canada is huge corporations making lots of money off education, because we still 
assume, even though less and less, that we'll pay taxes, that the testing systems aren't 
private, they're a part of our  government. So we're still leery about private involvement 
in government, or even the idea of … private companies, non-profit or for-profit, 
running schools (Interviewed Nov. 2015). 
However, she notes that that there are gathering voices for similar policies in Ontario, citing a 
2014 conference on education she attended hosted by the University of Toronto’s Rotman School 
of Management. The K-12 panel led by speakers from Teach for America and US charter 
schools, elicited support for bringing their programs to Ontario. Kidder sees emerging forms of 
‘school choice’ within the public system, such as Toronto’s selective specialty programs, as a 
worrying step in the direction of the advanced social segregation and privatization which exists 
in the US system. This topic will be further pursued in Chapter 7. 
 The largest academic association for studying education in the United States.61
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 The scaling up of education policy to the national level in the US in the early 21st 
Century under presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, responsible respectively for No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation and the Race to the Top program (both discussed in 
Chapter 5), were crucial in accelerating the neoliberalization of education. The absence of similar 
constitutional means to do so in Canada, may have hindered a faster movement of policy across 
provincial education systems . Vergari contends that a larger Federal role in US education 62
facilitated a stronger and more rapid push to “performance standards” through standardized 
exams compared to Canada. Both state and provincial test scores are reconciled against PISA and 
random sample groups of students participate in the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (US) and the Pan-Canadian Assessment Program (Vergari 2013: 241; Wallner 2014: 
222-226). However no structure with equivalent punitive powers exists in Canada to those held 
by the US Department of Education through NCLB (rescinded in 2015) or Race to the Top. 
There is evidence that a high degree of inter-provincial policy mobility occurs through the 
Council of Ministers of Education Canada (CMEC), which also represents the country in 
education discussions at the OECD (Wallner 2014). However it “lacks enforcement power” held 
by some initiatives of the US National Governors’ Association (Vergari 2013: 239). Distinct roles 
for education policy at the federal level in Canada and the US, the differences in political culture 
cited by Kidder and Winton, and more effective provincial teachers’ unions, are used by Mindzak 
(2015) to explain why charter schools have not expanded in Canada beyond their initial 
 One area in which the federal government has intervened in provincial education is through decisions of Supreme 62
Courts on labour conflicts. Recognizing the precedent it would set for other provinces, the governments of Ontario, 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Quebec intervened in support of the British Columbia government in an appeal by the 
BC Teachers Federation that BC illegally removed clauses on class sizes and specialist teachers from collective 
agreements. The BC government is now required to hire hundreds of teachers to restore class sizes to pre-2002 
levels. The BC Teachers’ victory took 14 years (O’Neil & Sherlock 2016).
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beachhead of a couple dozen schools in Alberta. Implemented in 1994 in the context of an 
ideologically conservative provincial government inspired by contemporary Republican 
politicians in the US, and in contrast with their continued proliferation south of the border, 
Mindzak concludes “Canadians do not appear to be interested in such reforms and continue to 
largely support their systems of public education.” (2015: 105).   63
 Political momentum for the neoliberalization of education emerged with varying 
intensities in every province during the period studied here. However it could be argued that the 
absence of a federal mechanism for strengthening the push behind these policies, such as through 
the engagement of powerful national actors (as Mexicanos Primero in Mexico or myriad similar 
business-led organizations in the US) has maintained education policy in Canada on local and 
provincial scales where teachers and community groups are more able to exercise political 
pressure. These ideas will be explored further in the case studies. 
4.4: Teachers’ Diplomacy, Policy Mobility and Transnational Solidarity 
 As I explained in the conclusion of Chapter 2, Towards a Labour Geography of Teacher 
Autonomy, a central premise guiding this study is that workers and their organizations possess 
agency and the capacity to intervene in the economic geographies in which they are situated. 
Given the focus of the preceding section on elite actors in the movement of North American 
neoliberal education policy, this section considers the engagement of teachers’ organizations, 
both official unions and informal networks, in transnational policy mobility. Andrew Herod’s 
work (2001) on how labour organizations utilize spatial strategies include the problematic history 
 Also see Wallner 2014: 230-231.63
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of top level union strategy. In one study, the Cold War era American Federation of Labor 
intervened in Mexico and Venezuela to subsidize anti-communist, conservative unions and 
marginalize their left wing rivals, as part of its domestic strategy of maintaining a positive 
relationship with the US government.  In this vein, an overview is provided here of how SNTE 64
leaders Elba Esther Gordillo and her successor Juan Diaz de la Torre, have practiced 
international labour diplomacy to burnish their weak legitimacy at home. Following this, a more 
hopeful presentation is made of the development since the early 1990s of the Trinational 
Coalition in Defence of Public Education, through the leadership of provincial teachers’ 
federations in Canada, Mexican solidarity activists in the US and grassroots groups aligned with 
and inside the democratic teachers’ movement of Mexico. Mention is also made of another 
direction in transnational teachers’ solidarity, the inspiration and support of Canadian and 
Mexican teachers in the emergence of ‘rank and file caucuses’ in urban US teachers’ unions. 
 One measure of SNTE leader Elba Esther Gordillo’s trajectory from an authoritarian in 
the classic corporatist style who gained some legitimacy by extracting tangible benefits for her 
members, to an authoritarian reliant on wealth and elite connections, can be found in her 
engagement in international teachers’ diplomacy. According to Hernandez Navarro (2013) and 
Professor Enrique de la Garza Toledo (Interviewed Feb. 2015), the efforts were an extension of 
her ambitions for leadership apparently unquenched by her power in national politics and control 
of the teachers’ union. Her courting of intellectuals with “dinners in deluxe restaurants, trips, 
 In a particularly egregious example, the CIA sponsored American Institute for Free Labor Development, in which 64
Albert Shanker and the American Federation of Teachers were particularly active, assisted military coups against 
leftist governments in Brazil and Chile in the 1960s and 1970s (Kuehn 2006: 24).
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book printings and paid conferences” were to compensate for her “profound lack of prestige in 
public opinion” (Hernandez Navarro 2013: 129). From 1991 to 2000, with considerable financial 
assistance provided by the Mexican government, Gordillo’s SNTE hosted a series of four 
international conferences over which she presided on public education, with delegations from 
teachers’ unions across the Americas and beyond (Enrique de la Garza Toledo, Interviewed Feb. 
2015). The first event gathered together academics and union leaders with a significant critical 
analysis of education policy and its drift towards what would later be described as neoliberalism. 
Conference papers reprinted in Understanding Educational Reform in Global Context: Economy, 
Ideology, and the State (Ginsberg 1991), are extensively cited above in Chapter 2 for their 
discussion on teachers’ professionalism.  
 Under Gordillo, the SNTE was an active affiliate of the Confederation of American 
Educators (CEA) . The SNTE funded the creation in Mexico City in 1993 of the Institute for 65
Education and Union Studies of America (Instituto de Estudios Educativos y Sindicales de 
América -IEESA), following a joint proposal of the SNTE and the CEA. It would be directed by 
Gordillo’s son in law. At its peak in the late 1990s, the centre had a full time staff of 60 academic 
researchers to pursue its mandate of studying education in the Americas (Enrique de la Garza 
Toledo, Interviewed Feb. 2015). The resources of the institute have declined considerably since 
 Founded in Buenos Aires in 1928, the CEA became the Latin American affiliate of the World Federation of 65
Teachers’ Unions, a branch of the Communist aligned World Federation of Trade Unions. Most provincial teachers’ 
unions conducted international activities through the Canadian Teachers’ Federation. Throughout the Cold War it 
avoided engaging with Latin American teachers’ unions as they were seen as too “politicized”, or in other words, too 
left wing. The strength of the CEA was a symbol of this. Leaders of the BC Teachers Federation representing the 
Canadian Teachers Federation in the late 1960s at the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching 
Profession exposed that 85 percent of the latter’s funding came from the CIA. The World Confederation was 
dominated by the National Education Association, which routinely paid the dues of member unions in developing 
countries. It tried unsuccessfully to undermine the CEA. The International Federation of Free Teacher Unions led by 
American Federation of Teacher president Albert Shanker was even more ideologically committed to the US side of 
the Cold War (Kuehn 2006: 20-22, 26, 59-60).
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the fall of Gordillo in 2013. Interestingly, while the institute is clearly a branch of the official 
SNTE, its publications carry a markedly critical analysis of Enrique Peña Nieto’s education 
policies that are lauded by the Juan Diaz de la Torre union leadership. They are described in an 
online editorial by the institute as neoliberal, business-driven and resulting in the “devalorization 
of teachers’ labour” (IEESA 2015). 
 Gordillo’s increasingly prominent public reputation in Mexico for political manipulation 
and corruption likely had an effect of reducing prospects for international union collaboration, 
even if the opposition that she generated among her members was less likely to be heard. After 
keeping a low profile for a year after Gordillo’s arrest, and while teachers grouped around the 
CNTE waged protests across the country against Peña Nieto’s education policies, in 2014 her 
successor Juan Diaz de la Torre initiated an aggressive outreach effort to the highest profile 
international education institutions. With the SNTE’s print and online communications and 
through the media, de la Torre strove to present to the nation and his own membership, the image 
of an upbeat, positive union whose forward-looking embrace of necessary reforms was endorsed 
by significant authorities abroad (El Universal 2015; La Jornada 2015). 
 Under Juan Diaz de la Torre, a delegation of SNTE leaders were dispatched to the 
Washington, DC headquarters of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) in July 2014. The 
Mexican union reported that among the themes discussed were “social participation, workplace 
violence, legal issues and union governance including transparency, accounting, training, service 
unions, and the training and evaluation of teachers.” (SNTE 2014a). Several days later, Juan 
Diaz de la Torre met AFT president Randi Weingarten at her union’s national convention in Los 
Angeles. The SNTE also reports on a meeting here with the president of Education International, 
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the global federation of teachers’ unions affiliated with the International Trade Union 
Confederation. A photo of the Education International president and de la Torre embracing was 
prominently placed on the SNTE website under the title “Education International recognizes 
leadership of the SNTE”. De la Torre responded to a warm endorsement that the “SNTE has 
transformed itself to work at the side of teachers and give them certainty in their new role and at 
the same time redefine their relationship with the government, without losing their 
autonomy.” (SNTE 2014b; SNTE 2014c). The SNTE reported additional meetings with AFT 
leaders from Texas, California and Illinois, where agreements were made for benefits and 
discount plans accessible to members of both unions (SNTE 2014d). Leaders of the AFT 
subsequently travelled to Mexico City to meet with the SNTE executive in September 2014 and 
April 2015, in the latter event holding a press conference at a primary school in the middle class 
borough of Benito Juarez (SNTE 2015a). 
 Having established strong recognition from the AFT and Education International, the 
SNTE pursued endorsement from UNESCO and the OECD. In contrast to Gordillo’s early 
international activities, de la Torre reached out to elite policy makers and proudly asserted his 
union’s support for their agenda  (El Universal 2015; La Jornada 2015). SNTE leaders praised 66
Peña Nieto’s policies in a meeting with a UNESCO delegation studying Mexico’s teacher 
evaluation systems: 
The SNTE is an institution within the Mexican State that has to assume its commitment 
for the  public policies that serve to improve education. If doing so represents the 
transformation of our  profession, we are in agreement. We are very clear that the right of 
children to a quality education is not opposed to the rights of education workers.  
 An international conference convened by the SNTE in September 2015 in Monterrey, featured alongside union 66
leaders, directors of the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education (INEE) responsible for administering 
standardized testing and the Confederation of Mexican Employers (COPARMEX) (El Universal 2015).
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(SNTE 2015b) [Author’s translation] 
At a later Mexico City meeting with UNESCO in April 2016, the SNTE again reported the 
blessings (“UNESCO recognizes the SNTE for its work in support of teachers”) from the UN 
agency for its collaboration with the government. “The most important thing we value is the 
quality of the relationship between the Secretary of Public Education and the SNTE.” announced 
a union spokesperson (SNTE 2016b). Turning to the OECD, SNTE representatives flew to the 
agency’s Paris headquarters in January 2016 to meet with senior education policy staff and the 
president of Education International (SNTE 2016c). The relationship was consolidated with a 
meeting in Mexico City in October 2016 with OECD general secretary Jose Angel Gurría, where 
the union’s importance was reiterated in administering remedial online courses for teachers who 
did not pass the standardized exams prescribed by Peña Nieto’s government (SNTE 2016d).  
 The SNTE under Juan Diaz de la Torre has engaged in considerable work to provide 
endorsements and validations with significant international actors for the policies of Peña Nieto’s 
government. This occurred at a time when Mexican authorities have been threatened not only by 
ongoing disruptive protests from the teachers’ movement in the CNTE, but by a widespread 
discrediting of Peña Nieto’s regime at home and abroad. These include the disappearance of 43 
student teachers from the Ayotzinapa College in September 2014 (see Chapter 6), many other 
high profile incidents of violence with state complicity, corruption, and persistent poverty and 
inequality despite the promises of neoliberal reforms like the privatization of energy. This 
support from de la Torre is surely welcomed by Peña Nieto. It can also be read as a sign of the 
union’s vulnerability and dependence on the state. While engaging in this process, the SNTE is 
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also trying to counter the international reach of critical portrayals put forward by the CNTE of 
neoliberal reforms, in which the SNTE has invested its credibility and support.  
 The most important means by which Mexican educators critical of their government’s 
neoliberal reforms have sought international solidarity has been through the Trinational Coalition 
in Defence of Public Education  (Arriaga 2008: 225). Education activists from Canada, Mexico 67
and to a lesser extent the US, concerned about the implications of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement for public education, began a series of meetings in January 1993 in Olympia, 
Washington. At subsequent meetings in Mexico in 1994 and 1995, OSSTF, Quebec federations, 
and the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation  formally joined, as did the CNTE and its largest 68
state sections, as well as major university workers’ unions in Mexico City. Neither the American 
Federation of Teachers or the National Education Association formally participated due to their 
affiliation alongside the SNTE in Education International (Kuehn 2006: 174). An initial unifying 
concern was around proposals, since dropped, by the US’s Education Testing Service towards a 
continental certification scheme for teachers, which could result in deprofessionalization (Kuehn 
2008: 62-66). The Trinational’s biennial conferences which provide critical analysis of 
contemporary education, rotate between Canada, the US and Mexico, with the participation of 
the Chicago Teachers Union, the United Teachers of Los Angeles and the Professional Staff 
 I became involved in the Trinational Coalition after attending its 2010 conference in Montreal as a representative 67
of OSSTF. I have since participated in many events organized by the Trinational in Mexico, including as a 
spokesperson for OSSTF at an ‘International Solidarity Conference’ in October 2013 near the height of the first 
wave of strikes and protests against the Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente of Peña Nieto.
 The latter has provided the most consistent financial and infrastructure support for the Trinational, particularly 68
through long active individuals like BCTF researcher Larry Kuehn, who with Dan Leahy, an academic who 
organized the initial meeting in Olympia, and Maria de la Luz Arriaga, an economics professor at the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) have provided crucial continuity (Kuehn 2006). As participation within 
the Trinational for OSSTF is not an official duty to the extent of its membership in the Ontario Federation of Labour 
or the Canadian Labour Congress, its ongoing participation owes much to the role of Domenic Bellissimo, Director 
of the Communications, Political Action & International Affairs Department.
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Congress of the City University of New York after left caucuses were elected in these unions 
(Roman & Velasco Arregui 2015: 130-131).  
 Led by the Mexican section, its most active national contingent, the Trinational organizes 
international solidarity campaigns when its member organizations are engaged in struggle with 
their respective state. One of the most significant contributions of the Trinational has been 
overcoming the international isolation of the CNTE and Mexico’s other dissident education 
unions, by creating direct connections and spaces for support particularly with the BCTF, OSSTF 
and the left leaning local US teacher unions (Kuehn 2006; Arriaga 2008). While the official 
SNTE leadership is not known to have publicly commented on the Trinational, the former’s 
aggressive outreach efforts with international unions should also be seen in the context of the 
Trinational’s success in raising concern among teachers in BC, Ontario and some US cities for 
struggles of their colleagues in Mexico which were unsupported or opposed by the SNTE. The 
movement for justice since September 2014 for the 43 disappeared student-teachers of the 
Ayotzinapa College and the 2013 and 2016 strikes and protests against Peña Nieto’s standardized 
teacher evaluation are recent examples (Potter 2016). 
 In the early 21st Century, the proliferation of online social networking applications like 
Facebook and Skype, along with lower cost air travel have considerably reduced the resource 
threshold required to participate in international activities for teacher activists across North 
America, with or without the official endorsement of their union. Leaders of the CNTE in the 
Mexico City elementary teachers’ local post calendars of upcoming events on Facebook which 
are shared by their online followers. The biennial conferences of left ‘rank and file’ labour 
activists organized in the US by Labor Notes, have become an important space for teachers 
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seeking to radicalize their unions.  Conferences in 2012, 2014 and 2016 were sites for 69
networking among teachers inspired by the successes of the Caucus of Rank and File Educators 
(CORE) in winning elections to the executive of the Chicago Teachers Union since 2010 and as 
the union, building alliances with parents and community groups which manifested in popular 
support for strikes in 2012 and 2016. Among the many local US teacher groups inspired by 
CORE, the most established are the Movement of Rank and File Educators (MORE) within New 
York City’s United Federation of Teachers (discussed in Chapter 5) and the Caucus of Working 
Educators in Philadelphia. Together with many smaller groups, they formed the national US 
United Caucus of Rank and File Educators (UCORE), which meets at Labor Notes conferences 
and online over Skype. 
 Less well known among the many accounts of the emergence of CORE, is its early 
inspiration from Mexican and Canadian teachers. This case of grassroots teachers sharing ideas 
and strategies across North American borders for organizing is recounted here. In a fascinating 
network ethnography (Ball & Junemann 2012), McAlevey (2016) explains how CORE co-
founder Jackson Potter, then on a sabbatical from high school teaching, was encouraged by 
education professor Pauline Lipman to attend the 2006 conference of the Trinational in Oaxaca, 
Mexico. There he was inspired by the idea of forming a caucus of similar minded teachers to 
transform their union. He met activists from the CNTE, and by McAlevey’s account, was 
especially encouraged by a meeting with Alex Caputo-Pearl, leader of a left caucus within the 
United Teachers of Los Angeles who was later elected its president. Also influential was Jinny 
 I attended Labor Notes conferences in Detroit in 2008 and 2010, and in Chicago in 2012 and 2016, and 69
participated in workshops and caucus meetings for teachers. These meetings grew year over year to reach 
approximately 200 participants of the conference’s over 2000 attendees.
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Sims, then president of the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation, who delivered an 
inspirational speech on her union’s successful illegal strike in 2005, and the extensive 
community organization which it required. Potter convinced other early CORE members to pool 
their money to fly Sims to Chicago for more in-depth strategic discussions. After CORE’s union 
election victory, and shortly before Sim’s election in 2011 to the Canadian parliament with the 
New Democratic Party, she returned to speak at a conference gathering US teacher activists 
seeking to replicate CORE’s success. Maria de la Luz Arriaga spoke on behalf of the Trinational 
and the Mexican teachers’ movement.    70
 The historical development of teachers’ unionism in North America over the 20th 
Century demonstrates significant national and subnational (state or provincial) divergences on 
the basis of political, cultural and economic contexts. It also presents convergences, as with the 
economic downturn of the late 1970s through 1980s and the emergence of neoliberalism, for 
placing teachers’ unions in all three countries on the defensive. Likewise, as has only been 
suggested here and will be explained in far more detail in the case study chapters, a shared 
hallmark of neoliberal governance has been the centralization and scaling up of education 
systems. Above all, in all three countries one of the most significant activities of teacher unions 
has been negotiating the dynamics of professionalism and the form of their members’ work. 
Finally, as centres of governance, New York, Mexico City and Toronto share important 
similarities within their regional or national contexts as sites for the development and diffusion 
of education policy, liaising with important multilateral actors like the OECD and UNESCO. 
 Personal observations from attending CORE conference in Chicago, July 2011.70
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 The experiences of the Trinational Coalition and CORE demonstrate how teachers’ 
movements in North America increasingly consider strategy and build relationships at a 
transnational, continental scale, despite the apparently geographically limited primary sites of 
their struggle at the municipal and at most the national level. This is also demonstrated by the 
prioritization placed by Juan Diaz de la Torre’s SNTE on international endorsements in the 
context of his leadership’s weak legitimacy. It suggests a similar concern on the part of Enrique 
Peña Nieto’s government. Nevertheless, for those concerned with making teachers’ unions more 
democratic, effective and radical, it is heartening to see how cross border networking is 
becoming increasingly accessible and no longer limited to small numbers of top level leaders.  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Chapter 5: New York City 
5.1: Preface- Visiting a Small High School on the Upper West Side 
 I met Jen, an untenured history and special education teacher with six years experience, 
on her preparation period at the entrance to her high school on Manhattan’s Upper West Side.  71
The large building had formerly been one school enrolling over two thousand students. Citing 
high crime and low standardized test scores, it was closed in the late 2000s and converted to 
house small schools of around 400 students on each of its four floors. “If anyone asks, just say 
you’re a friend of mine from college,” she says as we pass by metal detecters and the security 
desk. In New York’s complex ‘school choice’ system, middle school children must apply to 
several high schools without recourse to a default ‘neighbourhood school.’ Around a third have 
an enrolment prerequisite ranging from high marks in grade 8, an entrance exam, or an essay and 
extensive interviews with the child and their parents. Jen’s school requires none of these, giving 
priority to children whose parents attend an information night and live within Manhattan. Over 
two thirds of the students are Latino, around a quarter are black, about 1 percent are white. The 
students come overwhelmingly from poor families in the Washington Heights area.  
 She leads me to the drama space, where according to Jen, our interview will be 
undisturbed due to the lack of any drama classes. “The small school movement ruined 
everything,” she says, citing a program begun by progressive New York educators in the 1980s to 
convert some of the city’s most problematic giant high schools into smaller institutions where 
students would be less likely to fall through the cracks and teachers would have a democratic 
voice in its operations. Beginning under Mayor Giuliani and accelerating dramatically under 
 The experiences of ‘Jen’ and ‘Karen’ (both pseudonyms) are drawn from interviews and a school visit by the 71
author with New York Teachers 13 and 14 in April 2015.
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Bloomberg in the 2000s with a new mission, the program closed dozens of large schools and 
opened hundreds of small schools. She explains: 
[the closed big school] was notoriously bad. There was a lot of crime... But they did have 
any club you could imagine. They had an award winning orchestra, a fully developed 
sports program. They had a huge staff and a huge student body to support these programs. 
By closing it now, we don’t have arts at our school. We have one arts teacher who was 
leftover and she does a couple classes for two different schools here, but only a few. The 
kids don’t get to choose their classes here either at all. They have zero input in what they 
get placed. So we’ve got this dance teacher giving arts credits, arbitrarily getting students 
assigned to her class. Then they get arts credits through the creative writing English 
classes because we don’t have arts teachers. There’s no arts programs. There’s a room full 
of instruments that are just collecting dust and falling into disrepair. Hundreds of 
instruments and a beautiful auditorium no one ever uses because no school has the 
resources to support a band program. 
Unable to offer a broad curriculum beyond the core subjects that students must study to pass 
their Regents exams and graduate, or even substantial extracurriculars, these small education 
ecosystems are then subject to varying pedagogical regimes at the behest of their administrators. 
“This school was maybe started six years ago, by a 29 year old principal.” Jen continues: 
She just tested all these different radical pedagogical theories one after another. It was 
just drastically changing every year... it’s become a laboratory for different models of 
teaching. The most recent, last year we had a new principal... who implemented this 
curriculum model, Learning Cultures, which is school-wide. Every teacher’s required to 
do it in their class. It dictates how classes should run. Very specific guidelines for 
teachers and for students. It’s  supposed to be the opposite to a script. The idea behind is 
that teachers don’t need to teach content, because content is freely available on the 
internet now. So we’re supposed to teach kids strategies of how to learn. So, what it looks 
like is, I taught history, we basically give the kids a list of what they need to learn, some 
websites they can use to access it, some textbooks, and we tell them to go work together 
and learn it. Which is really beautiful in theory, but in practice, it looks like a mess. 
‘Learning Cultures’ is the product of a professor at a New York university who is seeking to 
develop and market this pedagogical form, according to Jen. The academic, a friend of the school 
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principal, receives royalties from its use and is paid from the school budget to train the staff on 
its usage: 
There’s no direct instruction. 70 minute periods, a ten minute lesson. We’re not supposed 
to teach content in the lesson, just, they call them ‘grassroots lessons’ which is: ‘I saw 
this student do this really good strategy yesterday. She used this website and found this 
video and wrote notes on the video. You all should use this strategy.’ Just different skills 
that we see the kids doing. We’re not really allowed or supposed to mandate anything 
really. The idea is the kids are supposed to have autonomy. We don’t assign seats. There’s 
a lot of really good things about it, but... there’s a lot of pushback among the students and 
the staff. 
Without sufficient instruction from teachers, the students struggle: 
[t]he lack of structure is overwhelming for them, especially because the students we get  
are struggling. On average, we have a third grade reading level here. Attendance is an 
issue. A lot of them don’t know what they’re supposed to be doing, and then once we tell 
them what they’re supposed to be doing, it’s just too much for them to handle without 
more direct instruction. 
According to the 2013-14 ‘School Quality Snapshot’ prepared by the NYC DOE, less than 30 
percent of this school’s teachers would recommend their school to parents. The city average is 76 
percent. However the proportion of parents ‘satisfied’ with the education their child receives here 
is just below the city average of 94 percent. By the end of grade 9, the proportion of students 
with enough completed course credits to graduate within the standard four year period was well 
above the city average of 83 percent. By the end of 10th grade, it dropped nearly 30 points, well 
below the city standard. 
Everything we do has to fit within this rigid mold of Learning Cultures. So, it’s not just a 
‘free for all’ like it sounds. The cornerstone of the model is what’s called unison reading, 
choral reading, where the kids have to sit in groups for 15 minutes and read out loud. 
There’s rules about it, and the way the teacher should act. So that has to happen in every 
class. Then the teacher spends their time doing individual conferences with each student. 
Especially in the history department, we have to prepare them for the Regents Exam.  
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Jen compares her experience at this school to the middle school in the South Bronx where she 
began her career several years ago, lessons there were highly scripted and paired with a “very 
militant” student discipline regime emphasizing quiet and straight lines. She says the 
commonality to these divergent pedagogies, was an underlying belief by the school 
administration, “that teachers cannot be trusted as professionals to use their professional 
judgement in how to educate kids.” She adds: 
There’s been a lot of pushback in the history department because our inclination was to 
teach the content and lead students in discussion about the content and guide them to 
interesting things to read about it. But we were told that was too teacher directed. I was in 
the history department for the first semester. My background is in humanities and I’ve 
only ever taught English and history, but because I’m Special Education certified, I’m 
technically certified to teach anything. So I made my opinions pretty loud about how I 
felt this was working in history, because our assessments were showing our kids weren’t 
learning anything. It was really painful everyday to not be able to do the things we as 
professionals know work. …with two days notice at the start of the second term, the 
principal pulled me into her office… she said, ‘I’m switching your entire program, you’re 
teaching all math classes.’ 
Jen is unequivocal that she was the subject of retaliation by her principal for her outspoken 
stance on the mandatory teaching structure used at her school. At this point we are joined in the 
drama space by Jen’s colleague Karen, an English teacher for 12 years with tenure, who 
transferred to this school three years ago. Both feel they are being pushed out of the school 
because they haven’t “drunken the kool-aid.” After having previously received ‘Satisfactory’ 
ratings under the NYC DOE’s former system of Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory annual evaluations, 
last year in 2013 for the first time, Karen was rated ‘Developing’ under the new four level 
system, and her movement up the pay grid was frozen.  
 I asked about the school’s union chapter and its response to these erosions to teachers’ 
professional autonomy. Both note that less than a quarter of the young staff have the full ‘tenure’ 
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protection of their union, gained after four years and the evaluation of a ‘portfolio’ with samples 
of student work by a superintendent. Karen has the most years of teaching experience in the 
school. The only other with more than ten years is the chapter leader, who Jen describes as “very 
vocal in defence of teachers’ rights.” Jen warns, a strong perception exists among the untenured 
staff that being seen talking with her will result in some form of retaliation from the 
administration. The school union leader is also the only remaining teacher of colour on the staff 
of around 40. According to Karen, over the past two years, five other high seniority black women 
were fired or forced out after receiving low ratings, despite previously receiving good scores. 
Ken and Jen describe it as racist. The women had refused to adopt disciplinary methods they felt 
were inappropriate for their students, and were generally critical of the administration. Their 
replacements were young and white, and accepted the explanation that they had replaced ‘bad’ 
teachers. Jen sums up her future prospects: 
I don’t have tenure, but I just can’t keep my mouth shut. And I’m not going to get it. She 
[the principal] extended it [probationary status] twice, even though I got heaps of data 
which shows I know how to do my job. Most people just keep their mouth shut, which is 
the wise thing to do if you want a career here. 
 Before her prep period ends, Jen leads me on a quick tour of the rest of the building. 
Climbing the stairs, we encounter a very different school. Unlike Jen and Karen’s, its entrance 
requirements are difficult and highly competitive. Students come from a wide area, but are 
overwhelmingly white. A bulletin board in the hallway boasts of the universities which the grade 
12 students will attend next year. Another board displays formulas drawn by students in an 
advanced algebra class. Another floor up we reach an elementary charter school. A class marches 
by in a silent, orderly column, students wearing formal uniforms, hands in their pockets. Next to 
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each classroom door is a roster of the students, ranked according to their test scores. Students 
with low scores have red dots beside their names. The classes are named after the alma mater of 
their teacher and the expected year of graduation of the students. The teachers all look young. 
The corridors are clean, with shiny new motivational posters on the wall and words on the floor. 
I feel like I’m in a school vertically segregated by race and class, with various forms of 
neoliberal experimentation underway. As I leave, I read a notice on the outside door for the 
parents of grades 3 and 4 students taking the New York State math exams for three days that 
week: “If your scholar arrives after 7:30 am they are late!” 
5.2: Introduction 
 Jen and Karen’s school exemplifies the outcomes of neoliberal education reforms in New 
York City in the early 21st Century. This chapter demonstrates how contemporary reforms have 
resulted in the loss of teachers’ professional autonomy and the degradation of their work in the 
city schools, and how this process connects to both the mobility of neoliberal policy and shifting 
scalar struggles over political power. I will first explore structural-institutional changes that have 
affected teachers’ work, and that have facilitated subsequent policy changes. These begin with 
the implementation of Mayoral Control under Michael Bloomberg in 2002 and the dissolution of 
elected community school boards (section 5.3). This is followed by the scaling up of the original 
‘small schools movement’ as the New Century Schools Initiative , which in conjunction with 72
increased standardized testing, sought to multiply the quantity of NYC high schools, while 
removing the option of a ‘default’ neighbourhood school, to create a marketplace for ‘school 
 Actually begun under his predecessor Mayor Giuliani, but expanded at a massive and rapid scale under 72
Bloomberg (Hantzopoulos and Tyner-Mullings 2012).
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choice’ (section 5.4). As at Jen and Karen’s school, the small faculty made the delivery of 
curriculum beyond the five core subjects tested under the Regents Exams difficult, but with the 
emphasis on these test scores, the loss of arts, languages, physical education and other electives 
has not apparently been deemed a serious shortcoming by education authorities -at least at the 
state level under Governor Cuomo. Instead, teachers in these hundreds of small worksites would 
compete through test score results with their colleagues across the city to enrol and retain 
students. However in practice, in terms of teachers’ work and professional autonomy, small 
schools have had the most impact where they have increased the importance of standardized 
testing, and by generating a negative institutional influence on union culture. 
 Failure in this ‘market’ would bear grave professional consequences through subsequent 
policy changes. Section 5.5 reviews policies that have weakened the school site union presence, 
facilitating attacks on teacher professionalism. These include the elimination of seniority in 2005 
for teachers at closed or downsizing schools, and the decentralization of staff budgets to school 
principals, creating strong incentives for retention and hiring of low seniority, lower paid 
teachers. Procedural changes to the awarding of tenure, resulted in an increase in the difficulty 
and time for new teachers to gain full job security, which when combined with increasing teacher 
turnover, has quickly lead to a rising proportion of untenured faculty in most New York City 
schools, who lack basic union protections. 
 Section 5.6 will look at how since the election of progressive leaning mayor Bill De 
Blasio in 2013, the initiative in neoliberal education policy has ‘scaled up’ to Governor Cuomo. 
The latter has directly confronted and frequently defeated attempts by the mayor to reduce the 
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emphasis on standardized testing for student and teachers, rollback the expansion of charter 
schools, and otherwise mitigate aspects of the education ‘market’.  
 Section 5.7 focuses on the expansion of student standardized testing initially under 
Bloomberg in 2002 within the context of federal No Child Left Behind legislation. It was 
subsequently expanded in 2010 under New York State Governor Cuomo with Value Added 
Assessments based on student test scores to determine teacher evaluations as part of the state’s 
successful bid for President Obama’s Race to the Top funding program. This punitive system 
created a powerful impetus for inducing ‘teaching to the test.’ Particularly when combined with 
changes by the state government to the weighting of annual teacher evaluations in 2015 to give 
roughly half the value to state test scores. I conclude this section with a brief study of the rising 
‘opt-out’ movement in 2015, which in the face of tepid union opposition to standardized testing 
and its related reforms, is emerging as the most important form of resistance to the edifice of 
neoliberal education policy and the degradation of teachers’ work in New York. 
 In the final section of this chapter (5.8), I conclude by presenting the voices of teacher 
activists on how these policies have cumulatively affected their union at the school level, and its 
affect on their professional autonomy. This discussion will introduce the emergence of the 
activist left wing caucus within New York City’s United Federation of Teachers (UFT), the 
Movement of Rank and File Educators (MORE). 
5.3: Structural Changes I: Centralizing Power to Facilitate Neoliberal Fast Policy 
    - Mayoral Control 
 Since the founding of the publicly funded secular ‘Free Schools’ in the early 19th 
Century, New York City public education has been transformed repeatedly by waves of reform. 
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Irish Catholics, elite reformers, corrupt Tammany Hall politicians, New Dealers and civil rights 
activists have alternately sought with greater or lesser success, to decentralize the US’s largest 
school system into various forms of local boards, or centralize the system into the hands of the 
mayor and his appointees (Ravitch 2000a). Prior to the start of Bloomberg’s mayoral term, the 
form of the New York City Board of Education (BOE) had been constituted by the state 
government in 1969, in response to demands by civil rights activists (and to a lesser extent by 
pockets of schools where predominantly white parents resisted busing that would lead to 
integration) for greater ‘community control’ of local schools.  Largely in continuation with post-73
Tammany Hall reforms,  the central BOE consisted of seven members appointed jointly by the 74
mayor and the five borough presidents. The BOE appointed the system’s chancellor, set overall 
policy and supervised system operations, and was directly responsible for the city’s high schools, 
as well as ESL and Special Education programs (significantly expanded from the late 1970s). 
However, 32 geographically defined Community School Districts (CSDs) enjoyed substantial 
autonomy to set budgets and priorities for their elementary schools. They were presided over by 
locally elected trustees, who appointed their superintendents. Despite strong initial parental 
involvement in the CSDs, by the late 1990s, Fullan and Boyle (2014: 22) described a third as 
being well-run, a third as mediocre insofar as they did not sufficiently acknowledge and address 
problems in their schools, and the remaining third as “characterized by patronage and 
corruption.” The best CSDs, as measured by high school graduation rates and elementary math 
 The divisive conflict in 1968-69 between an experimental ‘community controlled’ board in the Oceansville-73
Brownsville district of Brooklyn, which attempted to fire teachers appointed to its schools, and the UFT which 
waged months long strikes in this district and citywide in their defence, was discussed in Chapter 2.
 The capacity for local boards to be used as sites for corruption and patronage by district party machines was 74
reduced by moving most financial and management powers to the central BOE office (Ravitch 2000a).
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and literacy test scores, as well as by their clean and effective governance, were overwhelmingly 
located in gentrifying and affluent, mostly white regions of Manhattan, Queens and Staten 
Island, while with few exceptions, the worst were in the city’s low income predominantly black 
and Latino neighbourhoods in Harlem, the South Bronx, Central and Eastern Brooklyn (Ravitch 
2000a; Fullan & Boye 2014: 22). However where it functioned, this structure did provide 
opportunities for strong parental, and indirectly, teacher voice over the operations of their 
schools. 
 Near the end of his final term, Giuliani vented his frustration with the BOE’s 
administration by exclaiming that he wanted to “blow up” the board’s headquarters in 
Brooklyn.  For proponents of neoliberal education policy as well as for many exasperated with 75
the status quo, the implementation of mayoral control offered a shock doctrine (Klein 2007) style 
potential for systemic transformation. A strong chancellor, politically backed by a powerful 
mayor, responds to a widely perceived institutional crisis by rapidly blasting through 
bureaucratic obstruction to make the hierarchy accountable -superintendents and principals, as 
well as teachers and perhaps implicitly, though they were not placed in the same group in the 
language of reformers, the students themselves.  
 Mayoral Control can also be conceived as an example of fast policy in the sense 
developed by Peck and Theodore (2015), for its rapid proliferation across the US by neoliberal 
‘thought leaders’ who presented it as an experimental ‘idea that works’ to policy makers looking 
for ‘solutions’ to the perceived crisis of public education. Chicago is the commonly recognized 
 Unlike Bloomberg’s administration, under most of which Joel Klein served as chancellor, enjoying strong support 75
from the mayor, several chancellors led the Board of Education under Giuliani; despite their varying ideologies and 
organizational priorities, all ultimately clashed with him (Rivera-McCutchon 2012: 26).
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point of origin for the contemporary form of Mayoral Control from its implementation in 1995.  76
Then mayor Richard M. Daley widely promoted it as a governance model while president of the 
US Conference of Mayors in 1997, and was put in the spotlight by President Clinton’s State of 
the Union addresses in 1998 and 1999 (Shipps 2009: 118).  From Chicago, Mayoral Control 77
spread to Boston in 1996, Cleveland in 1998, Detroit in 1999 (subsequently reversed in 2004 
amidst controversy), Harrisburg in 2000 and New York City in 2002 (Henig 2009: 23). However 
among these cities, New York subsequently emerged along Chicago (and DC from 2007-10 ), as 78
the premier policy model. Teachers College at Columbia education policy professor Jeffry Henig 
contends, “When new mayors in other cities make a pitch for gaining authority over the schools, 
they are as likely, or more so, to name New York as their model as the other cities.” (2009: 22) 
The prominence of these three cities as policy models has much to do with the political and 
economic importance of their school systems at the national scale, giving experiments in charter 
schools, standardized high stakes testing and reductions in teacher job security, a broad audience 
among would-be emulators and opponents alike. For advocates of neoliberal education policy, 
 However Mayoral Control itself is not a new policy -it was the dominant form of urban school administration in 76
the US at the turn of the 20th Century, prior to reforms demanding decentralization in favour of greater parental and 
community voice. It was never abolished in Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Haven or Jackson, Mississippi, among 
other cities (Henig 2009: 23), but none are prominently cited as policy models for Mayoral Control, likely due both 
to the greater prominence of New York and Chicago, and because the historic institution of Mayoral Control in these 
cities is not an integral component for policy advocates of a larger package of contemporary neoliberal reforms, 
which this chapter seeks to establish is the case for New York.
 Mayoral Control was not a genuine innovation in the mid nineties Chicago context. Aside from 1989 to 1994, 77
Chicago mayors have appointed the school board, its superintendent and intervened in education policy. Exercise of 
this power and in some periods, control over the education budget, was an important source of the political 
patronage, notably for Richard M. Daley and his father, for which Chicago’s municipal politics are (in)famous. In 
1988, community activists won the creation of strong elected local school councils with the power to hire and fire 
the principal, set school priorities and approve the discretionary budget. Elected district structures and nominating 
committees for the central board were abolished with the return to mayoral control in 1995, but the empowered local 
school councils remain, though highly contested (Shipps 2009: 118-120). The charter schools which have replaced 
dozens of Chicago public schools over the past two decades lack this structure, giving principals considerable power 
and removing a check on the central appointed board.
 During the reign of charismatic policy advocate and schools chancellor Michelle Rhee.78
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implementing mayoral control weakens the capacity of teachers’ unions and parent’s groups to 
oppose these subsequent projects by insulating key decision making from popular pressure. 
Mayoral control facilitates neoliberal fast policy by curtailing the powers of democratically 
elected school boards, enabling policies from city hall, the state capitol or the White House to be 
more easily and rapidly implemented locally. 
 In When Mayors Take Charge: School Governance in the City, published to analyze the 
first seven years of mayoral control in New York City under Bloomberg and intervene in debate 
on the (successful) proposed renewal of Mayoral Control in 2009 , editor Joseph P. Viteritti 79
contends: 
Before the 2002 implementation of mayoral control, New York had one of the most 
ambitious systems of political decentralization in the country. Yet for more than thirty 
years, turnout rates in community school board elections had not exceeded 10 percent of 
the eligible voters and were usually much lower. Candidates were largely anonymous.  80
(Viteritti 2009: 8) 
The result, according to Viteritti, was that CSDs did not represent the genuine democratic will of 
their local constituent parents, and that in practice they were easily “captured” by highly 
organized groups including anti-poverty activists, resident’s associations and in particular, the 
teachers’ union . Adhering to a particular theory of representative democracy that eschews 81
collective organization, Viteritti argues that a strong mayor better represents the popular will, 
 The book contains a preface by then Public Advocate of New York City Betsy Gotbaum, who laud’s the 79
collection’s contribution to the contemporary debate, emphasizing its relevance to contemporary policy making.
 In Toronto, becoming a trustee has traditionally been the first step for would-be politicians to become elected to 80
higher (and better renumerated) office as a city councillor, or a member of the provincial or federal parliament, 
drawing many ambitious candidates into the race.
 This is a common argument among neoliberal advocates for mayoral control, see: Frederick Hess and Olivia 81
Meeks, “Rethinking District Governance,” 107-129 in Education Governance for the Twenty-First Century. Eds. 
Paul Manna & Patrick McGuinn. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Hess is the director of education policy 
studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Shipps repudiates this claim of teachers’ unions hijacking local school 
boards in her essay on Chicago’s experience for When Mayors Take Charge, (2009: 137).
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given a mandate by a much higher voter turnout rate, and greater media exposure leading to 
increased accountability (Viteritti 2009: 8). Henig contends in the same volume that mayoral 
control facilitates the enactment of policies that may be locally unpopular or adverse for teachers 
and other education workers: 
Mayors, chosen citywide in elections that engage a broad array of groups and interests, 
are structurally less dependent than school board members on teachers unions, which can 
wield tremendous influence in the generally low-visibility, low-turnout elections that 
typically select school boards. That, in theory, gives them a freer hand to engage in a 
range of administrative strategies that many believe are conducive to more efficient and 
effective use of government resources -including closing schools, contracting out for key 
functions, and bargaining more aggressively to limit teacher work rules and tenure 
protections. (Henig 2009: 25) 
Henig goes on to cite ineffective textbook distribution to explain DC school chancellor Michelle 
Rhee’s initial desire for more power over personnel in 2007 under Mayoral Control. He 
acknowledges concerns of parents and teachers in DC, particularly African-Americans, who have 
felt excluded from exercising a political voice, and see Mayoral Control through a racial lens of a 
white power structure asserting control over educators and the black grassroots (2009:28). A year 
after the publication of this book, Rhee’s appointee, Mayor Adrian Fenty, lost his reelection bid 
(and with it, her job) in large part due to her divisive attacks on teachers’ collective bargaining 
rights and school closures in black communities (Ravitch 2013: 286). As Kretchmar contends, 
Mayoral Control is driven by an ideology that sees corporate business management principles as 
applicable to public education (and the public sector more broadly) in order to enact greater 
‘accountability’, though ironically while reducing opportunities for substantive democratic 
participation by those who actually work and study within the system, as their perspectives and 
desires may contradict those of the top down reformers (Kretchmar 2014: 5). 
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 Wong, also an economics professor, adds in Viteritti’s volume that Mayoral Control can 
thereby counteract demands for increased education spending, and in fact make budget cuts 
under the pressure of fiscal austerity. Here, he describes the particular origins of public sector 
austerity in New York City in 1975, which subsequently emerged in other big US cities, and sets 
it within an ideological convergence that has made the education policies of urban Democrat and 
Republican administrations remarkably similar: 
From a broader institutional perspective, city hall is likely to apply fiscal discipline and  
accountability to the school system in both formal and informal ways. During the late 
1970s and the 1980s as well as the early years of the present decade [2000s], when cities 
faced severe fiscal stress, mayors began to adopt a new governing culture, which may be 
characterized as the new fiscal culture... Growingly responsive to concerns of taxpayers, 
these mayors move away from policies defined by traditional party labels and organized 
interest groups. In local governance that adopts this new culture, the traditional party 
labels become less relevant as the relation between social and fiscal issues weakens. 
Fiscal responsibility and social conservatism are no longer strongly linked. In reforming 
management of agencies, mayors who adopt the new fiscal culture accelerate contracting 
out, hold down taxes, focus on management efficiency, and  introduce outcome measures 
for periodic evaluation. These changes tend to overlap with the policy vision of civic-
spirited business leaders and the taxpaying electorate. (Wong 2009: 83) 
Contributors to When Mayors Take Charge, largely share a consensus that organized business 
interests are among the principal advocates for mayoral control in a given city. Viteritti writes, 
“A reading of the professional literature... reveals certain patterns that are evident in the politics 
of school governance. Whenever and wherever mayoral control of the schools was implemented, 
it was usually done with the strong support of business leaders.” (Viteritti 2009: 7) Their 
objectives are disputed. Viteritti appeals to schools needing to produce graduates better suited to 
the labour market, a discourse dominant in education policy since publication of the Nation at 
Risk report in 1983 (Ravitch 2013: 10; Kuhn 2014: 33-34) to continue, “The latter have a clear 
stake in education. Good schools are a prerequisite for a business-friendly environment. An 
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educated population is essential for a skilled workforce.” (Viteritti 2009: 7) The above quote by 
Wong, indicates a strong interest for business elites in obtaining reduced taxes thanks to a 
friendly mayor running the school board, also crediting the implementation of mayoral control in 
Chicago in 1995 with improving that city’s bond rating from BBB- to A- two years later (Wong 
2009: 83).  For Wong, the imperative for ‘fiscal discipline’ to serve ‘taxpayers’ and business 82
leaders, implicates an aggressive stance to teachers and other education workers whose wages 
and salaries comprise by far the largest component of education budgets: 
...education mayors are becoming more strategic in prioritizing their resource allocation 
and management. Central to this strategy is the notion of fiscal discipline in constraining 
labor costs. We see this in the inverse relationship between mayoral control and 
expenditures. Education mayors, while continuing to partner with labor unions, seem able 
to leverage cooperation (or concessions) from the school employees’ unions. (2009: 82) 
The experience of Mayoral Control in New York City under Bloomberg largely confirmed this 
claim. 
 Fullan and Boyle (2014) divide the education history of Bloomberg’s mayoralty into two 
periods, both dominated by major structural reforms with a significant impact on teachers’ work. 
The first period from 2002-2005 at the start of his tenure, is characterized by centralization. 
From February to March 2002, a high profile committee reassessed the organization of the Board 
of Education. It heard testimony from the BOE chair and Bloomberg, recommending its 
dissolution and restructuring under Mayoral Control. It subsequently voted to do so, promptly 
receiving approval from the State Assembly. Bloomberg took control of the city’s new 
 Education professor Kirst cites the Chicago experience of mayoral control to argue business lobbyists were 82
principally interested in exercising fiscal discipline over schools. She suggests they were less successful in doing so 
in Boston, a system which shared the top-down control of Chicago (and later New York), but in which high level 
career civil servants played a stronger role (Kirst 2009). In contrast, Wong praises the practices in Chicago (and 
subsequently in New York) of Mayoral Control resulting in the importation of management staff from outside the 
public education sector, who apparently share a mindset with business leaders (Wong 2009: 83).
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Department of Education (DOE) in July 2002 (Traver 2006: 502). As with the other two cities 
with the highest profile mayoral control regimes associated with neoliberal education reform, 
Chicago and DC, Bloomberg used his new power to directly appoint the chancellor by selecting 
a non-educator, Joel Klein, a federal Department of Justice lawyer and corporate CEO, who like 
Rhee and Chicago’s Arne Duncan, would become an important policy advocate. The new 13 
member Panel for Education Policy (PEP) appointed by the mayor, plus one individual from 
each borough president, may not appear to be substantially different from its preceding seven 
member appointed structure, however the larger PEP included a clear majority of mayoral 
appointees. Bloomberg actively intervened to ensure the PEP approved his initiatives (New York 
Teacher 10: Interviewed Apr. 2015). In a high profile incident in 2004, he earned the ire of parent 
activists by removed three panel members who threatened to vote against holding back grade 3 
children who were well below reading level. According to Fullan and Boyle, this contributed to 
public opposition that began stalling his initiatives in his third term. During this period, the PEP 
vowed to raise test scores by forcing through a single citywide literacy and math curriculum, 
previously used in Manhattan’s District 2. The initiative drew resistance from many teachers who 
argued it removed the capacity for professional judgment in assessing the best means to teach 
their students. Traver (2006) describes the homogenizing initiative as reminiscent of the 
Scientific Management labour deskilling principles of Taylorism. It was soon abolished after its 
content received criticism from the US DOE (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 26, 28-29; Traver 2006: 
502-507). Bloomberg and Klein’s efforts would have become obsolete a few years later in any 
case, with the implementation of Common Core. 
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 Another key structural change was the elimination of elected Community School 
Districts, which previously gave active parents a degree of power comparable to Chicago’s local 
school councils. Their public face was replaced by Community Education Councils, which lost 
the power to appoint principals and district superintendents. Authority over school budgets was 
increasingly transferred to principals (Traver 2006: 504; New York Teacher 2: Interviewed Dec. 
2014). On the operational side, Bloomberg and his chancellors experimented with a range of 
structures, which from 2005 through the end of his final term in 2012, had become a highly 
decentralized system of 52 networks, to which schools would affiliate, with a limited association 
to geography. However, despite appearing to be a more horizontal system, schools in practice 
were increasingly under the direct control of DOE headquarters, whose new ‘Office of 
Accountability’ kept them under surveillance by monitoring test scores (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 
31). The aggregate of these policies was increasing empowerment and autonomy for school 
principals, in relation to their teaching staff and parents. Journalist Clara Hemphill quotes a 
parent activist in her chapter for Viteritti’s book assessing Mayoral Control, “In the old days, if a 
principal got off track, the district superintendent could step in. Now, we live in a world where 
the principals are kings and queens.” (Hemphill 2009: 203). Accompanying the elimination of 
geographic CSDs and centralization of power under Mayoral Control, was the end of a policy 
enacted in 1996, that mandated school leadership teams comprised of elected parent and teacher 
representatives who worked with the principal to collectively establish a school’s priorities and 
budget. Alongside empowering parents, it also represented increased recognition and scope for 
the exercising of teacher professionalism. Its implementation was derided by policy advocates, 
many gathered in an earlier effort by Ravitch and Viteritti in mobilizing policy, City Schools: 
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Lessons from New York (2000), who claimed it hamstrung principals from making fast decisions 
unbeholden to ‘interest groups’. Like Viteritti’s 2009 work (in which Ravitch is only a 
contributor), it is interesting of itself as a collective representation of the ideological orientations 
of high profile academics working on education policy. The exhortions of several contributors of 
what I describe as the ‘principal as protagonist’, is one of several ideas from these volumes that 
would later be realized under Bloomberg. Hemphill, who also contributed to City Schools, 
articulates this belief well when she writes: 
Improving the quality of principals is the single most important thing we can do to 
improve urban education. It’s more important than recent initiatives to decrease class size 
or to provide universal pre-kindergarten... It’s even more pressing than repairing 
crumbling schools and buying new equipment such as computers. A good principal will 
make do in less than perfect conditions. But if the leadership of each building is 
uninspired, other efforts to improve education will fail. (Hemphill 2000: 59) 
Here she joins the criticism of school leadership teams, a position she reverses following their 
elimination in 2007, describing it as a loss for meaningful parental engagement in her entry for 
When Mayors Take Charge in 2009, accompanied by the criticism quoted above from a parent 
activist.  
 Reflecting on Mayoral Control under Bloomberg, Hemphill writes (2009) how his new 
methods for parental participation, the consultative community education councils and a new 
paid position of a school parent liaison are not empowering as the former lacks any power and 
the latter reports directly to their supervisor, the principal. Hemphill argues that these policies 
were driven by a vision of Chancellor Klein (and Bloomberg), in which parents and students 
exercised their voices as consumers, free to choose and change schools, based on test score 
results, rather than as democratic citizens. Klein explained his opposition to giving organized 
 162
parents political voice, by describing their active groups as ‘biased’, middle class and 
predominantly white, unrepresentative of the majority of poor or working class parents of colour 
(Hemphill 2009: 203). While adding the pretensions of an equity lens, his discourse remarkably 
resembles comments quoted above by Viteritti and Henig (2009), who praised Mayoral Control 
as a means to avoid capture by ‘interest groups’. While its proponents embrace a market 
discourse of ‘school choice’, Mayoral Control has facilitated New York City becoming a site for 
experimentation in neoliberal education policy, due to the reduction of electoral means for 
parents and community groups to voice any opposition, and due to systemic barriers for the 
political participation for parents a majority of which are racialized and working class. As one 
NYC teacher, who also contributes to New York education website Chalkbeat, argues: 
[C]ity kids are lab rats for the state to test out new things. The state cares about suburban 
parents and fights for their votes.... Those parents pay high property taxes. So their 
teachers are treated better because those parents don’t want to come into schools where... 
they have a new English teacher every year. Neither do parents in the city, but the state 
doesn’t care what parents in the city think. Partly they’ve frozen them out with Mayoral 
Control too. ... In New York, and this is true in Chicago too, part of the no political power 
thing is that it’s taken for granted that the city’s overwhelmingly Democratic, so nobody 
worries about how that’s going to affect voting. These aren’t contested terrain. But I think 
Mayoral Control is very important there. Because in LA… [because of] community 
boards... they’ve had a much harder time pushing through things like this. The union’s 
also much stronger in LA. (New York Teacher 2: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
These characteristics help explain why NYC, like many other major northern US urban centres, 
but unlike their predominantly affluent and white suburban neighbouring districts, have been 
particularly susceptible to the rapid rollout of neoliberal education policies. 
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5.4: Structural Changes II: Balkanizing the Workplace, Transforming Workplace Culture- 
    Small Schools & the New Century Schools Initiative  
 Mayoral Control and a weakened parent voice facilitated the rapid rollout of a program 
which epitomized Bloomberg and Klein’s faith in strong administrators and a marketplace of 
‘school choice’: the closures of dozens of struggling large high schools and their replacement 
with hundreds of small schools with less than 500 students and 30-40 teachers (De Jesus 2012: 
63).  The balkanization of secondary students has had a profound impact on teachers’ work. A 
small faculty limits capacities to offer a broad curriculum, while converging with increased 
emphasis on the five subject areas at the high school level tested in the Regent Exams, discussed 
below in the seventh section of this chapter (Shiller 2011). If arts, languages and other elective 
courses are no longer important for a student’s graduation, then it fits well that every teacher 
must be timetabled into math, English, science, history or geography, because enrolment 
numbers and the accompanying funding don’t allow otherwise. Alongside this curricular 
narrowing, the multiplicity of small schools puts into effect the competitive ‘market’ of school 
choice, which through the publishing of test score data, operates as a disciplinary mechanism for 
teachers. 
 As Jen described at the start of this chapter in reference to the former school in whose 
building her’s is located, many of the large high schools that were closed did have serious 
problems. Most had four year graduation rates under 50 percent , and because of their huge 83
sizes, were widely seen as places where their growing populations of at-risk students became 
anonymous and alienated. Many had significant problems related to crime and violence 
 Though Ravitch (2013) points out, this can sometimes be a misleading statistic, as the graduation rate in five years 83
is considerably higher. Five years was the standard in Ontario until 2003, under which I graduated in its final cohort. 
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(Barbanel 1993; Herszenhorn 2005). A majority were built in the early 20th Century, at a time of 
booming immigration, during which the BOE struggled to find seats for tens of thousands of new 
students every year. Because of rapidly shifting populations between neighbourhoods and a 
desire to save money with economies of scale, New York’s high schools were constructed as 
large campuses several stories tall, filling most of a city block. These schools typically housed 
2000 to 5000 students and a few hundred staff members. From the 1920s through to the end of 
the 1950s, they were widely seen to be functioning effectively, and even considered among the 
best schools in the US. However during this period, less than half of all youth attended secondary 
school, and fewer graduated (Ravitch 2000a). Classrooms and lecture halls were filled with 
willing students with few special needs. From the 1960s, a high school diploma became a social 
and an economic necessity, coinciding with major demographic and fiscal shifts for the city.  
 Aggarwal et al (2012), Kretchmar (2014) and many others argue that these schools were 
set up to fail, with a combination of a high needs population, insufficient resources and demands 
for steady improvement on low exam scores and graduation rates mandated under No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB) legislation from 2002 (New York Teacher 2: Interviewed Dec. 2014). One may 
argue that New York’s large high schools were structurally unable to effectively educate their 
students, necessitating some form of transformation. However many parents, students and 
teachers of these now former schools interviewed by Aggarwal and Kretchmar, contend that 
under mayoral control, they were excluded from these deliberations. As studied by Shiller (2007; 
2009; 2010; 2011), they were replaced with the small school system advocated by Klein and 
Bloomberg, guided by a neoliberal ideology that many schools competing for student enrolment 
would inevitably lead to improvements in all, as indolent educators would be forced to work 
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harder to avoid losing their positions from declining funding tied to student attendance. The 
result has been a narrowing of the curriculum and correspondingly of professional autonomy, as 
teachers are pressured to raise the averages of Regent exams. For a variety of factors, principally 
the limited actual mobility of many racialized poor and working class students, initial research 
suggests teachers are more pressured by the test score cut marks than by potential or real 
exoduses of pupils, undercutting the claims to efficacy of the ‘choice’ mechanism. However the 
small schools also have an insidious effect on teachers’ professional autonomy and working 
conditions, for their documented tendency to both segregate the neediest students in certain 
schools (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 37), bereft of the necessary additional resources to effectively 
teach them (as indicated in Jen and Karen’s account), and through the small size of the faculty, 
compound the tendency towards a narrowed curriculum (Shiller 2010). 
 This was not the original intent of creating small schools in New York. Beginning in the 
late 1960s, the small schools ‘movement’ in New York was led by educators, perhaps most 
famously Deborah Meier, who were motivated by social justice concerns for poor and racialized 
youth they saw as ill served by the existing system of giant high schools (Hantzopoulos & Tyner-
Mullings 2012; Shiller 2011: 164). Many shared progressive ideas (inspired by Kozol (2009) and 
Postman & Weingartner (1969), among others), on how schools could function far more 
democratically, of teachers collectively exercising their professional judgement to determine 
pedagogy, with far more input and relevance for students. With Meier’s leadership, the small 
Central Park East 1 elementary school opened in 1974, serving predominantly low income black 
and Latino children in East Harlem. Inspired by its success, along similar principles Meier 
opened Central Park East Secondary School in 1985, from which emerged 10 principles that 
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would define the Coalition for Essential Schools, a network of small high schools with critical 
pedagogy and an egalitarian structure (Hantzopoulos & Tyner-Mullings 2012: xxviii) .  84
 A former UFT official who worked with the movement in the late 1980s, describes its 
origins: 
The kids are still dropping out, and it’s no longer something that is acceptable. … [G]iven 
the role of race in American society and American education, disproportionate numbers 
of kids living in poverty are black and brown. By the 1960s, we’re saying, at least 
aspirationally, that that’s not acceptable that we would have this situation where these 
kids would be sent to high schools where there’s no chance. So what the small school 
movement, in its origins was really saying was that if we organize our schools differently, 
and if we have schools where we really pay attention to kids, they’re not warehouses, but 
we know the kids well. (Former UFT Official 2: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
For him, scaling schools down from a mass industrial model offered exciting possibilities for 
transforming traditional education, despite its subsequent co-option by programs funded by the 
Bill and Melinda Gates foundation: 
This is something that completely gets lost when Gates comes along, but the idea was 
that smallness, that scale, made certain things possible. … [A] huge problem in our large 
schools were kids being kind of anonymous... So one of the notions was that in a smaller 
school, with a  smaller number of students, every kid would be well known by at least 
two or three adults. Another was the notion that the school needed to operate 
democratically, and so in a small school you can put all of the staff around a big table in 
one room and they can work out their educational issues. So there’s a sense of a kind of 
democracy. (Former UFT Official 2: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
The collective decision-making required of teachers participating in a democratic workplace 
would also lead necessarily to more active union chapters in these schools, he thought. In this 
context, to facilitate the development of distinct institutional cultures with a committed faculty, 
he reasoned, it would be appropriate to relinquish some clauses of the collective agreement (such 
 Hantzopoulos & Tyner-Mullings attribute the ability of critical small schools to expand in the 1980s and early 90s 84
to “both the centralization (and the attendant inability to supervise all parts of the system) and decentralization 
(creating spaces that allowed new ideas to develop) of the New York City Board of Education...” (2012: xxvi).
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as subjecting teacher transfers to approval by a receiving school committee rather than seniority, 
or changing the structure of the school day, including the distribution of teacher preparation 
time), as long as it was teachers at each school site who were making these decisions. The 
‘School Based Option’ was introduced to small schools beginning in the late 1980s, subject to a 
super-majority 75 percent vote, later lowered to 66 percent, of all teaching staff: 
Schools where the adults feel empowered to make important educational decisions, that 
that can change outcomes for poor kids and kids of colour: not only is there a compelling 
educational justice case for that, but I think that really the sorts of changes that would 
demand of unions, are to my mind challenges. But from the way people are used to 
having these huge union chapters of 300 people... where you could have a small number 
of union activists, and therefore have a union chapter. But when you’re talking about 
small schools in a regional division, you’re really talking about having to pull all the 
teachers into the union. If you’re going to be making decisions about how you can change 
parts of the contract or who gets to come to your school, you need to have real teacher 
involvement. (Former UFT Official 2: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
For this union leader, the School Based Option exercised to develop unique small schools, was 
the antidote to excessively homogenizing effects of what he described as ‘industrial-style 
unionism’. It would also rebuke critics who claimed teacher unions drowned public education in 
regulation and bureaucracy that did not serve children, a charge which the UFT frequently faced 
from anti-union politicians, academics and pundits as the largest and arguably most powerful 
education union local in the US (Kuhn 2014: 8). With these understandings, he worked with 
Deborah Meier and other education activists to close problematic large high schools, notably 
Julia Richman High School in Manhattan and James Monroe High School in the Bronx, 
replacing each with several smaller institutions (Barbanel 1993). “What was different about this, 
than what happened later, was you would do at most one or two schools a year, and they were 
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schools where you had tried everything else before you decided you were going to close 
them.” (Former UFT Official 2: Interviewed Apr. 2015). 
 Under Mayor Bloomberg, a breakneck expansion of small schools shared only the 
concept of replacing big troubled schools. The how and why were completely different.  85
Recognizing the successes of existing small schools for increasing graduation rates, Bloomberg 
and Klein sought to dramatically scale up the experiment, receiving a $51.2 million grant from 
the Gates Foundation to open 67 of them. From 2002 to 2010, 45 large and mid-size high schools 
(with over 1400 students), with four year graduation rates below 45 percent were closed, and 
replaced with a total of 207 new small schools of up to 500 students, most located in the same 
buildings, predominantly in poor and working class black and Latino communities in Central and 
Eastern Brooklyn and the South Bronx (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 35; Kretchmar 2014: 4).  The 86
dramatic wave of closings and openings were presided over by a new ‘Office of Portfolio 
Development’. However for the mayor and the DOE, the primary rationale for dividing and 
multiplying schools was not spreading the advantages of smaller institutions. Many big high 
schools grew even larger as they took in students who did not fit in the new schools, often those 
who required more Special Education or ESL services, or did not have adult assistance in 
 Michelle Fine, another early New York leader in creating critical small schools wrote, “It soon became clear that 85
the small schools movement was being co-opted and commodified; Xeroxed and distributed across the city, with 
most of the key radical commitments of participation, equity, inquiry and dignity ‘left behind.’... in New York, a 
strategy that produced competing, overcrowded and under resourced small schools fighting with each other within 
the same building. ..small became the chrysalis for hatching charters, the sac for drip fed privatization into the public 
school system.” 2012: x).
 However, Critical Small Schools (2012) analyzes several institutions that opened during this period, like the 86
James Baldwin School, that despite challenges, notably high turnover and pressure to focus on Regents Exam prep, 
maintained a social justice vision. Many are among the 27 schools affiliated with the New York Performance 
Consortium, a network of schools with waivers from requiring students to complete most Regents exams. In these 
schools, teachers report a high degree of respect for their professionalism in structures of collaborative decision-
making. In large part this has been sustained by retaining veteran teachers, resulting in these schools having higher 
rates of seniority, and more capacity for challenging principals that go against the school’s egalitarian distribution of 
power (Rivera-McCutchen 2012: 30-31; Shiller 2012; Feldman and O’Dwyer 2012).
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choosing a specific, specialized small school (Herszenhorn 2005; Hemphill & Nauer 2009: 2-4). 
Rather, creating a ‘market’ of schools competing for enrollment, was a key manifestation of an 
ideology that held education to be a tradable commodity, thus believing anti-monopoly principles 
from the business world would force schools to compete or perish. Activating this system was a 
new policy in 2004 stipulating incoming students must choose their high school, and could not 
attend their closest school by default (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 35). The neighbourhood high school 
was eliminated. As data materialized showing improvements in some new schools accompanied 
by declines in old big high schools that experienced large influxes of leftover students, Klein 
interpreted it using his sink or swim free market philosophy, “Some of those schools managed 
the challenges and some are not managing the challenges. And those that aren’t, we’ll have to 
reconstitute.” (Quoted in Fullan & Boyle 2014: 37) 
 A New York teacher and active member of MORE completing his Doctorate in 
Education, explains how ‘school choice’ is increasingly applied across the entire K-12 system: 
I’m shopping for a kindergarten for my daughter, and the good news is, there are a lot of 
great kindergartens in my neighbourhood. The problem is, that as soon as a kindergarten 
gets hot, everybody gets excited about what’s going on in that kindergarten, then that 
school becomes a ‘Choice’ school. No longer a ‘District’ school. So just because I live in 
that district... I can’t just march her into one of those. I have to apply and be selected. 
(New York Teacher 1: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
Unlike District schools, Choice schools can screen their applicants:  
A Choice school has no obligations to any students. You have to apply, and if you get in 
the lottery than you’re in. … It’s a geographical issue, actually, that the geographic 
connection between kids and a school is- they’re attempting to break that. It’s about 
breaking the solidarity between a community and a school. And I think that explains a lot 
of what’s going on. In New York City in particular, we had some of the biggest parent 
movements here in the 1960s, and really intense struggles over trying to establish strong 
community schools and especially for black communities. And I feel like their answer to 
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make sure that never happens again is to rupture the link between community and school. 
(New York Teacher 1: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
For this activist teacher, ‘school choice’ has the outcome of making school-community 
organizing more difficult. Two other teachers noted the difficulties of getting parents active in 
their student’s school, because their far flung dispersal across the city discourages face to face 
meetings (New York Teachers 2 & 4, Interviewed Dec. 2014). Again, the importance of New 
York and other major US cities for setting precedents in neoliberal education policy: 
[I]n New York City this has gone further along... In small towns where there’s like a high 
school, you’re not going to create this free market. You can do the testing and you can do 
certain things to weaken the union. But you can’t use these market-based reforms. In the 
big cities, yeah. That’s what they’re trying to do. There’s a geography to it. (New York 
Teacher 1: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
 In the midst of this transformation, Klein boasted of the success of the initiative with a 
2008 study indicating a significant 6.8 percent increase in four year graduation rates among the 
new small schools compared to the institutions they replaced (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 37). Another 
review a year later revealed this initial increase had rapidly declined (Hemphill & Nauer 2009: 
2). An intensive qualitative study by Shiller (2010) of three new small schools in the Bronx 
questioned the extent to which higher graduation rates actually indicated an improved quality of 
education. From observing classes and staff meetings, and interviews with teachers and students, 
she determined that in fact the school’s predominantly low income racialized students were ill 
served by a widespread relentless focus on preparation for the five Regents exams (Shiller 2010). 
The pressure to teach to the test or receive a poor school rating was compounded by the relative 
inexperience of the teachers (the changed composition of teachers and its significance for 
professionalism and workplace culture will be discussed more in the following section), 
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aggravated by higher turnover rates. As Fullan and Boyle explain, “[T]heir inherent 
characteristic, being small, makes them more fragile than larger schools because they inevitably 
have less professional capacity. Their success is often dependent on a small, highly committed 
faculty, and normal turnover is more threatening than it would be in a larger faculty.” (Fullan & 
Boyle 2014: 37) 
 These characteristics of Bloomberg’s small schools also tended to create weak union 
chapters. Two teachers working in small high schools contended that the School Based Option 
praised by the former UFT official above for creating greater worker control, had actually 
weakened union culture at their schools. One, employed at a small school with a progressive 
mandate explains, distinguishing outcomes of the new small schools from the intentions of the 
original movement: 
In these small schools, the union contract doesn’t actually work for you... everyone’s 
supposed to have... this many hours of this duty, but when you have a school of 15 
teachers you don’t have that! ... I feel like the Small School Movement, as taken by the 
DOE itself, as opposed to the radical educators who worked to do it for really positive 
reasons, was co-opted and used as a union busting technique. Because in all these small 
schools, you have to hire a lot of new teachers... Over the course of the week, it all sort of 
evens out and it’s sorta fine. But, there’s something about like, the contract isn’t so 
present because you have to do all these things to make it happen, so you have these new 
teachers coming in who don’t really understand how a union is anyway, because union 
density in America is so low, most people don’t even know what the hell that means. 
(New York Teacher 5: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
New teachers don’t see the direct role of the union enforcing daily standards. For this teacher, 
despite her colleagues remaining dues paying union members as before (as statutorily required in 
New York State), the reduced role of the union in determining daily working conditions distances 
it from their awareness. Another teacher contends that School Based Options, in combination 
with schools overwhelmingly staffed by untenured teachers, who because of their employment 
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status, are unable to challenge their principals (or as the prior teacher suggests, by their 
inexperience may not even see a reason to do so), have become a means for administrators to 
increase the workload of their staff: 
[i]n this environment where the majority of teachers are untenured in many schools, 
probably at this point hundreds of schools throughout the city... and there’s just such a 
high rate of turnover. So like the school I worked at which was a very typical new, small 
school with some sort of concept behind it, you know it’d have great funding, bells and 
whistles come with these new schools. The union chapter leader there was always telling 
us not to- they’d bring this School Based Option up. We’d have this crazy schedule with 
only 30 minutes for lunch, we had something like four staff meetings a week. We had one 
that was all faculty, two before school, and then one after school. Which totally was a 
violation of the contract. It’s great for the principals, because they’d use that time to do 
administrative work, essentially. So all the School Based Option in this case was used as 
a way to push administrative work on to the teachers, give us longer working hours, have 
us work this insane schedule... (New York Teacher 2: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
The result was an intensification and extension of the teachers’ work day: 
So the kids still got there, let’s say at 8:15, we got there at 7:30, which again, is normally 
when I’d like to get there to set up, so it meant it was taking away from our teaching time 
when we’d be writing on the board, -our prep time was gone! There’s been a proliferation 
of schools operating on these weird schedules. And the idea is that it’s all for the students, 
but what it really is, the City’s getting around the contract. (New York Teacher 2: 
Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
He explained the role of the chapter leader, echoing the experience described by Jen and Karen 
of the socially isolated union representative at their school, with limited influence over a new 
staff eager to please the administration and ambivalent towards unionism: 
[T]he person who is the chapter leader for the union is not often, but sometimes, doing 
the principal’s bidding. Or, is sometimes totally isolated in the building because they’re 
the only tenured teacher or one of a few, and the principal will pack that vote on the 
School Based Option with the teachers that are in their corner. That’s what happened at 
the school where I worked. (New York Teacher 2: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
According to the former UFT official, the School Based Option (SBO) was subsequently 
negotiated in the early 2000s into being available for all high schools. One can speculate that the 
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extent to which SBOs are widely implemented, varies on the diverse workplace dynamics of 
each school. Mayoral Control created the context in which the work spaces of New York City 
teachers (and the learning spaces of their students) could be transformed through the rapid rollout 
of small schools, operating outside of union work rules, within a competitive ‘school choice’ 
system regulated by test score results (more on this below in the fifth section of this chapter). 
How this all impacted the composition of New York City teachers will be explored next in the 
context of policy and collective agreement changes under Bloomberg that have all contributed to 
shifting power relations in schools across the city away from teachers and towards increasingly 
empowered managerial principals. 
5.5: Policies that Increase Teacher Turnover and Precariousness, Weakening the School Site 
Union & Teachers’ Professional Autonomy 
 “You cannot go after more than one or two teachers at once. There simply isn’t time.” A 
principal complains to economics professor Dale Ballou (2000: 100) in his contribution 
‘Contractual Constraints on School Management: Principal’s Perspectives on the Teacher 
Contract’, for City Schools: Lessons from New York City, introduced in the previous section of 
this chapter. Another gripes on the difficulties of firing teachers through the system’s disciplinary 
process, “I need fifteen documented screw-ups, because some will be thrown out.” (Ballou 2000: 
99) Ballou approvingly cites the opposition of his interviewees to seniority-based school 
transfers when he claims, “As principals have noted, it takes only one or two of these teachers to 
poison the atmosphere in an entire school.” (2000:95) Ballou relates the opposition of these 
principals to virtually every aspect of teachers’ working conditions which receives some form of 
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protection in the UFT collective agreement. These include: seniority based staffing (though 
noting only about 500 transfers occurred in 1999 for 1100 schools and 68 000 teachers), the 
inability of principals to unilaterally or more easily implement School Based Options, the 
disciplinary stages and requirements for evidence needed to terminate teachers, fixed class sizes 
(34 students for high school, with exemptions for Spec. Ed) and the rights of teachers to duty-
free lunch breaks and self-directed prep time (Ballou 2000: 99-109). It is not uncommon to find 
administrators wishing to have more managerial authority in relation to the staff they supervise.  87
They find their champion in academics and policy advocates like Ballou (and other contributors 
to City Schools), who believe in the ‘principal as protagonist’ as the frontline implementors of 
the neoliberal policies they envision as improving public education. What is interesting about 
this laundry list of complaints is the extent to which so many were subsequently addressed under 
Bloomberg in his general effort to empower school administrators. I argue here that a large part 
of his success in doing so was owed to implementing labour policies which resulted in an 
increasingly precarious workforce subject to high turnover rates. 
 In this section, I contend that significant changes to the composition of NYC teachers and 
their employment status, namely a shift to an increasingly young workforce, with lower median 
years of service (suggesting higher turnover) and a much higher proportion without the job 
security provided by tenure, has had a fundamental impact on teachers’ professional autonomy. 
An increasingly precarious, short term workforce, spread over many small worksites, many with 
less than 30 staff, has led to weakened school level union chapters, as teachers lack the 
confidence, or interest, in placing themselves in a potentially adversarial position with their 
 Though Ballou admits it was difficult to find 11 principals willing to speak critically about the contractual rights 87
of NYC teachers, even when confidentiality was assured.
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school administrators. With weakened or non-existent school union chapters, administrators, as 
the front line managers tasked with implementing policies like raising test and exam scores at all 
costs -on whose effectiveness in doing so, are themselves directly judged by the DOE and the 
State Education Department, have greater power to implement policies like prescribed 
curriculum or classroom strategies. Or increasing time spent on test preparation, circumscribing 
teacher autonomy. 
 As Riegel (2003) and others have noted, and as I argued in my methodological chapter, 
academic and grey literature has tended to de-emphasize the teacher experience in discussions of 
education policy, despite their role as the ultimate enactors of much of these policies. Much of 
the literature discussed earlier in this section on New York is indicative of a general tendency to 
see school administrators and superintendents as the principal actors or subjects, to whom policy 
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advocates voice their appeals, with teachers (and students), as the objects upon which they act. 
Teachers themselves are seldom asked for comment. Exceptions are works like Kretchmar 
(2014), Aggarwal (2012), Shiller (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011), and Hantzopoulos and Tyner-
Mullings’ (2012) edited book on the experience of critical small schools in NYC. All employ an 
explicit social justice lens. In general analytical works like Fullan and Boyle (2014) or Viteritti 
and Ravitch (2000) or Viteritti (2009), there is remarkably less discussion of policy changes that 
directly affect teachers’ work, especially through collective bargaining, than there is of changes 
in high level system governance.  More so than concerning an issue like Mayoral Control, this 88
section in particular draws heavily on teacher accounts of changes in working conditions. 
 An exception is (Nuñez et al 2015), accessibly written by three teachers who became professors of education. The 88
book exhorts teachers to activism on education policy, drawing examples from the 2012 Chicago teachers’ strike.
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Figure 4: New York City Teacher Age 
Distribution, 2013/14
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Figure 5: Nassau-Suffolk Teacher Age 
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Figure 6: Median Teacher Salary 2013/14
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Figure 6 demonstrates the widely divergent salary ranges of teachers across New York State. Teachers in 
Genesee-Finger Lakes, an upstate region including the city of Rochester and some mainly rural counties, 
are among the lowest earners. By contrast, since the onset of province-wide negotiations in 2004, teacher 
salaries are uniform across Ontario. Teacher salaries vary slightly across Mexico, according to three 
regions defined by cost of living, with the highest areas in Mexico City and the north, and the lowest in the 
poor rural south. Table by Paul Bocking, using New York State Education Department data, 2013-2014.
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Figures 
4 and 5 
Figures 4 and 5 demonstrates how in the 2013-14 school year, NYC teachers were disproportionately 
younger than their colleagues in neighbouring, predominantly affluent suburban Nassau and Suffolk 
counties on Long Island, with nearly double the proportion of teachers in their mid to late 20s. Nassau 
and Suffolk counties have proportionally far more mid career aged teachers in their 40s through mid 50s. 
Interestingly, both areas have comparable proportions of senior teachers in their late 50s and early 60s, 
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 The 2005 collective agreement between the UFT and the NYC DOE, the only one signed 
under Bloomberg , marked a significant turning point in the composition of the teacher 89
workforce. After years under Mayor Giuliani during which teacher salaries declined in real terms 
and the gap between their median compensation and those of more affluent Long Island districts 
grew substantially, UFT members won increases adding up to 35 percent over inflation by the 
end of the contract in 2008 (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 42). However, also included in the deal was 
the elimination of seniority placement of teachers who lose their position due to declining 
student enrollment or the closure of their school. Affected tenured teachers became Absent 
Teacher Reserves (ATRs), who like substitute teachers, were deployed full time to cover regular 
teacher absences, but while keeping their original salaries and benefits. In the midst of dozens of 
school closures and conversions to small schools, perhaps 1200 to 2000 teachers lost their access 
to regular positions, according to counts by a network of ATRs, who have attempted to gain 
recognition as a member subgroup by their union (New York Teacher 10: Interviewed Apr. 
2015). An ATR teacher explains how the intersection of teaching to the five Regents exams, 
small schools with generalist faculties and a policy to encourage turnover at closed schools, led 
to many teachers becoming ATRs: 
Within [large schools], it could be like a miniature university because you could have a 
foreign languages department with multiple language choices. Now it’s largely the norm 
that there’s only Spanish available. We used to have professional non-academic, 
commercial classes. Like typing, carpentry, metal work. So for the non-core academic 
subjects, things that are not English, Math, Science, Social Studies, there’s no place for 
these teachers anymore. With the small schools, they’ve shredded these programs. … The 
other part of this, is that when they close these schools, the new schools are supposed to 
 As relations with Bloomberg worsened, the UFT leadership determined to wait out his term, though this resulted 89
in working under an expired contract for over four years. The union signed a deal with De Blasio within months of 
him taking office on January 1, 2014.
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take half of the staff and then shed the other half. (New York Teacher 10: Interviewed 
Apr. 2015) 
The surviving staff are divided up among the three to four new schools that succeed the original 
school and then the other half are put in this pool. An interview determines who gets to stay and 
who has to go, “The administration is often displaced too. So there’ll be new administrators in 
the new schools. So this very much tied in causally with the small school factor.” (New York 
Teacher 10: Interviewed Apr. 2015) For the first several years, this ATR teacher described the 
system as relatively satisfactory (though inferior to obtaining a new permanent position) as he 
was placed to cover semester or year long absences, similar to a Long Term Occasional teacher 
in Toronto, who receives the standard teacher salary for their level of experience, and holds the 
full range of classroom responsibilities. However in 2010-11, the system was changed so that 
ATRs are now on 4-6 week rotations between schools, in which they act as daily supply teachers, 
or as assistants in the classrooms of other teachers. New evaluation structures were also created 
to assess their performance as substitutes. He contends that this change was made to push ATRs 
to resign (New York Teacher 10: Interviewed Apr. 2015; ATR Phenomenon 2015; Antush 2014).  
 Despite the removal of seniority provisions, ATRs are still able to regain their status as a 
regular school faculty member by successfully interviewing for a new position. However a 
policy change by the DOE in 2007 outside of the collective agreement, but with the consent of 
the UFT, discourages this from happening for teachers with higher levels of service: 
There was a giant turning point in 2007, where this idea of Fair Student Funding got  
implemented. It gave [principals] a limited budget for hiring staff. So it gives a huge  
incentive to the principal to choose someone that’s of lower salary. The starting salary last 
time I checked in the $40 000s range. Mine is over $70 000. If you’re looking to fill three 
teachers, with a budget for $120 000, you can get more teachers for your money at this 
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level. Now what happened in the past, was principals were allocated teacher units. That 
would bring in whatever number of teachers you needed regardless of salary.  
(New York Teacher 10: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
As a result, principals had a strong disincentive against hiring experienced, tenured teachers to 
their schools, who had been surplussed through the ATR process, or through a regular transfer. 
The UFT contends the 2014 contract signed with De Blasio includes a provision exempting ATR 
salaries from the school’s average salary calculations, removing an incentive for principals to 
save money by not hiring higher seniority ATRs (UFT 2014). In Ontario, the number of teacher 
positions in a school is tied to student enrolment, with principals having no control over salary 
budgets, leaving no incentive for individual principals to hire lower paid teachers to their staff. A 
teacher currently employed at a small school further explains: 
[I]nstead of all teachers being paid from the DOE, you’re paid from a school budget, and 
so the budget each school gets is an average of all teacher salaries. And so it discourages 
small new schools from hiring experienced teachers because there’s one teacher who 
taught for 15 years, so she brings the average up. Now each teacher costs more.  
(New York Teacher 5: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
She argues that placement programs like Teach for America (TFA) which don’t assume its 
recruits will make a career commitment to teaching, work well within this context of lowering 
costs, with consequences for union capacities, especially at small schools: 
It seems to me that it’s a really great way to keep costs low for paying teachers. When I 
came in it was like high forties... [T]hey kept it really low because the top scale is a 
hundred and change. So they hire enough teachers, but they only get first, second, third 
year teachers, because that’s how they’re able to afford a whole staff. So my first year at 
that new school, there was 70 kids, because you build year by year, you’re trying to get to 
about 250-280. There was like three of us who were brand new Teaching Fellows or TFA 
people... There were a few more who were one or two years in, so a lot of inexperience. 
[W]e had one woman who had 15 years in the building, and another who had eight. 
Everyone else was under three years. That’s how they built it. Part of it is budgetary, but 
part of it to me seemed to me this way to... nobody’s tenured, a lot of them are teachers 
that are cycling in and passing through, they’re not really committed to any union or 
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fairness practice among their colleagues. Especially with TFA, it’s community service 
you do before you go to law school, so they’re not actually like committed to long term 
equity in the school, they’re there for their resumes. (New York Teacher 5: Interviewed 
Dec. 2014) 
 The NYC DOE hired 5 500 new teachers at the start of the 2015-16 school year, of which 
about 1000 came through the Teaching Fellows program, which like TFA, provides an intensive 
fast track several week long training program prior to entering the classroom, in place of holding 
a university degree in education (Darville & Decker 2015). Teaching Fellows complete a 
subsidized Masters in Education while working in the classroom. Unlike TFA, Teaching Fellows 
recruits individuals interested in education as a second career, resulting in considerably lower 
turnover. Several New York teachers I interviewed entered the profession through the Teaching 
Fellows. Their comments on the program were mixed as many felt considerably underprepared 
when they entered the classroom, emphasizing the value of conventional teacher training 
programs, but were happy with the program’s ability to attract a diverse cohort with a serious 
interest in teaching. Several remarked that a divisive ‘new versus old teachers’ dynamic and 
general anti-unionism which they perceived as pervasive in TFA, were not present in the 
Teaching Fellows training they received.   90
 TFA members employed in NYC schools have declined from a height of 536 in 2008 to 
400 in 2014, and 230 in 2015, half of which were placed in charter schools (Darville & Decker 
2015). TFA closed its NYC training site in 2014 due to growing difficulties in recruiting 
candidates. Its NYC director cited, “a contentious national dialogue around education and 
teaching in general, and TFA in particular.” (Quoted in Darville 2014a), alluding to criticism of 
the limited training offered to its members, who generally do not stay in teaching. Others 
 New York Teachers 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 12, interviewed between December 2014 and April 2015.90
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attributed the decline to an improving post-2008 recession US labour market for university 
graduates (Darville 2014a). One special education teacher I interviewed entered education 
through TFA. Entering her seventh year of teaching in 2015-16, she was virtually unique among 
her cohort for still being in the profession. She is also among the most senior of the 35 teachers 
at her middle school in Washington Heights (New York Teacher 11: Interviewed Apr. 2015).  
 However a teacher shortage identified at the start of the 2015-16 school year for many 
cities in the US (Rich 2015) did not materialize for NYC. Despite the large total number of new 
hires, it was still well below California, with 21 000 openings (and only 15 000 new teacher 
graduates from the state’s faculties of education) (Decker 2015). However unlike California and 
other states and urban areas, NYC is not making up for mass layoffs during the 2008-09 
recession and subsequent years of austerity. AFT president Randi Weingarten and other union 
activists attribute declining numbers of students entering teacher preparation programs to high 
profile attacks on the teaching profession by politicians like Governor Cuomo and his ideological 
brethren in other states. However in New York State, despite declining numbers of entrants, 
education graduates still overshot available new positions in 2015 by about two thirds according 
to the State Education Department (NYSED). While hiring at elite public schools in the city is 
far more competitive than for struggling schools, overall NYC appears to maintain its attraction 
for new teachers, with salaries well above most upstate districts (but below its suburban 
neighbours), and perhaps just as importantly, because of its more qualitative allure as New York 
City (Decker 2015). 
 A significant DOE policy change was enacted in 2010-11 which dramatically changed the 
way teacher tenure is granted. It has gone virtually unmentioned in published analyses of the 
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Bloomberg education era, but it has had a profound impact on the system’s large number of 
newer staff according to several interviewed teachers. In Canada and Mexico, the attainment of 
permanent employee status for K-12 public school teachers means greater union protection under 
seniority-based provisions for layoffs and due process on disciplinary issues, among other rights. 
The word ‘tenure‘ to describe this status as it is used throughout the US is misleading as the term 
is more commonly associated with the far broader rights of permanent full time university 
professors. In any case, the job security that tenure provides, especially as it limits the power of 
administrators, has an impact beyond the working life of an individual teacher, to affect the 
culture of the school as a whole. As one teacher said, “The last public school I taught at was 
great... Partly because it was overwhelmingly senior teachers. So they were tenured, they were 
not frightened of taking risks in the classroom, but also in terms of grieving things.” (New York 
Teacher 2: Interviewed Dec. 2, 2014)  
 As a result, considerable changes were made to the tenure granting process under 
Bloomberg, with the outcome of it being becoming much more difficult to obtain. This has had a 
significant impact on institutional cultures, as the proportion of teachers working precariously for 
years under probation has risen. Previously, provided that a teacher received Satisfactory annual 
ratings by their principal during their three probationary years, they were virtually guaranteed to 
receive tenure by their superintendent, as they were effectively vetted by their principal. Teachers 
who entered the profession at this time reported obtaining tenure relatively painlessly. A teacher 
activist who obtained tenure under this system explained the shift: 
But the big change that happened is that Bloomberg... there’s Race To The Top coming 
from Obama, and so he wanted a more stringent evaluation system. And New York State 
bought into that. So the state adopted the new observation system... [E]ssentially you 
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apply for tenure to the Chancellor or to your superintendent, that are appointed under the 
Chancellor. So under Mayor Bloomberg, he just changed the policy and said to his 
Chancellor, who said to his superintendents, ‘Only allow 50% of the people who apply 
tenure to get it.’ (New York Teacher 3: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
A younger colleague joins us and adds: 
I’m in my fifth year and I’m untenured. So I’ll be going up for tenure again this year. 
When you go through the process it just becomes supremely evident, it’s a completely 
subjective, arbitrary and political process. If you look at data and statistics across the 
City, because tenure decisions are made by the superintendent not the principals, you’ll 
see it’s arbitrary. So Queens has one tenure giving rate, and Manhattan has another one.  
(New York Teacher 4: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
He continued, “Things are changing a little bit, and the tenure rates are ticking up a little bit. A 
lot of that has to do with the orientation of the mayor [De Blasio] and the superintendent. But it 
used to be a guaranteed shot when you went up for tenure that you would get it.” (New York 
Teacher 4: Interviewed Dec. 2014) He explained the post 2011 application process: 
You have to submit a portfolio that has lesson plans, your observations from your 
principals and administrators, anything that can document contributions that you make to 
the school community, any leadership roles that you take. Student work, your data, your 
test scores for Regents exams. Your student pass rates in your classes. … So this is a big 
fat binder, and then you got hundreds of teachers for each borough applying for tenure, 
and they’re supposed to go through these binders and then make a decision whether you 
should get tenure or not. So they never see you teach. (New York Teacher 4: Interviewed 
Dec. 2014) 
This teacher had been denied tenure twice, and each time had his probationary status extended 
for a year by his principal. He is frustrated by the lack of feedback from the superintendent 
concerning his unsuccessful submissions, adding to his sense that the process is highly arbitrary. 
He echoes New York Teacher 5 quoted above, and New York Teacher 7, who recalls her principal 
refusing a suggested hire with ten years experience for being “too expensive,” and argues that 
low rates of granting tenure are part of an effort to have a lower paid, high turnover workforce: 
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It’s a labour shift going on, right?... Senior, expensive veteran teachers, to that of a 
transient labour force. Where people like me who came in through Teaching Fellows, 
typically only stay for five years. Before, after five years you were vested in the pension 
system... Then under Cuomo, our governor, they passed a law… it’s 10 years before 
they’re vested in the pension system. So that’s crucial… new teachers more generally, 
they’re leaving after five years. In addition to that, the big pay increases in the contract, 
don’t come until year 8. So there’s a huge incentive to deny us tenure because they know 
that before you get to year 8, you’re a cheap teacher essentially. (New York Teacher 4: 
Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
Like New York Teacher 5, he contends that the increasing proportion of untenured teachers has a 
powerful impact on staff relations in the school, and on the relative strength of the union chapter. 
His tenured colleague, a UFT delegate for the school and member of MORE explains: 
[T]he tradition in New York is, ‘If you don’t have tenure, don’t say anything!’ You 
shouldn’t be on any union committees. Just keep your head down. If you have a concern, 
you should talk to someone who has tenure... I think that it’s really hurt the teachers’ 
union movement that it is like that. There’s people who are like, ‘Don’t sign anything, 
don’t sign a petition, don’t put your name on anything.’ (New York Teacher 3: 
Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
His untenured colleague has given up trying to maintain a reputation unsullied by labour 
activism, writing articles for MORE’s blog and participating in conferences, “I’ve gone into the 
mode where, ‘I don’t give a fuck anymore.’ Pretty much. Because it’s not a fair process. You 
forced me to speak out, because your system is so corrupt!” (New York Teacher 4: Interviewed 
Dec. 2014) The tenure policy change increases the power of principals over untenured teachers, 
according to informants, who say that in addition to the absence of a publicly available rubric for 
superintendents to assess teacher portfolios, the endorsement of their school administrator is 
actually pivotal for the superintendent making this decision. Whereas tenure previously 
depended on successful classroom observations conducted by principals, including pre and post 
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observation meetings where feedback is provided, the submission of the portfolio for tenure and 
its approval or denial is a more mysterious process.  91
 A common theme throughout this chapter on New York, has been the propensity of the 
neoliberal education policies discussed here to increase the extent to which the characteristics 
and personalities of individual administrators define the working conditions of teachers on their 
staff. This is acknowledged both by teachers who report good relations with their principals 
(New York Teachers 5 and 11), and those whose experience has been mostly negative (New York 
Teachers 1, 2, 7, 12 and 13). These are the circumstances which give rise to laboratory-like 
schools like Jen and Karen’s described at the start of this chapter, where top-down changes to 
pedagogical practices are made on a yearly basis, irrespective of teacher input, and in which their 
professional autonomy is substantially degraded. I will return to the effect of these policies on 
the school-level presence of the union and its impact for teachers’ professional autonomy in the 
sixth section of this chapter. 
5.6: Scaling up: Initiative in Neoliberal Policy Shifts from NYC to Albany 
 The election of progressive Democratic Mayor Bill De Blasio in November 2013 marks a 
major shift in the neoliberalization of public education in New York. Elected overwhelmingly, on 
 A teacher activist in Nassau County explains the contrast between high teacher turnover in NYC, and stability in 91
the Long Island suburbs as a choice of school boards on whether to prioritize retaining teachers through adequate 
mentoring and good working conditions: “What you see in the City with a lot of the churning and churning out of 
teachers, that causes a lot of chaos. Because you’re constantly having new teachers in the building. You don’t have 
anyone who’s seasoned. That really makes a huge difference. That doesn’t occur in most Long Island schools. 
Because what happens is, if you get a job on Long Island, it’s like, Mecca. When people come in, like in my district, 
very very rarely do you hear people not being granted tenure. They really work with teachers. I think they tend to 
invest in them a lot more, more so than the City does because we’re more localized... I’m a mentor. In my district we 
have a really good mentoring program, we work really closely with our new teachers and really nurture them, and 
work hard with them if they’re struggling. I don’t think they do that in the City. So people are more likely to get 
tenure out here on Long Island because they’re invested in.” (New York Teacher 8: Interviewed Apr. 2015)
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a platform centred on combatting growing inequality in the city, one of his priority areas, like 
Bloomberg, was education. However in seeking to redistribute public resources from the city’s 
charter schools back to the municipally run school system, while curbing the weight of 
standardized test scores on the evaluations of teachers and schools, he threatened a significant 
part of the legacy of his predecessor. This section will discuss how in a scalar shift during the 
tenure of De Blasio, the initiative in neoliberal education policy passed to the state governor’s 
mansion in Albany, occupied by Andrew Cuomo since 2010. Through utilizing the considerable 
constitutional authority of the state government over the City, aided by powerful ideological 
allies, Cuomo has succeeded in defeating many of De Blasio’s most substantive education 
proposals. Cuomo’s success in subsequently advancing the neoliberalization of public education 
through standardized testing and its tying to teacher evaluations will be studied in the next 
chapter. Here, we will first look at the initial progressive efforts under De Blasio, and then 
consider how the shifting of power in education policy making authority from the City to Albany 
creates a problem of scalar strategy for the UFT. With changes increasingly being made to the 
working conditions of its membership by a state government with which the union holds no 
formal rights to collective bargaining, the UFT must adopt a new geographical strategy, in the 
sense articulated by Andrew Herod in his seminal Labor Geographies (2001), in order to regain 
its leverage. 
 De Blasio’s resounding win over centrist and right wing challengers in the Democratic 
primary and then his Republican challenger in November 2013, was heralded by many 
progressives as an opening for left-leaning urban policies, in a context where Democrat-led 
administrations across the country, exemplified by Chicago and Washington DC, were bastions 
 190
of neoliberal orthodoxy. In an article for news website The Huffington Post, ‘The De Blasio 
Mandate for Education’ shortly after his victory, Ravitch underlines the impact of his win on the 
education policy zeitgeist reaching far beyond the city, as “a major national setback for the 
agenda shared not only by Mayor Bloomberg, but by George W. Bush, Michelle Rhee, Arne 
Duncan, Jeb Bush, Scott Walker, Bobby Jindal, ALEC (the American Legislative Exchange), the 
Koch brothers and many others.” (Ravitch 2013b) She adds optimistically, “Make no mistake: In 
New York City, the drive to privatize public education has ground to a halt with de Blasio's 
election.” (Ravitch 2013b) Repudiating Bloomberg’s record, the education scholar urged de 
Blasio to reinstate default neighbourhood middle and high schools for students, dismantling the 
complex ‘school choice’ mechanism. She also recommended a review of the system’s principals, 
citing many hired with minimal qualifications under Bloomberg, and backed De Blasio’s plan to  
prevent charter schools from further usurping space from public schools with which they are co-
located, and requiring them to pay rent and accept a broader range of students. Finally, she 
advocates a general rollback of his predecessor’s testing and “flawed” school accountability 
mechanisms, “whose sole purpose seems to be to set up schools for closure and 
privatization.” (Ravitch 2013b) 
 De Blasio moved quickly and succeeded in making some significant changes in areas that 
were firmly under the control of the DOE. In contrast to Bloomberg’s choices, De Blasio selected 
for chancellor Carmen Fariña, a school employee who had started from the classroom and risen 
through the ranks through her long career, and who was well regarded by the UFT and advocates 
outside the system for her reasonableness and integrity (Former UFT Official 1: Interviewed Jan. 
2015). Several of her early policies were especially relevant to teachers’ professional autonomy. 
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Within weeks of acceding to the chancellorship, she changed policy to require a minimum of 
seven years teaching experience for new principal applicants, shifting from no minimum under 
Bloomberg, justified on the basis of administrator shortages in the early 2000s, and reflecting his 
neoliberal ideology that private sector managerial experience was more valuable than a teaching 
background (Darville 2014b). Extreme incidents of teacher mistreatment by administrators were 
more rapidly addressed, as in the case of a Bronx primary school principal pushed to early 
retirement after she threw her teachers’ desks and cabinets to the curb in a statement against 
sitting while teaching (Edelman 2015). MORE activists report that Fariña is enforcing a 
contractual rule in the UFT agreement that principals are required to participate in monthly 
consultation committee meetings convened by school chapter leaders.  Several teacher 92
respondents also report that under Fariña, rates of tenure granting have slightly increased. 
Bloomberg’s school letter grades based on test scores results, resembling the Board of Health’s 
posters found near the entrances of the city’s restaurants, were replaced with assessments based 
on broader criteria, downloadable from the DOE website. 
 In other crucial areas of education policy under his control, De Blasio chose to keep the 
status quo. With support from a broad based coalition of education groups, including some 
smaller charter school chains, he campaigned for and obtained an extension to Mayoral Control 
from the state legislature in 2015, arguing that the policies of his administration needed more 
time to reach fruition, such as the Renewal Schools program, in which 94 city schools otherwise 
subject to closing due to low state test scores, received additional resources and support. In a 
move viewed by political commentators as another example of Cuomo’s antagonism towards de 
 Personal observations at MORE Conference, October 24, 2015, New York City.92
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Blasio and the influence of his other principal adversary, Eva Moskowitz, CEO of Success 
Academy -New York’s largest charter school chain, the renewal was limited to one year rather 
than three, the mayor’s compromise proposal after initially requesting the policy be made 
permanent (Shapiro 2015). Meanwhile, parent advocacy groups Class Size Matters and NYC 
Kids PAC criticized De Blasio for what they saw as little empowerment of the Community 
Education Councils and School Leadership Teams, which had lost much of their influence under 
Bloomberg to the chancellor and local principals, respectively. While praising De Blasio’s 
success in stopping punitive school closures, they also charged him with not meeting his 
campaign goals to make the city’s stratified school choice system more equitable. These parent 
groups also criticized his decision to maintain the centralization of power under Mayoral Control 
(Haimson & Tanikawa 2015; NYC Kids PAC 2015).  
 De Blasio suffered one of his largest education policy defeats by Governor Cuomo over 
his proposals to make student standardized test scores less punitive for teachers and schools. Two 
other plans overturned by Albany were the introduction of a new wealth tax to fund the citywide 
expansion of pre-Kindergarten classes, and reversing one of Bloomberg’s final policies, curbing 
the further growth of charter schools by returning hundreds of millions of dollars earmarked for 
charter school construction back into public school funding (Weiner: Interviewed Dec. 2014). 
Following a $3.6 million advertising campaign against De Blasio’s anti-charter school policies in 
spring 2014 by the Families for Excellent Schools lobby group, high profile rallies of Success 
Academy pupils and staff led by Moskowitz and publicly endorsed by Cuomo, capped off by the 
state legislature’s overruling of municipal measures to limit charters, De Blasio backed away 
from his efforts to curb their proliferation (Singer 2014; Hernandez 2014). Weiner (2014) 
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contends that the defeat of the key planks of his campaign policy on education were 
foreshadowed by Joe Williams, executive director of Democrats for Education Reform (DFER), 
an influential pro-testing and charter school think tank and lobby group affiliated with the 
Democratic Party, whose principal donors are Wall Street hedge funds. “The much-maligned 
standardized tests aren’t going anywhere,’’ he commented in an article in January 2014 reporting 
on the new mayor’s education mandate. “The Bloomberg haters are going to have to settle for a 
change in style rather than major changes in substance.” (Willen 2014). DFER donated $72 000 
to Cuomo in 2015 (Gonzalez 2015). 
 Neoliberal interventions in New York State’s K-12 education system did not begin with 
Andrew Cuomo. Three term Republican governor George Pataki (1995-2006) authorized the 
creation of up to 100 charter schools across the state in 1998, raising the cap to 250 in 2006. 
During the course of his tenure, he refused to increase state funding for public education, and 
fought against a high profile legal suit by Campaign for Fiscal Equity to raise funding for NYC 
schools. At Bloomberg’s urging, he led the authorization of Mayoral Control for NYC (Traver 
206: 502). Nevertheless, under president Randi Weingarten, Pataki was endorsed by the UFT. A 
former UFT official explains some of the political dynamics behind the limits of Bloomberg’s 
influence in Albany: 
He [Bloomberg] had to do deals with Albany, and many times he didn’t get his shit… and 
as a result had to do what he did. It wasn’t his personality… It’s more like you can’t fool 
all the people. Giuliani had a bad relationship with Albany, because he backed [former 
governor] Mario Cuomo. When Pataki won, everyone said ‘New York is toast!’ (Former 
UFT Official 1: Interviewed Jan. 2015) 
Arguably Pataki’s most significant intervention in K12 education was in maintaining an overall 
context of fiscal austerity while Bloomberg’s administration proceeded with its agenda.  
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 The election of a mayor with a left leaning education agenda brought substantial financial 
backing from pro-testing and charter school lobby groups financed by Wall Street hedge funds 
and major US education policy philanthropists to Andrew Cuomo, apparently recognizing 
Albany as a strategic bulwark for maintaining the momentum of neoliberal education policy in 
New York. Students FirstNY Advocacy, the Coalition for Opportunity in Education and Families 
for Excellent Schools, spent over $8.3 million  lobbying state legislators to support charters in 93
2015. The latter alone spent $9.7 million in 2014 (Bragg 2014). Public education activists and 
investigative journalists have also raised considerable publicity over $4.8 million in political 
donations received up to 2015 by Governor Cuomo directly from hedge fund managers 
(Gonzalez 2015). His rival De Blasio remarked, “The hedge-fund contributors loom very large in 
Albany, and they have way too much influence; that is a fact.” (Quoted in Goldman 2015). 
 Cuomo rejected efforts by Fariña and the DOE to negotiate reforms with the UFT to the 
teacher evaluation process that would have made the process less onerous and tied to value-
added metrics on standardized test scores. Over the course of 2015, he led an effort from the state 
legislature, assisted by the State Education Department (NYSED), to increase the weight of these 
test metrics in annual evaluations, while making tenure more difficult to obtain. The new will of 
the state government under Cuomo to aggressively formulate and roll out education policy, the 
details of which will be fully outlined in the following section, creates a scalar problem for the 
UFT and other local teachers’ unions across the state. Whereas these unions hold statutory 
collective bargaining rights with local school districts and under Mayoral Control, the NYC 
municipal government, the state legislature wields increasing power over teachers’ working 
 The donors to these lobby groups are themselves not evident under New York State non-profit reporting laws, 93
though some have been traced to conservative ‘free market’ groups (Bragg 2014)
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conditions. This resembles Peck and Tickell’s influential scalar analysis of the tendency under 
contemporary neoliberalism of senior governments to upload policy making authority in the 
public sector, resulting in weakening avenues for locally based dissent (2002: 401) 
 This scaling up of teachers’ labour relations to higher levels of government follows 
developments in Ontario and Mexico (Sweeney 2013; Bocking 2015). However unlike these two 
jurisdictions in which education finance overwhelmingly originates from the senior level of 
government, inspiring a credible argument to negotiate with the actual holder of the purse 
strings, school district funding in New York is provided in roughly even measures from local and 
state sources, with under ten percent contributed by the Federal government. Even more 
significantly, unlike the centralized structures of the SNTE and OSSTF, the New York State 
United Teachers (NYSUT), controlled by UFT through the large proportion of the delegates, 
dues and officers that it contributes, principally acts as an umbrella association for local unions 
to lobby the Albany legislature, lacking any legally binding collective bargaining rights, or 
significant power independent of its affiliates. Absent these structures for formally scaling up 
contract negotiations to the state level, NYSUT could apply its statewide presence in public 
campaigns as it has around education funding. It has attempted to support the parent-led Opt Out 
movement, the state’s most powerful grassroots education mobilization, that seeks to undermine 
the state’s standardized grades 3 to 8 testing regime. However while joining calls to parents to 
opt their children out from the tests, NYSUT has been limited by the official stance of the UFT, 
which in 2015 did not support the movement. While 20 percent of children were opted out of the 
exams across the state in 2015, the rate was less than two percent in NYC (Shapiro 2015b). In 
the absence of participating in and leading strong statewide opposition, the UFT thereby finds 
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itself with weakened capacities to resist Cuomo’s 2015 reform of teacher evaluations, which by 
increasing the power of standardized testing, has far reaching consequences for teachers’ 
professional autonomy. 
5.7: Cuomo’s Expansion of Standardized Testing into Teacher Evaluation: Undermining 
Professional Autonomy 
 The eclipse of teachers’ professional autonomy in New York by punitive evaluation 
structures developed in the 2000s within the context of the first major federal interventions in US 
education policy since the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 . A key plank of 94
President George W. Bush’s No Child Left Behind (NCLB) federal legislation enacted in 2002, 
was mandating states to annually administer high stakes tests to students from grades 3 to 12. 
The results were used to reward or penalize districts and individual schools, and justify funding 
charter schools, part of an ethos of fomenting competition to mimic the economic consequences 
of globalization (Hursh 2007; Ravitch 2013a). However as NCLB required states to ensure 
virtually all of its students passed all exams by 2014, faced with this unreality, and the legislative 
inability to amend NCLB, the US DOE has consistently granted waivers to states on this 
requirement, so long as they presented evidence of pursuing desirable policies (Hursh 2013: 
578).  The NCLB provides another strong example of the tendency of neoliberal governance to 95
scale up policy making, while limiting local autonomy and downloading accountability for 
execution (Peck & Tickell 2002; Hursh 2013). 
 Which topped up local and state funds in school districts with low income children (Ravitch 2013a: 280).94
 This was finally addressed with a bipartisan revision of NCLB into the ‘Every Student Succeeds Act’ by the US 95
Congress in December 2015, devolving significant powers of the US DOE back to state governments (Strauss 
2015b).
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 The Regents exams served this purpose at the high school level in New York State. 
Justified by fears of rising mediocrity like so many other education policies harkening back to 
the 1983 Nation At Risk report, the state made its optional five high school Regents exams 
mandatory for graduation in 1996 (Hantzopoulos & Tyner-Mullings 2012: xli). Academics 
(Hursh 2007, 2013; Winerip 2012) and teachers interviewed here  have contended that 96
reinforced under NCLB, this has resulted in a narrowing of both school timetables (ie. the 
selection of available courses) and the actual content of individual courses, to emphasize learning 
content directly related to the five mandatory Regents. A teacher at a small school describes the 
imperative of teaching the test: 
So my English class, I’m getting ready to give an assignment tomorrow on question 27 
on the Regents exam, which is a very specific way of writing a short literary analysis. I 
wouldn’t be giving that garbage if I could be giving exactly what I wanted to do. But I 
have to teach them the language of the test. The specific language of it is, controlling 
idea. That’s what they have to write, a controlling idea. That’s not in the Common 
Core!  They don’t use the language of the controlling idea in the Common Core. 97
Nobody uses the word controlling idea in their pedagogy, in their instruction. It’s not a 
universal word like thesis or argument or claim, it’s none of that. But this is what you 
ask, cause you have to know what a controlling idea is when they take that test. (New 
York Teacher 4: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
Despite the original progressive ideals of the founders of NYC’s small schools movement as 
described above, the vast majority of small schools created under Bloomberg, facilitated by their 
narrow course offerings due to scale, tended to teach to the Regents, often encouraged by their 
 New York Teachers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12. Interviewed between December 2014 and April 2015.96
 The Common Core State Standards (CCSS) is a significant issue impacting the professional autonomy of US 97
teachers that is not addressed in this chapter. Common Core is an attempt at creating a standardized, national set of 
curriculum expectations by grade and subject. It has been lauded as an effort to ensure all students are taught 
according to the same high expectations, overcoming vast race and class inequities. Its outcome for secondary 
education is debated by education activists. Its provisions for expanding standardized testing for Kindergarten to 
grade 2 has attracted significant opposition (Weiner: Interviewed Dec. 2014). NYC teachers reported that it has had 
a minimal direct impact on their work. Among the various criticisms it has received, perhaps the most relevant here 
is that its curricular expectations are impossibly high for many struggling schools in impoverished areas, and that 
when tied to RTTT, a pretext is created for blaming and firing teachers for the low test scores of their students.
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principals. According to a 2008 Policy Studies Associates survey  of teachers and administrators 98
at 76 small New Century High Schools from 2002 to 2006, “Teachers provided successively 
higher ratings of the alignment of instruction with Regents requirements over time.” And, 
“...successively lower ratings of student discipline and their own influence on school policy and 
curriculum.”  (Foley et al 2008: 14). Teachers assessed their diminishing influence in the school 99
(Foley et al 2008: 23). Meanwhile, they indicated consistently high rates of observation and 
control by principals over their classroom instructional practices.  This study concurs with 100
Barrett, at the State University of New York (SUNY), who concludes that the influence of NCLB 
policies like high stakes testing, has the “capacity to fundamentally alter teachers’ professional 
practices and identities.” (2009: 1018).  
 A history teacher explains how interventions from principals to teach to the test in order 
to raise school scores has degraded the professional craft of educating: 
To some degree, in the major subjects the tests [Regent exams] always dictate things. ... 
At the same time, there can be a lot of freedom. [Y]ou can take risks as a teacher in a 
school with a principal who doesn’t micromanage… But if you have a principal who’s 
not sympathetic or who doesn’t understand history, or how to teach it, or just looks at the 
review books and says ‘follow this curriculum,’ as a teacher you have even less freedom. 
In some ways, the tests always dictate what you have to teach, but when you have a bad 
principal, they’ll even dictate how you’re going to teach it, at what pace, what you’ll 
emphasize, what you won’t... I think some of the tests are pretty good, and force the 
students to do some thoughtful intellectual work... The problem is the punitive nature of 
 Funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, among other institutions to evaluate the effectiveness of the 98
many new small schools that they had financially supported.
 Aligning instruction with the Regents are identified as: “Selecting curricular materials, developing curriculum, 99
designing classroom assessments, developing a school improvement plan, designing or selecting professional 
development opportunities.” (Foley et al 2008: 15). Influence on school policy and curriculum are defined as, 
“Establishing school discipline policies, Establishing and shaping the school curriculum, Selecting instructional 
materials that support the curriculum, Determining student retention and promotion policy, Making staffing and/or 
hiring decisions.” (Foley et al 2008: 23).
 Teachers strongly agreed with statements including: “My principal monitors the curriculum I use in my 100
classroom to see that it reflects my school’s educational focus” and “My principal monitors my classroom 
instructional practices to see that they reflect the school’s educational focus.” (Foley et al 2008: 21).
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it- if the students don’t do well, the school loses its funding. (New York Teacher 2: 
Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
This teacher’s reference to schools losing funding due to low test scores refers to Bloomberg’s 
school letter grade rating system, under which schools would be rewarded or punished, which 
was ended under De Blasio. A former elementary teacher and MORE co-founder relates: 
This was fourth grade, East Harlem... we were in the middle of a week long [science]  
investigation, in the middle of that day’s time in the investigation. The kids had all these  
materials out, they were measuring, looking, making notes, and the assistant principal 
tells me to put all that away and start doing test prep right now. And I said, ‘well yeah, 
sure okay. As soon as we’re done with this, we’ll clean it up and we’ll get started.’ She 
said, ‘No, right now.‘ So in front of the kids I had to beg her to let us continue the 
experiment. I failed. And we literally had to take everything as it was, notes and 
everything, and just put it away. Turn to page 39. Answer question 28: a, b, or c. (New 
York Teacher 1: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
The formal basis of power between teachers and the principals in terms of establishing time that 
is dedicated to test prep can vary dramatically: 
In some schools, test preparation is a course, it’s like considered a separate block of time, 
time is taken out for just pure test prep. In some schools it starts from the very first day of 
school, with assessment tests, drills and all that kind of thing. ...everyone’s thinking about 
the tests. They have to, in order to survive. And so what some principals do to protect 
teachers and children from the pressures of the test and test-based ideas of education, is 
try to encourage teachers to integrate things they know or suspect will be on the tests into 
their regular teaching. (New York Teacher 1: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
How do those varying conditions get negotiated? Is it solely the discretion of the principals, in 
terms of the policies or their philosophical inclinations? His response suggests the school by 
school nuance of teacher and principal power relations, and the limits of existing union 
protections for professional judgement in NYC: 
On paper, presumably the teacher has a lot of leeway to determine precisely how a given 
lesson will be taught. However, the reality is that if a principal gives a direct order, a 
teacher who doesn’t carry out that order is therefore according to the rules, the 
regulations that govern the principal-teacher interaction, the teacher is subject to 
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accusations of insubordination. So what the union often advises teachers to do is go along 
with it, but if you feel the contract has been violated, than you can grieve it. But in 
practice… people essentially defer to what the principal says we’re all going to do. … Or 
if they attempt to subvert it, they do it on the down-low. They close their classroom door 
or try to do something different... In general, the first schools where you see teacher 
resistance to testing, where teachers have organized to refuse to administer the tests, to 
refuse to do test preparation… the principal has one way or another given a signal. (New 
York Teacher 1: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
This again illustrate the decisive influence, post-Bloomberg, of administrators in setting the tone 
of the school in relation to the ability of teachers to act with professional autonomy, especially in 
the context of high stakes testing. 
 These accounts of frustrated teachers compelled to spend class time teaching a concept of 
limited use because of its adoption by the Regents exam, the history teacher whose professional 
capacity to plan lessons is curtailed, and the science teacher forced to shelve an interactive lab 
for test prep, serve as snapshots of the outcome of NCLB’s mandate for high stakes testing.  101
Educators have summarized the most significant consequence of the Obama administration’s 
Race to the Top (RTTT), as taking these high stakes tests beyond defining what’s taught in the 
classroom, to directly determining teachers‘ job security. Unlike NCLB’s legal mandate which 
compels states to implement standardized testing, RTTT implemented its agenda through a $5 
billion fund, particularly attractive to state governments suffering from significant loss of tax 
revenue in the aftermath of the 2008-09 recession. Winning applicants (19 out of 46 states and 
DC that attempted) secured the agreement of local school boards and teachers’ unions to raise 
limits on the number of charter schools, institute processes to close schools with low test scores, 
 Not only do educators argue that high stakes exams like the Regents frequently have poorly constructed 101
questions, Hursh (2013: 580) cites research by Winerip, to argue that the difficulty of the state Regents is 
manipulated year to year in order to meet political objectives of demonstrating either rising scores, or renewed 
toughness. He also cites acknowledgments of grade inflation in the English Regents exam by former NYSED 
Chancellor Merryl Tisch (2009-2015). New York pass rates on math and English Regents exams rose dramatically to 
82 and 69 percent in 2009, to fall to 54 and 42 percent with revised tests the following year (Kuhn 2014: 49).
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and determine at least 20 percent of teachers’ annual evaluations through Value Added 
Assessments, based on ‘growth’ of student scores between tests taken at the beginning and the 
end of the school year. For meeting these requirements, in 2010 New York State received $700 
million spread over four years.  However with half of these funds mandated for spending on 102
student testing and observations tied to teacher evaluations, the actual additional amount districts 
will receive per student is just $33.50 per year (Ravitch 2013a: 99; Hursh 2013: 574-576). With 
such a modest contribution to education budgets in exchange for considerable administrative 
restructuring, the extent that pursuit of RTTT funding was ideologically motivated will be further 
suggested through the description below of Governor Andrew Cuomo’s dogged efforts to ensure 
Value Added Assessments determined teachers’ evaluations to the full extent possible. 
 Another teacher, currently at a critical small school where all but the English Regents 
exam is waived, describes her past experience at a conventional high school prepping students 
for the math Regents: 
[T]he tests can test anything out of 12 different chapters. Most teachers I know, if they 
get through all 12 chapters it’s because they’re a speed racer and there’s not a lot of depth 
of learning happening... [M]y colleague and I went over 15 years of exams and tallied the 
topics, all this statistical analysis, to decide which six we’re going to teach this year 
because that’s all the time we have. And they scored great on all the past exams, and then 
that year for whatever reason, it’s [the actual exam] just totally different... And I was just 
like, ‘What the hell!’ We just spent nine months working our butts off, doing the best they 
can- Saturday school, after school, sitting in  an office with tick marks for a test we don’t 
even care about. And then they flunk. So now I’m a  shitty teacher. Because based on this 
test score I didn’t do my job, and I didn’t prepare kids and now there goes my MOSL 
score. (New York Teacher 5: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
Measures of Student Learning (MOSL) is the New York State value added assessment. At the 
high school level, Regents exams fulfill this role as the MOSL at the end of the school year. 
 The size of the grants is commiserate to the state’s population, with smaller states receiving far less.102
 202
Since receipt of RTTT funds began in 2010, New York State’s Annual Professional Performance 
Review (APPR) for teachers has consisted of two components: a series of informal or formal 
observations of classroom teaching by the school’s principal or an outside evaluator, and the 
MOSL. Official observations in New York State are based on the patented Danielson evaluation 
rubric, which specifies 22 distinct areas of teacher competency. It was narrowed to eight areas in 
the 2014 UFT contract, covering lesson planning, professional responsibilities, the classroom 
environment and instructional methods, with the last two categories holding greater weight (UFT 
2014). Initial requirements of two observations per year were raised in 2014 to at least one 
formal (mutually scheduled, period long) and three informal (unannounced, 15 minute) 
observations, or six informal observations. Teachers with ‘Effective’ or ‘Highly Effective’ ratings 
require 1-2 fewer observations. Some teachers interviewed here report having received fewer 
observations, noting the practical logistical difficulties for administrators of potentially 
scheduling hundreds of observations a year for all of their staff members. Overall, they reported 
far more concern about the impact of the MOSL test scores on their evaluations  (Hursh 2013: 103
583; NYC DOE 2015). 
 In 2011, Cuomo’s legislature doubled the MOSL component to count for 40 percent of 
the APPR, with observations reduced to 60 percent. NYSUT and the UFT responded with legal 
challenges, but the new 40 percent threshold stood, with the caveat that teachers at each school 
could choose to have part of the additional 20 percent evaluated through an additional locally 
 A teacher says of the observation portion of the evaluation, “The new evaluation system that was implemented in 103
New York, the Danielson System... it didn’t have an impact on me directly… I never received a negative rating 
under it, but it created tons of work. It made the evaluation process incredibly time consuming and stressful, and it 
also made it feel less under my control because that rubric is... filled with language that an administrator can play 
with and the standard that it shoots for in terms of what you do in a classroom on a day to day basis with 34 kids, it’s 
just not realistic. … It just creates a lot of anxiety and stress which cumulatively is miserable for teachers.” (New 
York Teacher 2: Interviewed Dec. 2014)
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developed standardized test. However faced with additional paperwork, many schools opt to 
simply give the existing Regents exams the 40 percent weighting (Hursh 2013: 584). Cuomo and 
others strongly advocated for increasing the weight of student testing in teacher evaluations with 
the claim that it is scientifically possible to isolate and quantifiably measure a teachers’ 
contribution to student knowledge year over year.  Factors like the socioeconomic status of 104
students and parental education levels were minimized in this formula with an argument that 
considering them is tantamount to lowered expectations for poor students (rather than a rationale 
for greater student supports). Accordingly, proponents argued value added assessments of the 
impact of teachers on their student’s test scores offered the most objective measure of the quality 
of an educator. Teachers who did not ‘add value’ could then be justifiably fired (Kuhn 2014: 45). 
As Texas School Board Superintendent and anti-testing activist John Kuhn explains, “The real 
magic -and faith -comes in when the algorithm attempts to set a predicted amount of 
improvement that each student ought to have made; the teacher is rated based on how often he or 
she outperforms the individual improvement called for by the algorithm.” (Kuhn: 2012: 45) 
Ravitch explains how this idea initially proposed by an industrial statistician from Tennessee, 
William Sanders, subsequently promulgated by economists at the conservative Hoover Institute, 
and entered public discourse in 2010 through its uptake by traveling neoliberal education 
advocates Michelle Rhee and Joel Klein (2012: 100-103). It was then appended as a key aspect 
of RTTT and diffused to states across the US. With strong support from Bloomberg and the new 
 Hoover Institute economists presented models which claimed to demonstrate specified dollar amounts that ‘great’ 104
teachers added to the earnings of their graduates. The concept received front page coverage in the New York Times 
and an approving citation by President Obama in his 2012 State of the Union address. The responses of critics that 
this modelling represented such a gross simplification of human lives as to be meaningless, received far less 
attention (Ravitch 2013: 105-106). In the same speech Obama also stated, “teachers should stop teaching to the 
test”, prompting Hursh to comment, “But RTTT, his own program, forces teachers to teach to the test. To do 
otherwise is to risk being publicly shamed and fired.” (Hursh 2013: 584)
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governor, but with the UFT refusing to agree to its form of implementation, it was imposed in 
NYC by the state education department, while other school boards and unions across the state 
enjoyed greater room to negotiate more local autonomy (Tisch & Berlin 2014: 2-4).  
 Fearing for their jobs if the exam scores of their students do not sufficiently rise, the 
result is a subordination of the professional capacity of high school teachers. Rather than 
interpreting broad curricular requirements through comprehensive student-centred and project-
based learning designed based on teaching deeper, more qualitative principles, and more likely to 
be based on ‘authentic tasks’ , emphasis shifts to rote-learning quantitative data. A major 105
impetus behind NYC’s critical small schools movement has been the creation of institutions, 
many grouped in the Consortium of Essential Schools and the New York Consortium for 
Performance Standards, which substitute most of the Regents for these alternative forms of 
evaluations (Hantzopoulos and Tyner-Mullings 2012: xxxiii). In 2015, these schools enrolled a 
few thousand NYC high school students, a tiny portion of the Department of Education.  
 With the full implementation of the APPR in the 2013-14 school year, Hursh (2013) 
anticipated that the evaluation system would result in mass firings, as he argued it was intended 
to do. Citing NYSED’s policy, he explained that: 
[F]ewer than half the teachers will be rated as ‘effective’ or ‘very effective,’ with most 
rated as ‘ineffective’ and ‘developing.’ This will occur for two reasons. First, teachers are 
required to be rated on a bell curve, so that 10% of teachers, whether based on test scores, 
observation, or other locally created criteria, must be rated as ‘ineffective’ and 40% as 
‘developing.’ Second, ‘before a teacher can be considered effective, her students’ score 
growth must exceed the average for all teachers – that means based on scores, more than 
50 percent of all teachers will not be effective.’ Third, although the median total score 
will be 50 out of 100 points (remember, it is a bell curve), teachers will have to score a 
total of 75 points or more to be rated ‘effective.’ Therefore, most teachers will be found to 
 Assignments designed to more closely resemble ‘real world’ activities, Eg. in an English class, writing a 105
newspaper editorial on a current event, rather than simply a two paragraph response.
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be ‘ineffective’ or ‘developing.’ In New York City, if teachers are found to be ‘ineffective 
overall’ for two consecutive years, the district can begin the process of removing the 
teachers. (Hursh 2013: 583) 
However in the 2013-14 teacher evaluation, less than 1 percent of teachers in the state were rated 
Ineffective, and over 95 percent were rated Highly Effective or Effective. With NYC’s results 
more closely tied to state test score MOSLs, 1.2 percent of teachers were rated Ineffective, but 
only 9.2 percent were rated Highly Effective, compared to 58.2 percent across the rest of the 
state (Tisch & Berlin 2014: 3). In a highly publicized response, Cuomo decried the results as 
“baloney,” claiming that more teachers must actually be ineffective, to account for insufficient 
improvements in student test scores (Smith 2015). Retired (2015) Long Island principal and anti-
standardized testing activist Carol Burris explains Chancellor Merryl Tisch and Cuomo’s 
motivations: 
To Tisch’s dismay, APPR which she helped design, has not produced the results that she 
and Cuomo wanted... The plan, according to the state’s Race to the Top application, was 
for 10 percent of all teachers to be found ineffective, with small numbers designated as 
highly effective. The curve of the sorting bell was not achieved. (Strauss 2015a)
 As part of the 2015-16 budget, Cuomo pushed through the state legislature in April 2015 
new measures he believed would result in a higher number of teachers being labelled ineffective 
and on the path to termination. School districts would be compelled to renegotiate their 
collective agreements and implement the policies locally by the following November, or lose 
increases in state education funding. First, the 60/40 balance of observations and MOSLs would 
be replaced by a more ambiguous matrix, with an even weight between both, but with negative 
(Developing or Ineffective) results on the MOSL lowering Effective or Highly Effective ratings 
on the observation component. After two consecutive Ineffective ratings, a teacher may be 
 206
charged with ‘incompetence’, leading to dismissal for untenured teachers and trials within 90 
days for tenured teachers. After three consecutive ratings the teacher must be charged, with a 
decision within 30 days. Next, the number of years service before being eligible to apply for 
tenure was increased from three to four, with Effective or Highly Effective ratings required in at 
least three of the four years. Finally, schools in the bottom 5 percent of state testing results for 
ten years may be restructured by a board or state appointed ‘receiver’ who can fire any or all staff 
(Bakeman 2015; Brody 2015). 
 The response of NYSUT and the UFT to these attacks on the job security of their 
members mainly took the form of intense lobbying in Albany. Union negotiators claimed victory 
in limiting the increase in probation to four years (Cuomo wanted five years), and eliminating a 
proposed tax credit for donors to private schools that would have been an initial step to 
subsidizing private tuition, and was fiercely fought for by charter school lobbyists. They were 
unsuccessful in forestalling the further influence of standardized testing results over teachers. 
Where they failed, New York state’s Opt Out movement claimed some success. Coordinated by 
parent-led networks like New York State Allies for Public Education, the cumulative effort of 
parent associations in districts across the state resulted in over 220 000 students in grades 3 to 8 
sitting out their math and/or science state tests in April 2015, over a fifth of all eligible students 
(Harris & Fessenden 2015). The opt-out movement was present throughout the state, but the 
highest concentration of test refusers was in the predominantly middle class Long Island suburbs 
of Norfolk and Suffolk counties, where it received vocal support from superintendents, elected 
trustees and local teachers’ union leaders, contributing to an overwhelming majority opting out. 
Opt out was a minor presence in poorer, rural districts, and in NYC, where despite tripling in 
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numbers from the previous year, was still less than 2 percent of all elementary test takers . Of 106
NYC’s 7900 students who were opted out, over 1650 were in District 15, the affluent Park Slope 
neighbourhood in Brooklyn (Rodriguez 2015; Harris 2015). 
 The teachers’ union president  of a small Long Island school board explained how 107
parents in her district became galvanized in response to state measures to quash the budding 
dissent and ensure the exams were administered: 
These school districts were going to pass resolutions that they were going to ‘discuss’ 
whether or not to even give the test in their district. ...both districts were told, by the State 
of New York that if they did that… the State would remove every member of the board of 
education and the superintendent, and put in their own representatives to run the district. 
  
“That doesn’t happen in America,” she continued. “In America, we believe in local control. We 
believe that in fact, if we elect a board of education, that board of education is supposed to 
represent us locally. The state is not allowed to tell us what we can and cannot discuss!…” The 
state government’s intervention helped build opposition to the tests: 
The parents went crazy! …[the] school board never brought the resolution to the floor. 
Superintendent, the news media, everyone was there. The superintendent said, ‘I’ve been 
advised by council not to talk about this.’ 
In response, activist parents began to self organize, “I don’t really know the politics in your 
country... I don’t know if you know mine. What I’m telling you is, this is revolution stuff, in 
America. This is crazy shit.” She later remarked during our interview: 
 For NYC anti-testing activists, key reasons behind the city’s far lower opt-out rates are the use of the grade 4 and 106
8 exam results as part of the school choice application for some middle and high schools, the Mayoral Control 
structure which replaces the role of elected trustees who have vocally opposed the tests elsewhere, and the 
geographic dispersal of students attending schools across districts and boroughs, making the organization of parents 
more difficult (Author’s observations). New York Teacher 1 (2014) makes a similar argument above about the 
impact of school choice on parental activism.
 The following exchange is extracted from a Skype interview with New York Teacher 9, in April 2015.107
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NYSUT’s agenda has not been an anti-testing agenda. It is only now becoming, because 
the parent groups are standing up and they’ve decided they’re going to protect public 
schools, and they’re going to protect their children. So unfortunately, my state and 
national union have not been setting the pace. They have been reacting to the fact that 
they are going to be thrown out of office, just like the legislative members, and the 
senators and the governor. This will destroy Cuomo. It will, because he will never be able 
to run for president. (New York Teacher 9: Interviewed April 2015) 
With Cuomo and his bipartisan allies facing an electoral threat, the scaling up of the initiative in 
neoliberal education policy in New York may have reached its point of vulnerability. The 
groundswell of public opposition in some politically influential swing vote regions of New York 
State to what are popularly viewed as excessive testing of children, and for some, an attack on 
teachers, has reverberated across the state. Teachers in NYC would benefit, despite the much 
weaker opt-out movement in their city, as would high school teachers, despite public organizing 
and protest focusing on grades 3 to 8, as these are statewide policies affecting elementary and 
secondary. 
 The NYC DOE’s 2015-16 Advance Guide for Educators, which explains how the teacher 
evaluation system functions, includes a notice that revisions may be made later in the school year 
in line with Cuomo’s legislation (NYC DOE 2015). The changes may not be necessary. In late 
November 2015, as local school districts were expected to complete and submit their revised 
teacher evaluation policies to NYSED, rumours emerged that Cuomo was considering a reversal 
of his own policies. The musings followed a high profile statement by Obama that testing should 
be reduced, and only occupy a legally limited set of time in the school year. A month later, 
NYSED announced that MOSLs and value added assessments would be suspended entirely from 
annual teacher evaluations until at least 2019, accompanying an overhaul of the Common Core 
State Standards on which the standardized tests were based. The previous August, NYSED 
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announced that school districts with high opt out rates would not be punished by having their 
funding levels frozen, as state authorities had threatened leading up to the tests several months 
earlier. The results of the 2014-15 state teacher evaluation revealed that 92 percent of NYC 
teachers were rated Highly Effective or Effective. (Zernike 2015; Taylor 2015a; Taylor 2015b; 
(Chapman 2015). If their own unions lacked the capacity to do so, will it be New York’s 
organized parents that save their children’s teachers? 
5.8: State of Our Union, State of Our Schools 
 Throughout this chapter there have been references to the response of the UFT to the 
neoliberal policies here that have cumulatively transformed teachers’ work in New York City by 
limiting their professional autonomy. We have heard about the impact of Mayoral Control for 
concentrating power in the hands of the mayor and the chancellor, weakening official forums for 
community challenges. The proliferation of small schools and ‘school choice’ that changed the 
spatial organization of the workplace. Policies which increased the precariousness of teachers by 
making tenure more difficult to obtain, and surplussed teachers easier to eliminate. Finally, the 
scaling up of policy making beyond the local plane on which collective bargaining is conducted, 
to make fundamental changes to the teacher evaluation process. Beneath all of these dynamics 
we have the political economy of austerity financing for public education, the gradual shift in 
state funding to the private sector in the form of charter schools, and rising socioeconomic 
inequity experienced by poor and working class, and racialized communities that represent the 
overwhelming majority of NYC’s students. 
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 Underlying policy shifts initiated chiefly by Bloomberg and later Cuomo, I argue, has 
been a largely consistent tendency to remake the teaching profession towards one that is 
disempowered and precarious. In doing so, we have seen a hollowing out of the power of the 
union, at the level which I believe matters most, the school site. Unlike once powerful teachers’ 
unions in the US that have lost institutional capacity from the passing of ‘Right to Work‘ style 
laws that hemorrhage dues revenue as in Wisconsin after 2011, or lost thousands of members 
from the expansion of non-union charters as in Detroit and Los Angeles, on paper the UFT 
remains as powerful as ever. Yet all of the policies I described above add up to weakening the 
capacity of teachers to defend their ability to exercise their professional capacities in their 
schools. I believe that some of these defeats are due to decisions by the leadership of the UFT, 
which have concentrated power and initiative at the top of the union, neglecting the chapter 
level, and a political strategy that has striven unsuccessfully to contain these policies through 
high level lobbying, while eschewing the building of alliances, as in the case of the Opt Out 
movement. From these decisions, one can see a consistent ideological orientation on the part of 
the leadership, that is unwilling to support grassroots, insurgent mobilization. For the most part, 
it does not acknowledge the contemporary manifold attacks on public education as being 
consistent within an historical context governed by the neoliberal variant of capitalism. Let alone 
a perspective that sees beyond the legislative programs and actors of City Hall, Albany or 
Washington DC, to horizons of similar policies crossing borders elsewhere, and the resistance 
that they encounter, whether in Ontario or Mexico City. Lacking a systemic analysis, a 
comprehensive alternative vision is not forthcoming and the battle continues to be fought in an 
isolated fashion. For these reasons, I devote a substantial focus here to the Movement of Rank 
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and File Educators (MORE), which has put forward an alternative vision for the union in this 
context. 
 The final section of this chapter focuses then on how the UFT has attempted to change, 
and been changed, during these circumstances, to help explain the unevenness of neoliberal 
reform across my three case studies. I begin with an overview of the current structure of the 
UFT’s leadership and school chapters, attempting to understand some reasons behind the 
weakness of the union’s presence in many schools. I will then trace the development of the 
MORE caucus, its use of policy mobility ‘from below’ through its inspiration from Chicago’s 
Caucus of Rank and File Educators (CORE), its struggles to both gain a critical mass of support 
from colleagues, and following the CORE model, build meaningful alliances with parent groups. 
I draw heavily on interviews with union activists, many affiliated with MORE, and to a much 
lesser extent, former UFT officials, one elected, another a senior staff person . I also utilize 108
notes from attending MORE caucus events, meetings, rallies and UFT delegate assemblies, and a 
content analysis of MORE, UFT and the incumbent Unity Caucus materials. 
 Continuing his explanation above of how the UFT responded to dysfunctional large high 
schools housing poor and racialized students, by supporting the small schools movement in the 
1980s and 90s, and creating the School Based Option that allows staff to opt out of certain work 
schedule provisions in the collective agreement, this former official  describes how the union 109
leadership confronted the education challenges of the Bloomberg era. He draws a dichotomy 
 Despite a letter of endorsement from the president of my own union OSSTF, multiple attempts at contacting 108
senior elected UFT officials by mail, email and telephone were unsuccessful.
 Former UFT Official 2: Interviewed Apr. 2015109
 212
between critics of the union executive, who equate unionism with comprehensive contractual 
rights, but do not recognize structural crises facing the school system, and a more farsighted 
leadership: 
[T]here are people -particularly internal opposition in the union, who have this vision that 
unionism is industrial unionism, and they will see this as union betraying some 
fundamental interest. But the union has- the union leadership, is a better way to put it, 
because even in the lengths of people who aren’t in the opposition, don’t necessarily 
understand this, but this sense that you need to change public education. You can’t 
continue to have a system- this drop out rate and leaves so many poor kids and kids of 
colour behind. ...[I]n the United States, the way in which education reform in the 
corporate sense gains its power is by pointing to the kinds of failings of the school system 
with regards to race and class. Even though it’s not like teachers or unions devised this 
system, or that they approve of it. Nonetheless, the charter schools in New York City 
were originally put into three of the poorest communities, huge concentrations of people 
of colour: Harlem, South Bronx, central Brooklyn... In New York City, the union actually 
sponsors two charter schools of its own... The problem with charter schools is not the 
structural relationship. It’s not because you don’t have the government officially running 
the school that that’s the problem. The problem with the charter school movement are the 
people who have seized control of it and run its leadership. So the idea was how we could 
produce a different vision of what a charter school should be, including a different vision 
of collective bargaining where we would have a contract that wasn’t this kind of long, 
detailed industrial style contract with regulations, but had in it, teachers having voice and 
control over all the work decisions. Sort of taking that bargaining we had made with the 
new small schools and elaborating it. (Former UFT Official 2: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
However he acknowledges that most charter school advocates aren’t interested in this experiment 
by the union: 
[W]hat interests them is that in the United States there are basically four unions left that 
can mount a real political presence, AFT, NEA, AFSCME and SEIU... And so to the 
extent to which they can undermine and incapacitate and eviscerate teachers unions, they 
are in a position politically to really have very little organized opposition to corporate 
control and incredible amounts of wealth and money in the electoral system. (Former 
UFT Official 2: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
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A MORE activist had a harsher critique of the UFT leadership’s effort to create a progressive 
model for charter schools which he viewed as indicative of a conservative approach to working 
within the system: 
[F]rom the beginning their whole strategy is to retain a seat at the table. Stay in the  
conversation. On charter schools, they said, ‘we can’t straight out oppose charter schools, 
because parents love them! Therefore, we’re going to start our own charter school! And 
prove that a unionized charter school is the best way to go.’... we later discovered, when 
they had one of these privatization summits, where somebody secretly videotaped a 
presentation of a guy on how to trick the unions, that that was a strategy! They were like, 
‘We’re going to tell the unions to start their own charter schools. If they buy it, then they 
can’t oppose charter schools because they’re part of it.’ (New York Teacher 1: 
Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
With the rapid proliferation of charter schools in urban US school districts, the UFT like other 
teachers’ unions, has worked with the AFT’s Alliance of Charter School Teachers and Staff 
(ACTS), to organize the non-union schools, with some modest successes at smaller independent 
charters in NYC (Winslow 2013; Zionts 2015). Eight percent of NYC’s approximately 1.1 
million students in publicly funded schools attend charters (Camera 2015).  
 Alongside the structural transformations in the organization of the NYC DOE under 
Bloomberg discussed above, came a disruption to how the union intervened on day to day 
workplace issues and school-level grievances. Describing how this worked previously: 
The power dynamics in a traditional school, there are various sorts of checks on 
principal’s authority, but they’re not so great that we’re dealing with a mythical world in 
which there were no abusive principals... In those days, one of the ways they would often 
get resolved is when you have an elaborate DOE bureaucracy, where you have for high 
schools five or six superintendencies, which are as big as districts all over the country. …
So depending upon the relationship and other things, if things got really bad, more often 
than not, the union would be able to go to the superintendent and they would be able to 
work out some changes, some accommodations. (Former UFT Official 2: Interviewed 
Apr. 2015) 
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The collapsing of geographically defined community school districts into various forms of 
support networks resulted in the shifting of administrative authority. While principals gained 
increased power within their 1800 schools through a broad range of policies, power over them 
came to be wielded to an increasingly direct extent from DOE headquarters, via surveillance and 
intervention based on student test scores. The intermediary structure of superintendents 
weakened, which according to this former UFT official, coincides with a push by Bloomberg’s 
DOE to diminish the union’s capacity to effectively resolve workplace problems through 
grievances and arbitration: 
[T]hey make a decision at the DOE to basically destroy the grievance system. Because 
the grievance system is based on a kind of funnel where you only want to take a small 
number of grievances to arbitration, the highest level. So you try to resolve these at lower 
levels. … The DOE refuses to solve any grievances at lower levels. They create this 
massive bottleneck at the top of the system, because the way arbitration works for us is 
we have a limited number of days that we have arbitrators to hear arbitrations. So we can 
only schedule so many arbitrations... the union [is] constantly trying to increase the 
number of arbitration days. Because what’s happening is too many things. We win all the 
arbitrations, because they’re taking stuff that they can’t win, but the object at the top is to 
block up the system. So that is one dynamic that makes it hard for us to use the grievance 
system. They do the same thing before a teacher gets tenure, they are at that point an at-
will employee. So there is supposed to be an appeal for your year-end ratings, which is 
really the only means of redress that a teacher that’s not tenured would have. They 
basically decided that they’re not ever going to overturn a principal’s unsatisfactory year 
end evaluation. (Former UFT Official 2: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
This form of ‘inside baseball’, obscure to those not involved in the union’s leadership and 
unreported in standard accounts of contemporary education policy change in NYC, results in 
reduced support from the larger union for school chapters locked in conflict with administrators. 
This helps shift the balance of power to the latter’s benefit: 
Those principals that are malevolent have a much freer reign to be malevolent. Which is 
still not by any means a majority in the school system. And they make the 
superintendents into empty shirts… So the ability of the superintendents to actually 
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override the principal. You have a system in which it becomes very difficult for the union 
to do the kind of servicing stuff that it did before. It doesn’t keep a union chapter from 
organizing, it simply makes the system that was in place for resolving conflicts 
impossible to work. (Former UFT Official 2: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
A former senior UFT staff member describes the duties of the school-level union chapter chair: 
[T]he eyes and ears and mouth of the union at the chapter level. The chapter leader is 
involved in grievance procedures and leads at grievance hearings. The chapter leader 
negotiates with the principal to withdraw charges, or finesses that those charges aren’t 
filed in the first place... [I]t’s a real job. People want to be chapter leaders for two 
reasons, one is they’re militants, two is they’re militants who also want to be in the 
leadership [Unity] caucus. Three, they’re militants who hate the leadership caucus. But 
for the most part, these are tough guys, and women, it’s mostly women, who recognize 
that things ain’t getting better, with the exception of the extraordinary principal. (Former 
UFT Official 1: Interviewed Jan. 2015) 
He provides an overview of the health of the union’s school-based chapters in this context: 
Of the 1400 institutions, there are not 1400 active chapters [there are over 1800 schools]. 
Depending on who you talk to, there are either 800 or less. Now of the 800, they tend to 
work fairly well. Sometimes, a chapter leader is a kiss ass, so they bury any problems and 
will finger troublemakers. Then you have chapter leaders who will put their necks out on 
the line everyday and risk Unsatisfactory ratings. A couple of U ratings and you’re out. 
The union goes out of its way to defend the chapter leaders, whether they’re part of the 
Unity caucus or part of the opposition caucuses. Because you lose one of them, and the 
camel’s nose is under the tent! (Former UFT Official 1: Interviewed Jan. 2015) 
MORE activists concurred that roughly half of all schools have functional union chapters.  All 110
teachers interviewed were asked to comment on the activity and health of the chapters in the 
schools where they have worked. Their responses indicated a wide diversity of experiences. One 
teacher explained why some chapter leaders were ‘kiss asses’: 
[T]here’s a lot of terrible chapter leaders now because we’ve had years of turnover and 
there’s  these schools where everyone’s a young teacher and no one knows their rights, 
and the principal will even encourage a teacher they like to become chapter leader so that 
they can then impose... Yes, in some schools it is a company union. It’s awful.  
(New York Teacher 2: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
 Personal observations at MORE Conference, October 24, 2015, New York City.110
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The role played here by the absence from many NYC schools of large numbers of veteran 
teachers, frequently made up by untenured staff, reiterates arguments made above of the impact 
of these trends on the capacity of teachers to assert their professional autonomy in the face of 
administrative pressure to teach to the test. The extent that untenured teachers are vulnerable to 
retaliation by administrators for participating in union activities led facilitators at a MORE 
workshop on building school chapters to advise against them taking any form of visible 
leadership role in the union.  The above teacher also described how he experienced this 111
retaliation while untenured, placing his employment at risk: 
We had a union meeting once where the guy everyone knew was the principal’s person, 
who’s now an administrator... just came in and took some notes, and left. And everyone 
knew he wasn’t there because he was a union guy, and I was observed [evaluated] the 
next day. He was coming to take attendance on who goes to the union meetings! (New 
York Teacher 2: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
This teacher and many others also described working at schools with strong union chapters and 
leaders.  Nevertheless, it is surely a sign of institutional weakness that many administrators are 112
able to create an intimidating environment surrounding participation in their union at their school 
(also recall the two teachers at the start of this chapter explaining how their school’s only veteran 
teacher was isolated from other staff as the chapter leader), how so many schools do not have a 
functional union presence, and in some it has been co-opted to serve managerial prerogatives. A 
major critique by MORE activists is the lack of initiative for many school chapters for involving 
its members in a participatory fashion to address significant issues. A MORE member described 
meetings at his former school:  
 Personal observations at MORE Conference, October 24, 2015, New York City.111
 New York Teachers 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11. Interviewed Dec. 2014 to April 2015.112
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[I]t’s during a lunch break or something, then there are cookies and chips. You can ask a 
few questions, and that’s it. But it’s never like the chapter makes decisions… There are 
some things the chapter has to vote on, like if we’re going to make changes to our 
schedule, there are some things within our rights. But it’s never like ‘a charter school’s 
going to colocate with us, what’s our action plan for how we’re going to fight that? How 
are we going to stop this, how are we going to rally the community to our side? (New 
York Teacher 1: Interviewed Dec. 2014) 
MORE activists tended to blame the UFT leadership for not creating or supporting structures 
within the union that would encourage greater school site activity.  For them and others, this 113
has served as a major impetus to join the MORE caucus as a means to make structural changes 
within the union. 
 A Washington Heights middle school teacher who became a MORE activist, describes 
how coming from overwhelmingly non-union North Carolina, as a self-identified progressive, 
she was eager for the opportunity to be involved in her new union: 
I started teaching here in 2009… I was very excited to join a union. I really liked the idea 
of it! My union rep at the time was like, ‘Ok, well, here’s a form you can fill out... we 
don’t really have issues with our administration...’ He did invite me later that year… to a 
restaurant reception to welcome the new UFT president, who at the time was Michael 
Mulgrew. I remember going and being very unimpressed, because the primary thing that 
was discussed was parking spaces... really, parking spaces?! [Laughs] Parking around the 
school. Which is an issue in New York City, getting to work on time, parking can be 
really expensive. I sort of get it, but I was surprised that was such a big topic of 
conversation. I was generally very unimpressed with Michael Mulgrew’s demeanor and 
choice of words, all of those things. The food was really good at that reception though. I 
think they also had mixed drinks… So that was my first exposure to union stuff. (New 
York Teacher 11: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
For her, the official activities of the union at both her school and in the larger institution and its 
narrow ‘business unionist’ focus were unsatisfying. They did not appear to her to serve as 
vehicles to address the sprawling range of equity and social justice issues affecting both her 
 New York Teachers 1, 2, 3, 6, 11: Interviewed Dec. 2014 to Apr. 2015.113
 218
students and colleagues. At the end of her second year, she ran to be the school chapter chair and 
was defeated. She attributes her loss to a rumour spread by the incumbent chair that she was 
handpicked by the principal, with whom she had a good relationship. Other teachers viewed her 
suspiciously as a Teach for America alumni, and for her limited teaching experience. She does 
not regret the loss in hindsight, reflecting on the fate of a friend who won the chapter chair at her 
school while untenured, became embroiled in conflict with the principal, and was soon fired. A 
year later, now holding tenure and with stronger relations with her colleagues, she was elected 
chapter delegate, a position similar to a vice-chair. She became active in the broader union, 
leading to her awareness of MORE: 
I started going to Delegate Assembly meetings. Of course my chapter leader was like, 
you don’t really have to go. It’s not important, no one goes. I went to a couple and I was 
like, ‘Wow these aren’t important, nothing happens!’ [Laughs] It also kind of sucks. The 
speakers are really loud. It’s like Mulgrew talking. My attendance that first year was not 
great. But towards the end of  the year, there were a couple of times when people from 
MORE would speak up. Actually there was the resolution about specialized high schools 
and how they were unequal. That got my attention, I wanted to hang out with those 
people. They’re saying smart things, they’re bringing up good ideas. They’re not just 
sitting here doing nothing. (New York Teacher 11: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
Adopting some ideas from her MORE colleagues, she is pleased with increased levels of activity 
she is seeing in her school chapter, leading to plans for further involvement on her part: 
People have become more interested in union stuff because this year for every meeting 
I’ve sent out detailed minutes... [W]hen we did our evaluation petition [an initiative by 
MORE concerning teacher evaluations], I got our chapter to endorse it. People said yes. 
There’s been a couple other little actions we’ve done as a chapter. And to the UFT’s 
credit, they’ve started to do a little more stuff that calls for people to be participatory. So 
whenever that happens, I jump on it and try to get my chapter to do it. Or whenever 
there’s an event, I say I’m going, who wants to come. So more people have taken an 
interest in union stuff. But we don’t have regular meetings or anything like that... I’ve 
been frustrated with my chapter leader in the ways he’s not been doing his job, now that I 
have a clear picture of what that job is, and so I’ve been thinking about running for a 
while. (New York Teacher 11: Interviewed Apr. 2015) 
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 Meanwhile, she increased her involvement in MORE. From 2013, she served multiple six 
month terms on its steering committee, participating in discussions on the direction of the 
caucus. In her time, the group has overcome various internal political tensions. According to her 
and other participants, generational differences among activists are sometimes evident. As a large 
generalization, across gender and race (though MORE, reflecting the composition of teachers in 
NYC, is predominantly white) older activists were more likely to focus on strategizing and 
organizing to win chapter elections and expand the presence of the caucus in the larger union, 
leading to the 2016 UFT elections. Younger teachers tended to be drawn to discussions and 
workshops focused on building alliances with parents and high school students, emphasizing an 
anti-racist framework. They were also more likely to identify politically with the radical left, 
than their older colleagues who were more social democratic. The strength of the caucus is 
concentrated in the city’s high schools, despite the prominence of several primary and middle 
school teachers among its founders and steering committee. At a meeting in April 2015, looking 
ahead to the fall 2016 union elections, the caucus set goals to double its share of the vote for 
executive positions from 18 percent to 35 percent and increase its base of supporters among 
chapter chairs and delegates in the union’s monthly Delegate Assembly from roughly 80 to 200. 
The caucus was notably lacking in hubris over the prospects of actually winning seats on the 
union’s executive.  114
 I arrived at Carroll Public School, set in the heart of a neighbourhood of well groomed 
brownstone townhouses in Brooklyn for a MORE conference in October 2015. Two high end toy 
 Author’s personal observations at MORE meetings, socials and conferences, 2014 to 2015.114
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stores and two private tutoring companies operated within a block. Suggesting the political 
power of the neighbourhood, they were joined by the cheerful storefront office of the district’s 
state assemblywoman. The primary school was immaculately clean, the hallways and auditorium 
covered with beautiful student artwork. The classrooms where we held our sessions appeared out 
of a photo from a government press conference on education policy. An American flag hung off 
the wall next to the blackboard, waving over neatly labelled baskets of picture books and art 
supplies. It was difficult to imagine here that any sort of crisis existed in US education. 
 Among 120 people registered for the conference, including a contingent of parent 
activists involved in the Opt Out movement, assembled in the auditorium. A plenary panel 
included one of these parents, who explained why she joined the movement after seeing a 
narrowing of her child’s grade three curriculum to test prep. “My teacher knows my daughter 
better than any test score.” she said to cheers from the audience. Outspoken anti-testing activist, 
elementary teacher and union chapter chair at the Earth School in Manhattan, Jia Lee was 
introduced as MORE’s candidate for union president, to challenge Michael Mulgrew, candidate 
for the governing Unity caucus.  Through Lee’s efforts in April 2015, parents at her small K-4 115
school opted 104 students out of the state reading and math exams, a majority of those enrolled 
(Rodriguez 2015). She hailed a successful recent strike by Seattle teachers for having won the 
elimination of value added assessments in teacher evaluations, guaranteed 30 minute recesses in 
primary schools, limits to Special Ed and ESL workload, and investigations on the racialization 
of student discipline -all of which were greatly needed in NYC, she argued. Lee explained, as 
 Lee’s story of organizing coworkers and parents to oppose and opt-out from NYS tests used for MOSL ratings is 115
included in More Than a Score: The New Uprising Against High-Stakes Testing (2014), a moving anthology of 
writings by teachers, parents, students, administrators and academics reflecting on fighting against high stakes 
exams across the US.
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would others throughout the conference, that the defining issue on which MORE’s greatest 
source of inspiration, the Caucus of Rank and File Educators (CORE) built community alliances 
and ran successfully for leadership of the Chicago Teachers Union, was through opposing waves 
of school closures in predominantly black and Latino neighbourhoods. The issue on which 
MORE would seek to define itself would be offering a clear voice against high stakes testing, 
and as an enthusiastic ally to the emerging parent-led movement. 
 Alongside a determination to build alliances with parents, evident in the discourse and the 
content of the conference, was a self-conscious effort to engage in a form of policy mobility, 
sharing the strategies of other US teacher caucuses and unions. Participants in a workshop on 
racial justice sat among several tables, each with an ‘artifact’ representing the activism of 
teachers’ caucuses and unions in NYC, Seattle, Chicago and Los Angeles. Lessons learned on 
policies promoting restorative justice, lower class sizes, prioritizing recruitment of teachers of 
colour, and delinking teacher testing from evaluations, were discussed and proposed for MORE’s 
upcoming election platform. Present on the closing plenary were members of the Social Equality 
Caucus, MORE’s equivalent within the Seattle Education Association, and Philadelphia’s 
version, the Caucus of Working Educators. All are affiliated with the United Caucus of Rank and 
File Educators (UCORE) described in Chapter 4. 
 I run into Jen in the hallway. It’s been six months since I interviewed her and her 
colleague Karen at their school on the Upper West Side. At the end of last June, Karen was fired 
by her principal after receiving an ‘Ineffective’ rating in her annual evaluation, weighed down by 
low student test scores on the Regents. Jen had been elected chapter delegate. 
“Overwhelmingly,” she said proudly.  Like before, Jen is unsure of her future employment 
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prospects. “I’ve already filed two grievances. No superintendent in NYC is going to give me 
tenure.” She said. Now entering her sixth year, she will go up for tenure again in spring 2016. 
Her principal is still pushing the Learning Cultures curriculum on the staff. According to Jen, 
most of her young colleagues still keep their heads down and work towards gaining tenure. 
Despite her precariousness, she presses ahead with her activism, wanting to do more but limited 
by the time constraints of the job. She would resign rather than be fired, and then apply to law 
school and devote time to her writing. 
 Of the three case studies in this dissertation, it is in New York City that the work of 
teachers has been the most transformed by neoliberal policy. This is not to say that the context 
here for public education, or for that matter, teacher unionism, is the most acute or dire. For that I 
guide my reader to the next chapter. However in terms of the subordination of professional 
autonomy, what it means to be a teacher has to the greatest extent been neoliberalized here. Like 
other major US cities with predominantly black and Latino working class students, in the North 
under the Democratic Party’s electoral hegemony, old ward patronage politics converged and 
acquiesced to new technocratic forms of neoliberal governance like mayoral control. Just as 
important as understanding the extent of this project, is its unevenness across local and state 
jurisdictions, from place to place. NYC as a site of experimentation in transforming teachers’ 
work can be contrasted with its immediate suburbs where far more continuity exists, ironically 
the base of the strongest contemporary movement against the neoliberalization of education in 
New York State. Even among other old racialized and gentrifying urban centres, important 
differences can be found. Charter schools have not expanded at nearly as rapid a rate in NYC as 
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they have in Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles or DC, despite the unparalleled 
concentration of corporate power in downtown Manhattan and its far reaching political alliances 
(Camera 2015).  
 However the workforce has also been profoundly remade through the intersection of 
small schools, managerial principals, school choice and changes to tenure with the tying of 
annual evaluations to student test scores. Nevertheless, in response to the strength of the Opt-Out 
movement, the Cuomo administration abruptly reversed its plan to fire more teachers by 
increasing the linkage of evaluations to test scores. This experience suggests how even in this 
context, neoliberal policy is politically vulnerable to organized resistance. Meanwhile, the 
scaling up to Albany resembles similar dynamics in Illinois, Pennsylvania, Florida and Michigan, 
where conservative state capitols move to establish rule over spatially removed contentious 
urban centres. With the local UFT faced with a new spatial vulnerability, could the network 
building of grassroots caucuses offer a possible future model of social movement teacher 
unionism? MORE has made a start, but so far, faced with a far vaster terrain on which to 
organize and a much more entrenched incumbent leadership to challenge, it has not yet made the 
breakthroughs of its allies in Chicago and Los Angeles. Now on to Mexico City. 
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Chapter 6: Mexico City 
6.1: Introduction 
 This chapter describes how the neoliberalization of education affected the professional 
autonomy of Mexico City’s teachers from the mid 1990s through 2016. In contrast with the 
previous case study which focused on initiatives led by municipal and state authorities with the 
federal government in the background, a far greater attention is placed here on the impact of 
national policies in education governance. This is due to the highly centralized nature of the 
Mexican state, a tendency which despite some reversals with the decline of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the 1990s, has only increased in the early 21st Century. Another 
major difference is the weaving throughout this chapter of the opposing roles of the official 
‘institutional’ National Union of Education Workers (Sindicato Nacional de los Trabajadores de 
la Educación -SNTE), and its internal dissident movement, the National Coordination of 
Education Workers -Coordinadora Nacional de los Trabajadores de la Educación -CNTE). The 
SNTE has historically been controlled by the state, while the CNTE has struggled since its 
founding in 1979 to democratize the union, while aggressively challenging policies of the 
Mexican government which it considers harmful to its members and public education more 
broadly. Both have a higher relative prominence than the UFT or MORE in the prior chapter, for 
proposing or contesting policy affecting the teachers at the centre of this case study.  
 I begin here by contextualizing attempts by the Mexican government to decentralize the 
burgeoning education authority in the 1990s, centred on the Mexico City megapolis, with efforts 
to curb the power of the SNTE over the system, under the tightening control of Elba Esther 
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Gordillo (section 6.2). I then describe how the Quality Schools Program (PEC) of President 
Vicente Fox, while purporting to increase ‘school autonomy’, in fact amounted to centralizing 
authority at the expense of teachers’ professional autonomy, particularly with the introduction of 
the ENLACE standardized exam. The extent to which this national policy affected Mexico City 
schools is assessed (section 6.3).  
 Next, we consider the 2008 Alliance for Quality Education (ACE) (section 6.4). A 
product of Gordillo’s increasingly neoliberalized power over education policy, the ACE claimed 
to rationalize teacher hiring and make continued employment contingent on standardized exams 
taken by the teachers, and after 2011, the ENLACE. However with the ACE significantly 
undermined by the continuous opposition of the CNTE, President Enrique Peña Nieto strove 
again to implement its key policies with his election in 2012 (section 6.5). He exercised an 
effective scalar strategy which undermined the regionally concentrated basis of the CNTE, 
including its relative weakness in Mexico City. To do so, he strengthened both transnational 
policy alliances with the OECD and domestic business lobbyists and opposition parties, while 
marginalizing the SNTE.  
 The resulting Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente has had a strong impact on teachers’ 
professional autonomy by undermining teacher training colleges (section 6.6) and through the 
use of an exam which does not recognize classroom teaching (section 6.7). All of these measures 
interact within a context of increasingly precarious employment conditions for Mexico City’s 
secondary teachers and changing teacher-school director power relations, both affecting their 
ability to exercise professional autonomy (section 6.8). This chapter concludes by considering 
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factors behind the uneven response of teachers in Mexico City to national education policies, in 
relation to more militant teachers in southeastern states (section 6.9). 
6.2: Transitions in State Power, Decentralization & Emergence of Elba Esther Gordillo’s 
SNTE as a Key Neoliberal Actor 
  
 From the 1990s, Mexico’s federalization process occurred within the context of 
decentralization as the dominant policy idea within education governance in Latin America. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this model of governance within the region was circulated through 
forums hosted by UNESCO and particularly the World Bank, which exercises editorial discretion 
in cultivating its roster of recommended policies (as described in detail by Peck & Theodore 
2015) and offered loans for their implementation (Messina 2008). Messina makes a distinction 
between decentralization programs initiated from the top down as opposed to in response to 
popular demands. The latter is motivated by desires for increasing local participation while 
maintaining central responsibility for funding. The former is more common in both developed 
and developing countries, and is associated with processes of neoliberalization in which central 
state funding are typically substituted for private financing. Messina also identifies parallel or 
subsequent processes of ‘recentralization’ where the central government reestablishes power 
through national standardized tests and other top-down policies which have adverse impacts on 
teachers’ professionalism. I argue that this is indeed the direction taken by Mexico’s education 
policy makers from the 2000s onwards, with strong examples found throughout this Chapter 
including the Quality Schools Program (PEC), the ENLACE exam, the Alliance for Quality 
Education (ACE) and the Professional Teaching Service Law (Ley de Servicio Profesional 
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Docente). Policies like these have evoked strong opposition from teachers’ unions across Latin 
America for their impact on working conditions, salary and overall funding, except Messina 
notes, in Mexico due to the corporatist nature of the SNTE (Messina 2008: 42-43). Resistance 
here has instead been led primarily by the dissident CNTE. 
 Secretary of Education Manuel Bartlett significantly furthered decentralization in 1992 
with the Acuerdo Nacional para la Modernización de la Educación Basica (National Accord for 
the Modernization of Basic Education -ANMEB), “to correct the centralism and bureaucratism 
of the education system.” (Marquez 2008: 156). Responsibility for negotiations over teacher 
salaries and a wider range of economic issues shifted from the federal government to the states, 
along with oversight of day to day system administration, the ability to add some locally 
developed course content, and license the growing number of private schools (Brambila 2009: 
218-219). The SEP’s national offices retained final oversight of programs of study and course 
curriculum, the free national textbooks, school calendar and teacher education curriculum, 
among other areas (Marquez 2008: 158; Hecock 2014: 66-67). One of the ANMEB’s most direct 
impacts on teacher professionalism was through a different trajectory of decentralization. The 
capacity of zone inspectors to evaluate teachers’ work was increased by formalizing their 
oversight over annual exams, and hence the way teachers interpreted the expansive curriculum, 
in forms which will be described below in relation to the Quality Schools Program (PEC) 
(Martin 1994: 88-90). 
 However with the exception of the latter policy, these waves of reforms left Mexico 
City’s school system relatively unaffected. As the Federal District lacked the constitutional 
powers of Mexico’s 31 states, the governance of its basic education system from preschool 
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through secondary as well as the normales, remained directly under the control of the national 
SEP (Arnaut 2008). To administer the second largest system after Mexico State, with the largest 
overall budget, a sub secretary for the DF was created in 1993. It was renamed the 
Administración Federal de Servicios Educativos en el DF (Federal Administration of Education 
Services in the Federal District -AFSEDF) in 2005, with new departments for secondary 
technical schools, and a unified department for the borough of Iztapalapa, by far the city’s largest 
delegation in terms of students, schools and staff (Arnaut 2008: 147). 
 According to Alberto Arnaut, the DF’s education system was not decentralized to the city 
government partially due to a mutual interest of the SEP and national SNTE leaders not to 
potentially destabilize the three largest SNTE sections in the country by undermining their 
subordination to the national union. The position of local dissidents, especially in Section 9 
(primary teachers), could have been strengthened if they were able to negotiate directly with a 
less monolithic city government, governed since 1997 by the centre-left Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD). Up until it won constitutional status equal to a state in 2016, the DF 
government also lacked many of the powers, particularly budgetary ones of states. According to 
one AFSEDF official, the DF government didn’t want the complications of administering nearly 
5 000 schools and tens of thousands of teachers (AFSEDF Official 1: Interviewed Feb. 2015). 
However writing in a publication of the Mexico City government, Messina and Marquez 
maintain that this has been a goal of the DF, complicated by political differences between its 
PRD administration and the PRI or PAN-led federal government (Messina 2008; Marquez 2008). 
The Mexico City government created the Secretaria de la Educación del DF (SEDF) in 2007 to 
administer its increasing involvement in the provisioning of upper level high school and post 
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secondary education. According to Arnaut (2008: 152), this created a possibility for eventually 
taking over responsibility for the city’s basic education as well.  
 The divergent experience of federalization between Mexico City and the rest of the 
country would contribute to the uneven rollout of national education policies impacting teachers’ 
professional autonomy in the renewed centralism of the 2000s. The potential influence of the 
CNTE in Mexico City was confined by not being able to negotiate directly with a semi-
autonomous subnational authority against which it could apply more pressure than against the 
national government, especially in the context of the DF’s centre-left administration. However in 
various ways described below, from the quantifiable: Mexico City’s relatively favourable 
education funding levels, to the more nebulous: the politically strategic position of its teachers, 
the DF was somewhat insulated from the more economically coercive policies which followed 
from the governments of Fox, Calderon and SNTE leader Elba Esther Gordillo herself. 
Subsequently, it would also help explain the lesser degree of militancy in Mexico City’s Sections 
9 and 10, compared to the bastions of the CNTE in the southeast of the country.  
 Gordillo flexed her growing muscles for the first time on the national stage with the 
negotiation of the Carrera Magisterial in 1993. At this time early in her tenure as general 
secretary, Gordillo’s control still rested to a strong degree on the consent of the restive 
membership, earned through winning material gains, rather than its later basis primarily in elite 
power relations and wealth. Following Hecock's (2014) description, she deployed her 
institutional influence among state and national political figures from the PRI and the PAN, as 
well as the SEP, to ameliorate the impact of a typically anti-union, neoliberal policy of merit pay 
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for some members, both in its establishment and its operation. In the process, Carrera Magisterial 
effectively consolidated her influence and power over the union’s membership and in relation to 
the government. 
 The Governments of Salinas and Zedillo developed and implemented Carrera 
Magisterial, presented to the public as a policy that would to improve the ‘quality’ of education, 
under a neoliberal rationality that teachers would work harder if they were rewarded for alleged 
improvements in their capacities. This was measured ‘objectively’ through standardized tests of 
their own competencies and that of their students. It was an “instrumental rationality, against a 
work ethic based on commitment and loyalty to education as an ends.” (Leyva & Rodriguez 
2012: 560) [Author’s translation]. According to Leyva and Rodriguez (2012: 553), it also had a 
hidden agenda of slowly transforming labour relations and teachers’ culture by contributing to a 
gradual undermining of the collective nature of the union. This view was supported by a CNTE 
leader in Mexico City during the 1990s who saw in it a strategy by the government to widely 
differentiate teacher salaries in order to prevent the kind of groundswell caused by a common 
low salary which precipitated the 1989 national strike (CNTE Section 10 Activist, Interviewed 
Feb. 2015). On the basis of its removal of salaries from a common basis of negotiation, it was 
strongly opposed by the CNTE (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 559). Carrera Magisterial was a 
system of economic incentives achieved by meeting a list of criteria. Seniority and degrees 
obtained, the traditional basis on which teachers (and many other workers) move up salary scales 
totalled 25 percent. Completion of professional development was 17 percent, the results of tests 
measuring professional expertise counted for 28 percent, the evaluation of a supervisor 10 
percent, and student test score results, 20 percent (Hecock 2014: 69). 
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 Through Gordillo’s successful negotiations, unlike conventional merit pay structures 
where teachers can see their salaries go up or down annually based on test scores, creating 
considerable insecurity as described by Ravitch (2013) and Kuhn (2014), salary increases gained 
through the system would be permanent. Unlike schemes in the US and elsewhere, participation 
was voluntary, but non-participants would receive smaller negotiated salary increases. The size 
of the increases offered through Carrera Magisterial would also be negotiated annually with the 
national SNTE. Teachers who obtained the first level, where 60 percent of participants remained, 
earned a 24.5 percent increase over their base salary. A further 25 percent ascended to level two, 
but less than one teacher or school director in two thousand ascended to the fifth and final level, 
which offered triple the base salary (Hecock 2014: 69). Estimates of the total number of teachers 
who elected to participate varied widely. Hecock reported about two thirds during the 2000s, 
while the CNTE activist cited above estimated 40 percent of his colleagues in Mexico City were 
enrolled, though he said the SEP claims twice this number (Hecock 2014: 69; CNTE Section 10 
Activist, Interviewed Feb. 2015). Responsibility for the program’s data collection, including 
performance on teacher tests, student test scores, completion of courses, seniority, was the 
responsibility of both state and national SEP offices, with the latter tallying results and then 
sending recommendations for promotion to state governments. At the national level, and in 
participating states, where administrative capacities and enthusiasm for the program varied 
widely, the SNTE was able to effectively apply leverage through various underhanded means, 
according to Hecock’s informants in state SEP offices, to influence the passage of teachers into 
the program, and turn the Carrera into “a potential patronage tool to strengthen the position of 
union leaders” (Hecock 2014: 69). While the Carrera’s original neoliberal objective of removing 
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teacher compensation from labour negotiations and making it contingent on external variables 
controlled by the state was to a considerable extent subverted, a shift which surely benefited 
many teachers, it left them subordinated to another authority. Levinson found that among 
teachers in Michoacan in the mid-late 1990s, it was entered by some, but “maligned by most, 
who found it corrupt and divisive.” (Levinson 2001: 239). Aboites observed that the SEP was 
unable to provide significant evidence to the public that Carrera Magisterial actually increases 
student achievement, mainly claiming that it provided useful information to the national SEP. 
Brambila (2009) reached similar conclusions. In this case, Aboites argued, teachers should 
simply receive regular salary increases (Aboites 2012: 829-830; Hecock 2014: 68-70).  
 Another initiative bundled with the Carrera Magisterial was a standardized exam on 
subject knowledge and teaching practices for entry into the teaching profession. It was opposed 
by the CNTE for undermining the ability of normal schools and faculties of education to 
determine successful graduates based on a command of pedagogy, on a comprehensive basis not 
possible on a written test. If implemented transparently, it would also undermine clientelistic 
practices employed by local SNTE sections and SEP officials of distributing jobs. With each 
state deciding on whether to participate, according to the Mexican senate, only 13 of 32 were 
participating by 2003, with only five assigning all new positions through the exam (Senate of 
Mexico 2016: 3). Its impact was limited. Believers in entrance exams as an effective accessor of 
teacher quality would push again for its implementation on a national scale through the Alliance 
for Quality Education (ACE) in 2008. 
 In 1998, Gordillo responded to the earlier federalization by the SEP of some aspects of 
salary and benefit negotiations by modifying the formal structure of the SNTE to delegate 
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matching powers to the state sections, also purporting to grant a degree of recognition of diverse 
political tendencies of the union. In practice, according to Leyva and Rodriguez (2012), she 
further consolidated her power. She ensured that the calling of general conventions by which 
state executives were elected, and the confirmation of the legitimacy of their outcome, continued 
to rest solely with the national executive, which she controlled. As during the 1980s under 
Jongitud Barrios, CNTE-led states exerted considerable pressure on the SNTE via the federal 
government every three years for these conventions to be convened fairly.  Gordillo’s power 116
was demonstrated in 2004, with the creation of the new top position of president, to which she 
was summarily promoted from general secretary. In 2007, the national SNTE convention 
suspended the rule prevalent in nearly all arenas of Mexican politics prohibiting reelection or 
setting strict term limits, allowing her to potentially become ‘president for life’ (Leyva & 
Rodriguez 2012: 550-551). Her further entrenchment and sometimes ham fisted efforts to impose 
her handpicked leaders in state locals, created dissent among a range of otherwise loyal, anti-
CNTE officials who saw their own ambitions blocked, or who opposed her rupture with the 
PRI . However in 2012 she was appointed to another newly created top position, as president of 117
the ‘General Union Council for the Strengthening of Public Education’ by unanimous vote of 3 
230 convention delegates (Bensusan & Middlebrook 2013: 78; Hernandez Navarro 2012: 
394-395). 
 The challenges for Gordillo of ensuring that these state congresses delivered their desired results, meant that 116
many locals like Sections 9 and 10 in Mexico City simply did not have internal elections for years (Hernandez 
Navarro 2012: 395).
 In a handful of states with governors who also resented Gordillo’s power, these leaders succeeded in gaining legal 117
recognition of small splinters from the SNTE, representing a few thousand members. The approximately 4500 
teachers of the upper high schools run directly by the Mexico City government also succeeded in gaining legal 
recognition for the independent SITEM union (Hernandez Navarro 2012: 395; Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 547).
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 From this vantage point, Gordillo’s “golden age” of power peaked under the PAN 
governments of Fox and Calderon, intervening in national politics and using her position to 
endorse the neoliberal reforms of the education sector of her allies, or author them herself. She 
was widely viewed as the most powerful woman in Mexico. Leyva and Rodriguez describe how 
under Gordillo, the SNTE distinguished itself from other corporatist unions, by ascending in 
influence rather than declining with the end in 2000 of the rule of the PRI under which it was 
nurtured: 
The SNTE possesses structural properties on the basis of the number of its members and 
the nationwide presence of teachers that few unions have. As these are conditions of 
power, the state has considered it necessary to contain and regulate the SNTE for the 
political stability of the nation. This statist contention of the SNTE functions the same for 
all the strategic national unions. The difference is that the teachers’ organization has 
effectively adapted itself to modern political and economic times, maintaining its own 
corporatist profile, which has given it such good results in surviving neoliberal PRIsta 
governments. It converted itself into the most powerful union organization in the country 
and in Latin America during the PANista governments.” (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 529) 
[Author’s translation from Spanish] 
While Gordillo faced some limits on her power under PRI presidents Salinas and Zedillo, by 
carrying her influence  over to the PAN she won the gratitude of Fox and Calderon, particularly 118
in the case of the latter’s tiny margin of victory, widely viewed in Mexico to have been 
fraudulent (Bensusan & Middlebrook 2013: 79-80; Hernandez Navarro 2012: 410). In return, she 
was appointed director of the National Lottery and the social security institute which administers 
health care and pensions for the nation’s public sector employees (ISSSTE). In addition to these 
 Such influence was measured in approximately 10 000 SNTE staff (comisionados) assigned to electoral work, 118
and the support of Gordillo’s own political vehicle, the National Alternative Party (PANAL), fully funded by the 
SNTE and led by her family, whose members, along with a secretary of education and the step-son of Vicente Fox, 
subsequently became federal senators and deputies. The PANAL alternated its endorsement of presidential and 
gubernatorial candidates according to Gordillo’s strategy. While the PANAL’s support never rose above the low 
single digits, its handful of deputies and senators won through Mexico’s proportional representation system also 
gave the SNTE a bargaining chip in close congressional votes (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 552; Bensusan & 
Middlebrook 2013: 79-81; Hernandez 2013: 150)
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patronage posts, she was given real power within the SEP: a veto over the appointment of sub 
secretaries for basic education and senior administrators of Mexico City’s school authority, the 
AFSEDF (highly strategic in her efforts to gain control over Sections 9 and 10). She had a voice 
in the presidential appointment of secretaries of education. One, Josefina Vazquez Mota (PAN 
presidential candidate in 2012), was substituted by Calderon halfway through her term due to 
conflicts with Gordillo, with a mutually agreeable replacement. To help rehabilitate the negative 
public image of herself and the SNTE, Calderon’s administration subsidized an educational TV 
program on Televisa , ‘All the world believes in you’ oriented to parents and children, in which 119
she and the SNTE were portrayed favourably (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 539-542; Bensusan & 
Middlebrook 2013: 82). The SNTE under Gordillo held far more institutional power within the 
state (though generally not for the benefit of its members, students or the broader public) than 
education unions in Toronto, Ontario or New York City or State. In this context, with nearly full 
support from the SNTE under Gordillo’s control, the PAN administrations pursued policies 
which saw a recentralization of education governance, though changes were less dramatic in 
federalized Mexico City. However these policies posed serious challenges for the professional 
autonomy of all Mexican teachers. 
6.3: Re-centralized Governance through Competition I: Programa de Escuelas de Calidad 
(Quality Schools Program -PEC), the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education 
(INEE) & ENLACE 
 The Quality Schools Program (Programa de Escuelas de Calidad -PEC) was the signature 
eduction initiative of the Vicente Fox PAN government of 2001 to 2006. It was expanded 
 The president of the massive entertainment conglomerate’s charity arm, Carlos Gonzalez Guajardo, went on to 119
lead Mexicanos Primero, the leading business lobby group on education policy, discussed below.
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through the terms of Calderon and Peña Nieto, though in a diminished form. While the program 
was limited to urban primary schools (excluding kindergartens, secondary schools and the 
nation’s many rural elementary schools), it had a significant impact on the basic education 
system as a whole. The PEC introduced a large-scale national competitive structure for education 
funding, an organization external to the SEP to oversee competition in 2002, the National 
Institute for the Evaluation of Education (INEE), and the premise for a national standardized 
exam for both upper primary and secondary students, the ENLACE, established in 2006. These 
developments led to a similar trajectory for Mexican teachers as increased emphasis on the 
Regents Exams and primary school testing in New York under Governor Cuomo made for his 
state’s teachers: a subordination of classroom instruction to the imperative of test preparation and 
more space for managers (in Mexico’s case, zone supervisors more so than school directors) to 
intervene in pedagogy under the premise of raising scores. The ‘School-Based Management’ 
mechanism within PEC also advanced privatization where it succeeded in substituting private 
financing for federal funding. Each of these initiatives were supported by Elba Esther Gordillo’s 
SNTE, and strongly opposed by the CNTE, to the extent of succeeding in partially or fully 
exempting states from these programs where the movement was strongest (Leyva & Rodriguez 
2012: 555). At the conclusion of this section, I will attempt to assess the specific impact of these 
national programs on Mexico City. 
 The PEC consisted of a national competition whereby urban primary schools would 
compete on the basis of a complex rubric of qualitative and quantitative measures for additional 
funding to be used according to a proposal authored by the school’s director, teachers and 
interested parents. It promised to improve student achievement as measured in graduation rates 
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and with ENLACE through standardized test scores. In its first year in 2001, 300 000 peso grants 
were awarded to 1 500 urban primary schools. In 2004, the grants were halved to 150 000 pesos 
but extended to 20 000 schools, approximately 1 in 10 of Mexico’s 194 775 public kindergartens, 
primaries and secondary schools, of which 90 000 were considered to be in “deplorable 
conditions” of repair according to the SEP (Aboites 2012: 839). The total of number of 
participating primary schools reached 40 000 by 2009 (Aboites 2012: 853). In subsequent years, 
PEC grants were significantly reduced, declining to 20 000 pesos by 2015 (AFSEDF Official 1: 
Interviewed Feb. 2015). The analysis below will focus on the first eight years of the program 
during its greatest influence. 
 Funding for the PEC was provided by grants and loans from the World Bank (Hernandez 
Navarro 2013). According to Teresa Bracho, an academic affiliated with the OECD and author of 
the definitive study commissioned by the SEP and the INEE on the effectiveness of the PEC 
from 2001-2007, the PEC emerged from ideas developed by education policy makers in the US 
and UK, subsequently endorsed and circulated in literature by the World Bank and OECD, 
around ‘school quality and effectiveness’ and ‘social participation’.  The latter was especially 120
described as a hallmark of ‘School Based Management’ (SBM), increasing parental involvement 
to identify school needs, and the procurement of private sector support to finance them. Bracho 
locates the PEC within a continuum of decentralization policies within 1980s to 2000s Mexico: 
[Decentralization] implicates combining various levels of government that in a vertical 
sense are implicated in the operations of programs (national, state, municipal and school-
level), with the opening of spaces in a horizontal sense, for the participation of new actors 
 With Fox and Gordillo’s SNTE sharing an interest in encouraging an official version of ‘social participation’, the 120
SNTE created a Secretary of Social Participation on its national executive to liaise with civil society groups like the 
Associacion de Padres de Familia (Parent’s Association) which were given a “corporatist” legitimacy by the Fox 
government through their representation on various state initiatives (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 557).
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from private and social sectors, through the reactivation of venues of citizen’s 
participation established in the 1993 General Education Law… As with the receipt of 
economic support on the part of parents and private organizations in a schema of co-
financing (Bracho 2009: 37).  [Author’s translation from Spanish] 
 She further distinguishes variations within SBM based on the concentration of decision-making 
to principals (as in NYC), teachers or parent committees. Integral is the concept of school staff 
(administrators and teachers) being reflexive about how to improve teaching and whole school 
practices and collegiality. Power relations between administrators and teachers within these 
structures are not explicitly defined, though emphasis is made on the importance of both the 
quality of administrative leadership (as in much of the mainstream US education policy 
literature), and buy-in from teachers (Bracho 2009: 17-39). 
 I argue that a key question is the line between teachers empowered to exercise their 
professional judgement through initiatives like SBM to locally identify and respond to the 
specific needs of their students, and becoming accomplices to the neoliberalization of education 
by ‘taking ownership’, often alongside parents, of the systemic under resourcing of schools by 
the state. Perhaps this distinction can be made at the point where teachers (and parents) accept 
the use of standardized tests to measure the success of their schools through SBM initiatives as is 
typically the case. By legitimizing this form of evaluation, the importance of systemic 
socioeconomic context and the need for greater across the board funding increases is obscured. 
Instead, a debate on the effectiveness of individual teachers is brought to the foreground, in a 
zero sum competition for essential resources amid systemic austerity. Parental involvement is 
manipulated to further the privatization of education when the identification of unmet needs is 
only to commit to fundraising or pursuing private sector sponsorships to meet them, as Bracho 
 239
acknowledges is in fact encouraged under SBM to augment a modest increase in resources from 
the state (Bracho 2009: 37). In response to these dynamics, the CNTE-led SNTE section of 
Michocan argued that the PEC removed the responsibility of the state to provide all schools with 
essential maintenance funding. In the context of a sympathetic opposition-led (PRD) state 
government in the 2000s, its proposal for across the board funding increases was enacted in place 
of the PEC (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 556). 
 In her analysis, Bracho acknowledges that while the additional funds awarded through 
PEC were originally intended to support initiatives like increased professional development and 
training for teachers to directly improve classroom instruction and thereby student achievement, 
in practice, most funding went towards more basic school needs. This was unsurprising, in light 
of the proportion of schools mentioned earlier in desperate need of such resources by the SEP’s 
own reckoning. How these needs affected both the capacity of teachers to do their work and the 
students’ experience of their school, were clearly visible in visits to this dissertation’s case study 
secondary schools in Mexico City in 2015 and 2016. The fundamental issue of a lack of space in 
overcrowded schools in working class Iztapalapa, meant that student desks and chairs occupied 
nearly all the space in each classroom, making it difficult to teach through instructional strategies 
like group work or differentiated learning circles, or any form not based on neat rows. Teachers 
were not allowed to use the one photocopier, located in the school’s office, and few classroom 
digital projectors functioned (installed several years ago as part of a technology initiative, but 
without funding for ongoing maintenance). Both shortcomings tended towards a reliance on 
teaching through the abundant free textbooks and usage of the whiteboard at the front of every 
room. However many teachers did demonstrate an ingenuity in classroom activities which 
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required few costly material resources . The most sophisticated technology in each school was 121
a biometric scanner to verify teacher attendance. While peeling paint and dirty windows were 
common at schools in all three case studies of this dissertation, in Mexico City’s schools, most 
plumbing fixtures appeared to never work and free drinking water was inexistent (the case 
everywhere in Mexico). There was wireless internet, funded by the Mexico City government. As 
will be discussed below, with an above average rate of federal funding supplemented by greater 
municipal funding, physical conditions in Mexico City schools are among the best in the nation 
(Arnaut 2008).  According to the Citizen’s Observatory of Education, two years into the PEC, 122
half of the funds at the school level were used for maintenance and construction. Most of the rest 
was dedicated to furniture, books and equipment, with only one percent used for the professional 
development of teachers (Aboites 2012: 837).  123
 The competition for additional school resources through PEC had significant implications 
for teachers’ professional autonomy. Participation in the PEC involved a substantial increase in 
workload for teachers, in an evaluative process that was in practice far more prescribed than was 
 I observed an ethics class accomplished by stacking student desks and chairs in a corner of the room, in order to 121
use rolls of thread tied to bottle caps, each held by individual students, who moved around each other in a lesson in 
interdependence and cooperation. In a physical education class, students learned and practiced a game devised by 
the teacher which involved aspects of soccer, jumping through tires and pivoting around steel poles stuck in cement 
buckets. 
 The author met rural teachers from Guerrero, Morelos and Oaxaca in 2015, who described their schools receiving 122
regular electricity only the year prior, and in some cases still lacked indoor plumbing. This makes problematic the 
use of Mexico City schools as a proxy for national data in studies like the World Bank’s Great Teachers: How to 
Raise Student Learning in Latin America and the Caribbean (Bruns & Luque 2014).
 The combination of the tendency of schools to use much of their funds for facility improvements and the 123
requirement that schools engage in a degree of private fundraising to access the entire 150 000 peso grant was an 
example of how privatization can be highly lucrative. After the first 50 000 pesos, PEC schools were obliged to 
obtain some funding from municipal governments, non-profits or the private sector, with this money being met 1 to 
1 or 2 to 1 by the federal government, depending on the affluence of the community. Given the limited resources of 
the first two in most communities outside of Mexico City, Aboites explains that the schools necessarily relied on 
business sponsorships, and where those could not be obtained, fundraising by the parents. For more affluent schools 
which provided a bigger market, school supply companies gave donations in return for preferential contracts for 
desks, projectors, TVs and books to be purchased with PEC funds. A fifth of the PEC magazine was typically 
devoted to ads for these products (Aboites 2012: 844).
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initially portrayed. The school’s application for the PEC and its subsequent evaluation by the 
SEP, required constant staff meetings to write reports on its 10 Specific Objectives: 
The teacher ends up subsidizing -with a free increase in their productivity- the resources 
that arrive at the school from PEC, because the program converts into the extraordinary 
what should be ordinary: that each school should receive the resources to meet its basic 
necessities and create the necessary conditions to work (Aboites 2012: 837) [Author’s 
translation from Spanish] 
The PEC utilized a progressive discourse described by Bracho, of encouraging participation of 
teachers, students and parents through horizontal power relations centred on the school site. 
However, Hugo Aboites, an academic in education policy, argues that confronted by the 
established tendency in the Carrera Magisterial towards standardized evaluation, in practice it 
was highly bureaucratic. As with the NYC’s small schools movement, an initially progressive 
discourse that claimed to empower teachers’ professional autonomy and combined it with greater 
community participation, was in practice, as with ‘school choice’ and its use of test scores to rate 
schools, subordinated to structures of neoliberal governance. Schools competed with others in 
their zone for increases in funding mainly for critical maintenance. Increased centralized control 
and surveillance through the use of standardized testing determined school applications for entry 
to PEC. Fox, his secretary of education and the developers of PEC articulated a philosophy of 
education in which the intrinsic value of learning (for students) and service (for teachers) was an 
insufficient motivator for improvement. They needed to be pushed by competition for greater 
resources and the potential for their loss (Aboites 2012: 829, 833-834).  
 Aboites relates these dynamics to a ‘business strategy’ of incentivizing worker 
productivity combined with deskilling, harkening to Frederick Taylor, the father of scientific 
management theory in the US. Aboites argues that school proposals were obliged to hew closely 
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to criteria set by program evaluators at the national SEP offices, or risk not getting approved, in 
contrast to the program’s purported objective of empowering local schools which best know 
local conditions. He cites an example given by the PEC director, of the initial rejection of a 
proposal from a school in Hidalgo prior to his intervention. Its staff and parents had chosen a 
focus on improving ‘values’ due to significant social problems including drug abuse and 
absenteeism among students, rather than the recommended emphasis on raising math & Spanish 
test scores (Aboites 2012: 835, 837). Contrary to horizontal collaboration, Aboites found that 
competition between schools in a local zone for PEC funding discouraged winning schools from 
sharing their strategies. The competitive structure of applications meant that the neediest schools 
frequently did not get grants , in a process which tended to favour the most organized schools 124
with strong parental participation and the highest test scores.  
 The increased importance of exam results, particularly after the creation of the ENLACE 
in 2006 (discussed below) in PEC applications, increased the relative importance of zone 
inspectors and regional supervisors [superintendents] of schools in relation to their staff, “It is 
easy to imagine these supervisors -dependents of a vertical power structure and selected to advise 
schools in the design of their projects and proposals- pushing a tendency towards the uniformity 
of these school projects.” (Aboites 2012: 843) As in NYC, they now had a rationale for regularly 
intervening in the classroom. Beneath regional supervisors and immediately above school 
directors, zone inspectors were responsible for overseeing teaching practices and student 
evaluation and graduation policies in around a dozen schools, in one of which they had their 
office. Their authority over teachers’ work had grown since the 1980s, when teachers were 
 Aboites cites anecdotes of school directors in poor areas not applying to the PEC because the program seemed 124
beyond the reach of their school (Aboites 2012: 837).
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required to submit mid year and final exams. Prior to the creation of the national ENLACE 
exam, zone inspectors gained the power to determine the parameters of a common zonal exam 
for each grade and subject area, to which teachers would not have access in advance, creating 
more pressure to teach the curriculum expansively, but due to limits of time and resources, with 
less depth (Martin 1994: 90-91). From his anthropological observations of secondary schools in 
Guadalajara and interviews with teachers, Martin describes the role of the inspector: 
The basis of the inspector’s authority is her forceful pursuit of technical controls on 
teaching. … carries with it a particular discourse, a form of intercommunication in the 
zone with its talk of qualifications, paperwork, tests, competitions… In addition the sheer 
weight and frequency of work load demands create a momentum from which the teachers 
find it difficult to escape. Finally, the inspector emanates a strong personal presence, the 
force of which make the teachers work hard which, due to its all-embracing character, its 
relative constancy and its depth of penetration can only be described as panoptic (Martin 
1994: 91). 
Though Martin’s observations were made before the 2000’s wave of centralization reforms 
described in this chapter, contemporary comments from Mexico City teachers suggest that it 
remains accurate for a certain type of inspector, as Martin acknowledges, who owed their 
position to senior SEP officials. Many zone inspectors and regional supervisors held their 
positions due more to approval from the sectional SNTE hierarchy under Barrios and Gordillo’s 
control, than their actual employer, making the zeal with which they pursued education reforms 
highly variable.  
 The actual process of the PEC evaluation included the following steps. First, teachers and 
school directors had to self-assess the success of their school in meeting PEC objectives, which 
were officially claimed to be locally developed, but in practice emerged out of a centrally 
defined rubric. The 24 primarily qualitative standards included: the usage of differentiated 
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instruction, degree of teacher planning, extent that teachers support and encourage students to 
improve, that the director “exercises academic leadership in transforming the school 
community”, “teachers and directors engage in continual training and self-development”, 
“teachers encourage the protection of the environment, appreciation for art and good health”, 
“teach universal values like solidarity, tolerance, honesty and responsibility in the formation of 
citizenship” and “parents participate in decision-making” (Aboites 2012: 848). SEP central staff 
then evaluated the extent to which schools met the criteria. This was very difficult and time 
consuming to do in practice. The SEP reported that these parts of evaluation were completed for 
less than a quarter of participating schools in the first eight years of the PEC (Aboites 2012: 
846). This problem was identified early on by the Fox administration, which attempted to rectify 
it first with the creation of the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education (INEE) in 2002, 
which as a body autonomous of the SEP would gather, analyze and disseminate data on its 
functioning, and later through the national ENLACE exam run directly by the SEP. In practice, 
test scores from the ENLACE, which were easy to compare and quantify, came to be the primary 
metric of comparison. The initial expanding influence of the ENLACE exam through the PEC 
will be discussed below. 
 To what extent did the PEC have a significant impact on teachers and schools in Mexico 
City? Since the late 1990s, the city government has increasingly covered school construction and 
maintenance, bursaries and uniforms for students, and other operating costs unrelated to staff 
 245
salaries, as the national SEP pulled back its funding (Arnaut 2008: 151).  As a result, parents do 125
not have to make up these costs as they increasingly do in other states. The AFSEDF posts 
official notices beside the main entrance of every primary and secondary school in Mexico City 
stating that the institution is completely free, offering a complaints hotline for parents to call if 
they are told otherwise. However according to Aboites (2012), ‘voluntary’ donations collected by 
the parent association rather than school staff, still make a significant contribution to the 
maintenance budget. The sometimes ambiguous line between voluntary and obligatory fees is 
politically sensitive for education authorities, due to the constitutional stipulation that basic 
education shall be free.  When explaining that all primaries and secondaries in Mexico City 126
receive a flat amount of 90 000 pesos per year (approximately $8 500 CAN in 2016) for their 
non-payroll costs, regardless of the number of students, a senior AFSEDF official acknowledged 
that this was not a generous sum (AFSEDF Official 1: Interviewed Feb. 2015).  
 Prior to the re-uploading of direct responsibility for the administration of employee 
salaries to the national SEP in 2014-15, statistics revealed that the funding provided from the 
federal government to state authorities for basic education varied drastically. While the average 
 The proportion of public GDP shifted from the federal government to states and municipalities rose from 2.8% in 125
1991 to 4.9% in 1993 and 8.3% by 2006, but little was new funding: “[F]rom the total transfer of resources between 
authorities (8.3% of GDP in 2006), 3.6% of this GDP corresponds to traditional [funding]; 4.07% are resources the 
federal government now gave out to pay for downloaded services; and only 0.64% of the GDP are new resources 
transferred for activities that previously did not exist.” (Marquez 2008: 163) [Author’s translation] GDF funding 
increased as its relationship with the SEP improved over recent years, reaching a funding parity for maintenance 
costs of 600 million pesos each in 2016 (AFSEDF Official 1: Interviewed Feb. 2015).
 When asked about school fees in other states, a senior AFSEDF official was quick to emphasize that they were 126
not the policy of state or federal authorities: “That was distorted… school was always free. But there were many 
necessities for school maintenance that were not met, that some [school] directors started to take the decision to ask 
for voluntary fees. Over time they became almost obligatory. And now we’ve returned to say no to requiring any 
parent to give a fee. Other parents can ask them, not the director, so that it’s not an obligation that their child to 
receive their grades, must pay.” (AFSEDF Official 1: Interviewed Feb. 2015) [Author’s translation] This official’s 
disavowal of any role of policy makers for requiring voluntary fees would seem to contradict the requirements of the 
PEC in practice, if not the written letter, given its requirement that parents and school staff obtain supplementary 
funding, and that in many circumstances they are unable to do so from municipal or business sources.
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per pupil funding in 2005 was 8 767 pesos, the AFSEDF received 13 530 pesos, the fourth 
highest among 32 states, with the adjacent jurisdiction of Mexico State, large portions of which 
are also highly urbanized, receiving the lowest rate at 5 467 pesos (Marquez 2008: 179).  127
Despite that the DF’s share of federal funding for basic education declined from 10 percent in 
1998 to 8.3 percent in 2006, both a relative and real decline (Marquez 2008: 180), Mexico City 
schools were still better funded than most.  
 In his anthropological study of the students of a secondary school in small town 
Michoacan in the 1990s, US academic Bradley Levinson describes an overall ethos of equity and 
an emphasis on human development, “There is a greater concern with educating the whole 
person in the secundaria. Students learn more about the art of getting along and appreciating the 
world. In the United States, subject matter reigns supreme.” (Levinson 2001: xv) Academic 
competition, as through test scores, was deemphasized. Secundarias are not streamed on the basis 
of academic ability, meaning that like in their primary schools, students move with a cohort 
through most of their classes over three years. However general secondaries offer the most direct 
route to continuing upper high school education and eventually applying to university, while 
technical secondaries offer more workshop classes, and are more oriented to being the terminal 
institution (Levinson 2001: 27). The latter are more likely to be found in rural areas, or in poorer 
and working class areas of cities, representing a certain degree of geographic streaming. In 2015, 
Mexico City had 539 public general secondary schools, employing 73 percent of secondary 
 Most of the states, aside from the DF, with the highest rates of per pupil funding were in the north and the 127
Yucatan peninsula. Large central states like Mexico State (the largest school system in Mexico, followed by the DF), 
Veracruz and Puebla fared worst. States in which the CNTE controlled the union were slightly above average. The 
simplest explanation would be that it was in line with the north, the Yucatan and DF having the highest costs of 
living during this period. The northern states and some in the Yucatan were also governed by the PAN during this 
period in which the same party was in the national presidency.
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teachers, 200 technical secondaries which employed 23 percent, and 47 telesecundarias (small 
schools predominantly located in rural areas, which lacking a teaching staff large enough to 
cover all subject areas, deliver some classes by television), employing 1 percent (SEP 2015). In 
Mexico as a whole in 2009-10, 56 percent of secondary teachers worked in general secondaries, 
25 percent in technical secondaries and 17 percent in telesecundarias (Hernandez, Llamas & 
Garro 2012: 324) 
 In this context, the INEE was established with the purported objective of being a 
‘transparent’ gatherer of information about the national education system, ‘autonomous’ from the 
SEP (and thereby the SNTE). It would interlocute with the OECD and the World Bank in the 
analysis and reporting of statistics. Its testing function was initially promoted by Fox’s 
government as a less intensive version of the controversial university entry exam Ceneval. It 
would merely provide indicators of the status of education in Mexico. However its role expanded 
with the ENLACE, and later the Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente: 
Faithful to its character as a centre of evaluation. Once it began to generate its own 
exams, it attempts (though maintaining an enormous ambivalence in its discourse) to 
convert itself into the great judge that apart from the testing of students, determined the 
most successful [states], which schools lagged, and ultimately, which teachers are the 
most efficient… (Aboites 2012: 828) [Author’s translation].  
The chair of the board of directors of the INEE was appointed by the Mexican president. Most 
directors were functionaries from various education authorities, plus representatives of the 
Citizen’s Observatory of Education (OCE) NGO, various parent groups, business lobbyists and 
religious groups (Aboites 2012: 859). Complaint from Elba Esther Gordillo promptly won the 
SNTE a seat at the table (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 556).  
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 Following unsuccessful attempts through the INEE to implement a national exam which 
would be used to assess PEC schools and incorporated into the Carrera Magisterial as a criteria 
for salary increases (a form of merit pay), the ENLACE exam was created directly by the SEP in 
2006. The INEE would not return to prominence in education governance until it was effectively 
relaunched by Enrique Peña Nieto’s government as its primary testing vehicle. ENLACE 
annually tested approximately 16 million students from year three of primary through the three 
years of secondary. As with similar tests in Canada and the US, it tested language comprehension 
(Spanish) and math, alternating a third subject such as history or science. It consisted of 150 
multiple choice questions. In its first iteration, results were used by the INEE to create tables of 
the ‘top 500’ primary and secondary schools in Mexico and to rank education achievement of 
each state. That students in rural Indigenous and poorer communities had consistently lower 
scores, was acknowledged by the SEP. With arguments similar to Ravitch (2013) and Kuhn 
(2014) in the US context, for Aboites this demonstrated the inherent flaw of standardized exams 
across incredible national diversity, that comparing impoverished rural schools with schools in 
Mexico City’s elite Polanco neighbourhood was unfair, and would yield predictable results. 
ENLACE received criticism from state government representatives who objected to the ranking 
of their schools as dismal without additional federal resources. Academics cited the experience of 
the Chilean education system (a ‘school choice’ structure similar to NYC), in which schools with 
high marks are inundated with applications and can choose their students, perpetuating high 
scores (Aboites 2012: 863). Implementation of the ENLACE faced significant resistance and 
sporadic blockage from teachers within states where the CNTE was dominant, or others like 
Puebla, where Gordillo was weaker within the local SNTE (Aboites 2012: 846). 
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 ENLACE’s focus on testing Spanish and mathematics placed a mounting weight within 
the curriculum for increases in student grades in these subjects, just as in New York, to the 
detriment of teaching in non-tested areas. To increase class time dedicated to Spanish and math 
in secondary schools, the RIES reform reduced history and civics classes and combined physics, 
biology and chemistry courses. There was a greater intervention by administrators in monitoring 
the pedagogy of teachers in accordance with published guidelines for optimal forms of test 
preparation. The SNTE objected to potential job losses from closing courses and the use of 
disciplinary power against teachers who stubbornly tried to maintain their classroom autonomy, 
but didn’t challenge the context behind this undermining of teachers’ pedagogy and professional 
autonomy (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 557). 
 Under Fox, Gordillo held a veto over education policy. She never appeared to harbour 
strong disagreements based on principle or ideology, raising objection when her institutional 
power could possibly be undermined, as with the initial establishment of the INEE. The PEC and 
the ENLACE exam were given her blessings, despite their ability to undermine the professional 
autonomy of her members and equity in education more broadly. Under the Calderon 
administration, in the context of mounting criticisms of the national education system from the 
left and the right, she took her combination of a pragmatic willingness to accommodate to the 
neoliberal drift, and her apparently primary desire to further consolidate her own power, to 
become according to Hernandez (2013), the “central protagonist” of education policy. 
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6.4: Re-centralized Governance through Competition II: Alianza por la Calidad Educativa 
(Alliance for Quality Education -ACE)  
 Elba Esther Gordillo’s transition from clientelistic populism in the 1990s (exemplified by 
her negotiation of the Carrera Magisterial) to a consistently neoliberal politics sustained by elite 
alliances, culminated in her central role in the development and implementation of the Alliance 
for Quality Education (Alianza por la Calidad Educativa -ACE) in 2008. The means by which 
this program innovated in the neoliberalization of the teaching profession, disrupting practices 
representing alternately the legacies of corporatist clientelism and Mexico’s welfare state, are 
described in this section. Along the way we see the full realization of standardized student 
evaluation through the ENLACE, on a national scale beyond the aspirations of No Child Left 
Behind and Race to the Top in the US, but in a manner that was ultimately fatal. Also discussed 
are the tremendous resistance it provoked among CNTE and non-CNTE teachers alike, which 
undermined the ACE and set the context for the next president, Enrique Peña Nieto’s more 
successful strategy. 
 An important antecedent marked Gordillo’s thoroughly neoliberal shift. As the ultimate 
authority over the public sector social security institute (ISSSTE), responsible for the health care 
and pensions of the nation’s active and retired government employees, in 2007 she presided with 
new PAN president Felipe Calderon, in its conversion from a defined benefit pension plan to 
individualized defined contribution savings accounts. Her centrality in the change was 
emphasized by both the SNTE and the CNTE, the latter naming it ‘Gordillo Law’. It provoked 
massive opposition among teachers as the largest group of affected public sector workers, re-
galvanizing the CNTE in both its bases and with new supporters in northern states. However 
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despite sustained massive demonstrations, Supreme Court and International Labour Organization 
legal challenges, strikes and occupations of SEP and ISSSTE buildings by the CNTE, and the 
insertion of grandfathering clauses, the shift was ultimately successful (CNTE Section 10 
Activist: Interviewed Feb. 2015; Hernandez Navarro 2012: 345-351; Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 
560). 
 The emergence of an increasingly vocal business lobby on education policy with 
considerable influence in Calderon’s right wing administration created the context for Gordillo’s 
neoliberal turn. Mexicanos Primero (Mexicans First) was quietly founded in 2005 by a small 
group of socially conservative cabinet members in the PAN government and business leaders, led 
by Claudio X. González, son of the billionaire magnate of Kimberly Clarke Mexico and 
Alejandro Ramírez Magaña son of the owner of Cinépolis, Mexico’s largest cinema chain. As 
described above in Chapter 4, its policies and tactics closely resembled those of its 
contemporaries in the US. Hernandez Navarro described Mexicanos Primero as the “front group 
of the business rightwing on education issues” (2012: 422) [Author’s translation]. It made its 
first major public intervention in 2007 with the release of Brechas: estado de la educación en 
México 2010, a report which citing test score results from the first years of ENLACE, described 
the education system as “mediocre” and accused the SNTE of coddling weak teachers. Its 
publication garnered significant government and media attention. Mexicanos Primero also 
presented awards to individual teachers for furthering a ‘more humanist’ vision of education, 
despite their union, while issuing public statements denouncing the majority of teachers as ‘lazy, 
selfish’ (Hernandez Navarro 2012: 419). Its influence in Mexican education policy would grow 
considerably in setting the terms for mainstream debate. Meanwhile school physical plants 
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deteriorated amid the expansion of secondary schools due to rising enrolment and retention, 
often poorly constructed and maintained, with a high impact on conditions for working and 
learning. However, these issues garnered little attention from either business leaders or the SEP 
and Gordillo in their diagnosis of problems facing the nation’s education system (Leyva & 
Rodriguez 2012: 560). 
 On May 15, the Mexican Day of the Teacher in 2008, flanked by Calderon, 26 state 
governors and an assortment of business leaders and bishops, Gordillo introduced the Alliance 
for Quality Education (ACE) initiative (Hernandez Navarro 2012: 353). Leyva and Rodriguez 
(2012) argue that the ACE was in part about demonstrating the “harmonious relationship” 
between the SNTE and the federal government, while excluding the CNTE as a legitimate 
national actor. They contend that the ACE was arguably more a product of the SNTE than the 
SEP, a view shared by Hernandez Navarro (2013). “It was more than the continuation of the act 
of signing pacts as a media show, it is the true expression of the power of the SNTE.” [Author’s 
translation] concluded Leyva and Rodriguez (2012: 557-558). They argued that: 
The SNTE adapted to the new economic and political conditions of the country and so as 
it was an active collaborator with the educator state, now it was with the neoliberal state, 
without its nucleus losing control of the workers it conceded to the education authorities 
initiatives that  tended to weaken its own power in the long term and at the same time 
undermine working conditions (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 563). [Author’s translation].   
The ACE covered three principal areas. Curriculum changes emphasized “citizenship, 
productivity and competitiveness” with an emphasis on the latter two, which Leyva and 
Rodriguez argue, corresponded with a de-emphasis on cooperation, humanism and cultural 
diversity. Also present were measures resembling the PEC’s promotion of public-private 
partnerships through ‘School-Based Management, to ostensibly improve school infrastructure 
 253
and student health. These consisted of technology procurement and outsourced food contracts 
(replacing school run snack shops), with parent committees encouraged to obtain private support 
to match public funds. Long hostile to the public normal schools which had served as principal 
incubators for the teachers’ movement, Gordillo described them as “unemployment factories” 
and recommended they be privatized and turned into tourism and hospitality training colleges 
(Hernandez Navarro 2012: 382-386). Hernandez Navarro observed that, “The ACE opened for 
private interests and non-profits, an enormous space to participate in the running of schools 
through school councils, and from there to create political clients. For this, the employer councils 
were enthusiastic for it.” (Hernandez Navarro 2012: 428) [Author’s translation].  
 The clause which provoked the greatest contention was titled “Evaluar para 
mejorar” (Evaluate to Improve). It proposed standardized evaluation processes for new teaching 
positions, temporary and low seniority teachers to obtain permanent status, and for promotions 
(Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 558). In the process, it not only removed the right of successful 
graduates of the nation’s publicly run normal schools to a teaching position, it removed 
graduation from a normal school or a university faculty of education as a mandatory prerequisite 
for obtaining a teaching position (Hernandez Navarro 2012: 356-357). A bachelor’s degree in a 
relevant subject area and passing the teaching application exam would now be sufficient 
(Bocking 2015: 81).  
 This clause would have a profound impact on teachers’ employment in several ways. It 
increased the precariousness of teachers whose continued employment would now be conditional 
on passing an exam. Leyva and Rodriguez (2012) contend that this undermined the importance 
of experience and performance in the classroom, a more accurate measure of professionalism, for 
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newer and temporary teachers in their trajectory towards permanent employment. The teaching 
position exam also purported to eliminate long standing and much criticized practices in many 
regions of the country where a retiring teacher could pass on their position to their son or 
daughter, or potentially for a price, recommend someone else for the position. Alternately, 
teaching positions were awarded by school directors, other administrators or union officials as a 
form of patronage. The argument that open competitions for jobs and promotions via exams 
would increase the system’s professionalism was an easy sell in the context of popular awareness 
of corruption and declining social acceptability of nepotism  (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 562).  128
 ‘Evaluate to Improve’ would actually undermine the professionalism of teachers. The 
removal of normales and other faculties of education as mandatory prerequisites was based on 
the notion that teacher abilities in pedagogy, instruction, child and adolescent development and 
classroom management were basic skills that could be initially evaluated on a standardized exam 
and further developed on the job. They did not require years of professional study and training 
beforehand. From this point of view, the particular professional characteristics of teachers, 
beyond the subject area knowledge an accountant would bring to the teaching of math, or an 
engineer to science, were thin indeed. Leyva and Rodriguez describe how these changes led to 
the deprofessionalization and precarization of teachers: 
…flexibility in teachers’ labour had the potential to corrode the character of the 
teachers… developing individualist attitudes. From solitary unshared work; it increases 
the anxiety, fear and grades of stress, with consequent physical and psychological 
consequences… it removes the obligation of the state to train and professionally prepare 
teachers, because now they will have to pay for their own training; it reduces vacation 
time in the summer from time teachers spend in courses and diplomas as part of their 
 While the practice of inheriting teaching positions was certainly unfair, the author should mention that two 128
friends obtained their positions from retiring parents, and that by available evidence including visits to their schools 
and meeting their students, they are skilled and committed educators.
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certifications; it intensifies and increases the  hours in the teachers’ work day. In other 
terms, the reform implicates the spending and investment of money and time in the 
search of professionalization, masking a complete process of deprofessionalization of 
teachers. (2012: 562-563). [Author’s translation] 
 Several key impacts then, gave a significant section of teachers personal reasons to be 
strongly opposed to the provisions of the ACE, a policy whose originators could be easily 
identified: Elba Esther Gordillo and the federal government of Felipe Calderon. 3 500 teachers in 
Morelos, 15 percent of the profession in this state, were on the verge of retirement when the ACE 
passed in 2008 (Hernandez Navarro 2012: 356-357). It became a key site for teacher militancy, 
where Gordillo’s loyalists were swept out of union leadership. The CNTE emphasized the 
deprofessionalizing aspects in its opposition to the ACE, particularly the degradation of the role 
of normal schools and the dubiousness of a standardized written exam for assessing teacher 
quality. The movement charged that administration of the exam lacked transparency, and could 
be manipulated by the SNTE and the SEP in favour of their preferred candidates (Leyva & 
Rodriguez 2012: 562). Fierce resistance emerged from both CNTE-led sections as well as several 
traditionally pro-institutional sections of the SNTE which broke ranks with Gordillo, including 
Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Morelos, Zacatecas, Durango, Puebla and Quintana Roo. In all, 
400 000 teachers in 14 states participated in strikes at various times over 2008-2009 in 
opposition to the ACE. In the most successful instances, teachers built alliances with parent 
groups concerned about school fees and commercialization, and campesinos engaged in their 
own struggles for land rights in states like Morelos and Chiapas with deep roots of rural 
collective struggle. In states with the most organized opposition, teachers refused to carry out 
aspects of the ACE. They blocked the administration of the ENLACE or the OECD’s new PISA 
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exam, which served for many dissident teachers as a manifestation of the international dimension 
of the neoliberal education agenda. The high levels of resistance created a crisis for Gordillo, 
who dealt with it by tightening control over the SNTE. National congresses now met in secret 
locations, conventions to elect executives of state sections were postponed (Hernandez Navarro 
2012: 388). While the host site for countless national mobilizations, which drew the participation 
of their active members, the CNTE was not sufficiently organized in Mexico City’s Sections 9 or 
10 to lead citywide strikes, though Section 9’s strong presence in many primary schools did lead 
to parents joining marches and protests.  129
 However, amid the growing and disparate mass movement united in its opposition to the 
ACE, a formal division opened among the dissidents of the teachers’ union. In July 2008, just 
two months after the inauguration of the ACE, movement activists from across Mexico gathered 
in the capital to launch the Democratic National Executive (CEND) of the SNTE. While sharing 
many principles and sympathizers, the CNTE did not recognize the new organization (Hernandez 
Navarro 2012: 432-435; Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 547). For years before, the CNTE’s 
difficulties in organizing effective mass protests at the national scale had been further hindered 
by the frequent inability of the leadership of its largest state sections to agree on shared strategies 
or dates for mobilization. The CEND initially emerged out of schisms between the leaderships of 
CNTE sections which had successfully gained some power in Michoacan and Guerrero (the 
former alienated the latter in pushing ahead with the CEND) from those of Oaxaca, Chiapas and 
the DF.  The dissident leaders of Michoacan aligned themselves with non-CNTE activists in 130
 Author’s observations and conversations with participants.129
 Possessing the greatest institutional stability and concomitantly the most resources, the Oaxacan section had long 130
held the most power within the CNTE. Observers believe this is a crucial reason behind the federal government’s 
focusing of juridicial repression on this section from 2013 onwards.
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the state sections of Puebla, Morelos, Tlaxcala, Mexico State, and San Luis Potosi, among 
others, who were disgruntled with the ACE and the pension reforms overseen by Gordillo the 
previous year (Hernandez Navarro 2012: 439-445; Cervantes Pérez 2012). The CNTE of Section 
9 issued a statement refusing in its terms, “to negotiate with charro leaders and betray the 
alliance policies of the CNTE.” (Cervantes Pérez 2012). The CEND launched with great fanfare 
amid over 1600 delegates representing membership factions from most of the SNTE’s sections 
(with the notable exceptions of Oaxaca, Chiapas and the DF) led by Michoacan. Its supporters 
campaigned intensely within the CNTE, to which it still claimed affiliation. However, it suffered 
division between non-CNTE leaders whose goal was the creation of a national education union 
parallel to the SNTE, and the majority of dissidents from within the CNTE who insisted on 
struggling to democratize the existing union.  Following the election of new leaders within the 131
SNTE of Michoacan in 2011 who strongly backed the CNTE, the CEND shrank to largely 
coalesce among the non-CNTE, anti-Gordillo leadership of the Puebla, Morelos and San Luis 
Potosi sections (Cervantes Pérez 2012). Dissidents grouped in both the official CNTE and the 
CEND maintained a steadfast opposition to the ACE, both claiming that fighting Gordillo and 
the neoliberal agenda for education was their primary objective, decrying sectarianism. 
Speculatively, it is however, difficult to see how these internal divisions did not undermine 
opposition against their powerful opponents, particularly their capacity to construct a cohesive 
resistance at the national level capable of fatally undermining the federal scope of the ACE.  
 Gordillo pushed to intensify the impact of the ACE on teacher evaluations. In 2011 the 
SNTE proposed a modification of the Carrera Magisterial that would raise the portion of teacher 
 Other axes of conflict, included electoral participation with Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, as 2012 presidential 131
candidate for the PRD, and afterwards through his new party, MORENA (Cervantes Pérez 2012).
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pay increases based on the results of their students’ test scores on the ENLACE from 20 percent 
to 50 percent (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 560; Hecock 2014: 69). With the overwhelming 
opposition it elicited from her own members, whose incomes became dependant on a 
standardized multiple choice test to which they had to orient much of their classroom instruction, 
the SNTE leader seemed to be taking one more step away from her earlier populist base to 
embrace the avant garde of neoliberal policy. The primary purpose of the ENLACE, rather than a 
national indicative of student achievement as its advocates initially claimed, was to act as a form 
of Value Added Measurement, in the manner described in the previous chapter relating to New 
York, which would further discipline teachers. According to Aboites, the pressures created by the 
salary incentive had particularly harmful consequences for meaningful student learning as it: 
Pressured teachers to create a climate of bureaucratic demands within their classrooms, 
totally  counterproductive to a true education process, it increased the use of fraudulent 
practices -like  the ‘loan’ of children from one classroom to another when the evaluations 
arrived -and increased un-pedagogic strategies to train the children to answer on the 
exams (Aboites 2012: 831). [Author’s Translation] 
 However, teachers with the CNTE claimed victory in the spring of 2012, when combined 
with a new wave of mobilization, tens of thousands refused the ACE’s mandated teacher exams 
and did not face reprisals. As part of the mobilizations, Mexico City’s primary school teachers in 
the CNTE Section 9 conducted hundreds of classes and activities the city’s downtown Zocalo to 
demonstrate an alternative pedagogy, with the participation of an estimated 20 000 parents and 
students. These teachers actively redefined their role, demonstrating the value and importance of 
their professional autonomy to the public (Hernandez Navarro 2013: 199-202). Meanwhile, it 
soon became evident to both critical education researchers like Aboites and administrators within 
the SEP, that the efforts by individual or small groups of teachers to try to ‘game’ the ENLACE 
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were so extensive, that the validity of the exam was fatally compromised on a national level 
(AFSEDF Official 1: Interviewed Feb. 2015; Hugo Aboites: Interviewed Feb. 2015). As SEP 
officials evidently saw no way to effectively bring its administration under their control, the 
national ENLACE exam for millions of students in years 3 to 6 of primary school and 7 to 9 of 
secondary was scrapped in 2013. While the CNTE steadily protested the ENLACE and blocked 
its administration in Oaxaca, Michoacan and elsewhere, it appears that countless unorganized 
individual acts of sabotage were the most effective. The test was partially revived by the INEE 
and renamed ‘Planea’ in 2015 on a much reduced scale for grades six and nine, the final years of 
primary and secondary school. It was used in 2015 to identify for intervention schools with 
positive or negative results outside the mean of their area (AFSEDF Official 1: Interviewed Feb. 
2015). 
 Insurgencies from the grassroots and middle ranks in state sections across the country 
threatened not only Gordillo’s control of the union, but her ability to effectively enact education 
policy in cooperation with the SEP. In the arena of elite politics she continued to consolidate her 
position, successfully playing the 2010 midterm elections through the PANAL to back a winning 
selection of PRI or PAN-PRD candidates in most states. As Calderon’s PAN fell in the polls 
leading up to the 2012 presidential election,  she sought a rapprochement with the projected 132
restorer of PRI rule, Enrique Peña Nieto (Hernandez Navarro 2012: 415-418). While making 
education reform a priority of his administration, Peña Nieto quickly demonstrated that he was 
uninterested in her partnership. His policies would not be a significant departure from the ACE. 
However, he rapidly demonstrated an understanding of some of the scalar reasons behind its 
 In great measure due to extreme levels of violence and chaos in vast regions of the country caused by his 132
government’s exacerbation of inter-drug cartel conflict.
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defeat due to the concentrated strength of dissident teachers and acted accordingly to further 
centralize the administration of education policy in Mexico. The results would provide the CNTE 
with their greatest challenge to date. 
6.5: Enrique Peña Nieto and Fast Policy 
 The rapid series of events in the year following the election of President Enrique Peña 
Nieto in 2012, provide a textbook case of ‘fast policy’ (Peck & Theodore 2015), revealing a 
fascinating convergence of actors in the production of neoliberal education policy. Advancing 
beyond the failures of the Fox and Calderon administrations in education policy, Peña Nieto in 
large measure reversed the earlier federalization of the system in his drive to firmly entrench the 
policies introduced in the ACE. He sought to do so in a manner that they could not be defied on a 
regional basis by the CNTE, which had had the effect of undermining the credibility of education 
governance on a national level. In doing so, he ruptured old political alliances in education 
governance and formed new ones. This section will first provide a brief narrative chronology of 
the events surrounding the launch of Peña Nieto’s education reform to introduce the key actors 
and their convergence, and will then discuss their relative influence. 
 The several point margin of Peña Nieto’s victory in July 2012 provided him with the 
impetus to begin formulating his agenda.  Following confirmation of his election in September, 133
he announced a transition team on education policy led by Mexicanos Primero chair Claudio X. 
Guajardo, who had become the nation’s most prominent business advocate of education policy. 
 Allegations of fraud were pushed forward by the student movement #YoySoy132 that had emerged to oppose his 133
candidacy, but he was largely able to maintain his legitimacy at this time in contrast to the mass protests that 
followed his predecessor’s widely viewed to be fraudulent victory for months.
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As President-Elect, Peña Nieto visited the OECD headquarters in Paris the following month, 
where he met extensively with its chair and former PRI politician Jose Angel Gurría, over several 
days. In September, the OECD had released the policy document Getting it Right: Strategic 
Reforms for Mexico, with basic education part of its primary focus. Its recommendations, which 
overlapped with Mexicanos Primeros’, were consistent with the dominant trajectory in education 
discourse, centred on increasing the evaluation of teachers with the aim of undermining their 
permanent employment status, measures largely found in the ACE (Bocking 2015: 78-79). All of 
this is an attack on the professional autonomy of Mexican teachers. 
 Recommendations from both organizations were reflected in Peña Nieto’s proposals for 
education presented on December 2, a day after being sworn into office. Beforehand, he had 
prepared extensive groundwork to ensure these and several other major reforms would pass 
rapidly through congress. The leadership of the ‘Pact for Mexico’, a grand coalition of the three 
largest parties, the PRI, PRD and the PAN, had agreed behind closed doors to pass substantive 
legislation during the first few months of Peña Nieto’s term on basic education, labour law, the 
tax code and privatization of the energy sector (Hernandez 2013: 27-31). Cooperation from 
Gordillo’s PANAL was not essential. On December 10, 2012 amendments to Articles 3 and 73 of 
the Mexican Constitution were moved in congress, stipulating that teachers’ employment would 
be contingent on evaluation, exempting public primary and secondary teachers from labour law 
that covered all other employees. The amendments passed on December 21, 2012 with support 
from the Pact, and entered law on February 6, 2013 (Bocking 2015: 78-79; Arriaga 2013: 13-14; 
Bensusan & Middlebrook 2013: 84; Aboites 2015: 4-5). 
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 Peña Nieto’s new alliance with the business leaders of Mexicanos Primero, the OECD led 
by Angel Gurría and the Pact for Mexico, had won its first victory in implementing its vision for 
education. Gordillo’s isolation as a power broker, first signalled by Peña Nieto’s appointment of 
an unfriendly education secretary, would end with her total downfall. Recognizing she had been 
sidelined, Gordillo denounced the education reforms for their adverse impact on teachers’ 
employment, threatening to mobilize the membership of the SNTE in opposition. Her 
performance was unconvincing. Earlier in 2012 during an interview with Milenio newspaper, 
Gordillo endorsed Peña Nieto’s campaign promises to make the permanent status of teachers 
conditional upon passing regular tests, criticizing politicians who disagreed, “Permanence 
perverts proper evaluation, it goes against evaluation…” (Quoted in Hernandez Navarro 2013: 
144) [Author’s translation]. According to Hernandez Navarro (2013), being such a consistent 
neoliberal advocate through the governments of Zedillo, Fox and Calderon to enhance her own 
political standing, regardless of its impact on her members, she was unable to change gears when 
she realized the fix was in. Less than a month after the passage of the constitutional amendments, 
Gordillo was imprisoned on February 26, charged with the embezzlement of hundreds of 
millions of pesos in union funds.  An opinion poll reported that 80 percent of the public and 84 134
percent of teachers approved of her arrest (Bensusan & Middlebrook 2013: 86; Hernandez 
Navarro 2013: 263; Bocking 2015: 82). Gordillo’s status as one of Mexico’s last great charro 
 SNTE union dues estimated at 2 billion pesos annually in 2005, were directed to the national executive which 134
Gordillo controlled (Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 543). However according to Mexican sociologist Enrique de a Garza 
Toledo and Hernandez Navarro, the real money and potential for corruption within the SNTE came from large funds 
entrusted to it by the federal government. In 2007 Gordillo oversaw 13.5 billion pesos (equivalent to the UNAM’s 
annual budget) for retirement programs, school technology initiatives and teacher home financing programs with 
little transparency (Enrique de la Garza Toledo: Interviewed Feb. 2015; Hernandez Navarro 2012: 414).
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union power brokers, a holdover from the corporatist era of the PRI, whose deft manoeuvring 
had gained her an extension on life through the administrations of Fox and Calderon, was over.  
Under Peña Nieto, a significant realignment occurred in the composition of the political 
alliances behind education governance in Mexico. On the Mexican left and within the CNTE, 
considerable attention has been given to the involvement of the OECD. This is consistent with a 
foundational nationalist narrative within the left that frames opponents of neoliberalism as 
patriots and its advocates aligned with the OECD or the World Bank as foreign controlled, and 
complicit in imperialism, usually American in origin.  Mexico entered the OECD in 1994, 135
shortly after the inauguration of the North American Free Trade Agreement, as the first 
developing nation to join the ’organization of rich countries’. Through the tenures of Fox and 
Calderon, it enrolled in the OECD’s increasing focus on education policy by participating in its 
international standardized test, the PISA since 2000, and in policy sharing forums. However it 
was under Peña Nieto’s administration that this collaboration drew much closer for both the 
elaboration of policy and in winning popular legitimation. Peña Nieto and Angel Gurría’s close 
political affinities were likely influential. A member of the technocrat wing of the PRI that came 
to power in the late 1980s with Carlos Salinas, Gurría was his chief negotiator for NAFTA, 
followed by secretary of foreign affairs and then finance in the Zedillo administration. After 
being appointed to the OECD in 2006 with Fox’s endorsement, he had only a nominal 
relationship with Calderon’s PAN government. His collaboration with Peña Nieto became known 
within months of his election, with the President-Elect declaring, “I propose that the OECD 
become a strategic ally for the design of the policies that Mexico needs, and what greater 
 A view often shared by US leftists, see for example Emily Keppler (2016). “Popular Uprising Backs Striking 135
Teachers in Southern Mexico,” Labor Notes. July 14. www.labornotes.org [Accessed July 17, 2016].
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contribution than to have a friend at the head of this organization.” (Jiménez 2012). Gurría 
replied in the forward to Getting it Right, that “the new Mexican government should consider the 
OECD an extension of its own capacities.” (OECD 2013: 4).  Even still, the OECD’s role largely 
consisted of acting as a prestigious third party legitimator for policies already in circulation, in a 
fashion described above in Chapter 4. Gurría and his staff gave Peña Nieto recommendations 
similar to those he received from Guajardo, some of which found their way into the 
constitutional amendments and later legislation. However this occurred with the free volition of 
the Mexican government. Peña Nieto was not “under the orders of the OECD” as many of his 
critics claimed. As Brenner, Peck and Theodore argue: 
...it is problematic to assume that neoliberalization processes normally or necessarily move 
‘downwards’ along a global-to-national vector....this superordinate gaze fails to take account 
of  the strategic role of national, regional and local state apparatuses as active progenitors of  
neoliberalizing institutional reforms and policy prototypes, and as arenas in which market  
oriented regulatory experiments are initiated, consolidated and even extended. (Brenner et al 
2010: 195-196).  
 Amid growing protests over the summer from the CNTE, which with the temporary 
silencing of the official SNTE, became the primary voice for the growing ranks of teachers 
anxious about how the reforms would affect their employment, the Professional Teaching 
Service Law (Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente) was passed in September 2013, putting the 
constitutional reforms into practice. The 2013-14 school year began with a massive wave of 
teacher strikes and protests in 27 of the 32 states, led by the CNTE but also drawing out 
previously unaligned teachers in new regions. It culminated in weeks long ‘indefinite’ strikes in 
the CNTE’s southern strongholds and strikes for days at a time in the Yucatan, Veracruz and the 
northern states, where teachers rapidly mobilized despite a limited history of organization. The 
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highway blockades, mega marches, and occupations of airports, international borders, 
government buildings and Mexico City’s Zocalo, rivalled the national strike wave of 1989 for its 
geographic breadth. By early November, the movement won vague agreements from state 
governments where the struggle had been strongest, to work around the federal dictate for a 
standardized testing regime for teachers, often combined with firmer commitments to hire more 
teachers or meet community demands to cancel proposed school fees . However concurrent 136
negotiations at the national level between the CNTE and the Secretary of the Interior (Secretaria 
de Gobernación) for the abrogation of the reforms yielded no gains. By early 2014, unlike with 
the defeat of the ACE two years earlier, state governments that had made side agreements with 
the CNTE came under strong pressure from federal authorities, which filed successful claims 
with the Supreme Court that they were in abeyance of the national constitution. These states soon 
reneged on their agreements (Aboites 2015: 2-5; Aristegui Noticias 2014; Bocking 2015: 93-93). 
In this context, the CNTE and the dissident teachers retreated from the national scale, to try to 
win exemptions in their strongest bases (Maria de la Luz Arriaga: Interviewed Jun. 2015). Peña 
Nieto’s scalar strategy of re-centralizing control over education policy to the national level by 
embedding reforms in the Mexican constitution were proving successful. The new evaluation 
program began its roll out in most states the following school year, with the standardized testing 
of existing teachers beginning in the 2015-16 school year. What did these new evaluation 
structures look like and how did they affect the teaching careers and professional autonomy of 
those under its examination?  
 Continuing the ‘School-Based Management’ policy trajectory from the Quality Schools Program (PEC), related 136
legislation had given state governments authority to download school operations costs to families, garnering fierce 
opposition from organized parents where it was attempted in Chiapas, Veracruz and elsewhere, and helping broaden 
the struggle beyond the professional interests of teachers (Aboites 2015: 5).
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6.6: What Makes a Teacher? Marginalization of the Normales and Teacher Education 
 On the evening of September 26, 2014,  dozens of students from the Ayotzinapa 137
Teachers’ College in the state of Guerrero commandeered five buses to travel to Mexico City and 
participate in marches against what they contended was discrimination in teacher hiring by the 
SEP against the graduates of public rural normal schools and the favouring of alumni of private 
urban university programs. Their struggle was within the context of Enrique Peña Nieto’s 
reforms and its predecessors, which cumulatively diminished the role of the normal schools in 
the formation of the nation’s teachers. In the town of Iguala and on its outskirts, two hours 
southwest of the nation’s capital, the buses came under fire by local police, killing six students. 
43 students were captured by the police. Passed off to a local drug cartel, they disappeared, 
presumed to be murdered. The abduction of these activist student-teachers placed an 
international spotlight on the political persecution of the normal schools. It launched mass 
protests for months across Mexico that drew tens of thousands, with strikes by CNTE teachers in 
Guerrero and students in Mexico City closing their university campuses in solidarity.    
 Explanations for the motivations behind the violent attack on the students vary. Many 
extend beyond the official version that it was the product of a corrupt local mayor and police 
force immeshed, like many others in Guerrero, in a cartel, who hated the students, were upset 
they had taken the buses, which unbeknownst to them may have been used for drug smuggling. 
According to the investigation of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts 
commissioned by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of 
American States, local human rights groups and Proceso magazine, local military authorities, 
 This account is based on the conclusions of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (2016) 137
Ayotzinapa Report downloaded at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/activities/giei.asp .
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situated at a base less than a kilometre from the attack which also provides communications for 
state, federal and municipal police, were aware of the movements of students that night and 
attacks upon them. Radio communications during key periods in the attacks were withheld by the 
military from the Interdisciplinary Group’s investigators (Turati 2014). The likely complicity of 
upper levels of government in the disappearance of these students presents a chilling picture of 
potential state involvement in the murderous suppression of politically inconvenient student-
teachers.  
 The rural college has produced 88 generations of teachers since its founding in 1936, 
during the government of leftist president Lazaro Cardenas. Since the beginning, its students, 
most from local peasant families, have led struggles for land reform while studying agricultural 
methods to in turn train the area’s children in primary and secondary schools. In marked contrast 
with the national education system’s official priorities of English, Spanish and mathematics, the 
normalistas of Ayotzinapa also take courses in community organizing, Indigenous languages and 
political economy. According to alumni and primary teacher Joel Amateco Venancio , a leader 138
in the campaign for justice for the disappeared and murdered students, “The goal of the school is 
to form teachers who are socially and politically aware and on the side of the vulnerable. 
Graduates of this school have a more profound understanding of the essence of what it means to 
be a teacher” (Bocking 2015b). 
 I visited the Ayotzinapa normal college and met with the parents of several of the disappeared students in 138
February 2015. A memorial of 43 empty chairs and portraits of each of the disappeared and murdered students 
occupied most of the central square for the school of 500 students. I slept that night in one of the classrooms along 
with several university students from Mexico City. The community police, autonomous from the government and 
armed with hunting rifles, guarded the gates of the college.
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 The Mexican government staggered the full roll out of programs associated with the Ley 
de Servicio Profesional Docente, beginning with measures that primarily affected new teachers. 
The SEP initiated the system of exams in July 2014 for new teaching jobs in the coming school 
year, with 149 000 applicants competing for 16 505 positions, according to the government. The 
exam consisted of two segments, with 80 multiple choice questions on teaching practice in the 
first, and 95 multiple choice questions to assess general intelligence and ethics on the second, 
with 20 questions on each segment not marked. 344 application centres were established 
throughout the country, most of which proceeded without incident. It was strongly opposed by 
the CNTE, which blockaded the exam sites in Michoacan, Guerrero, Chiapas and Oaxaca, 
resulting in their postponement and relocation to nearby states (Poy Solano 2014; Poy Solano et 
al 2014). Perhaps because this component of the Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente did not 
affect the employment of existing teachers, it did not provoke mass protests across the country, 
resulting in its more or less successful implementation. 
 The CNTE argued that the written exam was both a poor method of assessing whether an 
applicant would be a competent teacher, and that it undermined the credibility of public faculties 
of education, particularly the normales, which were dedicated to training teachers, and thereby 
the overall professional autonomy of teachers. It also represented a further shift from conditions 
prior to 1992 when successful graduation guaranteed a teaching position (Enrique Enriquez 
Ibarra, CNTE Section 9 General Secretary, Interviewed Jun. 2015). Their opposition was also 
rooted in a historic understanding of teachers in Mexico, existing since the founding of the SEP 
shortly after the Revolution in 1921, that teaching held a distinct status from the ‘liberal 
professions’ of law or medicine. Whereas duly certified doctors or lawyers were autonomous in 
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the sense that they could set up a private practice or become employees of an institution, teachers 
were civil servants more akin to military officers, in the terms of their professional commitment 
as civil servants (Hugo Aboites, Interviewed Feb. 2015). This section focuses on a significant 
change to teaching as a profession introduced by the Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente. 
Coinciding with the implementation of application exams, graduation from normales or faculties 
of education would no longer be a mandatory prerequisite for becoming a teacher. The federal 
government claimed that the principal rationale for the measure was to alleviate a teacher 
shortage, by making it much easier for professionals in other fields to apply (AFSEDF Official 1, 
Interviewed Feb. 2015). Prospective teachers would require a bachelor’s degree (licenciatura) in 
their subject area (or equivalent years of trade employment for workshop teachers). Their grasp 
of pedagogy, professional ethics and capacities for working with children and adolescents would 
be assessed through the multiple choice exam. In effect, it reiterated the ACE’s claim that there 
are limited professional skills intrinsic to the teaching profession, beyond subject-area 
knowledge. As a result, this aspect of the Ley had both a profound impact on the collective 
identity of the Mexican teaching profession, and threatened to considerably undermine its 
professional capacities.  
 It is the contention of education researcher César Navarro, that the Ley de Servicio 
Profesional Docente’s undermining of the normales is about fundamentally transforming the 
professional culture of teachers, “[T]eachers’ identity has been formed to a great extent from the 
‘cradle’ of the normales and for that reason, a central project of the reform culminates with its 
extinction and the sweeping out of the public school, teachers who graduated from these 
education institutions.” (Navarro 2016) [Author’s translation]. Mexico has 484 rural and urban 
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normal schools, of which 274 are public institutions, accounting for 77 percent of Mexico’s 121 
000 student-teachers. However public normales were at 73 percent enrolment and private 
normales 52 percent in 2013-14, the first year in which a degree in education became optional 
(Poy Solano 2016b). Funding from the SEP for these institutions has been in longterm decline, 
dropping precipitously in recent years.  The former president of the Escuela Nacional de 139
Maestros described the state of normal schools as “paralisis, financial asphyxiation and academic 
abandonment” (Poy Solano 2016b) [Author’s translation]. According to Poy Solano, one factor 
has been the increasing withdrawal of support from the official SNTE, which provides some 
resources through funding it holds in trust from the SEP. 
 The General Secretary of CNTE Section 9 of Mexico City’s primary teachers, Enrique 
Enriquez Ibarra, explains why training in subject knowledge alone is insufficient to being an 
effective teacher:  
When these colleagues come in to give a class, they don’t have all the elements necessary 
for classroom management, teaching strategies and pedagogy. It’s different to do it in a 
study, or a lecture hall, then to have 20, 25, 40 kids in a group. We see this a lot in the 
secondary [schools]. … We have doctors, accountants, chemists, mathematicians from the 
universities, that we’re not saying they’re not good, right? But when they enter the 
secondary, and they’re in front of adolescents that are changing, they don’t have control of 
the group… Because these teachers don’t have the profile of a graduate of the normales. 
And this is will become more prevalent in the primaries and preschools. (Interviewed Feb. 
2015) [Author’s translation]. 
A secondary teacher adds that the Ley in fact exacerbated a longterm issue within secondaries, as 
the SEP lacked pedagogical programs for less common subjects like art or music, the system has 
tended to hire professionals in areas outside of core academic subjects rather than normal 
graduates (Mexico City Teacher 9: Interviewed Jun. 2015). According to a senior official of 
 A symptom of underfunding is that only 29 percent of instructors in normales are full time, a majority work on a 139
variable, hourly basis (Poy Solano 2016b).
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Mexico City’s basic education system, AFSEDF acknowledges that graduates from normales are 
better trained in classroom practice than graduates from private and public non-education 
universities and those without education degrees. It has a first hiring round just open to graduates 
of the normales, then opens a second round for remaining positions to all other applicants 
(AFSEDF Official 1: Interviewed Feb. 2015).  
 The contention of the SEP and Enrique Peña Nieto that a degree in education is not 
necessary for effective teachers is tantamount to arguing that there is only a limited base of 
abilities and skills, apart from subject area knowledge which is intrinsic to teaching (Hugo 
Aboites, Interviewed Feb. 2015). According to these proponents, it is something that can be 
picked up on the job, or as the leaders of Teach for America (TFA) claim, through a three week 
crash course. This is a profound devaluation of the concept of teachers’ professionalism. While 
TFA has received considerable public pushback in the US as discussed in Chapter 5, this form of 
deskilling of teachers has not yet sparked popular concern in Mexico. Nevertheless, it is already 
transforming the profession in a far more profound way, with implications for the nature of being 
a teacher, and the education that students receive.  
6.7: Testing Teachers: Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente (Professional Teaching Service 
Law) 
 The resistance provoked by the implementation of standardized exams for existing 
teachers through the fall of 2015, though similarly geographically concentrated as the protests 
against the entry exam, proved to be more disruptive, and the resentment it represented, far more 
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widespread. What was the source of this strong opposition? According to a report issued in May 
2016 by the Mexican Senate’s policy think tank as protests began anew: 
The teacher evaluation system instituted by the reform of 2013 is one of the highest impact  
[italics in original] in the world because it determines each step in the employment trajectory 
of  teachers that work in basic education, approximately 1.3 million in the publicly operated  
system. It is unique in its objective of evaluating in a manner completely external, without 
the  participation of school authorities, each teacher in the immense Mexican education 
system (Senate of Mexico 2016: 3). [Author’s translation] 
This passage clearly presents the ambition of Peña Nieto’s government through the Ley de 
Servicio Profesional Docente and its dependence on the federal government. The legislation 
ultimately determined the employment conditions of teachers across Mexico, negating collective 
bargaining over the most important aspects of the profession. In the absence of firm control over 
many state education systems, and much less at the school level with the questionable loyalty of 
school directors to the Reform, themselves subject to the exam, the national SEP and the INEE 
were obligated to directly administer the exam. This remarkable degree of centralization 
contrasts with New York State where school districts and principals were relied upon to 
supervise at the smallest scale equivalent forms of teacher evaluation.  
 The standardized exam was structured to function within a fully centralized system. 
Lacking participation by local school officials, direct observation of teaching as is common in 
US and Canadian teacher evaluations was ruled out. The SEP and INEE established a schedule 
reaching to 2020, whereby Mexico’s 1.3 million primary and secondary teachers and school 
directors would participate in their first round of evaluations at the rate of 300 000 a year, 
divided over two periods in the spring and fall. Selected teachers reported to a local examination 
hall consisting of a computer lab, where over up to four hours, they completed a multiple choice 
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exam on teaching practice, wrote and uploaded a fully annotated lesson plan, and uploaded 
examples of student work, representing both high and low achievement. Teachers who passed 
with at least a ‘sufficient’ grade, were required to take the exam again in four years, while those 
deemed ‘insufficient’ must take remedial courses at their own expense, and try again next year. 
Failure for a third time would result in automatic dismissal for teachers hired before the 
implementation of the Ley in 2013. Those hired before this date would be transferred to a lower 
paid secretarial position (Senate of Mexico 2016: 1).  
 The first round in fall 2015 was “sensibly reduced” to only 106 000 participants. The 
second round in spring 2016 was postponed to the following school year, pushing back the initial 
schedule (Senate of Mexico 2016: 1). According to education researcher Hugo Aboites, at this 
rate it would take over 12 years to evaluate every teacher through the three steps, significantly 
weakening the practical effect of the Ley De Servicio Profesional Docente.  These 140
administrative setbacks were caused by a combination of numerous technical glitches in the 
national computer-based exam system  and large scale resistance by teachers in states where 141
the CNTE predominated. In these states, tactics varied from mass blockades of exam sites 
preventing their operation, to alleged widespread cases of sabotage of computer equipment 
within the halls by the test takers, on a sufficient scale to fully disrupt exams, as all attendees 
claimed that the technology was dysfunctional and would leave (Cano 2015; Briseño 2015). 
According to the Senate Report, 90 percent of teachers and directors called for evaluation in the 
first round participated. Of the 16 000 who did not, 75 percent were located in Chiapas, 
 Remarks at the opening plenary of a conference of researchers and teachers critical of Mexico’s education 140
reforms, attended by the author. Autonomous University of the City of Mexico (UACM), January 29, 2016.
 Leading the Senate report to suggest that this was the cause of many teachers only being able to complete one 141
section of the exam.
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Guerrero, Michoacán and Oaxaca, and will be assigned a new exam date in the following year. 
The 3 360 teachers located elsewhere were fired (Senate of Mexico 2016: 17). 
 Of the 103 313 teacher participants , 15 percent were considered ‘insufficient’, 38 142
percent ‘sufficient’, 40 percent ‘good’, and 8 percent ‘outstanding’.  If the teachers are 143
subtracted who failed due to submitting only one piece of the three components, rather than low 
marks, the ‘insufficient’ rate is cut in half. (Senate of Mexico 2016: 14). With its breakdown into 
four possible ratings, this evaluation system bears some similarities with New York State’s 
contemporary APPR (see Chapter 5.7). While the Mexican criteria is based on an exam taken by 
teachers (since the demise of the ENLACE), rather than the results of those taken by their 
students as in New York, in both cases politicians claimed that the exams would act as a sorting 
mechanism that would pinpoint the system’s bad teachers.  While New York State’s Cuomo 144
claimed that less than one percent of teachers being found unsatisfactory was ‘baloney’, and 
vowed to create a new exam, the SEP accepted the results with good graces, stating that they 
revealed “only the best prepared are giving classes” (Senate of Mexico 2016: 14). However the 
Senate’s report on the Ley acknowledges the challenge of prominent academics who argued that 
the results undermined the fundamental claims behind Peña Nieto’s education reforms, that the 
shortcomings of the nation’s school system were primarily due to bad teachers. They also 
questioned the validity of a multiple choice exam to evaluate teachers’ capacities in the first 
place. The report strikes a critical note in observing that while the INEE recognized the existence 
 The balance were school directors.142
 Entitling them to a 35 percent raise.143
 The similarities continue in the number of chances teachers have to improve on unsatisfactory grades in 144
subsequent exams and the ultimate consequence of dismissal. However all New York teachers would be required to 
participate in the evaluation every year, unlike successful teachers in Mexico.
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of various technical glitches, and said it would ‘perfect’ its instruments, not only did the SEP not 
question the results of the initial evaluation… it declared them “satisfactory and sound”, 
claiming that they “reflect the teaching competencies and the knowledge of those who were 
evaluated.”” (Senate of Mexico 2016: 17) 
 The CNTE has pledged to resist the Ley until its abrogation. Barring the success of 
massive government repression in the movement’s regional base, attempted since at least the fall 
of 2015 in Oaxaca, where the union’s bank account has been frozen, marches have been subject 
to police violence and leaders including the general secretary have been imprisoned, the 
standardized teacher evaluation exams will continue to be hampered. Though carried out in the 
absence of resistance in most of Mexico, a sizeable number of teachers across the nation will 
continue to hold the exams in contempt. Nearly all Mexico City teachers I interviewed prior to 
the implementation of this exam, treated it with suspicion. Returning to my two case study 
schools in the delegation of Iztapalapa in February 2016, where several teachers from each had 
been selected, their earlier views were confirmed. One teacher who had taken the exam, 
explained that she had done so because there was no other alternative, but did not believe that it 
was an effective evaluation of her teaching. Given its nationwide application, the questions were 
designed to assess as many realities as possible within the diverse country. However she argued, 
this meant that many were not relevant to the context in which she taught. “In twenty years in 
Mexico City, I have never taught a student for whom Spanish was a second language. How 
would I know those teaching strategies?” Or the questions were inane. “A spider enters the 
classroom. Do you: A) Kill it. B) Ask a student to kill it. C) Capture it. If I answer A, does that 
mean I’m against scientific inquiry or am I maintaining safety?” Only a school union 
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representative affiliated with the official SNTE Section 10 leadership seemed to think that this 
form of testing was the way of the future. 
 Opposition to the Ley from both the CNTE and many non-affiliated teachers can be 
grouped into at least three principal reasons. First is the objection that standardized tests cannot 
effectively evaluate the capacities of a teacher, substantiated by both self-identified ‘critical’ 
education researchers like Aboites, and even by the president of the INEE Sylvia Schmelkes. In 
an extraordinary interview in July 2016 with the Mexico City newspaper La Jornada in the midst 
of ongoing protests by the CNTE, she stated that the Ley in its current form, “may not be what 
the country and teachers need,” recognizing that it is strongly opposed by many teachers, and 
musing that changes could be made. She admits that the Ley in its current form was an inferior 
version of what would have been a more meaningful measure of teacher competencies:  
[B]ut when we calculated numbers and over all the logistics required to train evaluators 
that would be capable of evaluating teachers in the classroom, and not once but various 
times, and not one trainer, but at least two. When we confirmed this, we saw that it wasn’t 
possible, for this reason we designed qualitative instruments. (Poy Solano 2016a) 
[Author’s translation] 
While the Senate report purports to primarily serve as an objective analysis of the Ley de 
Servicio Profesional Docente without drawing its own substantive conclusions, its sympathy 
with this view is suggested, not least by its prominent citations of education policy critic Diane 
Ravitch in describing similar teacher evaluation programs in the US (part of a brief section of 
international comparisons). As will be discussed below, that Peña Nieto’s education reforms 
draws broad criticism from within the senate, and even from the head of the agency that designed 
its testing instruments, is precipitous for dissident teachers.  
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 A second objection voiced especially from the CNTE, is that the purportedly ‘objective’ 
system is not so. Given that the SEP and leaders like Peña Nieto apparently concur with 
Mexicano Primero that the primary cause of the deficiencies of the education system are ‘bad 
teachers’, and that they can be identified with a multiple choice test on professional knowledge, 
there is a widespread belief among CNTE activists that the exam can and will be structured to 
yield a desired pass/fail rate (Mexico City Teacher 9, Interviewed Jun. 2015; CNTE Section 10 
Activist, Interviewed Feb. 2015). Based on this fundamental mistrust of the intentions of the 
SEP, the INEE and the politicians which govern them, CNTE activists fear the exam would be 
used to purge experienced teachers and activists. They point to similar reasons for opposing an 
additional rule of the Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente, which sets out a series of reasons for 
which teachers will be automatically fired. A particularly contentious one consists of having 
three consecutive unexcused absences. In a national context where legal strikes are virtually 
unknown , activists fear that the law will quash militancy by creating a strong penalty for 145
participation in work stoppages of more than a brief duration. As will be discussed in the final 
section of this chapter, this rule did not prevent the eruption of open ended strikes in the CNTE’s 
core states in the spring of 2016, despite thousands of firings. Whether this limited its spread is 
difficult to ascertain, although a senior official of the AFESDF believed that it certainly had 
limited strikes as of 2015 in Mexico City, due to its judicious application here (AFESDF Official 
 The number of legally recognized strikes in the federally regulated sector (employees of state enterprises, most 145
manufacturing, banking, resource extraction, inter-state transportation) was an annual average of 138 between 1989 
and 1994, dropping over the succeeding 15 years to reach an average of 18 a year between 2007 and 2012. To obtain 
legal recognition of a strike, workers must make a formal request before a conciliation and arbitration board 
comprised of representatives of the state, employer associations and unions. The latter is nearly always represented 
by a PRI-affiliated pro-employer union. Requests for a strike are routinely rejected for myriad reasons (Bensusan & 
Middlebrook 2013: 59-60). Considering this, and the CNTE’s limited formal recognition at the state level, the 
movement’s strikes are virtually always illegal.
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1: Interviewed Feb. 2015). Suggesting awareness that the rule could have an effect on 
participation, the general secretary of Section 7 in Chiapas stated at the outset of a strike in May 
2016, “the first thing that we have to do is break the fear, because if we are thinking of the three 
days, well then we’re screwed, truly, I’ve said various times that there’s no 
alternatives…” (Alerta Chiapas 2016) [Author’s translation].  
 Thirdly, CNTE members and critical academics explain that the terms within the Ley 
which determine teacher employment were not implemented through negotiation with the CNTE 
(nor for that matter, with the official SNTE leadership). They were unilaterally imposed. 
Extending from this, the clauses of the Ley which stipulate when teachers may be fired (for not 
taking the exam, failing the exam, unexcused absences, among other reasons), may not be 
appealed. With the elimination of these rights to due process, public school teachers are 
exempted from federal labour law which covers all other workers. The capacity of the union to 
intervene in defence of its members is also significantly limited. Continuing in this general spirit 
of intransigence, the federal government subsequently refused to modify any aspect of these 
central aspects of the Ley (Hugo Aboites, Interviewed Feb. 2015; CNTE Section 10 Activist, 
Interviewed Feb. 2015).  
I think it’s an attempt to subordinate teachers who have been revolting for many years, 
decades, and who have become a very strong opponent to public neoliberal policies. … 
We’re talking about a half million teachers who were active in 26 states in 32 that form 
this nation. So it’s an attempt to control a political force. And then, on another level it’s a 
way of getting rid of some nuclei of resistance that are more important, like in Oaxaca, 
Guerrero, Chiapas, Michaocan, especially. And then, on another level it’s a way of 
fighting that teacher who’s a troublemaker or this one who’s a leader, or this one who’s a 
very responsible teacher, but that order, that we’re going to get rid of ‘irresponsible’ 
teachers that’s the main thrust of the reforms. No, it’s the other way around. First it’s the 
demolition of a political force. (Hugo Aboites: Interviewed Feb. 2015) 
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For Aboites and CNTE activists, the Ley has profound implications for the capacity of teachers 
to engage in contentious politics. The following section will explore how these measures interact 
with and increase the precarious employment conditions of secondary teachers in Mexico City, 
with considerable impact on their professional autonomy. 
6.8: Precarious Employment & Professional Autonomy 
 This section explores how workplace relations and power dynamics between teachers and 
school directors in Mexico City have been affected by the waves of neoliberal reforms described 
above in this chapter. As will be explained, school directors are not nearly as integral to the front-
line implementation of neoliberal reforms affecting teachers’ professional autonomy, as are their 
colleagues in New York City. This is reflected in the extreme top-down nature of the education 
reforms embodied in the Ley as discussed in the previous section. The structure of non-director 
participation is perhaps one of largest factors undermining the success of neoliberal reforms, as 
this limits the ability to influence school-level dynamics among staff. As a result, teacher-director 
relations vary depending more on individual rather than structural factors. In many of Mexico 
City’s secondary schools, the real source of weakness in autonomous teacher culture in the face 
of top-down edicts, is the virtual absence according to many teachers, of the official SNTE to 
represent their interests in workplace-level disputes. The second half of this section will explain 
how one of the fundamental sources of teacher precariousness predates the Ley, but has 
worsened in recent years. Mexican teachers are overwhelmingly employed on a part time basis 
and required to apply for more hours. The nature of this employment is perhaps so taken for 
granted, that it is hardly ever mentioned in analyses published by Mexican teachers activists or 
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their allies, yet it is a foundational cause for the insecurity of teachers’ work lives, with a strong 
impact on their professional autonomy. 
 It is highly significant that school directors in Mexico remain part of the teachers’ union. 
They do not have the power to hire or fire teachers. Most disciplinary authority is held by zone 
supervisors and inspectors. Whereas in Canada and the US, school administrator membership in 
teachers’ federations was mostly a holdover from when these organizations acted as professional 
associations rather than labour unions , in Mexico it is largely a product of the union’s 146
corporatist origins. The SNTE was formed to aggregate all education workers into one 
organization for the purposes of state-driven political mobilization. It was also an integral part of 
the union’s clientelistic structure. With promotion in many states controlled by the union and 
used to reward loyalty, a 1992 reform stipulating that directors be appointed by the SEP on the 
basis of a written exam was observed in the breach (Hugo Aboites, Interviewed Feb. 2015). 
However in school delegations (districts) where teachers were able to democratize the structures 
of the SEP and the SNTE, usually in states where the CNTE was consolidated, new practices 
emerged whereby school directors were elected by their peers (Cook 1996: 194-195). As a result, 
school directors in these areas are frequently movement leaders. An example is Enrique Enriquez 
Ibarra, General Secretary of Mexico City’s CNTE Section 9, who directs a primary school on the 
morning shift. Changing the role of school directors to become front-line managers capable of 
implementing top-down administrative policies is a key priority for neoliberal reform advocates. 
The Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente established a centralized written exam for aspirants to 
school leadership, wresting control of appointments from both the corrupt official SNTE, 
 They remain members in some provincial teachers’ federations in Canada. The evolution of administrator’s 146
involvement in federations in Ontario will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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weakened since the departure of Gordillo, and the democratic practices of its dissidents. After the 
implementation of standardized teacher exams, the highest demand of Mexicanos Primero has 
been the removal of school directors from membership in the SNTE (Bocking 2015: 92). Peña 
Nieto has not yet signalled an intent to pursue this exclusion. The OECD’s ‘Getting it Right: 
Strategic Agenda for Reforms in Mexico’ (2013) published at the start of Peña Nieto’s term, 
recommended giving school directors the power to hire and fire teachers, to increase ‘school 
autonomy’. This term borrows from the ‘School Based Management’ discourse previously used 
to advocate for the Quality Schools Program (PEC) and defend parent fundraising (OECD 
2013a: 129-130).  
 The capacities of school directors to intervene in teachers’ classroom practice has 
increased over the past few years. However a senior AFESDF official describes how much still 
depends on their individual characteristics and those of the teachers at their school: 
Technical secondary schools have a very hierarchical structure. … They’re militarized. … 
In the case of the general secondaries, it depends on each one, there’s some with a very 
successful leadership and others where it’s a disaster. In the primaries, much depends on 
the director… But I’ll say that the reform indicates that leadership needs to be 
participatory and inclusive. … I’ve observed that there’s some where they’ve really 
achieved a level of co-action, and they are very respected, they’ve earned their place in 
the hierarchy as a director. They’re others that haven’t, and they’re questioned [by their 
teachers]. And others that utilize the power relationship. (AFESDF Official 1, 
Interviewed Feb. 2015) [Author’s translation] 
This official describes a policy intended to increase the ability of school directors to observe 
classroom teaching, while creating a more formal school-level leadership team: 
As a part of the strategy to implement the reform in the DF, we’re striving to strengthen 
the director with a new structure. Because normally in primaries, it’s easier to see it, to 
know the teachers and the director, in front of the classroom. Now with schools that have 
ten or more groups per grade, which in the DF are 75 percent… of an administrative sub 
director to download administrative work from the director, an academic sub director, a 
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promoter of reading and a promoter of new technologies. (AFESDF Official 1, 
Interviewed Feb. 2015) [Author’s translation] 
At face value, such a structure could well offer benefits for improving the professional practices 
of teachers. This is assuming that resources, such as time from the classroom to pursue 
professional development, which historically has been scarce, are actually available for teachers, 
and provided that while showing ways for teachers to improve, that their capacities for 
professional judgement are also respected. While not an interview question, one participant 
complained that the ‘promoters’ were dictating how they should teach, and added that school 
directors now have the ability to reject or approve teachers transfers to their school (Mexico City 
Teacher 6, Interviewed Feb. 2015).  
 A secondary teacher active in the CNTE considered that school directors still don’t 
generally intervene in teachers’ work, but if there’s a conflict, than there is wider scope for them 
or inspectors to observe their classroom teaching. According to him such interventions were 
typically of a disciplinary rather than a collegial nature. Much depends on the power dynamics in 
a given school, “Lately the idea has been increasing that the director is the law. That’s to say, he 
will determine everything, when a few years ago, we could still, especially in the meetings of the 
technical committee [monthly staff meetings], debate what we should do in the school.” (CNTE 
Section 10 Activist, Interviewed Feb. 2015) [Author’s translation]. He believed that the SEP was 
pushing this culture shift, and that eventually they want to give directors the power to hire and 
fire.  It is interesting in this context that Mexico City teachers are both older on average than 147
 He also suggests how though since the Ley, directors are now appointed through a combination of exams and 147
minimum years of service, clientelism can still work, but more in the hands of SEP administrators rather than the 
SNTE, by sponsors guiding prospective directors through exam preparation (CNTE Section 10 Activist: Interviewed 
Feb. 2015).
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NYC teachers (42 years compared to 40), but also substantially more experienced, with an 
average of 17 years of service , compared to less than 11 in NYC  (INEE 2015: 35). A much 148 149
lower rate of turnover in Mexico City’s schools may be significant in shaping workplace cultures 
where teachers are more likely to be confident enough to assert their own ideas on both 
classroom teaching and how the school should be run. 
 Several teachers I interviewed, especially those serving as a sub director, director, or as a 
tutor for new teachers, emphasized a distinction between their criticism of contemporary policies 
which they saw primarily impacting teachers’ employment conditions, and a belief that many 
teachers lacked innovation in their pedagogical practices, and needed an external push to change. 
A sub director voiced his belief that: 
Many teachers defend their method, their form of work and they don’t want to leave their 
comfort zone, but some dynamic teachers are versatile, adapting to the necessities and 
socioeconomic conditions of the country and they are the ones promoting these changes. 
So we  have a contradiction between those that do it and those that don’t and the 
government says, ‘Some teachers in these contexts in primary and secondary [schools] 
are having success, why not you?’ And we’re in this dilemma, to make a Reform 
approved by law is not what we want, [so] we have to adapt ourselves to this new change, 
and the teachers should reflect daily on their  practice, in their innovation, they should 
also keep themselves updated, so that education can take another direction in the country. 
(Mexico City Teacher 4, Interviewed Feb. 2015). [Author’s translation] 
A secondary science teacher with 23 years experience, contends that the ideas of classroom 
teachers are seldom taken into account in policy making, resulting in a disjuncture with 
classroom experience creating cynicism among teachers: 
What I would like is that they take into consideration our perspectives as teachers in 
elaborating their plans, programs, strategies. …it’s as if they never call us. They say they 
do but it’s not true, who knows who they call, but it’s not people in the classroom. Those 
 Data provided by the AFESDF to the author, based on the 2014-15 school year.148
 Based on the 2013-14 school year. See Chapter 5.149
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of us in the classroom we have different challenges with the children. … Whoever it is 
that elaborates the programs and whatnot, they’re not in the classroom, they’re people in 
an office, working at a desk, and they don’t see the problems that there are in every 
school and each classroom. (Mexico City Teacher 2: Interviewed Feb. 2015) [Author’s 
translation] 
This high degree of skepticism of top-down policies, formed without their participation and felt 
to be divorced from their working experience, is common among Mexico City teachers, even if it 
is seldom expressed in the highly visible manner by their colleagues in more militant states. 
  
 The precarious employment of Mexican teachers is structurally determined in the 
assignment of positions (plazas), with a profound impact on their capacity to exercise their 
professional judgement. The issue exists on two levels. Firstly, the vast majority of teachers are 
underemployed, assigned less than full time status. Secondly, teachers receive little to no time 
during their regular workday for professional duties outside of classroom teaching. The time to 
do so must be found outside of extensive hours in the classroom for those full time, or the second 
jobs of underemployed teachers. In this sense, the employment structure of Mexican primary and 
secondary teachers is strikingly different from their colleagues in Canada or the US, where the 
job is structured in the overwhelming majority of circumstances as a full time occupation. 
 The standard teaching load for a primary teacher working in a school with morning and 
afternoon shifts consists of 18.4 hours of classroom time a week, amounting to daily 
responsibility for one grade-level class during one of these shifts. This work schedule does not 
recognize (or compensate) any time for non-classroom professional duties (Hernandez, Llamas 
& Garro 2012: 329). The work schedules of secondary teachers are more complex. While 
teachers in Canada and the US are usually assigned a full time course load at the start of their 
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employment, new secondary teachers in Mexico are typically assigned two or three daily 50 
minute classes, amounting to 12 to 15 hours of work a week. They may apply to teach additional 
courses as they become available, to eventually reach a maximum of 42 hours a week, typically 
only attained in the last few years of a career. According to the INEE, teachers assigned full time 
hours (36-42 hours a week) have remained static at around 10 percent from 1999 to 2015. The 
number of those at three quarters of full time was also static at around 12 percent. However, 
teachers employed half time (20 hours) declined from 32 to 22 percent from 1999 to 2014, and 
teachers with hourly employment less than part time increased from 43 to 55 percent, with the 
biggest growth since 2008 (INEE 2015: 56-57). Less than full time work is increasingly the 
trend, as in secondary schools opened between 2010-2014, 70 percent of teachers are on an 
hourly basis, whereas only half are in schools created between 1999-2004 (INEE 2015: 56-57). 
As a result, most secondary teachers approaching full time hours work in two or even three 
schools, frequently commuting from one to the other in the afternoon. In this way, the 
employment conditions of secondary teachers in Mexico bears a resemblance to itinerant adjunct 
university lecturers in the US or Canada. 
 Historically, the objective held by most teachers of increasing their hours towards full 
time status, obtaining assignments at schools closer to home, or consolidating their hours into 
one school, has created rich opportunities for patronage and clientelism for both SNTE and SEP 
officials (Hecock 2014; Hernandez Navarro 2012: 432; Martin 1994: 94-99; Mexico City 
Teacher 7: Interviewed May 2015). While the application exams of the Ley de Servicio 
Profesional Docente is supposed to remove this opportunity for graft, informants suggested that 
opportunities were still abundant for authorities to confer favours in employment assignments. 
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Meanwhile on another dimension of employment security, the proportion of secondary teachers 
with permanent status, formally gained after successfully completing six months in a permanent 
position, has declined from 94 percent in 2002 to 76 percent in 2015 (Hernandez, Llamas & 
Garro 2012: 330; INEE 2015: 61).  This statistic may suggest a growing number of teachers 
working in back to back interm positions, covering teachers on longterm absences, suggesting 
that the SEP is increasingly assigning work through these interm positions rather than new 
permanent positions (plazas). 
 Two problems exist with the assignment of work in units of several hours for secondary 
teachers. On one end, teachers lack enough working hours and therefore have to do other work to 
support themselves, often outside of teaching. A sub director observes of his colleagues: 
Here the average is 21 hours [a week], but there are those that only have 9, 12, 15. There 
are some that have more hours because they work at more schools… but you can’t live 
with 21  hours of work in this country, you need to do your 42 hours to live marginally 
decently. (Mexico City Teacher 4: Interviewed Feb. 2015) [Author’s translation]. 
 A secondary teacher of civics for eight years with a degree in psychology was assigned 20 hours 
spread over afternoons, with no work on Wednesdays. In the mornings she practiced psychology 
from her home (Mexico City Teacher 7: Interviewed May 2015). A secondary visual arts teacher 
in his first year got by with 12 hours a week, teaching six groups for two hours each (Mexico 
City Teacher 9: Interviewed Jun 2015). At the other end, senior teachers who have obtained a 
‘double shift’ in primary schools, teaching in both the morning and afternoon, and secondary 
teachers who have accumulated 36 to 42 hours, have an adequate salary, but no time to prepare 
for their classes. A secondary teacher of civics and ‘orientation’ (counselling) for 19 years who 
has gained full time status, works for 22 hours a week from 9 am to 1:30 pm at one school, and 
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for an additional 20 hours from 4:30 pm to 8:10 pm at another school (Mexico City Teacher 1: 
Interviewed Feb. 2015). His colleague a science teacher for 23 years, works for 19 hours from 
7:30 am to 11 am in one school, and then teaches for another 19 hours from 2 pm to 7:20 pm 
(Mexico City Teacher 2: Interviewed Feb. 2015).  
 The OECD statistics below in Table 1 demonstrate that Mexican secondary teachers 
spend a far higher proportion of their recognized working time actively engaged in classroom 
teaching than their colleagues elsewhere in North America. By ‘recognized’ working time, I refer 
to the period of time that teachers are contractually or statutorily mandated to perform teaching 
related duties. For example education legislation in Ontario stipulates that teachers must be 
present 15 minutes before the start of classes and for 10 minutes past the end of the school day, 
though in certain circumstances teachers can also be asked to perform duties up until 5 pm. 
Professional preparation periods where teachers are not responsible for students are included 
within this recognized work day in both Ontario and New York State. Not so for Mexican 
teachers. Unofficially ‘recognized’ work of teachers occurs on their evenings and weekends, 
usually outside the school. 
(OECD 2015: 455) 
This OECD report explains the significance of these statistics: 
Table 1: Secondary classroom teaching as proportion of recognized work
Mexico United States Canada OECD Average
Percentage of 
recognized work time in 
classroom
90% 71% 60% —
Total yearly hours of 
classroom teaching
1047 981 743 694
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The proportion of statutory working time spent teaching provides information on the 
amount of time available for non-teaching activities such as lesson preparation, correction, 
in-service training and staff meetings. A large proportion of statutory working time spent 
teaching may indicate that less time is devoted to tasks such as assessing students and 
preparing lessons. It also could indicate that teachers have to perform these tasks on their 
own time and to work more hours than required by statutory working time. (OECD 2015: 
450) 
Mexico City’s school authorities at the AFESDF acknowledged that their teachers must use their 
own time to perform many of the tasks described above which are essential to classroom 
teaching (AFESDF Official 1: Interviewed Feb. 2015). According to a school director, when 
secondary teachers are assigned their position, the AFESDF assigned them a proportional 
number of weekly ‘co-curricular’ hours for which they are paid to do non-classroom professional 
activities. The ratio was close to three hours for 30 hours in the classroom, with part time 
teachers often receiving none (Mexico City 8: Interviewed May 2015). The sub director who 
earlier voiced his frustration over a perceived lack of innovation among many teachers 
acknowledges the difficulties of being creative with a full time teaching load: 
A teacher with 42 hour in my country is not going to have time to train or update 
themselves because you’re up at 6 am and you’re working until 7 or 7:30 at night. When 
do you have a  shower, eat or sleep? When do you see your family? Here a class of 50 
minutes per group, if I have 39 hours and I teach science that means I give 6 hours a 
week to each group… it doesn’t leave me time before or afterwards. So I have to bring 
my marking home, but that’s on my time. But if I had 42 hours full time, I would have to 
mark and teach at the same time in the classroom, I wouldn’t be able to take away extra 
work. As a result, the only moment that I have to work and meet with my colleagues is 
during recess or during the technical committee [staff] meetings. There we have time to 
share, each month directors and teachers spend a full day evaluating the situation of the 
school to be able to make adjustments and changes. (Mexico City Teacher 4: Interviewed 
Feb. 2015) [Author’s translation]. 
It is noteworthy that neither the OECD nor the SEP or senior elected officials within the Mexican 
government have recommended or campaigned in recent decades to improve the quality of 
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teaching by giving teachers paid preparation time. A major World Bank report, Great Teachers: 
How to Raise Student Learning in Latin America and the Caribbean (Bruns & Luque 2014) 
found that Mexico City teachers routinely spent a significant amount of time marking or doing 
administrative work while in the classroom.  They argue based on correlations with test scores, 150
that such practices which take teachers away from directly engaging with students, has an 
adverse impact on learning. However consistent with neoliberal ideology, they blame the quality 
of the teachers for these practices, with little question raised that more resources may be required 
on the part of the state. It is difficult for teachers to fully use their professional capacities to do 
the time consuming tasks of preparing and delivering pedagogy oriented to the specific needs of 
their students when most are compelled to commute between schools, teach long hours or work a 
second job in order to earn a decent living. Recognized daily preparation time is critical to 
enabling teachers to exercise their professional autonomy.  
6.9: Acquiescence, Resistance and the Challenges of Scaling Up: the CNTE in the City and 
the Countryside 
 Having explored in this chapter the evolution of national-level neoliberal education 
policies, the integral role of the official SNTE under Elba Esther Gordillo in their 
implementation and the resistance of the CNTE, this final section will explore labour relations 
for Mexico City teachers since 2013. Specifically, I seek to understand why secondary teachers 
in Mexico’s capital have responded differently to similar education policies, especially from their 
 The study used the ‘Stallings’ method of video recording classes and analyzing the proportion of time devoted to 150
various activities. This method has been criticized by Lois Weiner and other critical education scholars as supporting 
deskilling, by approximating the classic ‘scientific management’ time studies that broke down work processes into 
discrete tasks in order that they be precisely defined (Lois Weiner: Interviewed Dec. 2014).
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more militant colleagues in the southeast of the country. Explanations studied here include 
differences in the nature of work for primary and secondary teachers, the historical position of 
the teacher in rural and urban contexts, the presence of political allies and the relative 
disciplinary capacities of education authorities. This discussion will then be applied to an 
overview of the CNTE’s upsurge against the education reforms over the summer of 2016, and an 
assessment of its outcome. 
 The day after Gordillo’s arrest for embezzlement in February 2013, without public 
protest, the union’s national executive appointed general secretary Juan Diaz de la Torre to take 
her place at the annual convention (Hernandez Navarro 2013). The departure of Gordillo did not 
lead to a collapse of the hold of the ‘institutional’ forces over the national SNTE and most of its 
state sections, despite de la Torre’s far weaker political power (Enrique de la Garza Toledo: 
Interviewed Feb. 2015). After being virtually invisible during the initial CNTE-led upsurge 
against the reforms in the fall of 2013, de la Torre increased his prominence, receiving public 
recognition from Peña Nieto, and began the international charm offensive described in Chapter 4. 
Despite the strength of the upsurge, the CNTE and other dissidents were unable to contest 
control of the national union to the extent achieved by the movement in 1989. A Mexico City 
CNTE activist emphasized that the national executive’s hold is reinforced by entrenched 
caciques (local political bosses) at the state level, who need to be challenged there (CNTE 
Section 10 Activist: Interviewed Feb. 2015). Despite the emergence of strong movements in new 
states including Veracruz and Jalisco, these dissidents were unable to win control over the 
official structures of their union sections, which could only be ceded by conventions called by 
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the national executive (Maria de la Luz Arriaga: Interviewed Jun. 2015).  Advances for the 151
movement are considerably impeded as a result of these mutually reinforcing state and national 
structures of control, even with a weaker leader at the top. 
 De la Torres’ eagerness to appease Peña Nieto at the national level filters down to affect 
Mexico City’s secondary teachers in the absence of a strong dissident movement in Section 10. 
According to one secondary teacher, “With the new reform, the union disappeared. Now we 
don’t have a union. The union exists but not for teachers, that is to say, we’re not protected by the 
union…” (Mexico City Teacher 5: Interviewed Feb. 2015) [Author’s translation]. A school 
official attributes labour stability in Mexico City in part to de la Torre’s closer alignment with the 
government: 
There’s the national level. If we compare the DF with other entities obviously there’s a 
great deal of stability and very good relationships… This owes to very fluid 
communications, to giving technical-pedagogical elements that strengthen the [local] 
union in a technical-pedagogical position, but also to the national context where the SNTE 
is since the departure of Gordillo, and the identification of corruption, in a position of 
greater alliance, we say, with the Secretary of Public Education. Not the Coordinadora 
[CNTE], but the SNTE. (AFESDF Official 1: Interviewed Feb. 2015) [Author’s 
translation]. 
A secondary teacher for 23 years bitterly described the situation of a dominant institutionally 
aligned Section 10 leadership and a weak CNTE dissidence for rank and file members: 
The truth is that the union has never truly helped us. One nearly always has to go out on 
their own to solve problems… It’s no more than a symbol and the truth is that it’s divided 
between the democraticos [CNTE] and the charros [institutionals]. It’s always a constant 
struggle between them and this doesn’t benefit us… (Mexico City Teacher 2: Interviewed 
Feb. 2015) [Author’s translation]. 
 For example, CNTE activists won an overwhelming majority of delegates to the convention of the Zacatecas 151
state section in July 2016, but the national SNTE was still able to circumvent them and appoint their preferred 
executive at a secret parallel convention. The same month, the dissident slate running for the state executive of 
Chihuahua were simply removed from the ballot by the national SNTE (Valadez Rodríguez 2016).
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The comments of this teacher are a reminder that while many in Mexico City hold opinions on 
the validity of the education reforms (most were opposed in the two secondary schools where I 
conducted interviews), relatively few align themselves politically with the CNTE or the official 
SNTE. Two teachers active within the CNTE of Section 10 attributed the sentiments of their 
colleagues to a reluctant resignation to the reforms and a disbelief in their ability to challenge 
them. They held little optimism in the likelihood of a mass upsurge among the city’s secondary 
teachers in the manner of their colleagues in the southeast (CNTE Section 10 Activist: 
Interviewed Feb. 2015; Mexico City Teacher 9: Interviewed Jun 2015). 
 However, interview participants active in the movement also identified significant 
differences between the experiences of secondary and primary teaching to explain why the 
dissident movement in the latter was far stronger in Mexico City. Firstly, various respondents 
described the nature of secondary teaching as more individualistic. One teacher describes a lack 
of solidarity at her school: 
As part of the same situation that we don’t have the support of our directors, we can’t 
collaborate as a team, everyone works individually. At times they form small groups, but 
nothing more, all the teachers in the school don’t come together to support each other. 
Everyone has their own little group, where they just defend each other… only when 
there’s a very grave problem, then we see the necessity of supporting these colleagues.  
(Mexico City Teacher 5: Interviewed Feb. 2015) [Author’s translation]. 
A Section 10 Activist (Interviewed Feb. 2015) adds that the tendency of many school directors to 
not encourage professional collaboration is augmented by the secondary level’s division into 
subject areas, whereas primary teachers teaching the same grade level more frequently share 
resources together. Some also argue that secondary teachers are not as collegial as primary 
teachers because while the former had long been a heterogenous combination of graduates from 
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public normal schools and university faculties of education, with the Ley of 2013, they were now 
joined by professionals lacking any degree in education. By contrast, a majority of primary 
teachers were still graduates from the public normales. As four year boarding colleges, they were 
long the incubators of a distinct teacher identity, and many graduated together from Mexico 
City’s large Escuela Nacional de Maestros. Another explanation are the differing structures of 
employment. Whereas primary teachers arrive and leave together for the morning and afternoon 
shifts, with their hourly employment contracts, secondary teachers have unique schedules. A 
secondary teacher whose employment is geographically fragmented with nine hours of classes 
each in two schools is also less likely to develop a strong identification with either community 
(Enrique Enriquez Ibarra: Interviewed Jun 2015; CNTE Section 10 Activist: Interviewed Feb. 
2015; Mexico City Teacher 9: Interviewed Jun 2015).  
 These teachers stress that the CNTE has a much longer and deeper history of organizing 
among Mexico City’s primary teachers, though the CNTE Section 9 has also faced significant 
obstacles. CNTE-affiliated teachers first won official recognition as the section’s SNTE 
executive in 1989 through a fair election convened by the national union in the aftermath of that 
year’s upsurge. The executive remained in the hands of CNTE supporters through subsequent 
elections. However in 2007, Gordillo staged a ‘charrazo’ (takeover of the union). At the last 
minute, the electoral convention was changed to a location unknown to the vast majority of the 
delegates, 80 percent of whom had pledged support to the CNTE slate. Gordillo’s candidates 
won by a landslide. Although CNTE supporters secured judicial recognition that the election was 
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unjust, they have been unable to compel the SNTE to respect this finding . According to CNTE 152
Section 9’s general secretary, he and other members of the parallel executive can continue 
representing members (on their personal time and without renumeration) because the AFESDF is 
aware that they have the support of most teachers (Enrique Enriquez Ibarra: Interviewed Jun 
2015; CNTE Section 10 Activist: Interviewed Feb. 2015; Hernandez Navarro 2012: 386-388, 
446-448; Leyva & Rodriguez 2012: 548). One of the largest reasons given for the greater 
strength of primary teacher dissidents is their greater ease in building alliances with parents 
(Hugo Aboites: Interviewed Feb. 2015). A young secondary teacher explains its importance for 
building a movement: 
In the primary schools it’s distinct because the parents are more active. In the secondary it 
gets more difficult, but you have to do this work. At the end of the day, if you do a good 
job, they see that you’re there in the classroom, they see how education is being destroyed 
not by the teacher, but by external conditions. So many parents see this clearly. Not all, 
there’s also some reactionary parents, but in this sense constant work gives you legitimacy.  
(Mexico City Teacher 9: Interviewed Jun. 2015) [Author’s translation]. 
Primary and secondary teachers share the same SNTE locals in all other states in Mexico, 
making this effort at alliance building easier outside the capital. 
 Strong differences in the political cultures of Mexico City and the southeast states are 
also important for explaining the unevenness of teacher responses to national education reforms. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a fulsome analysis of the context of teacher 
organizing in the southeast states where the CNTE has its base: Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero and 
Michoacan, each of which has its own complex history and distinctive dynamics from the others. 
 After the ‘charrazo’, the SNTE temporarily reoccupied the Section 9 building and extensively vandalized its 152
facilities. CNTE supporters soon forced their way back in and found most of the electrical wiring had been 
destroyed. Mexico City police did not intervene in either case. As of 2016, much of the large five storey building 
remains dark and unrepaired (Hernandez Navarro 2012: 446-448).
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However, a few brief points for the sake of illustrating a comparison with conditions in Mexico 
City can be made. When asked to explain why their colleagues protested less than teachers in the 
south, Mexico City secondary teachers suggested that in addition to having fewer opportunities 
for coalition-building with parents than primary teachers, overall, the school and their staff play a 
more central role in community life in the south. A teacher blamed school directors who ushered 
staff out of the building once their shifts were done, and lacked interest in starting extracurricular 
activities that could directly link the school with its surrounding neighbourhood.  A custodian 153
who worked in the school she attended as a child, and a longtime prefect (responsible for 
assisting with student discipline and temporarily covering absent teachers) emphasized how 
teachers who lived in the school’s neighbourhood tended to have an easier time connecting with 
both the students and their parents. They estimated that 30 percent of the teachers at their school 
lived nearby in the culturally vibrant but economically struggling neighbourhood in Iztapalapa 
(Mexico City Support Staff 1 & 2: Interviewed Jun. 2015). The custodian recalled an incident 
where staff arrived at the school to find that parents had blockaded the entrance over the shortage 
of certified teachers in all subject areas. She explained that while parents can support the 
struggles of education workers, they cannot reciprocate without risking discipline: 
If I support a parent that’s blocking the door to the school, I’ll be the one who’s 
disciplined…  For this reason, when the teachers demonstrate they do it away from the 
school, not here. They don’t close the schools, they simply stop work go to demonstrate 
in the Zocalo, [Monument to the] Revolución, etc. but not here at the school because 
then we could lose our jobs. (Mexico City Support Staff 2: Interviewed Jun. 2015) 
[Author’s translation]. 
 A teacher gave an example of how the students from her school came from a working class neighbourhood with a 153
lively music culture that has produced famous cumbia bands. Yet the school offers neither music classes nor music 
clubs or activities, or even the usage of its space after hours for community groups (Mexico City Teacher 6: 
Interviewed Feb. 2015).
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As a result, to avoid discipline, demonstrations are moved away from the school site to distant 
sites in the centre of the city, but doing could also make it more difficult to engage parental 
participation (Mexico City Teacher: Interviewed Feb. 2015).  
 By contrast, reports from Chiapas during the waves of teacher strikes and protests from 
May to July of 2016 against the Peña Nieto’s education reforms provide abundant examples of 
highly organized parents and community allies providing visible support for teachers, which 
would make the discipline feared by Mexico City teachers less likely. In one instance on May 23, 
“Before the march arrived in the central park [of state capital Tuxtla Gutiérrez] the group 
‘Organized Chiapan Businesspeople’ delivered to the teachers a ton and a half of supplies, 
among them bottles of water, biscuits, soap, canned tuna, beans and rice.” (Henríquez 2016a). 
The following weekend, La Jornada reported thousands of parents and other supporters marched 
in 80 of the state’s 122 municipalities in solidarity with the teachers’ strike (Henríquez 2016b). 
On July 13, La Jornada reported: 
The blockade installed by residents of this city at the access to Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to 
support the… CNTE in their struggle, has taken on a life of its own. It has constituted 
itself as a permanent popular assembly, broadening the demands of the teachers, and at 
15 days it is a reflection of the popular reach that the teachers’ movement now has in 
Chiapas. Hundreds of people, up to 3500 in recent days, remain here, day and night, 
mobilized. … everything started on June 27, when faced with the threat of repression 
against the blockade here… hundreds of people mobilized to create a ‘security corridor’ 
around the teachers. In a few days it  transformed into a centre of a community of groups 
and movements that defended the land, opposed the privatization of energy, demanded 
street paving, drinkable water and defence of the region’s nature reserves. 
(Bellinghausen 2016) [Author’s translation]. 
As was briefly described in the history of the emergence of the CNTE in the late 1970s and early 
1980s in Chapter 4, teachers’ movements in the southeast states have long built alliances with 
established campesino and other community movements with deep histories of organization. 
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They are largely without equivalents in Mexico City’s context, but distinctions also exist among 
its boroughs. Several CNTE members described Iztapalapa as the most politically active 
delegation (Mexico City Teachers 7 & 9: Interviewed May & Jun. 2015; CNTE Section 10 
Activist: Interviewed Feb. 2015). 
 It is also significant to note, that state strategies of responding to teacher and popular 
protest vary dramatically between Mexico City and the southeast states. Sociologist Enrique de 
la Garza Toledo (Interviewed Feb. 2015) suggests that the administrations of the Party of the 
Democratic Revolution (PRD) since 1997 in Mexico City contributed to de-radicalizing and co-
opting dissident movements, whose members may have been reluctant to alienate the 
government with protests when possibilities for dialogue existed. This tendency declined since 
2013 with the election of Miguel Mancera to head the government, who has distanced himself 
from the social partnership approach of his predecessors, while moving closer politically to Peña 
Nieto. Little parallel of ‘progressive’ governments and social dialogue has existed in Chiapas or 
Oaxaca, states where the PRI has long wielded control and a reputation for violent repression of 
protest.  Authorities in Chiapas succeeded in alienating parents at the outset of Peña Nieto’s 154
education reforms in 2013 by interpreting increases in ‘school autonomy’ to allow the 
government to download the cost of various school operations onto the parents themselves. By 
contrast, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the AFESDF has emphasized that no parent would 
ever be obligated to pay a fee, and with support from the Mexico City government, provides free 
school uniforms and other supplies, as well as some bursaries. The AFESDF also retained 
 The CNTE did have a more positive relationship with a PRD governorship in Michoacan in the 2000s. However 154
it was under the same party banner in Guerrero in 2014, that the 43 students of the Ayotzinapa Teachers’ College 
were abducted and presumed murdered with the complicity of the authorities.
 298
stronger administrative capacities for enforcing discipline among its staff. It is easier for regional 
and zone inspectors to regularly visit schools when they are within a contiguous urban area, 
rather than spread across hundreds of kilometres of rural territory. Arnaut (2008: 148) argues that 
the traditional administrative hierarchy of directors, sector chiefs, supervisors, school directors, 
are relatively stronger in Mexico City which has remained continuously under direct federal 
control, than in many states that have experimented with various forms of decentralization since 
1992. A senior official of the AFESDF contrasts the ability of teachers in the southeast to engage 
in illegal strikes, with their firmer grip in Mexico City: 
Sections 9 and 10… the relationship is very good. The leaders of these sections are of the 
SNTE, and up until now we haven’t had [strikes] in Mexico City. How could this be, 
because the Federal District is the scene of all the mobilizations, all the protests, that we 
haven’t had stoppages, nor protests, well, individual protests sure, but massive ones, no. 
Why? Because the law stipulates that if you are absent, you are not paid. And if you miss 
three consecutive days, without justification, then you lose your employment. There are 
entities like Oaxaca, Guerrero, etc. that haven’t paid attention to this and they haven’t 
made deductions. On the contrary, as the newspapers say, they [CNTE] have been able to 
negotiate lost wages for everyone who came to protest. In the case of the DF, no. It’s 
very punctual. The teacher that’s absent is reported and [the pay] is deducted. The 
teacher who’s absent three times… we proceed with the firing if there’s no justification 
on their part, medical or what have you. So this has also made, in addition to good 
communication, that we have a very stable and organic relationship with the leaders of 
the Section. (AFESDF Official 1: Interviewed Feb. 2015) [Author’s translation]. 
 The corporate national website of the SNTE provided no indication that another massive 
wave of strikes and protests by teachers across Mexico was unfolding against education reforms 
through May to July of 2016. A succession of press releases on successful meetings of its 
leadership with state officials and international dignitaries was only interrupted by a statement of 
concern on the killing of 11 teachers in rural Oaxaca, fired on by police during a demonstration 
convened by the CNTE that June. While urging authorities to exercise due diligence in its 
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investigation, it expressed its “profound concern” that “under the banner of education reform, 
some actors had entered the debate with a belligerent position that precipitates violence”, not so 
subtly blaming the CNTE for the death of its own members (SNTE 2016). However that the 
SNTE felt compelled to issue a public statement on the conflict which it otherwise strenuously 
ignored indicated the significance of this incident. The attack made international news, with 
some commentators drawing comparisons with the disappearance of the 43 Ayotzinapa student 
teachers. Teachers’ unions in Vancouver, Toronto, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago and 
Boston held solidarity rallies at Mexican Consulates. Many more including Education 
International, sent statements to the Mexican government denouncing the killings. The negative 
publicity for Peña Nieto was compounded as it coincided with a meeting of the North American 
heads of state, the ‘Three Amigos’, in Toronto.  
 Mexico’s Interior Ministry announced it would meet with the CNTE, but only to 
acknowledge the massacre. Section 9 of the CNTE then convoked a full strike over the last two 
weeks of school in July (except for a final day to deliver grades and meet with parents), with the 
estimated participation of 400 primary schools across Mexico City. While a minority of all 
elementary schools, it was a mobilization not seen for years by Mexico City teachers. Dozens of 
secondary schools across the Iztapalapa borough held one day strikes, careful to avoid triggering 
the three days absence leading to firing rule.  The work stoppages were joined by another 155
unprecedented dynamic. MORENA, the left party which had broken away from the PRD and 
now comprised the largest political force in the capital, began actively mobilizing its extensive 
 In one instance, brigades of parents from a particularly politically active school traveled to other schools to 155
encourage parents to support the movement citing the system’s dismal funding and buildings, who then gave moral 
and physical support to the more cautious and less organized secondary teachers blocking their schools.
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network of neighbourhood committees in support of the teachers, and hosted a hundred thousand 
strong march to the Zocalo.  Amid the road blockades, occupations and strikes in the CNTE’s 156
strongholds and sporadically elsewhere, the Interior Ministry agreed to formal negotiations on 
the structures of teacher evaluation, the fate of 8000 teachers who had been fired during the 
strikes and several imprisoned leaders. The CNTE refused to meet with the adversarial education 
secretary, who convened a parallel series of closed door meetings with the SNTE that produced 
proposals around incentive pay, but nothing related to the contentious evaluation system (Poy 
Solano 2016c). Meanwhile, responding to meetings with CNTE leaders, MORENA, the PRD, 
smaller left parties and a handful of PAN deputies in the congress and senate, voiced their 
interest in revising Peña Nieto’s education legislation. The Business Coordinating Council 
(Consejo Coordinador Empresarial, CCE), Mexico’s most important corporate lobby group, 
echoed the calls for a solution to the conflict, decrying the impact of months of road blockades 
by the CNTE across the country, but urged the government to avoid giving concessions to “acts 
of extortion” (Carlos Miranda 2016).  
 As the 2015-16 school year concluded, the CNTE reported to its members that tentative 
agreements had been reached to reverse the firings of striking teachers and free imprisoned 
leaders. That these negotiations occurred suggested the importance of both Mexico City teachers 
and the movement’s intervention into national politics to tip the balance in a conflict that was 
previously largely regional. Despite the sentiments of demoralization and resignation to the 
national education policy expressed by secondary teachers in 2015, reconfirmed in meetings in 
 Email correspondence with member of the Trinational Coalition in Defence of Public Education, July 19, 2016.156
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February 2016, the conflict is a reminder of how the political culture of Mexican teachers 
remains in flux. The main demand remained of revoking the Ley de Servicio Profesional 
Docente. It remained unclear whether the teachers’ movement could successfully apply frontal 
resistance to either sufficiently tip the balance at the national level or establish lasting regional 
exemptions from Enrique Peña Nieto’s Ley. The political context for education policy has 
become increasingly polarized. Peña Nieto is historically unpopular as is the PRI in many 
regions, evident in losses in the 2016 gubernatorial elections, and this has contributed to 
discrediting many of his signature policies. However Mexicanos Primero, some leaders from the 
PAN and other neoliberal voices have maintained pressure from the right wing thanks to high 
profile media coverage, against any ‘backsliding’ in granting concessions to the teachers. 
Constant direct actions by teachers including blockades of highways, malls and airports have 
aggravated business groups. It is also not difficult to imagine that weeks of school closures in 
some regions, would have alienated some parents despite efforts of striking teachers to engage 
with them. 
 Over the early 21st Century, teachers with various degrees of collective organization have 
proven their capacity to render widely contentious policies inoperable, as with the Alliance for 
Quality Education of Elba Esther Gordillo and Felipe Calderon, or the national ENLACE exam 
which determined teacher pay. It is yet to be seen if the three step teacher evaluations of the Ley 
de Servicio Profesional Docente will be successfully implemented over the long term. Visible at 
the peaks of national mobilization in the early fall of 2013 and early summer of 2016, the CNTE 
has expanded and reinforced its networks in the north and centre of the country, beyond its bases, 
in the context of an official SNTE with a diminishing impact on the work lives of its members. 
 302
Yet the control of Juan Diaz de la Torre and his supporters over the union’s institutional 
apparatus has not weakened. The movement does not appear to have significantly grown among 
Mexico City’s secondary teachers, whether due to the greater governance powers of the 
education system, or because of its division from the better organized primary teachers. The 
dissident teachers of the CNTE lack powerful allies beyond the regional level in states like 
Chiapas and Oaxaca, though an alliance with the leftist MORENA party could change this 
especially by creating a much needed base of support in Mexico City. Struggles over neoliberal 
education policy in Mexico will likely continue to focus on the nature of teachers’ work, 
increasing its precarity and de-professionalization. Such attacks undermine the core of 
professional autonomy. Without employment security and pedagogical training, professionalism 
is eroded and autonomy is impossible. Scalar strategies, though geographically uneven, will no 
doubt remain central to the struggles of both rural and urban teachers.  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Chapter 7: Toronto 
7.1: Introduction 
 Developments in education policy in Ontario over the early 21st Century have broadly 
followed the dominant trends of other Canadian provinces. Despite the absence of an intervening 
federal government as in the US, let alone a centralizing national government as in Mexico, there 
has been policy mobility between provincial education ministries and academics (Wallner 2014). 
Perhaps due to the absence of a neoliberalizing strong central government, distinctive waves of 
neoliberal policies have not passed through the provinces with the same rapidity as they have 
transformed US education (see Chapter 4). Though all provinces have their own standardized 
student exams from which data is gleaned to judge the overall effectiveness, they differ in their 
consequences for students. None are paired with disciplinary mechanisms comparable to the 
original No Child Left Behind Act of the US which would close and ‘reconstitute’ schools with 
low results year over year. As Wallner (2014) explains,  “…no policy encounters a clean slate in 
the receiving jurisdiction. Rather, the legacies and the regimes at work within each province 
mediate the introduction of new ideas and influence the likelihood that they will be 
adopted.” (Wallner 2014: 221). 
 Understanding the legacy of the Conservative government of Premier Michael Harris 
(1995 to 2003) for education politics in Ontario is essential for contextualizing the succeeding 
Liberal governments led by Dalton McGuinty and Kathleen Wynne (since 2013). The period 
studied in this chapter are defined by the latter regimes as the earlier period was covered in 
Chapter 4. Each section below will begin with a brief overview of his legacy in this area. There 
is a paucity of published academic research analyzing the post-Harris era of education policy and 
 304
governance in Ontario (Pinto 2015). Publications released several years into the McGuinty era 
still reflect back and focus on analyzing changes in the Harris period, likely due to the dramatic 
nature of the changes in the latter’s so-called ‘Common Sense Revolution’, but making analysis 
more difficult of the changes and continuities since then. Michael Fullan and Alan Boyle’s book 
Big City School Reform (2014) is most valuable for its comprehensive explanation of McGuinty 
era policies (as it is for discussing New York under Mayor Bloomberg). It takes an inside (and 
overwhelmingly favourable) perspective as Fullan was an appointed Special Advisor on 
education to the provincial government during this period, remaining one of four advisors under 
Wynne (Fullan 2016: 219). Pinto (2015) is also very useful in assessing the same period and 
many of the same policies from a critical perspective. However following the central premise of 
this dissertation’s focus, this chapter relies heavily on the perspectives of secondary teachers in 
Toronto, reflecting on how the policies rolled out under the McGuinty and Wynne governments 
have affected their professional autonomy as educators.  
 The chapter demonstrates how the education policies of the Liberal governments of 
Ontario drew upon a profound centralization of power under the previous Conservative 
government and its implementation of standardized testing as key metrics for defining education 
‘success’ to shape many of their own policies. It begins as did previous case studies, by 
demonstrating the importance of scalar centralization, in this instance from the Toronto District 
School Board to the Ontario Ministry of Education, for establishing the context for contemporary 
neoliberal education reform in section 7.2. Next, I analyze the rapid roll out of provincial policy 
under the Liberals as it was understood from the centre (drawing heavily on Fullan’s account) in 
section 7.3. The perspective then shifts in section 7.4 to look at its impact from the perspective of 
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teachers in an ‘inner city’ secondary school, where the imperative of raising graduation rates is 
felt through the increasingly managerial role of principals and vice principals as they encroach 
on the ability of teachers to exercise their own professional judgement in the classroom. Section 
7.5 demonstrates how teachers’ professional autonomy faces different challenges in a secondary 
school serving an affluent area. In this context, parental intervention with administrators over the 
children’s grades is prevalent. For schools in working class and affluent areas, a common stress, 
affecting each differently, is the existence of ‘school choice’ policies, which it is argued, are 
contributing to a racial and class sorting of secondary students in Toronto. Finally, in section 7.6 
I consider the impact of the scaling up of teachers’ collective bargaining for professional 
autonomy and the strategies of the Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation.  
7.2: Centralizing Governance: Increasing Ontario Ministry of Education Control of the 
TDSB 
 The centralization of funding from school districts to provincial governments and the 
parallel centralization of governance and policy, began in the late 1990s and became the 
dominant trend across Canada by the early 2000s, reversing decentralization in the 1960s 
through the 1980s (Wallner 2014: 76-77). Chief among political motivations was a perceived 
greater capacity of provincial governments to control the large proportion of education 
expenditures determined by teachers’ collective bargaining. Another key impetus was the 
harmonization of funding levels which varied widely depending on the taxing capacities of local 
districts. I begin here with an overview of how the Conservative government shifted power from 
local school districts to the provincial government, while reducing funding particularly for 
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Toronto and the province’s other large urban districts. This section will then demonstrate how 
this structure of governance has largely remained intact under the Liberals, establishing the 
context in which under McGuinty and Wynne, the provincial government has a significant 
influence on teachers’ work and professional autonomy. 
Centralization of Governance under the Conservatives (1995-2003) 
 In Ontario, the Conservatives pointed to other provinces while arguing in 1997 for the 
uploading of education finance from locally levied property taxes to centralized funding from the 
provincial government under Bill 160 (Wallner 2014: 219). This resulted in the ratcheting down 
of funding to a lower common denominator that squeezed Toronto which had previously 
financed its schools at an above average rate. Overall education funding was cut by $5.4 billion 
in 1997. Some smaller rural boards which previously drew from a limited property tax base did 
receive funding increases (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 62).  Among its many impacts on education, 157
another means by which Bill 160 pushed centralization was through the forced amalgamation of 
129 school districts into 72 (including all public, Catholic, French & French Catholic systems). 
The Toronto District School Board (TDSB) was formed from the school boards, each of which 
was larger than many rural boards, of the six former cities of metropolitan Toronto, which at this 
time were also forcibly merged into Toronto (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 60). While New York City 
lost its elected school board trustees with the implementation of Mayoral Control, they remained 
in Ontario, but with an annual stipend capped by provincial legislation at $5 000. Trustees that 
were not independently wealthy or retired were hampered from representing their constituents on 
 Most rural Ontario electoral ridings outside the far north and the southwest consistently voted Conservative.157
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a full time basis, as was formerly the case in Toronto (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 62). The provincial 
government reasserted its drive to fiscal austerity and centralizing control in 2002 by declaring it 
illegal for school boards to approve a budget deficit. Districts in Toronto and Ottawa passed them 
anyway and were taken over by provincial supervisors. They were also unable to create balanced 
budgets without drastic cuts to programs and staff. With an election on the horizon, the 
increasingly unpopular Conservatives were pressed to restore some modest portions of funding 
(Fullan & Boyle 2014: 63). 
 While it avoided altering the formal structure of local collective bargaining, the 
Conservatives used their power over education finance to legislate provincial control over key 
aspects of teachers’ professional autonomy negotiated between boards and federations. This 
included removing the following issues from the purview of collective bargaining, while 
imposing changes generally intended to reduce funding: class sizes (increased), staffing 
allocations (reduced), the length of school year (five more days were added), PD time (reduced), 
the amount of preparation time (cut in half), teachers’ administrative duties (increased in addition 
to ‘mandatory’ voluntary activities). The outcome of these policies imposed by the provincial 
government was the reduction of approximately 10 000 teaching positions through retirements 
and layoffs (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 63). As Rezai-Rashti explains: 
All of these policy reforms served to centralize educational decision-making and increase 
the ministry’s control over matters of finance and curriculum that had previously been 
under the jurisdiction of local boards of education. In just five years (1996-2001) the 
Ministry of Education and Training became the main source of funding and principal 
regulator of education, drastically reducing the power of school boards. (2009: 309) 
 The final straw was perhaps an unpopular law in 2001 providing tax credits to parents for 
sending their children private schools. This amounted to a step in the direction of school 
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vouchers and was a profound form of privatization by which public funding would be 
redistributed to subsidize private schools (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 65). Soon after this juncture, 
academics at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, many of whom would later play 
important roles within succeeding Liberal governments, released The Schools We Need: Recent 
Education Policy in Ontario & Recommendations for Moving Forward. It was a strong critique 
of Conservative education policies for being too many and often harmful (Leithwood 2003 et al). 
It was heavily cited in the Liberal Party’s campaign in the October 2003 election, won by 
McGuinty with a majority government. The tax credit was promptly repealed. A Conservative 
proposal for a revised tax credit for students attending private religious schools was widely 
attributed to their defeat in the 2007 election and a second majority government for the Liberals. 
McGuinty’s government came one seat short of a majority in 2011 (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 66), 
but under his successor Kathleen Wynne returned to a majority in 2014. 
  
Change & Continuity in Education Governance: Liberal Governments (2003- ) 
 During his first term from 2003 to 2007, Dalton McGuinty carried out a key campaign 
promise as the self-described ‘education premier’ and restored $2.6 billion in education funding 
(of the original $5.4 billion cut by Harris) to hire specialist and classroom teachers to lower 
elementary class sizes and fund a Student Success teacher in every high school as part of an 
overall priority discussed in the following section to raise graduation rates (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 
67). However Shilton observes, “More fundamentally, the McGuinty Liberals have shown no 
interest in repealing the keystone of the Harris-era centralizing reforms: central control of 
education funding, reflected in the provincial education funding formula.” (2012: 235). Taxing 
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power would not be returned to local districts. Despite increases in the per-pupil student grants 
through which most provincial funding was directed, considerable pressure remained for districts 
to close small schools, as fixed costs were covered by declining enrolment, as will be discussed 
below in section 7.5. It was also the primary mechanism facilitating the competition for 
enrolment in Toronto and other large cities through ‘school choice’. 
 The leadership of the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) enjoyed a much better 
relationship with the Liberals than their predecessors who had drastically reduced their autonomy 
and funding while temporarily taking over their administration (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 86). 
Somewhat symbolically, maximum trustee compensation was raised to $25 000 (leaving it still 
mostly a part time job). From the 2003 provincial election through the 2014 election, nearly all 
of Toronto’s 22 provincial ridings elected Liberals, making the city along with the surrounding 
‘905’ suburbs the core of the party’s support in the legislature . Not insignificantly, Kathleen 158
Wynne’s political trajectory began as a TDSB trustee in 2000, where she opposed mass school 
closures threatened by the Harris government’s budget cuts. Elected to the provincial legislature 
with McGuinty’s victory in 2003, she served as education minister from 2006 to 2010. 
Meanwhile, the TDSB was restructured into 20 ‘family of schools’ led by superintendents, which 
unlike New York City’s more amorphous school networks, was still generally aligned 
geographically with the city’s trustee wards, each with a total of 25-30 elementary and secondary 
schools. Fullan and Boyle explain how these ‘families’, larger than many districts in northern 
Ontario functioned in relation to the ambitious roll out of reforms from the provincial Ministry of 
 Suffering in part from a popular backlash against the Harris era, the Conservatives were frozen out from winning 158
any of Toronto’s provincial ridings in the four general elections during this period, only temporarily winning two 
seats in byelections.
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Education:  
The families of schools enjoy high levels of professional autonomy led by the 
superintendents with the close involvement of trustees. This independence, coupled with 
less direct connection from the centre to the schools in a larger organization, meant that 
the Ontario reforms were slower to gain traction in TDSB compared with most other 
school boards across the province. (2014: 87)  
 Fullan and Boyle observe, “the district had a tradition of operating with a degree of 
conflict and turmoil at the top (among the trustees, with the government)” (2014: 86). Tension 
with the Liberal government was limited to stated frustration over the disparity between its 
mandate to run new provincial programs like full day kindergarten, and insufficient funding 
provided to do so. However internal conflict made front page headlines in 2013 and 2014, 
challenging the legitimacy of its elected board as an institution. It survived, but after being 
subjected to a further redistribution of power to the Ontario government. A director known for a 
charismatic persona and ‘culture building’ events like a motivational mass rally of thousands of 
teachers and board staff at the start of one school year, resigned in 2013 after being found to have 
plagerized a newspaper column. Together with the district’s struggle to balance its budget with 
received funding, one conservative columnist called it a “crisis of governance” and looked south 
for an alternate model, “In big cities like New York or Chicago, the head of schools is a high-
profile position filled by high-calibre individuals. The TDSB needs a chief executive with 
experience in the business world or the broader public sector at complex administration.” (Gee 
2013). In late 2014, scandal ensued again when it was revealed that the new director facilitated 
herself receiving a substantial raise while teachers and other employees were subjected to a wage 
freeze by the provincial government. Among other sources of near violent boardroom conflict, 
she refused to share her employment contract with trustees despite their duty to provide this 
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oversight. The chair of the board resigned over a controversial contract for language programs 
with the Chinese government and a scheme to staff private schools in Vietnam with TDSB 
teachers. Others were implicated in forms of influence peddling. Pundits and politicians called 
for a takeover by the provincial government, or inspired by US models, mayoral control (Lorinc 
2014; Canadian Press 2014). The Liberal government commissioned an ‘outside expert’ to 
conduct a public review of the TDSB’s top administration. In addition to a “culture of fear” 
among senior managers and dubious ‘pet projects’, a particular problem she identified were 
trustees who “retained a ‘full time’ mind-set” despite their “symbolic” compensation (Wilson 
2015: 5). They would intervene regularly in the work of principals in their ward, demand their 
participation in political events and even hold influence over their appointment (Wilson 2015).  
 The discrediting of the district leadership created a context for the Ministry of Education 
to intervene with an unpopular and seemingly unrelated agenda of closing schools with declining 
enrolment to sell off its valuable real estate. In the final few pages of a report focused on 
interpersonal dynamics and management culture, the reviewer pivots to under-utilized schools, 
arguing the need to sell them off to bring much needed revenue to the system, and criticizing 
trustees for obstructing this process due to the interests of their constituents (Wilson 2015). 
Within days of the release of the review in early 2015, the education minister issued an 
ultimatum that the board address these findings (Sandals 2015). The budget of trustees, access to 
assistants and office space were considerably reduced. New plans were made to close secondary 
schools with low enrolment due to demographic changes and as will be discussed in section 7.6, 
a lack of success in the context of ‘school choice’. Embarrassing dysfunctional conflict and 
alleged corruption at the TDSB ultimately facilitated both a significant wave of privatization and 
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the further centralization of power over education policy to the provincial government. In this 
context, the governments of McGuinty and Wynne held considerable sway over the roll out of 
policy from the centre to Toronto’s classrooms.  
7.3: Quantifying Student Achievement: Policy from the Centre 
 The following section details the development of education policy primarily from the 
vantage point of the provincial Ministry of Education. I describe it as ‘policy from the centre’ to 
emphasize its top-down origins whereby most initiatives began with the Ministry, which actively 
participated in global policy networks. They were then pushed out to the school districts, which 
depending on the policy, held varying but generally limited scope for adaptation to local 
circumstances. As before, to provide context I begin with a brief overview of the significant 
intervention of the Harris Conservative government on teachers’ professional autonomy. Then I 
will consider how the education policy imperatives of the Liberal McGuinty and Wynne 
governments, particularly their emphasis on EQAO test scores and high school graduation rates 
as key metrics to define their success, emerged from the Harris era, to underpin ever increasing 
‘layers’ of top-down policy (Pinto 2015) which have increasingly defined the work of educators.  
 This section particularly draws on and critiques a detailed account by Michael Fullan 
(Fullan & Boyle 2014) of this era in which he has served as a prominent advisor to the provincial 
government. For his prolific and high profile interventions into provincial education policy over 
more than two decades, Fullan is among the few policy consultants whose name would be 
familiar to many Ontario teachers. His influence radiates far beyond the provincial scope he 
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might otherwise have as a professor emeritus and former dean of the Ontario Institute for Studies 
in Education. He is arguably one of the world’s most well-known and influential education 
policy consultants. Toronto-based People for Education executive director Annie Kidder 
describes Fullan and the UK-based policy advisor Michael Barber, as “rock stars that zoom 
around the world” (Kidder: Interviewed Nov. 2015). In December 2016, the homepage of his 
consultancy website where he is described as a “worldwide authority in educational reform” 
touted his ongoing work with authorities in California, the Peel District School Board of 
Mississauga and Brampton, Ontario, and a workshop tour in Australia (MichaelFullan.ca 2016).  
Near the apex of his influence, in 2010 Fullan co-chaired with Barber a large scale 
international conference on policy, Building Blocks for Education: Whole System Reform 
sponsored by the Ontario government and hosted by Premier McGuinty. Ministry of Education 
and senior school board officials learned about and spoke on ‘international benchmarks’, 
comparing recent changes in the systems of Australia, Finland, Singapore, Ontario and the US 
(Fullan & Barber 2010: 2). Keynote Andreas Schleicher, director of the OECD’s Program for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), argued for the importance of generating data through 
standardized testing, earning strong agreement from Fullan and Barber. They explained that it 
would constitute ‘collective autonomy’, arguing “We should not interpret the call for autonomy 
as a return to the autonomy of the individual teacher. ‘Behind the classroom door’ is decidedly 
not for fans of whole system reform.” US Secretary of Education Arne Duncan extolled merit 
pay for teachers and his ‘Race to the Top’ program (described in Chapter 5). Fullan disagreed in 
his final report, citing insufficient evidence of its efficacy and argued that it would be a “huge 
distractor” which the Ontario government was not interested in (Fullan & Barber 2010: 13). 
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 Fullan’s success comes in considerable part from codifying policy lessons  from his 159
experience as a senior advisor under Dalton McGuinty into a “brand of education reform” (Sue 
Winton: Interviewed Dec. 2015). For these reasons I believe it is worthwhile analyzing at length 
his portrayal of the education policies in Ontario which he has helped to engineer. I take a critical 
approach to some of the McGuinty era policies which he stands behind, particularly the reliance 
on EQAO standardized test score results to evaluate the Ontario education system, and the drive 
to raise graduation rates without considering its effects on the integrity of classroom teaching. 
Overall, I am critical of his embrace of top-down policy in the Ontario context, insofar as it does 
not take seriously the capacity of teachers to effectively exercise their professional judgement.  
As a result, this chapter contends that their classroom autonomy has been undermined. However 
as Kidder observed in Chapter 4, in the context of the dominant policy discourses in the US, 
Mexico and many other countries like the UK, his “brand is not to attack teachers”. In his later 
writings (Fullan 2016), he has clarified his criticism of No Child Left Behind’s punitive approach 
of firing teachers and closing struggling schools. He also recognizes that teachers draw 
significant satisfaction from a feeling of having exercised their professionalism well and that 
accordingly merit pay is a “wrong driver” for reform. Fullan has even critiqued top-down reform 
more generally (but not in reference to Ontario), recognizing that more often than not these 
policies fail to connect with the realities of teachers’ work lives. However his chief remedy is to 
scale down from working through civil servants, administrators and politicians at the national or 
 He has written dozens of books drawing on his experiences as a policy advisor, many published by the Ontario 159
Principal’s Council. They are decidedly unacademic in tone, marketed in an airport bookstore business 
empowerment style including Changes Forces: Probing the Depths of Educational Reform, Changes Forces: The 
Sequel, Change Forces with a Vengeance, Leading in a Culture of Change, The Six Secrets of Change, The 
Challenge of Change, Change Wars, Freedom to Change, Motion Leadership in Action, Professional Capital, and 
The New Meaning of Educational Change.
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the state/provincial level to the district level. The voice of classroom teachers remains 
marginalized because he does not acknowledge or take seriously the contradicting power 
relationships of schools and school districts as hierarchical workplaces. Administrators and 
superintendents do not necessarily understand or sympathize with the realities of teachers’ work 
or share the same interests, as teachers and principals themselves will argue in the following 
sections. Nevertheless, while Fullan is a focus of critique, he is symptomatic of the post-Harris 
Conservative experience in Ontario generally, of a softer neoliberalization of education, in 
contrast to the pro-privatization, anti-labour approach of Governor Cuomo in New York State or 
Mexicanos Primero and President Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico. 
Harris Conservatives Set the Context for Policy from the Centre 
 Drawing on recommendations of the Royal Commission on Learning from the preceding 
New Democratic government, in 1996 the Conservatives established the Education Quality and 
Accountability Office (EQAO) soon after their election as an independent agency responsible for 
administering standardized testing within the public education system . The EQAO phased in 160
tests from 1997 to 2002 of reading, writing and math in grades 3 and 6, math in grade 9 and 
reading and writing in grade 10 (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 61-62). The tests were strongly opposed 
by teachers and their federations, among other grounds, that they would narrow instruction. 
Under pressure to obtain high scores for a school, teachers would divert time otherwise spent on 
regular course content to drilling students on the specific knowledge most likely found on the 
 A strong parallel can be drawn here with the creation of the Mexican National Institute for the Evaluation of 160
Education (INEE) in 2002 (described in Chapter 6), which was similarly autonomous from the main education 
administration, also with the rationale that formal separation would increase the testing agency’s objectivity.
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tests. ‘Teaching to the test’ would constitute a significant threat to professional autonomy, as 
teachers in the US and Mexico could corroborate. Except for the grade 10 literacy test , the 161
EQAO tests would not be considered directly ‘high stakes’ for teachers or students in the way 
that they are in New York State, where they decide teacher employment and student graduation 
(in the case of the high school Regents exams) or in Mexico where the ENLACE also determined 
teacher employment and salary increases . Elsewhere in Canada, provincial exams comprise 40 162
percent of a student’s final marks in grades 10 through 12 in British Columbia and 50 percent of 
final grade 12 marks in Alberta (Wallner 2014: 79). The primary significance of the EQAO test 
scores was indicative, to provide an analysis of the system as a whole, as well as individual 
schools. While lacking a direct punishment capacity as US standardized tests did through No 
Child Left Behind, through which consistently low scoring schools could be closed and their 
staff fired, the results similarly received a wide public release and as will be argued below, were 
linked to more subtle forms of pressuring and shaping teachers’ work. As Spencer (2012) 
contends, the highly centralized record keeping practices to which the school-level 
administration of the EQAO contributes, is a form of ‘governance at a distance’ through the audit 
of local authorities. 
 Pinto (2012) critiqued the outsourcing of provincial curriculum development under the 
Harris Conservatives to non-profit and for-profit consultants for its lack of accountability to both 
the educators who would be required to follow their guidelines and the broader community. She 
 Students must pass this test to eventually graduate from high school. In the case of failure, they must take the test 161
again the following year. If again unsuccessful, they are enrolled in a ‘Literacy’ course, which from the author’s 
personal experience as a teacher, has a very high pass rate.
 See the respective New York and Mexico City chapters above for a complete analysis of the standardized tests in 162
these cities.
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found a loss of internal capacity through privatization under the Conservatives to accommodate 
the rapid rewriting of high school subjects curriculum. Teachers were hired through external 
companies and given limited autonomy due to hierarchy, tight timelines, and the government’s 
prioritization of input from business lobby groups. However it is consistent with neoliberal 
governance, despite this and other examples of outsourcing, the capacity of the Ministry under 
Harris to regulate teachers’ work greatly increased. In addition to reintroducing streaming for 
grades 9 and 10, declaring supervision of extracurricular mandatory (though seldom enforced), it 
created the professional regulatory body Ontario College of Teachers (OCT) in 1997 (again 
following recommendations from the previous government). The OCT produced the Standards of 
Practice document which defined teacher professionalism in broad terms that were largely taken 
for granted.  
 More controversially, in 2001 the OCT was tasked by the government with administering 
the Ontario Teacher Qualifying Test (OTQT)  an exam for all new applicants for teaching 163
positions, and a requalifying test for teachers every five years. Both resembled the standardized 
evaluations of the Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente discussed in the previous chapter that 
have been bitterly resisted by the Mexican teachers’ movement. The primary system for 
evaluating teachers through principal observations was standardized with the Teacher 
Performance Appraisal (TPA) process consisting primarily of two formal classroom observations 
every two years, and the New Teacher Induction Program (NTIP) of two observations of teachers 
in each of their first two years (Rezai-Rashti 2009: 309-310; Fullan & Boyle 2014: 62; Shilton 
2012: 234). Interviews by Pinto, Portelli et al (2012) with 41 Ontario elementary and secondary 
 Development was outsourced by the Conservatives to a US testing agency (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 62).163
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school administrators on what makes a good teacher found that they drew largely on two popular 
archi-types, the ‘charismatic teacher’ possessing intrinsic intangible skills (caring, firm, a good 
communicator, etc), and that of ‘competency’ more reflective of the official discourse of the 
Ministry of knowledge of curriculum and policy. Pinto, Portelli et al conclude, “NTIP reflects a 
knowledge transmission model of induction, whereby the focus is on conformity and the 
transference of so-called “expert” knowledge.” (2012: 79). They argue that neither the criteria of 
NTIP nor that of individual administrators encouraged independence on the part of teachers. 
While arguably superior to Mexico’s standardized teacher exams in assessing how teachers work 
in the classroom, Ontario’s NTIP and TPAs rely heavily on the subjective perceptions of 
principals, which mostly align with dominant discourse from Ministry, and do not tend to 
encourage alternative or critical approaches to pedagogy and instruction by teachers 
 Rezai-Rashti (2009) summarizes the impact of the Harris era on teachers’ work as 
intensification (new curriculum squeezing new content into fewer courses, budget cuts leading to 
larger class sizes and less prep time) and reorganization. The latter was comprised of the 
replacement of high school department heads with subject-area expertise by a system of around 
four teachers as Curriculum Leaders each responsible for several subject areas. As Curriculum 
Leaders would usually not be personally experienced in all of the several subject areas for which 
they were responsible, their duties veered away from actually being curricular leaders. Rezai-
Rashti describes this as a shift from skilled veteran teachers to ‘teacher-managers’ “…whose 
main responsibility is to administer government-mandated policies in local schools” (2009: 316). 
Meanwhile the new provincial curriculum was more prescribed, with detailed lists of ‘overall 
expectations’ and ‘specific expectations’ meaning less teacher discretion in interpreting courses. 
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Some teachers interviewed by Rezai-Rashti suggested this could provide students with a clearer 
idea of where marks came from. Overall he argues these changes had a profoundly adverse 
impact on teachers’ professional autonomy, and that the “…impact of restructuring was felt most 
strongly in Toronto, where more progressive ideas and support mechanisms had been in 
place.” (Rezai-Rashti 2009: 312). 
 Rezai-Rashti found that at least some veteran teachers were able to continue to exercise a 
fair amount of autonomy in the face of these top-down reforms, bringing to mind Larry Cuban’s 
comments  in Chapter 2 on the persistence of classroom autonomy despite major top-down 
policies. One experienced teacher explained: 
I have been teaching long enough to see a number of different things come and go 
through the years, and generally what you do, if you’re in a position where you already 
have a permanent contract, and it is unlikely you would be called up on the carpet, and 
you have seniority…is take what you like from these changes that come about, and the 
things you think are best suited to the particular subject area that you’re teaching…if I 
were a beginning teacher or even mid-career looking at another ten or fifteen years, then I 
would definitely address these things in a much more serious way. …my situation is 
somewhat different, so I have been picking and choosing a little bit. (Rezai-Rashti 2009: 
313)  
Accordingly, Rezai-Rashti argues that the strongest impact of the Harris era reforms on teachers’ 
professional work was on new teachers with less experience, ability or confidence to push 
existing professional autonomy to the hilt in response to reforms. He concludes pessimistically:  
…there have been no substantial structural changes in the everyday practices of 
schooling. The reorganization of the education system institutionalized by the former 
Conservative government is now so entrenched that the potential for any substantial 
changes to the system are limited. (Rezai-Rashti 2009: 318) 
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Pinto concurs that from the Conservatives to the Liberals in 2003, “Ontario’s core education 
policy has remained largely unchanged while the neoliberal rhetoric has persisted” (2015: 143). I 
will now attempt to assess the extent to which this is the case. 
Change & Continuity in Education Policy: the Liberal governments of McGuinty & Wynne 
(2003-2016) 
 Dalton McGuinty’s government intervened quickly after taking office to change some 
significant aspects of teacher evaluation instituted under Harris. The OTQT qualifying 
standardized test and recertification requirements were eliminated, while the performance 
appraisal was shifted from every two years to every five years, and the New Teacher Induction 
Program was retained (Rezai-Rashti 2009: 309; Shilton 2012: 234; Pinto, Portelli et al 2012). 
The broader trend under Harris of rolling out layer upon layer of top down policy from the centre 
continued and arguably intensified. Pinto did not see substantial changes towards more 
democratically engaging educators and communities in curriculum development during 
McGuinty’s first term (2012: 206-207). Under McGuinty, the Ministry did substantially expand 
its capacity as it centralized its control from local school districts over education policy. Through 
this process, policymaking became more politicized according to OSSTF president Paul Elliot:  
It really came to fruition, the whole shift in power, after Harris left, but he was the one 
who started the ball rolling. When he shifted the funding to the provincial government, it 
really  became more political than it ever was before. Locally, it was just locally 
political, some people couldn’t even tell you who the trustees were… McGuinty, as 
much as he may have been known as the education premier, it really all had to do with 
the directives and policies that came out…[T]he exponential growth of the Ministry of 
Education, of policy advisors specifically. … Because now, if they were funding it, they 
really took control over of the direction of education. That’s when we began to see the 
drive to increase graduation rates. (Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
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Elliot continues, explaining how in his opinion, the steady expansion of the Ministry of 
Education under McGuinty and Wynne created its own rationality for ever expanding policy: 
Every time I go over there, you’re always meeting new policy people. And they come 
and go so quickly. Case in point, when I went to the last central table in bargaining, we 
talked about Ministry initiatives. We got them to agree to a one year hiatus on Ministry 
initiatives. They were just aghast. They said to us, ‘you have no idea what you’re asking 
us to do.’ Because it was almost impossible for them to do that because they are driven 
by new initiatives. Without initiatives, they don’t exist for any reason. You had whole 
floors of people who would continue working on new initiatives because that’s what they 
do. (Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
Certainly, this explanation of institutional self-perpetuation is far from Fullan and Boyle’s 
account below of ‘morally driven’ policy reform. 
 The most significant part of the McGuinty government’s education policies centred 
around measures intended to produce increases in the annual EQAO tests instituted under Harris, 
as they were assumed to be the most accurate form of measuring the system’s overall 
effectiveness, and increasing high school graduation rates while requiring youth to remain in 
school until 18. As noted in Chapter 4, Fullan and Boyle attribute the Liberal government’s 
emphasis on improving ‘literacy and numeracy’ to a trip by McGuinty to England in the late 
1990s, where the future premier observed Fullan’s work there as an assistant to Prime Minister 
Tony Blair. They credit McGuinty with leaving behind Blair’s more punitive policies in which 
schools performing badly on tests were subject to “assertive name-and-shame 
accountability” (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 67). The Ontario government established a Literacy and 
Numeracy Secretariat in 2004 to coordinate school strategies aimed at improving scores. Raising 
graduation rates would be the subject of projects grouped under the Student Success Initiative 
(Fullan & Boyle 2014: 67-70). In contrast to Pinto, Fullan and Boyle claim that the McGuinty 
 322
government did increase the involvement of teachers in developing the Student Success, Literacy 
and Numeracy programs, especially relative to the Harris government, “The unwritten message 
was that schools and teachers needed to be key participants in improvement and that their ideas 
and knowledge mattered. This was a smart move early in the strategy, as it demonstrated trust in 
the profession, an essential ingredient for an effective partnership and buy-in from 
teachers.” (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 68). 
 Fullan and Boyle tout their model of a balance of ‘pressure and support’, which they 
contend was followed by the McGuinty government during this period, with the subsequent 
successes that ensued in terms of higher EQAO scores and graduation rates. Rather than the 
punitive consequences for low scores seen in the contemporary UK or the US under NCLB, in 
2006 the Ontario Focused Intervention Partnership (OFIP) was created through which 
elementary schools with low or stable scores received additional support. Initially, $25 million 
was spread over 1100 schools ($27 000 each), including 150 TDSB schools, reduced to 10 by 
2013, as their scores rose (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 72, 89). Fullan and Boyle describe the basis 
behind the program’s success, claiming that it motivated teachers to be proactive where they 
previously were not: 
Before intervention, more teachers blamed external factors such as poverty roughly 2:1. 
After OFIP, the opinions shifted 1:2, with more teachers admitting they could do 
something about it. Across the province the OFIP program was a big success. Combining 
high expectations, nonjudgemental (positive) stances towards the schools, and targeted 
and ongoing support for capacity building… (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 91) 
The number of low achieving schools was reduced, due to the “involvement of superintendents, a 
shift from professional development to professional learning, more sophisticated use of data, and 
a deliberate focus on improving teaching.” (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 91). EQAO scores and high 
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school graduation rates rose during McGuinty’s first term from 2003 to 2007, Fullan and Boyle 
say due to: “a combination of focus, new resources, and mutual commitment between the 
government and schools” (2014: 73).  
 To make it easier for more students to graduate, the Specialist High School Majors 
(SHSM) program was launched in 2006, where school developed ‘specialist programs’ with 
connections to local businesses and industry. Students could earn additional credits through work 
placement programs and free community college courses. Within a few years, 38 000 students 
had enrolled in 1500 programs at 647 high schools, representing 12 percent of all secondary 
students (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 70). Fullan and Boyle give credit to this program for 
substantially boosting graduation rates. The program had a proportionally much lower enrolment 
in TDSB, with only 1700 participating students as opposed to 4800 if involvement was in 
proportion to the rest of the province. They blame TDSB trustees for obstructing the program for 
reasons that are unstated (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 91). Fullan and Boyle also herald a shift from 
formal professional development sessions to improve teaching to “ongoing learning in schools”, 
collectively facilitated by teachers especially in high schools. “Through moderated marking and 
co-teaching, this form of professional learning has also moved schools on. Some refer to it as the 
deprivatization of the classroom…”. It was “not being mandated or part of a deliberate strategy”  
(2014: 95) suggesting it was bottom-up, though they later explain these programs were launched 
by superintendents. 
 Fullan and Boyle describe the Ministry’s activity from 2008 to 2012 in which Fullan was 
embedded, “The reforms picked up momentum in the second phase, and the sheer volume of 
work is enormous.” (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 74). The Energizing Ontario Education (2008) policy 
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document retained the prioritization of increasing the proportion of students scoring above 70 
percent on math and literacy tests, and set a target of 85 percent of high school students 
graduating within five years by 2011, up from 68 percent in 2003 . Initiatives were also 164
launched to raise EQAO scores among marginalized groups, including Indigenous students, 
recent immigrants and students from low income families (Ontario 2008: 5-9). Seventy two 
percent of students graduated high school within the standard four years by 2010, reaching 84 
percent in five years by 2012. Meanwhile, the proportion of students achieving 70 percent and up 
on the grade 9 math score increased from 59 percent in 2007 to 73 percent in 2012. These 
numbers on the grade 10 literacy test declined slightly over these years from 79 percent to 77 
percent (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 80, 81). In the TDSB, EQAO test scores for grades 3 and 6 
closely tracked Ontario averages from 2003-2012. They remained consistently a couple 
percentage points below on the grade 9 math and grade 10 literacy test, as well as on the 
graduation rate. Consistent with their focus on the agency of their policy and dismissal of 
structural causes, they blame this on the lower TDSB uptake of the SHSM program (Fullan & 
Boyle 2014: 98-100). Fullan and Boyle attribute the success of McGuinty’s ‘Ontario Strategy’ of 
which Fullan was a part, as having a “small number of ambitious goals” and a “focus on data as 
an instrument of continuous improvement” (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 85). They note approvingly 
that the “TDSB is one of the leading boards in the province in using data to measure outcomes 
and inform decisions and instructional practices” (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 88). Like in New York, 
an Office of Accountability and Student Achievement reports to the director.  
 According to OSSTF President Paul Elliot, publicized government statistics on graduation rates and EQAO test 164
scores always use 2003 as the base year, which is when the Liberals entered office (Interviewed Sep. 2016).
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 People for Education’s Executive Director Annie Kidder, head of Ontario’s most 
prominent education advocacy group, contends that the government’s encompassing focus on 
increasing test scores has created distorted priorities of helping a specific range of kids reach a 
specific metric, in this case, obtaining at least 70 percent (level three of four). While lauding the 
province’s less punitive approach towards teachers and schools in comparison with the US, she 
comments: 
So it's definitely we're going to work together [teachers, schools and the government], 
but it's still having very very strong overall goals, and despite it being not commonly 
copped to at a provincial level, it certainly has been, if our political goal is getting X 
percent of kids up to level 3, then certainly, high schools were told, work on the kids 
who are at 2.7. Really target those kids ‘cause you can get them up to level 3! To us 
that's a bastardization of what we should be doing in our classroom. (Annie Kidder: 
Interviewed Nov. 2015) 
Vibert observes in the context of education reform under Harris and McGuinty in Ontario, “So 
highly do proponents of accountability value the demonstration of improvement that the 
appearance [emphasis in original] of improvement becomes the primary consideration. As in the 
market, perception is reality.” (Vibert 2009: 296). A high school teacher and education activist 
adds even more skeptically: 
[T]he McGuinty government and subsequently the Wynne government is very data-
driven. It's all about graduation rates, and test scores too but in particular credits earned, 
graduation rates...and so they came up with all these initiatives like credit recovery, 
credit rescue..to basically grant credits. … So we've seen massive mark inflation… but 
of course they have the data. So graduation rates have gone up under the Liberals, not a 
surprise. When you take the  Enron approach to education, if the numbers don't add up, 
just figure out a different way to add up the numbers. I'm speaking as somebody who 
doesn't even care about marks. I would be happier teaching a system that didn't give 
marks. (Toronto Teacher 10, Interviewed Jul. 2015) 
This teacher’s language implying a deliberate effort on the part of the provincial government to 
skew grades upwards to support their political agenda may sound like an exaggeration, or 
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assigning too much intent and agency. Consider however, this account by a teacher hired over the 
summer by EQAO to score grade 6 reading and writing tests of an incident during the grading 
process: 
[A]fter two days of scoring, we were informed that whatever we'd been scoring as a code 
20 was now a code 30 (laughs). We were organized in pods. Pods are two groups of  
approximately 30 teachers in each group, so there was 60 teachers in each room, and 
there are supervisors at the front… and there was an audible outcry. People were like, 
‘What do you mean? What do you mean all of a sudden what you told us was this is now 
this?’ That was the curve, right? They weren't getting the results that they wanted from 
that particular question. …there were some people who said, ‘I don't think I can do this.’ 
They wanted to leave. They just felt that the integrity of the process, if there was any to 
begin with, was completely undermined. … [M]y guess is that the results that were 
coming in on the language score were lower than they wanted. …the difference between 
a code 20 and a code 30 could be the difference between some students passing and 
some students failing. (Toronto Teacher 2: Interviewed Aug. 2014) 
This teacher’s experience of shifting grading criteria used by EQAO was corroborated in a 
separate interview with Toronto Teacher 4 who had also graded these exams. 
 More incredulously, Fullan and Boyle claim that the ‘Ontario Strategy’ was “Not top 
down or bottom up”, citing the involvement of some school district directors in policies 
ultimately determined from the provincial Ministry of Education as “policy leadership from the 
middle” (2014: 88). After publication of Big City School Reforms, Fullan developed the concept 
of ‘Leadership from the Middle’. Critiquing policy reforms from national or state/provincial 
governments as being too top-down, he also dismisses bottom-up (ie. teacher-led) reform as 
being “too piecemeal” (Fullan 2016: 203). His ‘middle’ is the directors of school districts, whom 
he urges to work together horizontally for finer grain policies than can be meaningfully 
elaborated and implemented from the top. The top remains important for developing the right 
‘drivers’, such as standardized test scores to measure schools (Fullan 2016: 203-204). 
 327
 Fullan and Boyle articulate their technocratic orientation underpinning many of the 
assumptions behind McGuinty and Wynne’s ‘Ontario Strategy’ in explaining why test scores and 
graduation rates improved in the TDSB:  
The alignment of data was important, coupled with the growth of skills and ability to 
compare and manipulate the data. … The intense focus on higher expectations with 
accountability led to more precise conversations between district and school leaders 
about which students needed most support and how it was going to be provided. Then it 
was the resources, human and financial, that came with the Ontario Strategy that made 
the difference. Today the district and  the schools feel that they are part of a larger plan. 
(Fullan & Boyle 2014: 90)  
It is a version, albeit friendlier towards classroom teachers, of the same assumptions guiding the 
centralization of education governance in New York and Mexico, in which only when subjected 
to sufficient external pressure, will educators improve their schools, and that ultimately it is up to 
experts and top officials to generate the means by which this will occur. Accordingly, they are 
willing to share credit, “Donna Quan, Director of Education at TDSB, has evidence showing that 
District Reviews of schools have made the biggest impact on student achievement in recent 
years.” (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 92). The District Reviews consists of high schools first 
completing ‘School Effectiveness Framework’ to self-assess room for improvement, then review 
teams visit schools to speak with staff and students, and observe them in classrooms, and 
scrutinize student work. “Communication is open, honest, and transparent throughout the 
process. The District Review Team adopts a supportive and nonjudgemental approach.” (2014: 
93). Fullan and Boyle note that the process was developed with union consultation. This likely 
helped create a process that was less punitive or adversarial than New York Mayor Bloomberg’s 
initial letter grades for schools. “Current conversations focus on the differences between a good 
and a great school.” they note optimistically (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 93). In addition to all high 
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schools completing these reviews within three years, principals in consultation with teacher 
Curriculum Leaders complete annual ‘School Improvement Plans’, which are appended to the 
‘Board Improvement Plan for Student Achievement’ submitted to the Ministry. Individual 
schools and the TDSB as a whole must explain how they will make improvements in “literacy, 
numeracy, learning pathways, community, culture, and caring” At least the first two are defined 
by EQAO scores. Anecdotally, according to teachers cited in the following section and 
administrators interviewed by Pinto (2015), it is these more quantitative criteria that are 
politically more significant, making these policy plans reminiscent of the ‘Quality Schools 
Program’ (PEC) instituted in Mexico during this period. 
 Reading Fullan and Boyle’s chapter on Ontario education policy and its roll out in 
Toronto, it is striking that while the authors take pains to distinguish their endorsed strategy from 
the punitive contemporary ones of New York and England, they retain the use of standardized 
test scores as a primary metric with which to judge the system’s progress. Moreover there is a 
very clear imperative woven throughout of the necessity of year over year sustained, rapid 
improvement on all fronts. How feasible is this to maintain indefinitely? How does this affect the 
system? Is there a dumbing down of credit integrity, or of the standardized exams themselves? 
Teachers interviewed in the following section do believe that constantly rising progress has been 
achieved at least partly through weakened standards. Their voices are nowhere to be found in 
Fullan and Boyle’s accounts. Yet these authors also criticize contemporary trends in “negative 
accountability, isolated school autonomy, the continued deterioration of the teaching 
profession…” (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 145). 
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 The policy imperative of constantly rising graduation rates is thornier. Students without a 
high school diploma hold limited options for a life without poverty. Raising the proportion of 
youth in high school also requires increasingly high amounts of resources, as OSSTF president 
Paul Elliot explains: 
If you want to get to 95 percent, it’s a huge influx of money. … It’s at about 85 now? If 
they want to get to 90, it’s a huge step in support to get to 90 because the next 5 percent 
are going to take such an increased level of support, attention, different kinds of 
programs… (Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
Additional Special Education classes with very low teacher to student ratios, more educational 
assistants, youth workers and counsellors are required to effectively accommodate students who 
often suffer from a range of emotional and mental health issues. If they had a choice, by the age 
of 16 or 17, many would drop out of school, as was the case in previous decades. The gritty 
realities of this are not captured in Fullan and Boyle’s bird’s eye system analysis. What we see 
instead are a parade of good intentions from the McGuinty government and their colleagues at 
the top of the TDSB. Providing the necessary resources to keep a growing proportion of youth in 
school precipitates a collision with austerity politics, which in regards to education, became 
pronounced in Ontario from 2012 onwards, threatening the incremental improvements in funding 
of the Liberal’s first two terms. These developments will be further discussed in the final two 
sections of this chapter. 
 Criticism of the top-down education policy of the Liberal premiers and traditional 
skepticism of academics and civil servants were opportunistically employed in the 2014 
education platform of the hard-right Conservative candidate Tim Hudak. His education white 
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paper claimed to champion “a teacher and principal driven system”, and dismissed the work of 
Fullan and other policy advocates contracted by the Liberals: 
Only the classroom teacher really knows the particular needs of your child. When it comes to 
education, a key principle for the Ontario PC Caucus is that decisions made by individuals 
closest to students and parents work better than those made by big bureaucracies. We believe 
that the community school ought to be the key unit in the system, and that the teachers and 
their principal are the most important players. Right now, education bureaucrats at Queen’s 
Park, the school boards and teachers’ unions are the key players. The teacher is the most un-
empowered person in this top-down system. … We believe teachers should be respected 
enough to make decisions in their own classrooms. (Progressive Conservative Party 2013: 
10) 
The Conservative’s strategy here of lauding teachers as a profession in their appeal to parents 
should be considered in the context of the unpopularity gained by the last Conservative premier 
Mike Harris who attacked teachers in television and radio ads for protesting the policies of his 
government. It also suggests that while resentment or skepticism of top-down policy is 
widespread, the Conservatives believed a juxtaposing of ‘out of touch’ technocracy against 
classroom teachers would help garner popular support from voters for their education platform. 
On the following page of the policy document under the heading ‘A realistic definition of a 
teachers’ job’, it is clear that despite the Conservative’s claimed view of top-down policy, 
teachers would continue to be disempowered. Principals would have increased power to assign 
them additional non-classroom duties and change the composition and size of their classes as the 
government would remove these issues from collective bargaining (Progressive Conservative 
Party 2013: 11-12).  165
 Where this approach fit into their austerity agenda is seen in the next section, ‘How to do more when money is 165
tight’. It is explained that by increasing class sizes, close to half a billion dollars could be cut by having fewer 
teachers. The platform also recommended cutting 10 000 jobs dismissed as ‘non-teaching’ positions, primarily 
educational assistants, youth workers, custodians and school secretaries. The Conservatives earned the fervent 
opposition of teachers, education workers and their unions, helping the Liberals return to power in 2014 with a 
majority government, despite the latter’s attack on collective bargaining rights in 2012 (see section 7.6).
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 For Fullan and Boyle, success in school districts can chiefly be attributed to the agency of 
directors, superintendents and provincial Ministry officials. In this hierarchical view, the role of 
the classroom teacher is more implicit, reduced to people who carry out policies from above to 
which they must be accountable. In reading their account, one gets a strong impression that little 
consultation was done with school staff (teachers and administrators), and a great deal was done 
with other policy leaders at TDSB headquarters and the Ministry offices. This would appear to be 
a reflection of the practices of the provincial government and the school district, according to 
OSSTF Toronto Vice President Leslie Wolfe:  
The level to which the provincial governments under McGuinty and Wynne have 
infiltrated, extended themselves into the development of curriculum, the implementation 
of curriculum, the funding, the standardization of curriculum and the standardization of 
expectations of performance by teachers and students, all of that has come together to, 
whether in actuality or in perception, make teachers feel like they have very little 
professional control over what’s happening in the classroom. (Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
Wolfe subsequently qualifies her comments that in comparison with McGuinty, the latter Wynne 
government since 2013, likely preoccupied with the implementation of full day kindergarten, has 
been more restrained in rolling out new policy initiatives at the secondary level, “To be fair, I 
think she’s been more sensitized to our complaint that too much, too fast, too many changes, not 
enough time or professional development to implement any of them properly.” (Interviewed Sep. 
2016). 
 As has been suggested here, the official record of the progress and success of the 
McGuinty and Wynne government’s test score and graduation rate driven interventions into 
education policy, as presented by Fullan and Boyle, is open to contestation. Some argue it has 
distorted a significant part of the focus of education policy by fixating on improving the abstract 
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metrics given so much political weight. It will be argued in the following section that such 
policies have had a significant impact on teachers’ work, and an adverse effect on their 
professional autonomy. 
7.4: Quantifying Student Achievement: Impact on the Classroom & Professional Autonomy 
“It's always better to give a higher mark than a lower one. Always. Cause of those three, you 
know, the parents, the admin and the colleague? That'll make it easier for you in all of those 
circumstances. And the kid. It makes your life easier, so just hand out the high marks and 
pretend...swallow your integrity and give the high marks because it makes everything easier. 
Everyone's happy then.” (Toronto Teacher 8, Interviewed Jul. 2015) 
“It feels less and less like a respected profession, and more like being a hired babysitter, in terms 
of my feelings of how I feel like I'm treated by the board and the admin ....I don't feel as valued 
or respected. It's harder and harder to do my job effectively in the classroom cause I don't feel 
that there are as many supports.” (Toronto Teacher 6, Interviewed Mar. 2015) 
 The previous section gave an overview of how the Liberals drew on the centralization of 
governance to the provincial level under the Harris Conservatives to implement layers of policy 
downwards onto the TDSB, in a context where education remained politically sensitive. I now 
draw on teachers’ perspectives on how this has affected their work. As will be emphasized in the 
following two sections, these provincial policies affect schools differently. An important variable 
is the socioeconomic context of their students, creating varying pressures depending on 
graduation rates, EQAO test scores, and the school’s desirability under ‘school choice’. I begin 
by exploring how the downward flow of policies from the Ministry, to the TDSB and the 
principals to implement in their schools, has affected the latter’s relationship with teachers. I find 
that changes in the responsibilities of administrators have contributed to modifying their power 
dynamics with teachers, as the work of principals becomes increasingly centred around ensuring 
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compliance with Ministry and district policies. The professional autonomy of teachers to assess 
how to best meet the specific needs of their students is continually challenged by the pressure to 
meet provincially set targets for test scores and graduation rates, and the imperative of 
implementing ‘layers’ of centrally devised policies (Pinto 2015) towards these ends. As in New 
York City, the imperative of showing continual quantifiable improvement, creates the pretext at 
the school and classroom level for administrators to intervene in teachers’ work. 
Changing dynamics in the roles of administrators & their relations with teachers 
 As noted earlier, a watershed moment in the working experience of Ontario teachers 
occurred when the Mike Harris Conservatives legislated the removal of principals and vice 
principals from any form of union organization under the provincial Labour Relations Act 
(Shilton 2012: 223). OSSTF Toronto Vice President Leslie Wolfe explains it was: 
…a punitive measure after they supported teachers in our political protest in 1997. …it 
wasn’t an original part of Bill 160, but he said ‘principals are not teachers, they’re 
managers, therefore they don’t belong in the union…’ (Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
For teachers employed during this period, a shift in power dynamics and roles was perceptible:  
Definitely since when I first started teaching to now, the role of the admin has become 
very adversarial. Whereas when I first started teaching, it was much more collegial. The 
principals and vice-principals were part of our union. … And that was a completely 
different feeling. As soon as they were taken out of the union they were made to choose if 
they wanted to continue on being administrators or if they wanted to stay in the union 
then they went back to teaching in the classroom. As soon as that happened, you could 
feel a definite shift to a them versus us feeling. The role of the principal seems to be a lot 
more punitive towards teachers. It feels like  they're middle-managers. They don't feel 
like teachers. (Toronto Teacher 6: Interviewed Mar. 2015) 
Another veteran teacher at a different school used similar terms to describe the shift from 
collegiality to a hierarchical “manager versus employee system” (Toronto Teacher 3: Interviewed 
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Aug. 2014). Wolfe argues that even without returning school administrators to the federations, 
greater collaboration could have been fostered: 
What could have happened, subsequent to the demise of the Harris [Conservatives] is 
that there could have been a focus on creating a model of education where principals 
were seen as lead teachers. … What’s happened instead was that principals have become 
truly, I call them on-site managers. They’re not lead teachers. They have nothing to do 
with curriculum development and implementation. (Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
Instead of striving to understand the particularities of their school’s community and build 
consensus for improvements derived from that context, as Wolfe contends was more commonly 
the case when she began teaching in the mid 1980s, now they’re mainly responsible for 
implementing and managing top-down policies and reporting on local results. Consultation with 
teachers is not as important: 
They are now small business/public relations managers whose job it is to implement at 
the school level what’s trickling down from the government and through the board to the 
schools. I would say that that approach to change and the separation of the principal 
from being the lead teacher into being the ‘manager’ of these people who must 
implement the changes they’re being told to implement has also created that sense of 
loss of autonomy and increased stress. … [I]t started under Harris, but really under 
McGuinty all this top down kind of new curriculum, new  expectations, new approaches 
to teaching, is really the culprit. Principals have been probably as much a victim of it, 
although they probably don’t recognize that necessarily as a group, they might as 
individuals, as teachers have been. (Leslie Wolfe: Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
 Pinto argues that ‘policy layers’ around literacy, numeracy and graduation rates from the 
Liberals on top of the Conservatives have been overwhelming for principals and teachers, 
describing a  “neoliberal move to mandate staggering volumes of new policy” (Pinto 2015: 140). 
In Ontario’s context, she describes “policy texts as regulatory mechanisms that increase state 
control over educators” (Pinto 2015: 140-141). According to Pinto, a key form in which 
neoliberal education policy has affected the professional autonomy of principals and teachers has 
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been the usage of standardized tests, arduous reporting requirement and ‘highly prescriptive 
policy’ which has placed their work under greater surveillance as a form of ‘audit culture’. She 
explains: 
Audit practices intensify educators’ labour processes by encroaching on technical control 
through management systems with reductive and prescriptive mandates. Within this  
accountability vacuum, schools find themselves privileging certain practices, while 
detracting from educators’ autonomy to make choices that they believe would better serve 
the needs of students. (Pinto 2015: 142) 
A similar conclusion is drawn by Vibert on the impact of top-down policy on teachers’ work in 
Ontario, describing a process of deskilling and disempowering, where educators lose their 
capacity to exercise professional judgement: 
The consequence for teachers and especially for principals is that their time is 
increasingly taken up with documenting their work, filling forms, and sending 
information back to the system. In the process, of course, the work of teachers and 
principals is redefined in technocratic terms: no longer agents in the ongoing debate 
about purposes and practices that historically was central to education, they become 
technicians who ‘implement’ a given curriculum and ‘administer’ prescribed tests. 
(Vibert 2009: 301) 
 Reporting to the provincial government on the culture of the TDSB’s senior administration, 
Margaret Wilson cites a principal’s account, “Every Executive Superintendent generates work for 
the principal in terms of reports as do the constant flow of new initiatives. Life becomes a paper 
chase leaving little time for the real job, curriculum leadership” (Wilson 2015: 13).  
 Ontario high school principals and vice principals interviewed by Pinto (2015), most 
frequently cited the government’s Student Success Initiative, lauded in the section above by 
Fullan and Boyle as being responsible for higher graduation rates, as particularly onerous and 
frustrating. Key concerns were that the policies were frequently disconnected from school 
realities and that they had to implement them regardless or face disciplinary consequences (Pinto 
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2015: 146). Pinto found the: 
intensity of accountability measures within policy results in the inability for educators to 
step back from their immediate demands and consider broader educational issues or look 
at these practices in a more holistic sense. This amounts to intensification: profound 
changes through more of the same work, or signification of different work tasks being 
assigned, such as record-keeping and administration. Characteristics in school settings 
include: a perceived lack of time; chronic work overload; replacing time spent caring for 
students with meeting administrative demands; enforced diversification of expertise; and 
pre-packaged curricula and pedagogy. (Pinto 2015: 142) 
Many of these issues are highly similar to those raised by teachers in previous chapters, as well 
as below in this section. School administrators frequently viewed the policy as the product of an 
‘ivory tower’ removed from school realities or of political imperatives to get quantitative results 
on test scores and graduation rates. They also complained that policies were sometimes 
contradictory and were generally top-down in conception and implementation, with little 
consultation with school staff. Their standardized character meant they did not meet the specific 
needs of individual schools and their communities. Time was lost for addressing local issues not 
identified by central policy (Pinto 2015: 146-148). One principal interviewed by Pinto explained: 
The way for me to get promoted in this system is to be very initiative-driven. And I can 
let the  whole school fall apart, but if my [policy] initiatives have very good scores, I’m 
going to have a circle of people thinking I’m doing a good job. Not the kids, not the 
teachers, but at the board level, because my spreadsheets look good. (Pinto 2015: 150) 
Winton and Pollock concur:  
Under neo-liberalism, strong and poor performance are attributed to schools and 
individuals rather than socio-political, economic, or cultural factors. School leaders are 
individuals who are increasingly held responsible for students’ academic achievement 
(defined as high test scores). Thus, a successful school leader under neo-liberalism is one 
whose students demonstrate high achievement on standardised tests. (2016: 21-22) 
 Researchers differ to some extent on the degree of agency held by school administrators 
in pushing back against top down policies that they do not find to be in their school’s interests. 
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Vibert reports that the Toronto principals she interviewed consciously tried to minimize time 
spent on Ministry and board initiatives that they believe have little direct benefit to their students. 
However they also know that career security and advancement depends on their at least nominal 
participation, what Pinto (2015) refers to as “fear driven compliance”. While Ontario principals 
and vice principals interviewed by Pinto complained that their professional autonomy was 
undermined, she found that participants did not actively or even passively resist provincial 
policy, however much they disliked it. Some would engage in self-conscious ‘performativity’ to 
elicit desired responses from the Ministry (Pinto 2015: 150). Despite their lower rank, teachers 
may have more agency in this regard due to union protection through the ability to grieve 
infringements on professional autonomy, and due process rights if accused of insubordination. 
Moreover, in a typical secondary school, the ratio of teachers to principals is higher than 
principals to superintendents within the TDSB’s ‘families of schools’, making surveillance of 
principals easier. A study by Winton and Pollock (2016) of Ontario elementary school principals 
suggests that administrators do in fact exercise some agency in prioritizing school activities 
towards goals identified by the local community such as school climate, student well-being, as 
well as academics, rather than the Ministry’s singular neoliberal focus on boosting EQAO and 
international test scores. This is particularly the case when they are supported by an active group 
of parents (Sue Winton: Interviewed Dec. 2015). However as in New York and in Mexico under 
the ENLACE exam, EQAO test scores (especially at the elementary level) and high school 
graduation rates have become a key basis for supervising principals. The ensuing pressure flows 
downwards. 
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The pressure of continually rising graduation rates on the classroom 
 A Toronto OSSTF leader and several high school teachers interviewed suggested that 
provincial and thereby school board pressure on educators and schools to raise EQAO test scores 
is much more significant at the elementary level. A Curriculum Leader at one of the case study 
schools explains: 
I don't hear the English department complain about it much. Heck, most of these teachers 
started teaching around the same time the literacy test came into being in the first place. 
It's so  second nature. It's always been there, so I don't think they question it. How much 
time goes into prep… I think most English teachers argue that they do everything that is 
on the literacy test. I  remember more talk about that before. (Toronto Teacher 5: 
Interviewed Mar. 2015) 
The implication here is that the EQAO has little direct impact on teachers’ instructional time 
outside of time spent directly writing the test, since they feel most skills tested by the exam are 
addressed through the existing curriculum and do not receive any direction otherwise. This was 
borne out in my prior experience teaching grade 10 English with students who were generally 
strong academically. I applied my professional judgement, supported by the department, that 
only two classes of practice drills directly related to the test were necessary. Another teacher of 
grade 10 English commented: 
I used to be super resentful of it, I thought we could be spending our time in much more 
constructive ways. And I also really used to feel that if a kid passes English that should 
be enough to show literacy. It definitely does encroach on our professionalism, and it 
does feel like  it undermines our judgment. I guess I'm just so used to it now that I don't 
get as annoyed. But it does feel like the month of March is kind of a waste. In some 
schools they spend all of grade 9 and all of grade 10 leading up to it, preparing for the 
test, which I think is such a shame because, there's things on that test, I don't know who 
decided that that's what literacy is, but it's hilarious. (Toronto Teacher 4: Interviewed 
Nov. 2014) 
 In 2011-12, the proportion of the TDSB’s grade 10 students enrolled in academic courses 
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who passed the Literacy test the first time was 87.8 percent, dropping to 37.4 percent for students 
in the applied stream (Parekh 2013: 5). A teacher of an applied level  English class recounted 166
the considerable class time she must focus on preparing students for the literacy test, leading her 
to also question the pedagogical value of some of its segments: 
With the grade 10 applied class, my real goal is to get them to pass the literacy test… 
While I wouldn't say I teach directly to the test, I'm definitely very aware now in my 
planning for that grade 10 course of what sorts of skills I need to build in that. Now 
granted, they're important communication skills regardless, so I don't have a problem 
with that aspect of teaching to the test, in terms of working more on reading 
comprehension, that's a very important skill. …There are however, and especially in the 
last two years, additional kinds of questions…I am sometimes not even sure what they're 
asking, in some of those questions. So, I do find that I end up, again, teaching somewhat 
to the test. I spend a lot of the year just formulating questions, formulating units in ways 
that prepare the students for the test. (Toronto Teacher 2: Interviewed Aug. 2014) 
  
The Curriculum Leader above who suggested the literacy test (OSSLT) did not considerably 
impact the work of English teachers in his department added that the test did seem to carry 
significant weight with the district. He did not share Fullan’s respect for the Ministry’s mandated 
School Improvement Plans: 
[T]he metrics seem to matter, it's my impression that they matter more than they did 
before. That there's less discussion about individual cases and more on, ‘well, we see 
your numbers are like this, we'd like to get them like this’. And of course the charade we 
go through every year of looking at the School Improvement Plan, saying, well, our plan 
is to get the OSSLT scores up by 3 percent next year. And we realize that whatever we 
do never has an impact…it never does. Nothing I have ever seen or heard of at any 
school, has anyone ever actually made a 3 percent  impact because they said to make a 3 
percent impact… It's made up. (Toronto Teacher 5: Interviewed Mar. 2015) 
According to an OSSTF Toronto leader, whenever the union convenes a discussion on forms of 
job action short of a full strike, the boycott of EQAO related tasks is always recommended, with 
teachers describing it as a waste of time and money and an unnecessary stress on their students. 
 Most grade 9 and 10 Ontario courses are streamed into two levels of difficulty, applied and academic.166
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When an attempt by EQAO to move the literacy test online resulted in a massive computer 
system crash shutting down the exam for dozens of schools in Toronto in the fall of 2016, a few 
dozen OSSTF Toronto members were quick to express their contempt for the test in a union 
Facebook discussion group. OSSTF took the opportunity in a press statement to question the 
value of the EQAO. 
 Among Toronto secondary teachers, a stronger consensus is found on the overall impact 
of the provincial imperative of constantly rising graduation rates on their professional autonomy. 
Teachers described how their professional judgement to determine grades is frequently 
challenged: 
A lot of admin it feels like they're disconnected from what goes on in the classroom. …
they’re stuck between a rock and a hard place because they're getting policies coming 
down from the board that they have to implement whether or not they actually make 
sense from an educational perspective… Like the ‘pass the students at all costs.’ It's more 
important to look good on the books and our pass rates than to actually do what's right for 
the kids. I'm teaching kids in grade 12 who have never actually passed a single grade in 
their life. If you look at their transcript for high school, almost every class they've been 
gifted the 50, and they were transferred all the way through elementary school from grade 
to grade. So I feel absolute pressure to pass kids who are illiterate in English. It doesn't sit 
well with me. (Toronto Teacher 6: Interviewed Mar. 2015) 
This teacher, echoing a similar story described by a colleague, explains how this pressure is 
realized through the direct intervention of their principal who rounded up from nine the grades of 
every senior student:  
I think the big issue is that she didn't consult or tell us ahead of time. … There’s small 
things that feel like they undermine our professional judgment. We've gone to school for 
X number of years to learn our craft. We’ve done tons of volunteer work before we've 
even started our teaching careers. Many of us have been teaching for decades. …it makes 
us feel like we're not  professionals. If we can't make that judgment call on final marks, 
what power or authority do we have in our job? (Toronto Teacher 6: Interviewed Mar. 
2015) 
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OSSTF President Paul Elliot (Interviewed Sep. 2016) concurred that principals can employ 
various means to intervene in teacher grading to make it easier for students to pass courses and 
thereby increase graduation rates. A common unofficial policy enforced at the school level is that 
students could not receive a final mark between 43 and 49 percent, typically resulting in their 
grade being rounded upwards. Likewise, school and district policies dictate that students may 
have until the end of a semester to hand in an assignment. OSSTF Toronto Vice President Leslie 
Wolfe explained: 
The principal under pressure for their school to be a top performer, in turn pressures 
teachers, whose student’s marks might not be reflecting what the principal wants the 
school to look like. …teachers feel under pressure to basically falsely inflate student 
marks in order to meet these needs. Or the other thing we hear is, if the students aren’t 
succeeding to the expectations of the principal, there must be something wrong with the 
teacher. It’s not that the teacher has tried everything and the student can’t do it, it’s that 
the teacher isn’t good enough. (Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
 For schools with below average rates of graduation and credit accumulation , which 167
tend to place highly on the TDSB’s Learning Opportunity Index , various interventions by 168
administrators and/or Ministry staff occur in the classrooms as part of the Student Success 
Initiative. In the case study school which fits this description, a teacher explained how at the 
behest of a vice principal, English teachers were required to use the same readings and 
assignments: 
It takes all the joy out of my work. I feel like a robot, just handing out handouts I didn't 
make,  and talking about things I don't care about. The vice-principal pushed... who also 
wanted Shakespeare removed from the texts. They wanted to do comic books instead. …
but I think they [the students] can handle Macbeth, so I planned to do it. I went rogue 
and taught the elevensies Macbeth! Imagine getting in trouble for doing that.  
 The rate at which students pass courses.167
 Along with family income, the index also considers parental education levels and the proportion of single parent 168
families. It was last updated in 2014.
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(Toronto Teacher 8: Interviewed Jul. 2015) 
Her use of professional judgement as an experienced English teacher to determine the most 
pedagogically appropriate materials for the specific needs of her students was dismissed. This 
teacher then explained how assisted by Ministry and TDSB staff, administrators led staff in all 
departments through exercises where targets for increases in student grades are set based on 
diagnostic activities at the start of the year. Teachers are then required to adopt in their 
classrooms one of several specific ‘Evidenced Based Instructional Strategies’ (EBIS) endorsed 
by Ministry and TDSB staff, after creating a model lesson plan to demonstrate the teacher’s 
comprehension of the strategy. This teacher with 15 years of experience, noted her frustration 
that while being able to choose among several strategies, there was no space in which to question 
their pedagogical value. She also commented that by the apparent ages of the TDSB facilitators 
that they could not have had more than four or five years of experience as classroom teachers, 
despite being “totally motivated, totally on it”. She explained from her perspective how the 
targeting of student grades worked in her school: 
I'm willing to learn new strategies, but the measuring and predicting…okay, now it’s 
higher  because I don't want to look like I haven't done my job, and they say, well, the 
system obviously works, look how much higher it is! Because they took what the kids did 
at the beginning, the first time they evaluated it, they didn't do so well. Then I did the 
instructional-based strategies, and so then I evaluated them on a completely different 
assignment, and their marks ended up being higher… or they’d say, well where do you 
think they’ll be…and some of them ended up doing well on a very different assignment, 
so therefore there had been progress. It was the least scientific thing I've ever seen. 
(Toronto Teacher 8: Interviewed Jul. 2015) 
This teacher described how the school staff was made ‘accountable’ by administrators for their 
progress in relation to the targets:  
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Then they had, at the end of the year, all of these graphs put up on the board in the staff  
meeting, and they said, 'look, look, look at the change! This is the beginning of the year, 
this is the end of the year. Everyone is doing better.' …math especially got hammered… 
with English, okay, you didn't understand the reading comprehension, but you wrote 
something interesting  later on… we can give you marks for your thoughts. In math, you 
know how to do the process or you don't, so it was harder for them to… (Toronto Teacher 
8: Interviewed Jul. 2015) 
The teacher noted the absence of a ‘control group’ of comparable classes in the school. In their 
opinion, this undermined claims that adoption of the new teaching strategies is responsible for 
changes in student performance. This teacher also expressed frustration for how little attention 
was given to the context of her students, some of whom had seldom attended school for a few 
years, and who received little parental support. This comment should be considered in light of 
Fullan and Boyle’s description above of the ‘Focused Intervention Program’ in schools with low 
graduation rates. Here an effort is indeed made to de-emphasize the importance of a student’s 
socioeconomic and familial context in the minds of teachers, while increasing the weight 
assigned to an individual teacher’s performance in determining the success (or failure) of a 
student. In sharing this experience, as this teacher also stressed to me, it is not my intention to 
look cynically at or dismiss all efforts by administrators, school districts or higher education 
officials to introduce better pedagogical techniques into classroom teaching. Virtually all 
teachers whom I spoke with (and with whom I have personally worked with) would agree that 
self-improvement is an integral part of their professional responsibility. The problem I wish to 
identify here are education strategies elaborated from the top (whether the Ministry, the TDSB or 
school principals) and then imposed on teachers with minimal consideration for their own 
expertise. This is how their professional autonomy is undermined. 
 Meanwhile, the role of Curriculum or Assistant Curriculum Leader has shifted some 
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towards the role of the ‘teacher-manager’ described by Rezai-Rashti (2009), Vibert (2009) and 
Robertson (2000). Over the past several years, the two schools in this case study and many others 
in Toronto, shifted independently from the initial model under Harris of four or five teacher 
Curriculum Leaders responsible for all academic subjects as well as Ministry initiatives such as 
preparation for the EQAO tests and Student Success to twice as many Assistant Curriculum 
Leaders, each responsible for a smaller subject area (Toronto Teachers 1 & 3, Interviewed Aug. 
2014; Toronto Teacher 5, Interviewed Mar. 2015). This structure came closer to the restoration of 
the old department head structure  and brought more teachers onto the ‘leadership team’, 169
assisting in making decisions affecting the school as a whole (Toronto Teacher 1, Interviewed 
Aug. 2014). However, their role of participating in School-Based Management and ‘School 
Autonomy’ type tasks of micro budgeting has increased. Assistant and Curriculum Leaders at 
both schools noted that final decisions always rested with the administrators, but that to varying 
degrees, their opinions were considered. While these respondents were clear that this position 
does not give them any form of managerial authority over other teachers (in large part due to the 
intervention of OSSTF), in other ways they have been implicated in an adversarial conflict over 
resources with their peers. Toronto Teacher 3 (an Assistant Curriculum Leader) described how 
their meetings have sometimes been dominated by debates between Assistant Curriculum 
Leaders over the allocation of money between departments: 
There's these discussions where you watch the power of the school being allocated by 
dollars… And certainly, seeing shifts in that balance of power… I've watched teachers 
attacking other teachers around the needs of their department. Saying, ‘are these truly 
needs?’ Because I feel like we're all competing for limited resources, there's a little bit 
more conflict there than one might think. … Because before it just came from a magical 
 For example, an Assistant Curriculum Leader could be responsible for English rather than also overseeing other 169
languages.
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box and people would just dip into that box as much as possible. There's an effort to be 
more transparent. I wouldn't say completely transparent, but more transparent. So we can 
help inform the decision-making around that. …On the other hard it provided another 
source of conflict, or competition over limited resources. (Toronto Teacher 3, 
Interviewed Aug. 2014)  
With school budgets increasingly placed in defined, small funds rather than just a ‘general fund’, 
amid a context of overall budget reductions, this form of School Based Management not only 
extends some teachers into time consuming managerial roles of administering budgets, but into a 
competitive one at that. Rather than uniting in solidarity across departments and subject areas to 
press for more funding from the school board or the Ministry, an externally imposed context of 
scarcity is taken for granted and teachers are pushed into a zero sum competition with their 
colleagues. Another Assistant Curriculum Leader described these competitions as, “the way you 
get co-opted away from the real conflict… that education is not being funded enough.” (Toronto 
Teacher 1, Interviewed Aug. 2014). Vibert (2009) describes this as another form of 
‘accountability’ from the fiscal perspective of central authorities, as teachers and administrators 
discipline each other, while engaging in increased bureaucratic reporting procedures. 
 The continual roll out of new policy ‘layers’ especially under McGuinty, built on the 
Harris era removal of school administrators from the teachers’ federations to make principals and 
vice principals increasingly subservient to the imperatives of the provincial government, and to a 
lesser extent the TDSB. This redefined role with increased ‘accountability’ to meeting 
provincially defined graduation targets, and to a lesser extent EQAO scores, flowed downwards 
from administrators to place more pressure on Toronto’s secondary school teachers, undermining 
their professional autonomy in the classroom. These ‘accountability’ measures undermined 
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autonomy in distinct and uneven ways depending on the diverse constituencies of Toronto’s 
schools. Most of the accounts by teachers in this section were from a case study school with 
predominantly working class students, approximately half of colour, many from families newly 
immigrated to Canada. Pressure here on administrators and teachers was primarily derived from 
a need to raise course credit accumulation and thereby graduation rates. 
7.5: Quantifying Student Achievement: Intersection of Race, Class & School Choice on 
Teachers’ Work 
“If I had to choose one thing that was particularly challenging and has an impact on so many 
different aspects, it would really be related to evaluations, and what we can and cannot do with 
respect to evaluations.” (Toronto Teacher 2: Interviewed Aug. 2014) 
 The following section will draw more on the experiences of teachers at a predominantly 
middle class (overwhelmingly white) school, where a bigger pressure on professional autonomy 
comes from parents and the Toronto institution of school choice. While this school receives less 
attention and concern from the Ministry and district due to its high graduation rates and EQAO 
scores, teachers here report that administrators are more likely to intervene in their work at the 
behest of parents looking to raise their children’s grades, particularly when applying for 
universities. Teachers here also argue that in addition to the policies and programs described in 
the previous two sections, Ministry documents regarding the assessment and evaluation practices 
of teachers, particularly Fresh AER and its successor Growing Success, have had a particularly 
large impact on their professional autonomy. The community of predominantly affluent and well 
educated parents who tend to intervene to increase the marks of their children, are also active 
participants in Toronto’s ‘school choice’ practices. Similar to New York in some respects, this 
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competition between schools to enrol predominantly white and affluent students has increased 
racial and class segregation within the school system, with deleterious effects on the classroom. 
Provincial policy documents and student evaluations 
 Although not raised by Fullan and Boyle in their review of policymaking under the 
McGuinty government, a significant example of the Ministry’s intervention into teachers’ 
professionalism was the release of policy documents which determined how teachers should 
conduct student evaluations, especially Fresh AER and its successor Growing Success 
(introduced in Chapter 2). Fresh AER (Assessment, Evaluation and Reporting) released in 2006 
by the Ministry of Education and distributed by school districts, prescribed teacher practices in 
respect to conducting evaluations of students. Some educators considered its emphases on 
transparency to students as to how evaluations are conducted and greater lenience on accepting 
student assignments to be pedagogically progressive and in the interests of equity for 
marginalized students. Ultimately these policies were in line with the Student Success Initiative’s 
objective of increasing student pass and graduation rates. However for many teachers, with all 
but banning marks of zero, being required to accept assignments up to the end of the course and 
prohibiting late marks, to name a few issues, Fresh AER epitomized top-down government 
policy’s effect on watering down curriculum standards and undermining professional autonomy. 
OSSTF President Paul Elliot described how Fresh AER resulted from a drive by the government 
to standardize important aspects of instructional practices across Ontario: 
That was all provincially driven until people started pushing back, saying there needs to 
be some changes here, there needs to be some autonomy in terms of what I do in the 
classroom. Because they tried to make sure that an urban school in Toronto is the same 
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as a school in the suburbs, is the same as the schools in Ottawa, same as the schools in 
Kenora, which just isn’t the case. (Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
 Four years later in 2010, Growing Success, a new policy on assessment, evaluation and 
reporting procedures was released by the Ontario government. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it 
included an explicit acknowledgement and detailed definition of professional judgement, in 
response to teacher and union intervention (Paul Elliot, Interviewed Sep. 2016). Compared with 
Fresh AER, it left more of the more specific details of policy to the interpretation of teachers. 
However a teacher at an affluent school argued, the perception remained among parents that 
marks and grades assigned by teachers could be negotiated: 
[We] were given back the power of the zero, but I think that the mentality is still, do 
whatever it takes to not give a kid a zero. Again, that tension in the relationship, and sort 
of this nudge- nudge wink-wink expectation between the students and you and the 
parents and you and the admin and you, that you can make a zero disappear… By even 
suggesting that a teacher should not give a child a zero, it suggests that there's no 
professional judgment, right? (Toronto Teacher 2, Interviewed Aug. 2014) 
Related to these pressures, OSSTF Toronto vice president Leslie Wolfe described how over the 
Harris Conservative and McGuinty/Wynne Liberal eras, teacher complaints about (course) 
‘credit integrity’ issues have changed: 
Credit integrity before meant did the student complete the work, did the student get the 
information, did the number of hours get completed. Now teachers talk about it in terms 
of ‘did  the student actually earn the mark they’ve been given.’ Or, ‘has our focus on 
success only being measured by standardized tests and marks outcomes, meant that we’re 
forcing teachers to inflate the marks, and really the credit is lost’, because the mark is 
about creating a perception of the school. (Interviewed Sep. 2016)  
Under Growing Success, teachers cannot be told to change a student’s grade (Ontario 2010). 
However under the Education Act, the primary provincial legislation governing K-12 education 
in Ontario, principals are the ultimate assignees of grades, enabling them to subsequently change 
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grades, which they frequently do according to Wolfe. According to her, this practice is most 
prevalent in Toronto’s affluent schools: 
They change marks because parents demand it, and they change marks because they think 
a teacher has been unfair. I’ve had teachers called in and disciplined because the principal 
thinks they’re not marking fairly because the student class average is lower than what the 
principal wants to see it at. There’s a whole equity piece in this because I would say that 
in the largest part, the greatest incidents of this kind of interference by the principal in the 
integrity in the teachers’ professionalism in terms of assessing and evaluating a student, 
happens in the neighbourhoods where there is the highest socioeconomic factor. Where 
there is the greatest parental pressure and involvement, and there are much higher 
expectations from the community on the kids. …in the schools that we consider high 
needs, we don’t hear about this at all, or very rarely.  (OSSTF Toronto vice president 170
Leslie Wolfe, Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
Following in the context of an affluent school with policy aware parents, the perception exists 
that marks can be leveraged with the proper application of influence: 
[T]here seems to be this idea, not among all the parents, but I think in the community 
that I've been teaching in, that teachers should make bad marks disappear. There is the 
flip side of a marks-driven culture. … So there’s a lot of pressure on us… to do whatever 
it takes to get a student a particular mark for some school [university] that they have 
their eye on. But essentially those marks become meaningless… because of all these 
limitations and all of these pressures that are exerted on professionals. And it does create 
conflict between teachers if two teachers are teaching the same student, and one decides 
to exercise their professional judgment in a way that isn’t in accordance with what 
another teacher might do, or what the admin might do. The admin will say it's your call, 
but what they really mean is ‘don't cause more shit for us.’ (Toronto Teacher 2: 
Interviewed Aug. 2014) 
 Many activist teachers and academics, including those interviewed here, call on their 
colleagues and unions to build alliances with parents as one of the most important strategies for 
combatting the deleterious effects of degrading professional autonomy of teachers. This call is 
 Wolfe did mention a secondary school in a low income community in Toronto whose principal eliminated applied 170
courses (the academically easier tier of grade 9 and 10 courses). She believed that the principal did this to artificially 
boost the academic profile of his school. She notes it will actually have an immediate adverse effect on the students, 
regardless of how struggling students will navigate a more rigorous curriculum, as applied classes are provincially 
mandated to have a lower student/teacher ratio.
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particularly made in reference to working class and racialized parents who are socially (and often 
geographically) distant from middle class and predominantly white teachers (in Canada and the 
US) (Hagopian 2014; Weiner 2012). In Toronto as in New York, absent a strong outreach effort, 
parental involvement at school is generally weak at the secondary level to virtually non-
existent . Unfortunately where parents tend to be considerably more active, in middle class or 171
affluent neighbourhoods, teachers suggest that in the context of strong societal pressures and 
competition for entry to post-secondary education programs , parents intervene with the 172
objective of securing an advantage for their child. How teachers should respond requires more 
investigation by education activists and intellectuals. At the case study affluent school, parental 
intervention over grades can go as far as litigation: 
I think there's a real fear that administrators are driven by fear of parents. In fact, some 
of them talk that way, ‘we have to please the parents.’ And the corollary to that is it feels 
like teachers aren't as supported. … There's a thing in all of the documents that talks 
about teacher's discretion. It's put in there, but I feel that is being taken less and less 
seriously, due to this fear of accountability, this fear of, can you actually back it up? And 
I think, sometimes it's done from the best of reasons. Principals and vice-principals are 
trying to protect people from negative consequences through parents, who are 
increasingly litigious. Certainly there have been more lawsuits in the last couple of years 
at my school than I've seen in my career. (Toronto Teacher 3: Interviewed Aug. 2014) 
Policy openings by the provincial government to question the professional authority of teachers 
in the evaluation of students are predominantly utilized by parents who through their 
socioeconomic status already exercise substantial agency within the education system. Self-
interest, especially among the most class and racially privileged parents, has had another adverse 
 The author recalls working at an average sized Toronto high school with students from predominantly low 171
income and racialized families, where the ostensibly parent-led school council in fact consisted of one parent, and 
experiences here and at similar schools with a tiny parental attendance at parent-teacher interview nights.
 Ontario’s public post-secondary education system is far more equitable than in the US or Mexico, possessing 172
little substantive difference between similar undergraduate degrees offered by different universities.
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impact on Toronto’s public secondary schools, through the institution of school choice. 
School choice, race & class dynamics 
 In 2006, the TDSB counted approximately 17 000 teachers and 272 000 regular 
elementary and secondary students (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 87). In the context of a demographic 
decline of families with teenage children in Toronto due to rising housing costs, but also 
aggressive recruitment by the publicly funded Catholic school board and the opting of some 
wealthy parents for private schools, by the 2015-16 school year, these numbers had declined 
respectively to 15 615 and 243 000  (TDSB 2016). The TDSB has responded by initiating 173
specialty programs for students outside of the regular course stream, and eliminating 
neighbourhood boundaries for all but the most in-demand secondary schools. These few are 
located in the most affluent communities in the city, and in the face of great demand, limit 
overcrowding by enforcing neighbourhood residence as a prerequisite for enrolment. Meanwhile, 
other schools have increasingly opted to create their own specialty programs to attract choosy 
parents and avoid demographic losses to other schools. In this sense, the institution of school 
choice by the TDSB can be seen as more of a reaction to a specific context, than a primarily 
ideologically driven decision based on the supposed efficacy of competition for driving school 
improvement as it was in New York under Bloomberg (see Chapter 5). Nonetheless, this 
competition has had an adverse impact on equity. Rather than empowering all families, evidence 
 Aside from competing with the Catholic school board and private schools for enrolment, one other way of 173
compensating has been to recruit tuition paying international (mostly secondary) students. Their enrolment has 
increased by over 200% since 2001 to over 1400 students by 2015-16 (TDSB 2016: 6). It has also been selling 
properties from declining enrolment for more revenue, with 59 sold (often parcels of land like part of a school yard, 
not complete schools) from 2009 to 2016, netting over $412 million (TDSB 2016: 35).
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has emerged that school choice as in New York and elsewhere, has increased racial and class 
segregation in Toronto (Kurek 2016; Francis 2016; Kunin 2016).  
 As was explained in Chapter 5 in relation to New York, ‘school choice’ is a form of 
neoliberal education policy specific to urban areas sufficiently large and dense enough to include 
a significant number of local schools that children could plausibly commute to, with more or less 
assistance from their parents, in order to generate ‘market competition’ between the schools for 
enrolment. Lessard and Brassard observe that it has existed informally for as long as affluent 
parents and those familiar with the system have known how to work it. In Canada, Alberta set the 
precedent in 1996 (following a few US states which did so a bit earlier) to remove school 
boundaries (Lessard & Brassard 2009: 267). The TDSB followed suit in 1999 with the ‘optional 
attendance policy’, giving parents the opportunity to apply, space permitting and at the discretion 
of the receiving school, to schools outside their neighbourhood. Unlike New York, all students 
retained a right to attend their neighbourhood elementary or secondary school by default (TDSB 
2004). As stated above, schools at maximum capacity may have a ‘closed’ status, restricting 
enrolment to the neighbourhood catchment area. An annual ‘Report Card’ on Ontario schools 
published by the pro-privatization Fraser Institute think tank which in part uses EQAO test 
scores to rank schools, is widely cited in the media. It is considered highly influential in 
establishing perceptions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ schools, even attributed with affecting real estate 
values as parents strive to move into the neighbourhood catchment areas of in-demand 
elementary schools with closed enrolment (Lessard & Brassard 2009: 267). Regardless of the 
stated intentions of the Ministry of Education that the EQAO tests are purely indicative and 
unlike their equivalents in the US or Mexico, do not carry punitive consequences, in the context 
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of the credibility assigned by the public and the media to the Fraser Institute’s report, this is not 
the case in practice. The viability of schools subject to Toronto’s competition for enrolment 
depend at least in part on these metrics. Another large part depends on the racial and class-based 
determinations by many mobile parents of a local school’s desirability.  
 A TDSB teacher from a secondary school experiencing significant declining enrolment 
explains how ‘school choice’ tends to segregate schools on the basis of race and class: 
North Toronto, Northern, MacKenzie, Lawrence Park… these are schools whose 
populations are swelling. And it's coming at the expense of other schools. So schools that 
are… more mixed racially, economically...those schools are seeing a lot of their diversity 
disappear because of this white middle-class...I'm generalizing, but this kind of 
consolidation at these schools… The more racialized the school becomes the less 
desirable it becomes in the eyes of people who are shopping for good schools. And that 
includes racialized parents, who evaluate a school based on whether white kids go there. 
(Toronto Teacher 10: Interviewed Jul. 2015) 
Likely as a result of these dynamics, Vaughan Road Academy, a school with a significant black 
population, had its enrolment decline from 770 in 2006-2007 to 220 in 2016-2017, as more local 
elementary students attended Forest Hill Collegiate, in a neighbouring affluent and 
predominantly white area. Parents whose children remained at Vaughan Road Academy believed 
the school was the victim of racial and class segregation. The TDSB voted to close the latter 
school at the end of the 2016-2017 school year (Kurek 2016; Francis 2016).  
 In the context of declining demographics, many ‘closed enrolment’ secondary schools 
reach this status by operating specialty programs, chief of which is French Immersion, into 
which students outside the neighbourhood may enrol . According to the detailed demographic 174
statistics maintained by the TDSB on program enrolment, the students of its most prestigious 
 If students later leave the French Immersion program, they may be required to return to their default 174
neighbourhood school (TDSB 2004).
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specialty programs, French Immersion and Gifted tend to be among the most privileged . They 175
are much more likely to be in the top income decile of families (23.9 percent and 22.4 percent 
respectively, with conversely 3.1 percent and 1.8 percent in the lowest decile), who are much 
more likely to be university educated, and white (55.4 percent and 41.6 percent, by comparison 
28.3 percent of all TDSB secondary students are white) (Parekh 2013). The TDSB teacher above 
explained how his school participated in this context: 
Schools no longer have a community, it's now a service provider. Parents can shop 
around and it's about catering to the customer. But of course the parents and families 
who most often opt for optional attendance are those who have some mobility…who can 
drive their kids across the city, or kids for whom even taking the bus twice a day is not a 
major expense. So it tends to appeal to a certain demographic of family… So in order to 
keep us alive, we were drawing in kids from outside the catchment area. Middle class… 
Predominantly white. And these families were interested in the program only insofar as 
the demographics of the program pretty much kept to that. (Toronto Teacher 10: 
Interviewed Jul. 2015) 
As this teacher implies, specialty programs affect school cultures, and by extension teachers’ 
work, by in effect segregating students with particular characteristics into specialty programs. In 
practice, this typically means the most academically inclined students, with much lower 
suspension rates (as a quantifiable means of measuring student behaviour) are skimmed from the 
top, leaving their peers behind. At a macro scale, this reproduces the spatial segregation seen in 
New York City’s exclusive magnet schools with difficult entrance requirements, but within the 
same school building.  
 Vaughan Road Academy attempted to sustain enrolment by offering an International 
Baccalaureate (IB), which was successful in terms of growing to over a hundred students, but it 
 Interestingly, two other specialty programs oriented towards academically successful students, Advanced 175
Placement and International Baccalaureate, were much more racially diverse, drawing disproportionate numbers of 
south and east Asian students, whose parents were nearly as likely to be university educated as those attending 
Gifted and French Immersion programs, but with lower incomes (Parekh 2013: 75, 80-81)
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did not stop the regular program’s decline in enrolment, which in the school’s final year was only 
slightly larger than the IB program. According to a longtime teacher at the school, in response to 
parent preferences, the IB program was fully segregated from the rest of the school, with 
dedicated teachers and a separate set of non-academic elective courses. Working in the IB 
program can be an intellectually rewarding experience for teachers as its students tend to 
universally be highly academically committed. Some aspects are more prescribed for teachers 
than the regular curriculum, as final assignments are determined by the IB program, which 
oversees this level of evaluation (Toronto Teacher 10: Interviewed Jul. 2015). Another 
consequence for teachers’ professional autonomy would appear to be that as in many of New 
York’s small schools, low enrolment makes it unfeasible to offer a broader range of courses 
beyond those essential for a high school diploma. However the largest impact on teaching I 
believe to be the unbalanced nature of classrooms caused by further stratifying the existing 
system of academic streaming  with an additional elite level, whether French Immersion, IB, 176
Gifted or Advanced Placement courses, that tend to be primarily accessed by parents with the 
highest social capital (Parekh 2013). 
 Across the city in southwest Scarborough, Birchmount Park Collegiate, a school with a 
recent reputation for discipline problems, located in a racially and socioeconomically mixed area, 
added a Gifted program consisting of self-contained classes in most academic subjects in the 
2016-2017 school year. It aimed to draw in students who would otherwise attend neighbouring 
Malvern Collegiate in the predominantly white and affluent Beaches community. However only 
recruiting 14 students, some of whom would have likely attended the school in any case and 
 Academic subjects in the Ontario curriculum stream grade 9 and 10 students into academic and applied versions, 176
and in grade 11 and 12, into workplace, college and university-bound courses.
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taken academic courses, placed the viability of the program in doubt . School choice is a 177
particular concern for the People for Education research and advocacy group. Executive Director 
Annie Kidder expressed her concern that cumulatively it would undermine public education by 
creating enclaves of privilege within the system: 
There's a real love of alternative schools, French immersion… various ways to stream 
my perfect, precious child—and I speak as one of them—into a place where they'll be 
with children  like them. That's an inexorable, less visible shift, where you start to make 
public education… work for those with social capital… But they're just wonderful little 
bubbles of upper middle-class white people where they teach social justice math. (Annie 
Kidder, Interviewed Nov. 2015) 
 The publicity and social weight associated with EQAO test scores is the key easily 
comparable quantitative variable used to facilitate school choice at the elementary level in 
Toronto. These scores can also be easily located online by the parents of prospective students for 
secondary schools. However according to accounts cited earlier, it is likely that pressure to raise 
EQAO scores has a greater impact on the work of elementary teachers than their secondary 
peers . The pressure described in the previous section by secondary teachers to inflate marks in 178
order to increase the pass rate for courses and thereby the overall school graduation rate, finds its 
expression in the context of school choice in the more qualitative realm of school reputation. 
Schools with students from predominantly white and affluent families are considered most 
highly as de facto being the most academically rigorous. However in practice, at the schools that 
appear to ‘win’ under school choice, teachers report that academic integrity and their ability to 
exercise professional judgement, is continually under challenge from these mobile and status-
 Personal notes from conversations with school staff, September 2016.177
 As the focus of my research is limited to secondary teachers, the effect of standardized testing on elementary 178
schools is only mentioned to provide context.
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oriented parents. School choice cannot be considered solely responsible for the rise of a culture 
in which education is treated as a transactional consumer good, but it and the class and racial 
segregation which it facilitates appear to bear some role. Meanwhile, elite programs that pull in 
the highest academic achieving students who are also usually the easiest to teach, with fewer 
special needs and who face the lowest systemic barriers, leave behind everyone else. The nature 
of teaching changes in these contexts, but more profoundly, the overall equity of the system is 
undermined to the detriment of the most vulnerable students. 
7.6: Scaling up: The Centralization of Bargaining & the Negotiation of Professional 
Autonomy 
 The centralization of labour negotiations for Ontario teachers under the Liberal 
governments of McGuinty and Wynne, followed the uploading of financing to the Ministry of 
Education under Conservative Mike Harris described at the start of this chapter, completing the 
succession of the provincial over the municipal, as the most important scale in education 
governance. This development had important implications for teachers’ professional autonomy 
when an initial collaborative period between the McGuinty government and the federations 
ended with a drive for public sector austerity. Under the Wynne government, the new provincial 
scale of negotiations coincided with the increasingly active Ontario Public School Boards 
Association, which advocated to increase the managerial power of principals to define teachers’ 
work as a cost saving mechanism for insufficiently funded districts. With the Ministry of 
Education’s now well established policy interventions, provincial bargaining became a venue to 
press for Ontario-wide concessions in professional autonomy.  
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 Centralized collective bargaining is the dominant trend in Canada for teachers, with 
Ontario and Alberta the latest provinces to join British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia 
and Quebec  with two-tiered  district/provincial negotiations structures. The smaller maritime 179 180
provinces of Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island have completely 
centralized negotiations for teachers (Sweeney, McWilliams, Hickey 2012: 251). Two tiered 
negotiation structures typically delegate issues which are most directly determined by funding 
levels, such as salaries, pensions, benefits and usually class sizes to negotiation between the 
provincial government and the provincial unions. Other less directly economic issues relating to 
working conditions are typically left for negotiations between school districts and union locals. 
The centralization of funding created a strong rationale for Ontario’s teachers’ unions to scale up 
negotiations to deal directly with provincial policymakers, while striving to keep other issues, 
such as the managerial prerogatives of principals to assign non-classroom tasks to teachers, at the 
local level if strong contract language already existed here. For employers, a major incentive was 
a perception that school districts could not hold their own against local unions that also counted 
on the support of their provincial federations. Many of OSSTF’s historical gains such as the large 
salary increases of 1974-1975, were done by ‘whipsawing’ school boards, winning a precedent 
setting salary in one district and pressing to have it met or surpassed elsewhere. British 
Columbia, considered an important influence on the Ontario and Alberta government’s 
subsequent shifts towards centralization, was motivated to do so to counter the highly effective 
 Quebec has perhaps the most complex structure. Salary and pensions are negotiated at a third level, between a 179
coalition of public sector unions and the provincial government (Sweeney, McWilliams, Hickey 2012: 251).
 ‘Two tiered’ is the term most often used in official governmental and journalistic reports on provincial/local 180
collective bargaining in Ontario. It is not related to its usage elsewhere in labour studies research to refer to 
collective agreements where new workers are placed on an inferior salary and benefits scale.
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coordinated local bargaining of the BC Teachers’ Federation (Schucher & Slinn 2012: 20; Rose 
2012: 216; Shilton 2012).  
 This section sets the context with a brief overview of the Harris government’s disruption 
of the existing structures of local collective bargaining. I then look at how during his first two 
terms from 2003 to 2011, the McGuinty government’s political strategy of pursuing labour peace 
with teachers led to the increasing formalization of two tiered collective bargaining as OSSTF 
and the other federations agreed to these new processes. Next, I will show how this scaling up of 
negotiations was transformed in the highly adversarial context of McGuinty and Wynne’s push 
for fiscal austerity from 2012 onwards, which initially centred on education worker 
compensation rather than aspects of professional autonomy with a direct effect on the classroom. 
There was little diminishment of this underlying conflict in the 2015-2016 round of collective 
bargaining, despite the legal formalization of the two-tiered structure in 2014. At this juncture, 
the government in concert with the Public School Boards Association, tabled significant 
concessions on teacher professional autonomy, as well as compensation increases below the rate 
of inflation. Ultimately the former were defeated by the federations, at the cost of the latter. The 
political approach taken by the provincial government has been the decisive factor throughout 
the experience of centralizing negotiations in Ontario. These contentious rounds of negotiations 
have also precipitated debate among OSSTF members over the balancing of union demands 
relating to compensation versus professional practice. This discussion is significant insofar as it 
also signifies an opportunity, as it did for activist teachers allying with parents over onerous 
standardized testing in New York State, to reinforce a broader interest of teacher unionism in 
matters of the public interest. 
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The Harris Conservative government’s attack on teachers’ professional autonomy 
 In 1997, the Conservative government repealed Bill 100, the legislation governing 
teacher labour relations since teachers won the right to strike in 1974, replacing it with 
provisions under Bill 160, which as referenced above, had a multi-faceted adverse effect on the 
federations. Teachers were placed within the Ontario Labour Relations Act, which was 
significantly revised to eliminate anti-scab legislation and card check certification for union 
recognition, the latter not relevant to public teachers who remained statutory members of the 
federations. Bill 160 removed class size and instructional time from collective bargaining, 
promptly increasing both (Rose 2012: 208). Reasonable class sizes and sufficient preparation 
time are critical for the ability of teachers to meaningfully exercise professional judgement. The 
five federations representing 126 000 teachers launched a two week illegal strike in November 
1997, as mentioned in chapter 4. They did not defeat this legislation but did build public 
awareness of Harris’ austerity agenda in regards to education (Gidney 1999). The fight over Bill 
160 was emblematic of the frequent strikes and occasional lockouts of teachers in local 
negotiations in 1998 and 2000, chiefly over the loss of prep time, with a strike rate of 23.8 
percent, versus 2.2 percent under Bill 100 from 1974 to 1996 (Rose 2012: 210). The federations 
were often ordered to end strikes by the labour relations board, but teachers responded by 
refusing to do extracurriculars. The government partially capitulated in 2001 by redefining 
instructional activity to begin to restore lost prep time (Rose 2012). 
 The uploading of education finance combined with the imposition of a rigid funding 
formula, “gave the government an effective veto over meaningful local bargaining on crucial 
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monetary and non-monetary issues and took other major issues off the bargaining table 
altogether.” (Shilton 2012: 222). In the context of an aggressively neoliberal, pro-austerity 
Ontario government, the “real quarrel was not about the new collective bargaining framework 
per se. It was about a shift in power within the school system from the local to the provincial 
level.” (Shilton 2012: 221). Shilton explains further:  
the government used its legislative and regulatory authority to circumvent the collective  
bargaining process, deliberately constraining the flexibility of local parties to negotiate 
local solutions to the challenges created by the new funding formula. It was an approach 
calculated to alienate all parties to local bargaining, since it clearly reflected the 
government’s view that school boards were captive to the teachers’ unions, incapable of 
asserting the strong management control needed to keep both teachers and tax levels in 
line. (2012: 232-233) 
While undermining local negotiations both by imposing policies that were loathed by teachers 
and a highly restrictive finance structure which offered no room to manoeuvre for school boards, 
the Harris government did not attempt to implement any form of formalized central negotiations. 
This did not prevent the federations from waging political campaigns targeting the government, 
as it had when Ontario set a ceiling on school district expenditures to combat inflation in the 
1970s. 
Labour peace and the emergence of two-tiered bargaining under the McGuinty Liberals, 
2003-2011 
 During their campaign and upon taking office, the Liberals stated a desire for a shift from 
“intense and confrontational government-teacher relations to an approach based on consensus 
and cooperation.” (Rose 2012: 212). Collective agreements were reached with informal 
provincial coordination for 2005-2008 which in addition to gains mentioned earlier including the 
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hiring of more specialist teachers, restored prep time lost under the Harris Conservatives, made 
voluntary activities voluntary again, and reintroduced negotiated class size limits, gaining overall 
federation support for Dalton McGuinty’s education policies (Leslie Wolfe, Interviewed Sep. 
2016; Fullan & Boyle 2014: 71; Rose 2012: 213). The 2008-2009 negotiations for the 2008-2012 
contracts involved a “more open and formal approach” (Rose 2012: 213), with a consultation to 
determine central issues and the participation of Ministry representatives in local negotiations. A 
twelve percent salary increase over four years provided a strong incentive for OSSTF and the 
Catholic Teachers to settle, especially in the context of the approaching economic recession. 
Through these two rounds, the Provincial Discussion Tables (PDT) functioned despite the 
government not having an official legal mandate to conduct bargaining. The PDTs guaranteed 
central funding for salary and workload, enabling a decline in class sizes. Local negotiations 
would subsequently occur within this context, subject to a deadline by the Ministry in order to 
receive agreed central funding for salary increases, creating a de facto two tier bargaining system 
(Leslie Wolfe, Interviewed Sep. 2016; Rose 2012: 212; Shilton 2012: 235). This shift was 
facilitated by the legal assigning of local bargaining rights to provincial teachers’ federations.  181
According to Rose, the key factors for success in these two rounds for OSSTF were the 
“Liberals’ close ties with teacher unions” (2012: 215), tangible improvements on workload issues 
from the Harris years in the first round, and real salary gains in the second round at a time of 
recession and austerity. Teacher salaries rose faster than private sector workers and the average 
 Over 300 local teacher and occasional teacher bargaining units existed in Ontario, with each board having four 181
unless the locals had amalgamated (Shilton 2012: 224, 226).
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of other public sector workers from 2004 to 2009 (Rose 2012: 215).  182
 The emergence of two tiered bargaining created new dynamics within OSSTF and the 
other federations. A critical, recurring issue was the lack of clarity around the defining of central 
and local issues. Shilton observed that the government could use financial pressure through 
proposed salary increases to force central negotiations on issues that unions prefer to be local 
(Shilton 2012: 238). Unions can also disagree internally about the central/local split, depending 
on whether local leaders hoped below average contract terms could be brought up to a higher 
provincial average or feared that it would fall to this level. Within OSSTF, the Toronto 
bargaining unit lobbied for on-call supervision and workload language to remain at the local 
bargaining table, as the union local believed it had the best contractual language in the province 
(Leslie Wolfe, Interviewed Sep. 2016). Sweeney, McWilliams and Hickey reported from their 
interviews with union leaders a tendency for local officers to have more reservations about 
central bargaining than staff at the provincial level. Through two tiered bargaining, provincial 
union negotiators became increasingly important within the federations in relation to local 
elected union executives (Sweeney, McWilliams & Hickey 2012: 255, 259). 
 Significantly, the Ontario Public School Boards Association (OPSBA) was not an 
influential organization during the 2005 and 2008 to 2009 negotiating rounds. This favoured 
 The Liberals could also be punitive, rescinding part of a salary increase for Elementary Teachers, already 182
accepted by the other unions, when they held out in 2009 for parity in prep time with OSSTF (Shilton 2012: 236). 
Meanwhile, as a precursor to the conflicts driven by school boards interested in increasing management rights and 
flexibility that would wrack future provincial negotiations, Toronto teachers were the last OSSTF local to settle in 
2009, due to the TDSB’s struggle to weaken contract language limiting on-call supervisions (Shilton 2012: 237). A 
side deal with the government, allegedly with the personal intervention of education minister Kathleen Wynne, 
enabled Toronto OSSTF members to gain the full salary increase despite the late agreement. The use of deadlines by 
the provincial government to reach local deals including agreed upon salary increases was a power tactic in exerting 
influence over local bargaining (Sweeney, McWilliams & Hickey 2012: 260). The federations were frequently 
feuding at this time, as in a battle over representation between OSSTF and ETFO for newly hired early childhood 
educators and a squabble over dues owed by OSSTF to the Ontario Teachers Federation. This likely diminished 
solidarity when the Elementary Teachers attempted to buck the trend in 2009 (Shilton 2012: 239).
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easier resolutions as despite sharing federation demands for greater school funding, OPSBA was 
sharply at odds on issues governing teacher working conditions and professional autonomy 
insofar as they curtailed the management prerogatives of principals. Rose wrote presciently, 
“Two-tier bargaining has benefited from favourable economic conditions and funding 
assurances. How sustainable it will be in leaner economic times in uncertain.” (2012: 217) 
Austerity, the end of labour peace and the formalization of two-tiered bargaining, 2012-2016 
 The Liberals shifted from a ‘partnership’ to an increasingly adversarial approach to 
OSSTF and other education sector unions. The 2008-2012 collective agreements bridged over a 
global recession, during which the Ontario government engaged in some mild stimulus spending 
to ameliorate the effects of the downturn. The provincial deficit rose significantly as tax revenue 
also declined . McGuinty and the leadership of the Liberal Party emerged with a new approach, 183
in which provisioning the education sector was not a priority. OSSTF lagged behind this political 
realignment. While issuing strong public statements denouncing the political direction of the 
Liberals, engaging in protests and assisting the New Democratic Party (NDP) in some strategic 
wins at the expense of the government, other actions suggested provincial and perhaps also the 
Toronto leadership, held out hope for a high level compromise, and were less than fully 
committed to struggle. Through this process, the centralization of negotiations to the provincial 
level continued, while McGuinty’s government flexed its power over education policy in a 
manner reminiscent of the Harris Conservatives. In the aftermath, a formal two-tiered bargaining 
structure was created. It was immediately demonstrated that beyond newly defined legal 
 Primarily due to the economic downturn, but also because of a decision by the provincial government to reduce 183
the corporate tax rate.
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parameters, the decisive factor determining the character of negotiations were the intentions of 
the employers, the provincial government and the school boards, which continued to press for 
austerity and concessions. The following account and analysis draws heavily on the author’s 
direct experience as an active member and local leader within OSSTF Toronto during this period. 
 McGuinty’s Liberals won reelection in 2011, one seat short of their earlier majority. In 
the context of shifts in US politics associated with the so-called ‘Tea Party’ movement and the 
election in Toronto of charismatic mayor Rob Ford, the official opposition Conservatives moved 
further to the right on economic issues in the midst of the recession, using populist conceptions 
of government waste to accuse public sector workers including teachers of being overpaid. The 
Liberals responded shortly after their victory by commissioning a high profile bank economist to 
analyze the province’s fiscal situation and provide recommendations on eliminating the deficit by 
2017-2018 through reductions in public expenditures. Measures to increase revenue such as 
raising taxes were explicitly rejected (Ontario 2012a). The report recommended cutting $2.8 
billion by 2018 to K-12 education, the largest ministry after health, by limiting increases in 
funding to a rate below inflation. The salaries and wages of 294 000 K-12 teachers and education 
workers, accounting for 76 percent of the provincial education budget, would be the target 
(Ontario 2012a: 363). 
 The widely publicized release of the Drummond Report (named for its author) in 
February 2012 coincided with the start of negotiations by OSSTF and other education unions 
through the Provincial Discussion Tables. Its proposals to eliminate the new full day kindergarten 
program and increase class sizes to eliminate thousands of teachers were rejected by the 
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government . The report also suggested that threatened job cuts of thousands of support staff 184
and larger class sizes could be traded for salary concessions by teachers and education workers 
(Ontario 2012a: 223). The government subsequently demanded salary freezes, furlough days, 
reductions in paid sick days and elimination of a gratuity by which retiring teachers received a 
cash bonus for unused sick days  (Ontario 2012b: 1; Fullan & Boyle 2014: 85). The 2012 185
Ontario budget released soon after included a $500 million cut to education funding by these 
means. Toronto OSSTF member Caitlin Hewitt-White described the focus which left “intact 
relatively decent features of the school system, like class size caps, a clever strategy that made 
use of the public’s perception of teachers as well-off and spoiled.” (2015: 173). The provincial 
government avoided proposals directly related to classroom practices and professional autonomy. 
It appeared to be a ploy to convince the public that the conflict was purely monetary, in a 
political context where fiscal austerity had popular support. Negotiations came to an impasse, 
despite a full page newspaper advertisement by the provincial leadership of OSSTF that the 
union was willing to accept a two year wage freeze. While intended to win public support by 
emphasizing the union’s moderation, the concessionary stance alienated many activist members. 
It failed to elicit any change in the government’s approach (Personal notes; Hewitt-White 2015: 
181). The government reached a concessionary deal with the Catholic Teachers Association 
(OECTA) in July that closely resembled its opening position (Hewitt-White 2015: 180).  
 Lay offs of thousands of custodians, school secretaries and educational assistants and the intensification of work 184
for those who remained were subsequently carried out with little media attention or public awareness. Many schools 
in Toronto were affected (Personal notes, 2013).
 The latter benefit had high symbolic value. A year earlier it was the focus of Toronto’s newly elected conservative 185
mayor Rob Ford’s drive for concessions from municipal employees.
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 As OSSTF and ETFO decried this substandard deal and planned job action as the 
2012-2013 school year began, the Liberal government set a precedent for a legislated attack on 
trade union rights by proposing that the Catholic contract be imposed on the hold out unions. Bill 
115, the Putting Students First Act passed in September with Conservative support. It required 
OSSTF and ETFO to reach agreements that were ‘substantively similar’ to the OECTA deal, and 
set a deadline of December 31, after which contracts would be imposed. The Ontario Labour 
Relations Act prohibits strikes during the life of a contract. Teacher protests would thereby be 
effectively curtailed regardless of consent or dissent to the outcome of this imposed structure. 
Provincial OSSTF negotiators initially tried to work within this constrained framework in an 
effort to limit losses, but five of seven local bargaining units that reached tentative agreements 
were voted down by members. OSSTF abandoned any further deals under the circumstances. 
While ETFO conducted a series of rolling one day district strikes over the fall, OSSTF boycotted 
non-teaching administrative and extracurricular activities, the latter drawing significant public 
attention to the conflict. Weekly pickets were also held outside of Liberal provincial parliament 
offices across Ontario. OSSTF Toronto members at the school level organized leafletting at 
subway stations. Despite this activity by many members, Hewitt-White critiques a lack of 
alliance building with parent groups or other unions, noting that these protests seldom attracted 
outside supporters. Other union activists criticized the apparent lack of coordination between 
ETFO and OSSTF in the organization of protests. Thousands of Ontario high school students did 
organize one-day walk outs, including several high schools in Toronto, culminating in a rally at 
the provincial legislature. They were ostensibly over the lack of extracurriculars, but most had an 
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overall pro-teacher approach, demanding that the government negotiate fairly (Sweetman 2012; 
Hewitt-White 2015: 180-183). 
 Dalton McGuinty resigned amid rising conflict  in October 2012, having served nearly 186
nine years as premier. New contracts were imposed on most OSSTF and all ETFO locals in 
January 2013, at which point Bill 115 was rescinded, having served its purpose. Kathleen Wynne 
was elected interim premier by the Liberal Party, touted as being to the left of McGuinty and her 
contenders. As a former education minister, she was considered well placed to resolve the 
conflicts with teachers. While organizing rallies against the Liberals, the OSSTF Toronto 
Teachers executive donated a total of $30 000 to candidates for their party’s leadership including 
Wynne, causing considerable controversy when this was published by Elections Ontario. Many 
active members expressed their frustration that this was done without their knowledge or 
consent, and thought the ‘realpolitik’ it represented smacked of cynicism  (Hewitt-White 2015: 187
185). The incident generated a caustic editorial in the pro-Liberal daily Toronto Star, which 
accused OSSTF Toronto of “playing an old-fashioned political game” by donating to politicians 
against whom they were simultaneously protesting (Toronto Star 2013). Retiring as OSSTF 
president in the aftermath of the Bill 115 conflict, Ken Coran shocked many members by running 
that summer for the Liberals in a London, Ontario provincial by-election. He was defeated by the 
NDP (Hewitt-White 2015: 182-185).  
 Wynne publicly acknowledged that Bill 115 was a mistake for having generated 
considerable conflict and mistrust, but did not act to ameliorate the financial losses it inflicted on 
 In addition to the conflict with teachers, his government was embroiled in a scandal over the costly cancellation 186
to help win several ridings in the 2011 election, of a plan to build gas-powered electrical generators.
 Personal notes from many formal and informal discussions with OSSTF Toronto members on this topic.187
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teachers , holding the austerity line of lowering education expenditures. Her government 188
consulted the education unions for the creation of the School Boards Collective Bargaining Act 
(2014) which formalized a two-tiered negotiations structure of central (provincial) tables and 
local tables (Leslie Wolfe, Interviewed Sep. 2016). Its first round from 2015 to 2016 yielded 
major conflict. In the context of the government’s intention to further limit funding, the Ministry 
of Education tacitly or explicitly encouraged the Ontario Public School Boards Association 
(OPSBA) to propose significant concessions on professional autonomy which could give 
districts and school administrators more flexibility in the usage of provincial funding. OPSBA, 
representing directors, superintendents and principals, was not originally conceived in the two-
tiered Collective Bargaining Act as a full party. To the frustration of the federations, it appeared 
to be delegated this role by the Ministry of Education and the provincial government, aligning its 
interests against the professional autonomy of teachers.    
 Negotiating over which issues would be dealt with at central and local tables consumed 
most of a year before collective bargaining could formally begin (Jones 2016). According to 
OSSTF President Paul Elliot, this was in large part due to the intervention of OPSBA. Elliot 
explained how this structure made for a very slow start: 
[I]t might have worked if it was just a two tiered process at the provincial level we 
negotiate directly with the government. But they’ve set it in such a way that they have 
the third party which is the school boards. …two of the parties may agree, but one of the 
parties may hold up the rest of this or have a veto power over the deal… Really in fact, 
what we’re bargaining is some local issues, and also over the provincial issues. … We 
went to an arbitrator, for us it became obvious that this was going to take so long that we 
actually said was, ‘if you agree that this will be a central item, than we’ll agree on these 
two items that you said will be central items’. Our goal was to minimize the central 
 The Wynne government did engage in limited provincial negotiations with OSSTF and ETFO in spring 2013, 188
improving sick days and partially restoring movement up the pay grid for teachers not at the top of the ten annual 
steps (Fullan & Boyle 2014: 85).
 370
items, just big ticket items, that’s it. But they wanted things like class size, supervision, 
all kinds of things that vary all over the province. That took far too much time, as 
opposed to having a defined number of issues that are in regulation or legislation… 
(Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
Elliot explained some of the differences in emphasis between the Ministry and the school boards, 
blaming the latter for scuttling deals reached with the government: 
The government is about policy and initiatives… But for school [boards], it’s really local 
management issues. Class size, supervision, number of on-calls. … in our estimation, at 
the central table, if you want to have the school boards there, they should be in an 
advisory capacity. … The central table, just the government and ourselves, we talk about 
money. Then  we have local bargaining where we really talk about local issues. 
(Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
Education minister Liz Sandals, previously a long time school trustee and past president of 
OPSBA, championed the association’s issues according to Elliot. She would push for the 
elimination of class size caps, arguing that with declining enrolment they were leading to 
program cuts at small schools. Elliot argued this conveniently overlooked the provincial 
government’s power to determine per-pupil funding (Interviewed Sep. 2016). Again suggesting 
the asymmetrical relationship between the Ministry of Education and school boards, Elliot 
believed the former did not trust districts to disburse their funds to signature provincial 
programs, rather than to other areas with budget shortfalls. However a priority for increasing the 
managerial power of principals in relation to teachers seems to have prevented school boards 
from otherwise making common cause with the teachers’ federations in demanding more funding 
for education. 
From the opening of provincial negotiations in February 2015, OPSBA and the provincial 
government demanded an aggressive series of concessions from OSSTF and other education 
unions. Moving beyond Bill 115’s imposed salary freezes and back to the Harris era, employer 
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demands included removing class size limits, eliminating all preparation time for several 
categories of teachers and significantly reducing it for all others by increasing the ability of 
principals to assign on-calls and other forms of unscheduled supervision. Striking at the heart of 
professional autonomy, “[School] Boards would determine the type, frequency and timing of 
diagnostic assessment tools used by teachers. Boards would establish the mechanism to be used 
by all teachers to record the results and these would be used to inform teacher 
practices.” (OSSTF 2015b). OSSTF locals in four school districts struck near the end of the 
school year, with more planning to walk out before the Ontario Labour Relations Board ruled 
that the strikes were illegal as they were not ‘local’ strikes but were in fact in response to 
provincial bargaining issues. The confusing and labour unfriendly nature of two-tiered 
bargaining was again demonstrated. By the start of the 2015-2016 school year, with OSSTF now 
threatening a full provincial strike, the Ministry and OPSBA dropped their extensive demands 
relating to professional autonomy. The union won a year’s hiatus on new Ministry initiatives and 
contract language recognizing teachers’ professional judgement. Also won were modest salary 
increases below the rate of inflation.  189
 According to OSSTF Toronto vice president Leslie Wolfe, beyond its economic 
consequences for teachers, an impact of Bill 115 was to “exacerbate what was already a sense of 
a lack of control over their own professional worlds”, in the context of previous policy layering 
under McGuinty (Interviewed Sep. 2016). She recognized that many members also felt 
 Commencing after provincial negotiations concluded, OSSTF Toronto Teachers’ bargaining over workplace 189
issues dragged on for nearly a year. Members boycotted administrative duties but not extracurriculars to avoid 
alienating parents. Eventually, the TDSB dropped a proposal to eliminate a subsidy which covered the salaries of 
half of the executive released from classroom duties, and the union won improvements on health and safety (Leslie 
Wolfe: Interviewed Sep. 2016).
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mistrustful of the union, adding to the overall frustration of teachers. One OSSTF Toronto 
member, who described herself as pro-union and had participated in the protests, looked back on 
the Bill 115 conflict: 
It was so crazy last time with the contracts being imposed. It felt like this shocking 
breach of democracy, and we, at our school anyway… were ready to do illegal strikes, 
we were ready to really take strong action, and our union was not on that page at all. And 
we felt pretty let down last time around. … So that was really strange to see, when we 
were all fired up and ready to do whatever we needed to do, and stand up not just for our 
own contract and salary and what not, but just basic democratic rights. (Toronto Teacher 
4: Interviewed Nov. 2014) 
An activist member within OSSTF Toronto explained the dynamics of the Bill 115 struggle by a 
top-down nature of the union which came to rely heavily on connections with politicians during 
the McGuinty era, while neglecting grassroots forms of exercising political power: 
Ken Coran, who had spent many years building solid relationships with the Liberals was, 
I think, genuinely dumbfounded when the terms [of the imposed contract] were 
presented to him in 2012. …he had built relationships with these people and he 
trusted...it was like he was trying to explain to them, ‘don't you understand, we're the 
good guys.’ People were completely unprepared. I think this is something that happens in 
labour leadership, with our managerial class of union managers. Many of them are in 
their positions for a long time, they build relationships with these people, they think they 
can come to count on. Then everybody looks for the electoral fix. To be honest, right 
now, in terms of negotiations, I don't really see a lot more  that our union can be doing 
that they're not doing. But the big problem is what they haven't been doing for many 
years, which is really about building community links and community supports.  
(Toronto Teacher 10: Interviewed Jul. 2015) 
As a co-chair and an active member of OSSTF Toronto’s Political Action Committee, it is my 
experience that non-electoral strategies to build political power which require the involvement of 
large numbers of members, such as systematic outreach to parents or potential community allies, 
do not figure in the union’s core strategies. The official ‘labour-community’ organization for this 
purpose, the Campaign for Public Education, has acted as a coordinating body for union leaders 
 
at the TDSB and progressive trustees to issue public statements and advertisements. At the same 
time, through a range of other member-led committees, OSSTF Toronto supports a range of 
causes beyond the pecuniary interests of its membership, through donations, advocacy at the 
TDSB and direct participation . However, these efforts are seldom conceived as part of a 190
deliberate strategy of the union for building political power in the context of defending public 
education. In this way, OSSTF Toronto and the provincial union as a whole, like many unions, 
engage in ‘social unionism’ if not a ‘social movement’ or ‘social justice’ unionism (Ross 2012; 
Camfield 2011: 50-52; Fletcher & Gapasin 2008). 
 Preventing the provincial government from framing labour struggles with teachers as 
being primarily over compensation issues is critical for OSSTF and the federations if they are to 
gain popular support in a context of stagnant wages for most working people and financially 
squeezed public services. During the fight over Bill 115, the unions framed it as an attack on 
democratic rights, gaining some public support, especially with those already disillusioned with 
McGuinty’s long reign due to other instances in which the government’s interpretation of law 
was questionable. Some teachers interviewed (Toronto teachers 3 and 4) expressed a desire that 
OSSTF be more pro-active on curriculum, pedagogy and other areas more integral to 
professional practice. The 2015 central agreement was ratified by 78 percent of members and all 
bargaining units (OSSTF 2015c). In Toronto more member attention was attracted to the below 
inflation salary increases, coming after two years of salary freezes under Bill 115, than to the 
victory on professional autonomy. 
 These include immigrant rights groups, campaigns to raise the minimum wage, a public transit riders’ group and 190
many charities serving children and youth (Personal notes).
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 Considering the context of education governance after the Harris Conservatives and 13 
years under Liberal premiers McGuinty and Wynne, Wolfe observed:  
Secondary teachers today in Toronto experience their jobs with a great deal more sense of 
stress and pressure than when I began teaching in the late 1980s, Pre Harris. I would put 
that down to the amount of change, the speed with which change is implemented, the lack 
of inclusion of the front line worker, in this case the teacher, in developing the change. So 
there’s no opportunity for a teacher to… have a sense of control over, or a sense that their 
professionalism is being recognized or honoured in any way. (Interviewed Sep. 2016) 
A clear continuity existed, despite major changes in discourse and the early restoration of 
funding, from the Harris government to the Liberals, through the inheritance of disciplinary 
institutions like the College of Teachers and the Education Quality and Accountability Office. 
The initial centralization of authority to the provincial level under Harris through the 
transformation of education finance, facilitated far more sophisticated forms of governance under 
the Liberals which steadily increased the capacity of the Ministry of Education to regulate the 
professional lives of teachers. For secondary teachers, this chiefly occurred through the premise 
of steadily increasing graduation rates at all costs. Simultaneously, as with New York City, albeit 
in a less extreme form, the neoliberalization of education manifested itself in the specific context 
of the big city. ‘School choice’ introduced a competitive market for enrolment to the public 
system. The result was structured along already existing racial and class inequities in Toronto, 
grounding segregation more strongly in schools, with an adverse affect on students and teachers. 
 Finally, shifting economic circumstances with the 2008-2009 downturn saw McGuinty 
change his alliances to the detriment of OSSTF, whose leadership appeared slow to comprehend 
that their organization was no longer considered an essential partner by the government. At both 
the provincial and the local level in Toronto, leaders struggled to adapt to the new context, to the 
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frustration of members, some of whom saw the union as another unresponsive bureaucratic 
intrusion in their work lives like the district and the Ministry (Toronto Teacher 1: Interviewed 
Aug. 2014). The supplanting of the initial informal structures for provincial union-government 
consultations by the formal School Boards Collective Bargaining Act did nothing to improve 
negotiations in the 2015-2016 round. Rather it demonstrated that the key ingredient, in the 
context of unions on the defensive, were employers willing to compromise on the roll out of top 
down policy affecting teachers’ professionalism, and willing to ensure that their real 
compensation was not eroded. Unfortunately, in the context of neoliberalized governance and 
fiscal austerity, this was not the case. Amid a return to conflict and the ongoing neoliberalization 
of education among many other sectors in Ontario, an OSSTF Toronto teacher argued that 
ultimately a deeper rethink of union strategy is needed: 
[W]e’ve got members who say, we should just all walk out, we need to take a hard 
stance…I actually don’t agree with that. We’d be legislated back to work, eventually. 
We’d blow through our budgets, we would be fined massively, like in BC, for every day 
that we were out illegally. We couldn’t sustain a full walk out… unless you know you've 
got... a massive social movement behind you. We don't, and we wouldn't, because we 
haven't done that work to lay the foundation for that. I think it means that we're really 
bargaining right now from a position of weakness. There's a lot of work on the ground 
that needs to happen, and I don't think anyone in our leadership know how to do that. I 
don't think too many people in the labour movement these days know how to do that, 
because it's all been about… negotiating contracts and enforcing contracts, and that's it. 
But that ends up keeping us in these silos. That for me is why we’re weak. It’s not just 
us, it’s right across the labour movement. Unless we can figure out a way to build social 
movements, I don’t know how we're going to exist. (Toronto Teacher 10: Interviewed 
Jul. 2015) 
One way to build trust with parents and a skeptical broader public that teacher job actions are not 
just about salaries and benefits, and create a deeper role for the union in the work lives of many 
members, could be to more prominently and articulately champion their professional autonomy.  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8. Conclusion 
 The resistance to attacks on teachers continues in North America. In the 2016 spring 
election of New York City’s United Federation of Teachers (UFT), the Movement of Rank and 
File Educators (MORE) and their allies won all seven seats reserved for high school teachers on 
the union’s executive board. President Mulgrew and his colleagues were handily reelected, but 
MORE presidential candidate Jia Lee received over 10 000 votes, doubling the caucus’ 
presidential vote in the last election in 2013. Overall UFT member turnout in the 2016 election 
rose from 18 percent to 24 percent (MORE 2016). After a year at her school serving as a UFT 
Chapter Leader, having not received tenure, Jen left teaching and moved to California to enter 
law school. In the aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election, MORE and other NYC teacher 
activists have gathered inside and outside of the UFT to strategize on opposing the entry of 
immigration agents into the city’s schools to deport undocumented students. Trump’s education 
secretary, billionaire Betsy DeVos, holds no experience within public education and was a major 
proponent of private school vouchers in Michigan. There is much speculation about what her 
agenda will mean for public education in NYC and the nation. 
 Mexico’s Secretary of Public Education (SEP) announced in the fall of 2016, that the 
standardized teacher exam would now be voluntary, except for those who had failed it last year. 
If upheld, this is a major victory for the teachers’ movement (CNTE). However the CNTE 
reports that some teachers are still receiving letters stating that they must attend exams scheduled 
for the 2016-2017 school year. The government is also reportedly not following through on firing 
teachers who were absent for the exams last year, but it is in the process of firing over 2000 
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teachers across the country who had more than three unexcused absences in a month, principally 
those who participated in the strikes at the end of the previous school year . Twenty-one of 191
these teachers are from Mexico City, the majority are primary teachers of CNTE Section 9 who 
participated in the strike last June and July. This includes all 11 classroom teachers of the small 
Leonardo Bravo primary school in central Mexico City, where CNTE leader Francisco Bravo is 
the school director. He has been threatened with termination. I met with several of these teachers 
and the director at their school in October 2016. They were continuing their regular classroom 
duties, despite not being paid since the end of September. The school’s parents had mobilized to 
physically block the entry into the building of replacement teachers sent by the SEP. The SEP 
repeatedly refused to meet with delegations of parents requesting the reinstatement of the 
teachers. The teachers whom I talked with were pessimistic about their prospects, noting the 
difficulties of time consuming legal appeals. The CNTE of Section 9 has been holding 
fundraisers to help support them. In February 2017, the CNTE delivered over 500 000 signatures 
on a national petition to the Mexican Senate to repeal the Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente, 
the government of Enrique Peña Nieto’s constitutional changes that mandate teacher testing, and 
to abolish the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education (INEE) which oversees 
standardized testing (Poy Solano 2017). 
 After nearly four years, in 2016 the Ontario Superior Court ruled that Bill 115 violated 
the Canadian Constitutional right to freedom of association, requiring the teachers’ federations 
and the provincial government to negotiate a remedy. The government approached the 
federations separately, incorporating a proposal that in exchange for salary and benefit increases, 
 Discussions with Professor Maria de la Luz Arriaga Lemus, October 2016, Mexico City.191
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the central contract be extended by two years, taking it through the 2018 Ontario election. Under 
a new centrist leader, the Conservatives are projected to defeat Liberal premier Kathleen Wynne. 
The federation memberships ratified the extensions and a remedy which would partially 
compensate teachers for delayed pay grid movement. The 2015 results of the OECD’s PISA 
science exam generated some newspaper coverage as Ontario’s rankings declined slightly, but 
did not precipitate considerable public discussion. The issue of ‘choice’ and the contrast between 
neighbouring overcrowded and empty schools has gained increased public attention in Toronto, 
in the context of the city’s deepening issues of socioeconomic inequity. 
 Despite some reversals, the neoliberal education reform project is far from defeated. 
Analysis of the current situation is still required as we imagine a path forward. The major 
contribution of this thesis is theorizing and providing evidence of the fundamental role of attacks 
on the professional autonomy of teachers in the neoliberalization of education. Further, this 
dissertation has shown the importance of understanding the scales of governance involved in 
developing, delivering and implementing policy over time and space. Finally, by exploring how 
teachers and their organizations have resisted and shaped this policy, we are able to imagine a 
more radical multiscalar geography for teachers. 
Centrality of teachers’ professional autonomy in the struggle against the neoliberalization 
of education 
 The ability of teachers to exercise their professional autonomy in determining how best to 
meet the unique needs of their students is a crucial issue determining the future of public 
education in the contemporary context of its neoliberalization. Professional autonomy is the 
capacity of teachers to interpret the best means by which to teach defined curriculum objectives 
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according to the unique contingencies of a classroom, based on formal professional training, 
working experience and collegial exchange. While there are manifold consequences relating to 
the privatization of education, particularly seen in the rise of charter schools and vouchers in the 
US, the most decisive battles have occurred over the nature of teachers’ work itself.  
 I have identified five means across the three contemporary case studies to assess the 
extent that the neoliberalization of education in North America is undermining professional 
autonomy. The first is a common trend towards the centralization of education governance, away 
from local school districts and towards the state/provincial or national level. Centralization 
facilitated the roll out of subsequent policies, as institutions and structures which may have 
provided resistance, such as elected school boards, parent organizations and local teacher unions 
found themselves out-scaled in the mismatch of locally based power to centrally made executive 
decisions. In all contexts here but especially Ontario and Mexico, scaling up also meant a level 
of government with much more capacity to regulate teachers’ work gaining authority over 
education. 
 Second, the intense roll out of top down education policy has tended to transform the 
roles of school administrators, responsible for supervising its front line implementation. This can 
include ‘school autonomy’ or ‘school-based management’ initiatives where principals are given 
managerial control over elements of school funding and an interest in cutting costs. The 
relationship between principals and teachers has shifted from its earlier basis in collegiality to 
become increasingly hierarchical, as the former are now tasked with ensuring their staff are in 
compliance with the policy of the day. Their success in doing so is now a primary measure of 
their own effectiveness as a manager. In the process, the capacity of principals to intervene in the 
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classroom work of teachers as well as redefine the scope of their professional duties has 
increased.  
 Of the various policy measures moving through this relationship, various forms of 
quantitative performance metrics with politically determined thresholds, such as standardized 
exams and course credit accumulation towards graduation rates, have the greatest impact on 
professional autonomy. Teachers in all three case studies reported how their freedom to exercise 
their judgement in how best to interpret curriculum and pedagogy is subordinated to the 
imperative of showing progress on these metrics. Here though, the degree and form of pressure is 
uneven depending on school contexts, with teachers of academically struggling students 
generally the most affected.  
 The power of these quantitative metrics over teachers’ work is particularly insidious 
when combined with the creation of a competitive ‘market’ for student enrolment through 
‘school choice’, a significant form in which the neoliberalization of education has specifically 
unfolded in urban districts in Canada and the US. Staff compete to avoid the closure of their 
schools due to low enrolment because of a negative reputation from standardized test score 
results, and/or class and racial stereotypes. This is done through the marketing of specialty 
programs, with varying results on teacher professional autonomy. Where large schools have been 
replaced with many smaller schools, a consequence of the smaller faculty has been the narrowing 
of course offerings to classes subject to standardized exams. Rather than compel all schools to do 
better as free market advocates theorize, in practice these local systems become increasingly 
segregated, with the most mobile students, who tend to be the most privileged on the basis of 
race and class, concentrating in a handful of ‘good’ schools. This inequity has a strong effect on 
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teachers’ work, but especially on the life opportunities of students left behind by their more 
privileged peers. At its worst, as in New York City during the era of Mayor Bloomberg and 
NCLB, rather than receive additional support, struggling schools are stigmatized and 
reconstituted, with teachers losing permanent status at the discretion of administrators. 
 Finally, an important factor in the effect of neoliberal policy on professional autonomy 
has been the responses of teacher unions themselves. In all three case studies, unions whose 
primary scale for contention with the state had been at the local district level, were confronted by 
an increasing scaling up to state/provincial, and/or national levels of governance. New York 
City’s United Federation of Teachers found itself vulnerable as it depended on the political 
lobbying of state and federal officials, as formal collective bargaining rights remained at the 
municipal level and as the union leadership was reluctant to fully engage in broader community 
coalitions which were more confrontational. Mexico City teachers affiliated with the CNTE, 
have participated in the much larger mobilizations led by the movement in the country’s 
southeast. This has given dissident Mexico City teachers more strength than they would ever 
have resisting national policies on their own, because of the stronger administrative structures of 
the city’s education authorities. The movement remains limited by the continued dominance of 
the conservative-led SNTE union in much of the country. Collective bargaining for Toronto 
teachers officially accommodated the uploading of governance to the provincial level with the 
institution of two-tier negotiations. However, they also face a much higher degree of unity from 
districts and administrator associations in the advancement of policies against teacher autonomy.  
 In all circumstances, teachers’ unions grapple with perennial issues of balancing 
workplace issues relating to autonomy and workload, which offer more immediate bases for 
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building alliances with parents and community groups, and compensation, especially amid 
widespread fiscal austerity. In contexts where the professionalism of teachers is consistently 
undermined, unions are challenged to avoid being seen as another overbearing and unintelligible 
institution, and instead fight for greater democracy in the workplace. Part of this struggle 
emerges from the changed composition of many education unions, particularly in Canada and the 
US. From their roots representing teachers, the UFT and OSSTF have grown to embrace the 
breadth of education workers from para professionals to clerical staff. In the interests of building 
power in relation to their employer, this is a positive step. Maclevey (2016) and others have 
argued for sector-wide unions uniting workers across job classes and with the most and the least 
bargaining clout. However professional autonomy in the classroom is no longer a unifying issue 
relevant to the entire membership. While maintaining its sectoral scope, perhaps OSSTF could 
learn from the Alberta Teachers Association. It has developed a relatively higher provincial 
prominence on issues related to pedagogy and teacher practice, in part by being an important 
centre for producing and diffusing education research (Annie Kidder, Interviewed: Nov. 2015). 
The retention of administrators in Alberta’s union likely helped sustain this as a shared priority. 
Teachers’ unions must become the primary, popularly recognized authority on what constitutes 
good teaching, and should gain this status by devoting considerable effort to obtaining a deep 
participation of its membership. The alternative is for advocates of neoliberal education policy or 
external disciplinary agencies like the Ontario College of Teachers successfully making this 
claim. Teachers’ unions should make professional autonomy, including the ability of teachers to 
interpret curriculum, devise appropriate pedagogy for their students, and limit standardized 
evaluation and testing, integral issues in collective bargaining, potentially subject to strike action.  
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 Renewing the role of unions in developing teacher professionalism is not without 
significant pitfalls. Prior to the upsurge of militancy in the 1960s and 1970s, teachers’ federations 
in Canada and the National Education Association in the US defined themselves as professional 
organizations, which in their contexts resulted in a lack of capacity or willingness to assume the 
role of a labour union and confront their employers. While leading in the devising of curriculum 
and pedagogy, they shunned ‘unprofessional’ activities like strikes or political advocacy to 
challenge school districts and governments. Teachers’ salaries and working conditions 
languished. It is easy to imagine that transported to the contemporary context, such organizations 
would have struggled to mount a resistance to privatization and the undermining of autonomy. 
As mentioned in section 2.6, in the 1990s many US and Mexican union leaders responded to a 
popularly perceived crisis in education and calls for standardized testing, ‘school choice’ and 
more prescribed curriculum by adopting these proposals in the belief that doing so would renew 
the professional authority of their organizations and blunt anti-union attacks. As seen in chapters 
5 and 6 in New York and Mexico, given the broader neoliberal context in which these policies 
were being developed, their approach was unsuccessful in protecting the integrity of the 
profession, and instead contributed to the undermining of working conditions and the capacity of 
the union to engage in contentious politics. 
 Nevertheless, it’s a political dead end to dismiss the importance of unions becoming 
authorities on teacher professionalism as a distraction from militancy on conventional collective 
bargaining issues. This means losing a powerful basis for engaging many members through their 
devotion and concern for the craft of teaching. It is also the most effective way to build a 
counter-hegemonic position to that of government authorities and neoliberal ‘experts’ which will 
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have credibility with parents and the broader public. In the contemporary context, state 
authorities have demonstrated an increased willingness to intervene against teachers’ strikes, 
through legislation in Canada and the US, and with repression in Mexico. In all three countries, 
teachers have most successfully defended themselves when they have won the battle of public 
opinion, creating a heavy political penalty for governments. As a caring profession, K-12 
teachers must be able to demonstrate how their expertise serves their students better than the 
prescriptions of neoliberal policy advocates. 
 If teachers’ unions develop comprehensive and politically significant positions on 
professional practice, a thorny question emerges on how they should respond when members fail 
to meet these standards. The conduct of doctors and lawyers is governed by their professional 
associations, but teachers do not have a similar degree of freedom to determine their conditions 
of employment. They are salaried, skilled workers subject to the authority of their supervisors. 
Teachers also have a more complex relationship with the public. Demands by parents and 
broader communities for a voice in teacher practice emerges from both their fundamental role in 
child development, and the broader political significance of schools as sites for the reproduction 
of ideology. As discussed in chapter 2, these claims pose limits to teachers’ professional 
autonomy. 
 If teachers’ work is deskilled, debased, disempowered and professional autonomy is lost, 
we will see the potential extent of the neoliberalization of education. If the growing number of 
cut rate, for-profit charter chains in the US are an example, for the publicly funded schools of the 
working class, it will consist of the replacement of professional educators with non-union 
technicians responsible for administering an entirely prescribed curriculum of daily lesson plans 
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with no time or space for pedagogical experimentation. Aside from marching students through 
preparation for standardized exams and online work modules, their other major task will be 
maintaining discipline. 
Comparing policy trends on professional autonomy and the scaling up of education 
governance 
 Policy trends relating to pedagogy, evaluation and curriculum appear to be going in 
opposite directions in Ontario, versus New York State and Mexico. In the former, progressive 
pedagogical concepts of assessment and evaluation over standardized testing continue to be 
ascendant within the policymaking establishment represented by OISE academics, the Ministry 
of Education and the TDSB. With scores appearing to have stabilized at a high level, less 
attention is paid to the EQAO. Despite the many layers of provincial education policy, teachers 
in Toronto, Ontario continue to enjoy substantial professional autonomy. Though as in New York 
and Mexico, it is often subject to the micro-dynamics of power at the school level, especially 
defined by the balance of relations between teachers and administrators. It would appear to take a 
radical shift in political direction to disrupt this status quo.  
 However even in New York State, a continental epicentre for neoliberal education policy, 
the peak of standardized testing mania and its use to discipline and regiment teachers and their 
work, appeared to have been in the fall of 2015. Given the shift in political winds, in great part 
due to the parent-led Opt Out movement, Governor Cuomo has since moved on to other issues. 
The formal rescinding of No Child Left Behind in December 2015 by the US Congress, appeared 
to mark the end of an era of ambitious federal intervention into K-12 education policy, which 
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under Bush and Obama was profoundly neoliberal. The experience in Mexico shows the repeated 
failure for myriad reasons, of top down federal education policies such as the ACE, the ENLACE 
exam, and the Ley de Servicio Profesional Docente, that dismiss the concerns of teachers. The 
work of key policy advocates like Michael Fullan (2016), suggests that the dominant scale of 
education governance reform will return to the state or district level. Despite these setbacks, with 
the continued political dominance of neoliberalism across North America and far beyond, the 
potential lucrativeness of privatized schools, and the general weakness of the labour movement 
and of alternative political visions, we can expect to see a continued push for the 
neoliberalization of education for the foreseeable future. 
 Described throughout this dissertation, an important area of convergence for all three case 
studies is the general scaling up of labour negotiations, in response to the parallel shift in 
education governance. To varying degrees in all three cases, it appeared that the strongest scalar 
advantage was afforded to teachers at the local district level. Teachers’ unions are trying to 
reconsolidate themselves at higher scales, but face much stronger government authorities at the 
state/provincial or national level than locally. Unlike New York, Ontario teachers are weakened 
by being divided into four federations that have lacked unity at critical junctures. They also face 
an adversarial Principal’s Council and Public School Boards Association. In New York State, 
these authorities have split on issues of education finance, standardized testing and teachers’ 
evaluations to align with teachers (Hagopian 2014b). In Ontario, the priorities of these bodies 
conflict with teachers’ professional autonomy, and hence they have aligned themselves with the 
provincial government. In Mexico, the context is wholly different. On the one hand, the national 
leadership and many state executives of the official teachers’ union (SNTE) gives its unqualified 
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support for the federal government’s education policy, regardless of its impact on its members. 
While drawing the sympathies of hundreds of thousands of teachers nationally, the capacity of 
the teachers’ movement (CNTE) for sustained collective action remains geographically confined 
in the south. On the other hand, despite considerable effort by the SEP, the reliability of many 
school directors throughout the country remains in doubt for carrying out neoliberal reforms 
affecting teachers’ work such as the standardized evaluations. Mexico City school authorities are 
unusual for having strong administrative and disciplinary capacities. As a result, one of the 
greatest difficulties faced by neoliberal education reform in Mexico has been the lack of reliable 
agents for enforcement at the school level. Conflict in education, among other areas, defined 
most of Enrique Peña Nieto’s presidency, contributing to his record low approval ratings. 
A multiscalar geography of teachers’ professional autonomy 
 The past two decades have seen a significant growth in international connections at both 
top and grassroots levels between teachers’ unions and movements across North America. Much 
of this can be attributed to an increasing awareness of the similarities of struggles faced by 
teachers across jurisdictions and borders. Unlike other groups of workers in the context of 
globalization, teachers do not share the same employers (this could change if we see the rise of 
multinational private school chains) and we do not see forms of geographical competition for 
employment and investment in the same manner of other sectors such as manufacturing. 
However, among union leaders and activists, local exceptionalism and parochialism is giving 
way to an understanding that there are dominant forms of neoliberal education governance which 
share strong similarities from place to place. As a result, the impetus for solidarity has grown 
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from a moral imperative to support workers in struggle, to recognizing the usefulness of sharing 
strategies for confronting similar policies whether of high stakes standardized exams or ‘school 
choice’. As teachers struggle for professional autonomy, a geographically informed multiscalar 
strategy needs to be developed which is not reduced to ‘scaling up’ or ‘localizing’ actions. To 
have a greater impact on the work lives of teachers, the understandings involved ultimately need 
to be rooted in the classroom experience. 
 Since the successful strike of the revitalized Chicago Teachers’ Union in 2012, its leaders 
and organizers have been hosted by Toronto’s teachers’ unions and groups at least five times to 
share the lessons behind their victories. Toronto has not experienced the expansion of charter 
schools and standardized testing like Chicago over the past decade, pushed by neoliberal 
governments more extreme than have been seen in Ontario. Yet hundreds of Toronto teachers 
have been enthusiastic to learn about the transformations that occurred within the Chicago union 
to enable it to score victories and build strong political alliances with parent and community 
groups, recognizing the applicabilities to their own context. Without neglecting the significance 
of geographical context in determining distinct strategies, teachers in Toronto and elsewhere 
have benefited from this policy mobility from below. The biennial Labour Notes and Trinational 
Coalition in Defence of Public Education conferences have increased in importance since the 
2000s as physical gathering points, building long term relationships based on familiarity with 
other’s struggles and a shared analysis of common issues. Internet communication between 
conferences has opened up between grassroots groups of teachers across great distances as never 
before. Practical forms of solidarity remain the familiar forms of demonstrations at embassies 
and consulates, letters, morale building visits of guests to rallies, and donations. The new 
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element of transnational teacher unionism is how in the spirit of education, it precipitates radical 
learning communities , through the strategic sharing of experiences in relation to similar issues 192
relating to confronting neoliberal reform. Such radical learning communities could gather ideal 
conceptions of teachers’ professional autonomy by unions and movement activists, the governing 
discourse from education authorities, and qualitative assessments of the actual status of 
professional autonomy across jurisdictions. This research could then be used both to inform 
collective bargaining by individual unions with their employers, and as a means to intervene in 
public debate on education policy. 
 Struggle against multilateral neoliberal education institutions like the OECD’s PISA 
exam, subject to a call for protest by the Trinational Coalition in Defence of Education, are 
unlikely to galvanize more than symbolic activities by teachers’ unions in the intermediate term. 
The local, provincial and national state still has primacy in the education sector, leaving labour 
struggles highly bound by place.  The key strategic political question for teachers is still how to 193
deal with the state. Historically, North American teachers’ unions have been among the most 
active participants within organized labour in electoral politics. An exception has been the CNTE 
which has depended politically on its sustained capacity for disruptive protest while avoiding 
electoral engagement, fearing co-option and a loss of autonomy. In the context of relatively open 
electoral systems as in Canada, union political strategies could involve forming longterm, 
meaningful alliances with local parent and community groups that could then evolve organically 
 To adapt the term, ‘Professional Learning Communities’, which following Michael Fullan and others, is used by 192
jurisdictions like Ontario to mean meetings among teachers where plans are made to address specific school-level 
issues, and subsequent progress is assessed.
 The importance of the local scale is further exemplified when teachers broaden their targets to protest corporate 193
actors with significant political influence, as the CNTE, the Chicago Teachers Union and others have done.
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into electoral coalitions to support progressive politicians who subscribe to the movement’s 
democratically determined priorities. The ‘short cut’ of union leaders simply donating large sums 
of money to influence election campaigns has generated cynicism in the absence of member 
involvement. Cash donations have limited effectiveness in light of intensifying counter pressures 
to neoliberalize education, without grassroots union participation and substantive efforts to shape 
the policies of political parties and candidates.  
 Despite the prominence of multilateral institutions like the OECD and the World Bank in 
advocating publicly and privately for neoliberal education policies, particularly in Mexico, in the 
North American context it is still government officials and politicians who make the decisions. 
Shifting the direction of education governance is not simply a matter of replacing the people who 
are feeding ideas to policymakers and searching for new ‘good ideas’. It is the structures of 
governance and the interests which policymakers serve that must be changed, if we are to have a 
more democratic and socially just public education system that is protected from privatization. 
This is a profoundly political struggle rooted in every place-bound jurisdiction in North America. 
 The contradiction of the scaling up of negotiations is that it could become more distant 
and abstract from the experience of members, removed by further layers of representation from 
active participation in the absence of job actions and strikes. Likewise, in part due to sustained 
top down policy from state authorities, the day to day work of leaders and staff members of 
teachers’ unions revolves to a considerable extent around interlocution with these senior officials, 
or interpreting their edicts. While necessary, this work considerably reduces the opportunity for 
union officers to work directly with groups of members. In this environment, the markings of a 
union leader are fluency in a technocratic form of policy and quasi-judicial knowledge. A 
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technocratic union becomes autocratic when these specific forms of expertise become 
unchallengeable by rank and file members, leading to their apathy and demobilization. 
 The institutional health of a local teachers’ union remains the cumulative of its presence 
at school sites, in the degree to which a union culture prevails among its members. The retention 
and sustained development of worksite stewards recognized as leaders by their peers is critical. 
Job expertise is strongly associated with workplace leaders recognized by their peers, with or 
without formal titles. School-site union leaders are most likely to hold the respect of their 
colleagues, enabling them to make calls for solidarity, if they are considered to be good teachers. 
Good teachers are defined by their peers as well as their institutions, in large part by their 
effectiveness in exercising the full breadth of their professional autonomy, through their 
pedagogy, instruction and social support for students. A greater emphasis by teachers’ unions on 
analyzing and advocating the elements of good teaching could bring the spatial centre of gravity 
within the union back to the school site and the classroom. The technical skills of lawyers, 
negotiators and grievance officers are essential so long as employment within K-12 education 
remain complexly regulated, but the time and energy this demands of leaders and staff comes 
with the corollary effect that teachers’ unions lack skilled member organizers. Professional 
autonomy and practice offer a substantive basis to engage members that is much more 
meaningful to their working lives than charity fundraisers. Were a union to research and debate 
professional practice with an approach that drew on the workplace knowledge of a significant 
number of its own members, rather than merely hiring outside experts to draft a position, this 
could make unions more substantively participatory, and thereby more democratic.  
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 On a professional development day during which schools are closed at the Toronto 
District School Board, OSSTF offers over two dozen workshops, most developed by teachers for 
their peers. These sessions are among the most popular, in large part because their colleagues are 
considered best able to cater to the realities of schools and classrooms. They are one of the 
principal means by which the CNTE in Mexico organizes teachers outside of protests. Unions 
survey their membership on their priorities for salary and working conditions before entering 
negotiations. More could be done to train school-site union leaders to canvass the perspectives of 
their peers on contemporary curricular and pedagogical issues. Doing so could shift power 
dynamics within schools. With a collective position, teachers would be better able to curb the 
tendency towards the concentration of managerial power in principals and school directors, and 
challenge policies that don’t work well in their classrooms. At a higher scale, unions with 
positions on teacher practice developed through a bottom-up process will have a stronger 
mandate to negotiate, knowing that their members have been deeply engaged in their 
development. Approaches like these could form part of a multiscalar strategy for defending and 
supporting teachers’ professional autonomy. 
  
Directions for future research 
 The cities I chose as my case studies had in common important histories of teacher 
unionism and labour activism generally, but they have not been known recently as focal points of 
struggle or dynamic opposition to contemporary neoliberal education policy. Part of my reason 
for choosing these cities is that with such a status they have attracted less recent academic 
attention from scholars like myself who are interested in workers’ and teachers’ agency. To 
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further probe teacher agency, more research is needed in recent case study sites with self-
declared radical leadership and higher profile militancy. The experience of the Chicago Teachers 
Union since the rise of the Caucus of Rank and File Educators has been well assessed 
academically (Brogan 2013, 2014; Alter 2013) and popularly (Bradbury, Brenner et al 2014; 
McAlevey 2016). Few studies have been made of how the United Teachers of Los Angeles, the 
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation, or (in English) the teachers’ movement of Oaxaca and 
Chiapas, have responded to threats to the professional autonomy of their members. Relatedly, we 
need more research on how teachers’ union leaders and activists conceptualize professional 
autonomy, and how they grapple with the tensions between a focus on workplace-related issues 
and on compensation issues in union strategy.  
 Another geographical approach would be to eschew global cities and see how the work of 
teachers and their unions have been affected and how they have responded in small cities or rural 
areas. To draw further lessons on the agency of organized labour and the significance of political 
context, one could also study the status of professional autonomy in ‘right to work’ regions of the 
US or in non-union charter schools. Research could be done on neoliberal policy mobility and 
professional autonomy using a different regional context, such as Europe or Latin America.  
 More research is also needed that focuses on how professional autonomy intersects with 
working class communities, and issues of race where teachers are predominantly of a different 
ethnicity than their students. Considering the infamous racially tinged conflict between unionism 
and professional autonomy versus black ‘community control’ movements in 1968 New York, to 
what extent do these tensions still exist? Does professional autonomy also empower working 
class parents, or is it a manifestation of the teacher’s middle class authority? At the classroom 
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scale, what does a loss of professional autonomy look like for teaching practices? How does it 
affect pedagogy, the interpretation of curriculum and classroom management? What do high 
school students think? How can professional autonomy be conceived in a way that rather than 
isolating teachers and potentially creating conflicts with the communities they serve, actually 
gives teachers intellectual freedom and control of their labour process, while democratizing 
schools by giving a real voice to parents and students? Put another way, what are the justifiable 
boundaries of power between the priorities of a democratic state, teachers’ professional 
autonomy and the will of a local community? 
 Significant work is being done on how top-down policy is affecting principal’s work, (in 
Ontario: Pinto 2015; Vibert 2009; Winton & Pollock 2016), but more could be done through case 
studies across state jurisdictions and with a more international analysis of neoliberal policy 
mobility. An analysis of the attack on professional autonomy in the context of the 
neoliberalization of public services and this methodology of qualitative research on how policy 
has affected workers, could also be applied to other sectors. A particularly strong parallel could 
be found with nurses, another feminized professionally trained ‘middle class’ labour force 
subject to significant institutional and state regulation. The place-contextualized study of work, 
the role of agency and how it is affected by highly mobile neoliberal policy, hold many 
possibilities for future research. In general, there is much more that can be done to systematize 
comparative studies of teachers’ professional autonomy. 
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Final words 
 This dissertation has strived to derive its contextual analysis of why teachers and their 
organizations have responded in diverse ways to neoliberal reforms, from balancing an 
assessment of structural factors and agency. The differences of history and politics between 
Canada and the US, and even more between them and Mexico, have been described here. I hope 
I have also convincingly explained the commonalities of experience in the transformations of 
work lives of the teachers of New York City, Mexico City and Toronto. At the outset of this 
dissertation, I situated myself in relation to my research subject, as a teacher and a union activist, 
with a personal role in some of the international solidarity initiatives described here. My 
principal method of research, interviews with educators on how their work has been affected by 
various policies, comes out of my belief in the importance of individual and collective worker 
experiences in shaping their social worlds. Teachers in various contexts and circumstances have 
demonstrated considerable agency in challenging the roll out of top down policy that they 
considerable to be harmful to their craft. While they have experienced many set backs, teachers 
have shown that the political space for the implementation of education policy remains far from 
empty, and that policy makers dismiss the power of education workers at their own peril.  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Appendix A: List of Interviews and Dates 
New York 
New York Teacher 1       December 2014 
New York Teacher 2       December 2014 
New York Teacher 3      December 2014 
New York Teacher 4       December 2014 
New York Teacher 5       December 2014 
New York Teacher 6       December 2014 
Lois Weiner, Professor of Education     December 2014 
New York Teacher 7       January 2015 
Former United Federation of Teachers Official 1   January 2015 
New York Teacher 8       April 2015 
New York Teacher 9       April 2015 
New York Teacher 10      April 2015 
New York Teacher 11       April 2015 
New York Teacher 12      April 2015 
New York Teacher 13      April 2015 
Former United Federation of Teachers Official 2   April 2015 
Mexico City 
Mexico City Teacher 1     February 2015 
Mexico City Teacher 2     February 2015 
Mexico City Teacher 3     February 2015 
Mexico City Teacher 4     February 2015 
Mexico City Teacher 5     February 2015 
Mexico City Teacher 6     February 2015 
CNTE Section 10 Activist     February 2015 
Enrique de la Garza Toledo, Professor of Sociology  February 2015 
Graciela Bensusan, Professor of Politics   February 2015 
Hugo Aboites, Professor of Education   February 2015 
Mexico City SEP Education Official (AFSEDF) 1  February 2015 
Mexico City Teacher 7     May 2015 
Mexico City Teacher 8     May 2015 
Mexico City SEP Education Official (AFSEDF) 2  May 2015 
Mexico City Teacher 9     June 2015 
Mexico City Support Staff 1     June 2015 
Mexico City Support Staff 2     June 2015 
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Enrique Enriquez Ibarra, CNTE Section 9 General Secretary June 2015 
Maria de la Luz Arriaga, Professor of Economics  June 2015 
Secretary of Public Education Official (SEP) 1  June 2015 
Secretary of Public Education Official (SEP) 2  June 2015 
Secretary of Public Education Official (SEP) 3  June 2015 
Toronto 
Toronto Teacher 1      August 2014 
Toronto Teacher 2      August 2014 
Toronto Teacher 3      August 2014 
Toronto Teacher 4      November 2014 
Toronto Teacher 5      March 2015 
Toronto Teacher 6      March 2015 
Toronto Teacher 7      April 2015 
Toronto Teacher 8      July 2015 
Toronto Teacher 9      July 2015 
Toronto Teacher 10      July 2015 
Annie Kidder, Executive Director of People for Education November 2015 
Sue Winton, Professor of Education    December 2015 
Leslie Wolfe, OSSTF Toronto Vice President  September 2016 
Paul Elliot, OSSTF President     September 2016  
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Appendix B: Teacher Interview Protocol 
1. Titles and school responsibilities, subject areas. How many years in this position? Union 
involvement? 
2. Over the course of your career, which policies from the education authorities (education 
ministry, school district, etc) have had the most impact on your work in the classroom? 
3. Which is more important in setting education policy as far as it impacts the classroom, the 
central education ministry or the local school district? Has this changed over your career? 
4. How much scope do teachers have currently to exercise professional judgement or 
professional autonomy (Eg. the interpretation of curriculum in your lesson plan, selection of 
teaching strategies and materials) within their classroom teaching? Has this changed over your 
career? 
5. What is the role of principals (or school administrators) in how teachers exercise professional 
autonomy? Has this changed over your career? 
6. To what extent does standardized student evaluations (Eg. EQAO tests) affect your daily 
teaching? 
7. To what extent does the administration and preparation for student standardized exams vary 
from school to school? What causes these variations, if any? 
8. What relationship, if any, exists between the exercise of professional autonomy and obtaining 
permanent employment status as a teacher? 
9. What is the role of parents, if any, with teachers’ professional autonomy? 
10. To what extent are teachers in your school aware of, or active in the union? How would you 
describe the presence of the union in your school?
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